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

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AMERICAN CHURCH REVIEW.

THOMAS AQUINAS.

The Life and Labors of St. Thomas of Aquin. By the Very Rev. Roger Bede Vaughan, O.S.B., Cathedral Prior of St. Michael's, Hereford. In two vols. 8vo, pp. xxii.-808, xiv.-928. Longmans & Co., London. 1871. With two indexes, pp. 36 and 51.

THIS is the first appearance in English of a life of the great doctor of the middle ages, usually styled the Angel, because he was esteemed the most exalted of the scholastic hierarchy.¹ If he had been an archangel, no higher position, perhaps, could have been assigned him, and not loftier veneration lavished on him, by devotees of the modern Church of Italy. For Aquinas was not a Romanist only, but a native-born Italian, and was also of no mean lineage, having veins into which genuine aristocratic blood had found its way.

Still, it would be of small service to ordinary readers to look at him from a scholastic point of observation only, and show what he was as a profound theologian, or a wondrous general scholar.

¹ Also called *Doctor Universalis*, because the Pope, in solemn conclave, made him a doctor of the highest kind,—a doctor of the Church Universal.—Vaughan, ii. 145.

People, nowadays, do not want to know what a man was, merely to be looked at, admired, and applauded. If they care to know what Aquinas was, and was accounted, they desire to have him presented under the *cui bono*,—the utilitarian aspect. Suppose he was, for the times, a peerless scholar and a transcendent theologian, the question will be, What is he worth to us? or, How did he influence the times in which he lived, so as to be estimated in the balances of history? If his labors had an aim in reference to the times in which he flourished, *that* especially is what we desire to ascertain. If he moulded and wielded the appliances of his times, and *generated history*, that is what we, at this distant day, most care to be informed of; and by such issues only shall we estimate him.

So there is very little use, to our age, of half, or more than half, of the better than seventeen hundred octavo pages which such an enthusiastic eulogist as the Oratorian Vaughan has expended on him. To show what St. Thomas was *in himself*, in comparison with the fathers and the philosophers, *i. e.*, to make him an image like Nebuchadnezzar's golden one, for mere homage and adulation, is what the members of a Church may do, who ask for temples and a worship amid which externals form the superior glory. But we pragmatical Americans do not want to know how far Aquinas was worthy of dulic or hyperdulic veneration, but what he was good for,—looking at his own times, and then glancing down to ours.

Wherefore, if we wrote as ambitiously and oratorically as Prior Vaughan has done, the readers of this REVIEW might hardly give us the tribute of a lazy nod. And they who desire such plethoric eulogy and stilted commendation as he incessantly bestows upon his subject, will not find it here. All we shall aim at will be to tell, in as plain and unvarnished a style as may be, who Aquinas was, how he contemplated his own age, and tried to influence ages then to come. And, singular as it may seem, this will be regarding him from a novel point of view. In the extensive Index of Modern Periodical Literature, prepared by Poole, we find no mention of his name,—not even under the head of schoolmen.

When we were students of theology, and first lifted an anxious eye in the direction of this towering name, and when we were told to regard the *Summa* as one of the foremost achievements of the human intellect, and worthy, in consequence, of our unbounded admiration, to say nothing of a stronger sentiment, our Yankee propensities would inevitably crop out, and we asked, Well, and

what was this unparalleled achievement for? Did Aquinas attempt it solely that he might look back, and say with the Roman poet:

"And now 'tis done: more durable than brass
My monument shall be, and raise its head
O'er royal pyramids?"¹

Was there any special exigency which called it out? And if so, did it meet the necessities which summoned it to religion's forefront, and did it discharge its office with success and triumph?

And, strange to say, when we asked what Aquinas wrote for, so elaborately and so unsparingly, we got not a more satisfactory answer than he himself did, when he went about, at the commencement of his studies, teasing people with the question, *Quid esset Deus? i. e.*, What *should* God be? or, What *might* He be? and not, What *is* He? as Mr. Vaughan prefers to phrase it. What God ought to be, or can be, is a higher matter than what He is. One is *à priori*, the other *à posteriori*; and the query shows the rationalistic turn which the mind of Aquinas was then taking.

Wherefore, we had to study out for ourselves what the Angel *intended* by his greatest theological performance, styled a Summary, not of theology merely, but of *all* theology,—of theology, most especially, considered as a science, and as (so the fashion of the day required) the queen of all sciences whatsoever.²

To imagine theology a science, like those sciences which we consider the foremost attainments of human wisdom, to put it forth as the keystone of such overarching things, and then to attempt a conspectus of it, and of all of it,—doubtless, this is to aim about as high as a mortal scholar can elevate a human purpose. And to

¹ Horace, Od. iii. 30, Conington's version. More expressive of the original than Francis's, and therefore more acceptable to scholars.

² The *Summa* is called more frequently, *Summa Theologia*; but Disraeli and Sharon Turner quote a Paris edition as *Summa Totius Theologia* (Curiosities of Literature, i. 63). It may have been called a summary, simply because unfinished by the author. The *intention*, in view of his plan as given in this review, cannot be doubted. He meant to have it a sort of pantology. It is in 1,250 pages folio, fine print, double columns. And it is amusing to see a Jesuit (who has no love to waste on a Dominican) call it "rudimentary," and intended for "novices" (J. Jones, S.J., in his pamphlet against Ffoulkes, pp. 46, 47). Such a mere *rudimentary* treatise, intended for *novices*, placed (so it was) on the centre-table of the Council of Trent, alongside of the Bible and the decrees of the Popes, as infallible commentary for infallible text! *Credat Domine Samson aut Domine Jones, S.J.*

accomplish such a task felicitously, would be to overshadow the greatest of one's predecessors, as our Lord said the tallest of the prophets might be looked down upon by the least in the kingdom of heaven.

But Thomas Aquinas designed to make a book which should embrace all the elements (at least all the "rudimentary" ones) of the noblest and grandest of all the sciences and its dependencies, and enable a mortal mind to say, The whole province of all necessary knowledge is mapped out before me, and I may sit down leisurely to its steady and sufficient contemplation.

For what did he make this vastest of all human forecasts? Why did he provoke himself, or why did others provoke him, to this about the utmost reach of a mundane intellect?

There is an answer, we think, to this inquiry, and it gives, we also think, the practical key to St. Thomas's *magnum opus*. If we err about it, which is of course quite possible, let others try more successfully, if they see fit. We are ready to give our own answer to this question; but, before we do so, must call attention to a slight historical review of the exigencies amid which the Angel came upon the stage.

He was born at Aquin, or Aquino, in Terra di Lavoro, not far from Ponte Corvo, well known as connected with the name of Bernadotte, once a marshal of France, and afterward king of Sweden. Ponte Corvo is said by the gazetteer to be some fifty miles west of north from Naples, so that it may readily be found on any full map of Italy. His birthplace was that of the celebrated satirist, Juvenal. He was born, Prior Vaughan thinks, in 1227; though he says the date is disputed, as well as the exact locality of his birth. At any rate, he was born in the thirteenth century, and was a not distant successor of Abelard, the great French rationalist, who died A.D. 1142.

We say *rationalist*, for our author seems to have a correct idea of the position of Archbishop Anselm, who began (say, in round numbers) in 1100 the grand battle with rationalism in his treatise, *Cur Deus Homo*. In that unfortunate treatise, Anselm left higher ground, and came down to the level of rationalism itself. The result was that he set theological *whys* and *wherefores* in motion with an impetus they never have lost. Mr. Vaughan says (i. p. 139): "I refer to the period beginning with St. Anselm and ending with the Lombard,—a most exciting epoch, and one full of the contests and antagonisms of human thought. At this period it was that faith and reason, the principles of authority and self-assertion, stood over against each

other, and grew into clear and distinct shape, and manifested their bearings on society with greater boldness than perhaps they ever had done before. This was the period in which those two sides of truth, the speculative and the contemplative, and those two sides of the reason and the will, created the great schools of scholastic and monastic theology."

Here was, indeed, a tremendous difficulty to be encountered,—the proper reconciliation of faith and reason, a difficulty as rampant as ever; but Albert the Great, who taught at Cologne in the middle of the thirteenth century, proposed to meet it, encompass it, and transmit it in the following way. The Hereford Prior thus sketches the effort: "The two grand objects he kept in view during his brilliant career as professor, and his long labors as a theologian, were, *first*, that the influences of philosophy, the wisdom, clearness, and systematic methods of the powers of Paganism, should be brought over and turned round for the defence and glory of the Church; that Aristotle should be Christianized; and, *secondly*, that faith should be thrown into the form of a vast scientific organism, through the application of Christianized philosophy to the dogmata of revealed religion. Thus would the Church possess all the highest truths of Greek philosophy in the purest form, without the alloy of error that is generally encrusted round the noblest of human speculations. Thus would she present an impregnable barrier to the efforts of pride of intellect, when endeavoring to upset the framework of the Church" (vol. i. pp. 124, 125).

However, the labors of Albert were but partial and partially effective. They needed seconding and strengthening. And the man for the time and the opportunity was soon forthcoming. "The confusion and the excitement and the clash of the contest had begun before St. Thomas entered the arena, but the fight was by no means over; the forces on both sides had deployed, and a general engagement was being carried on. All depended upon him who held the supreme command; fortunately for the cause of truth, the man of the hour was not wanting. The Angelical had been prepared, it would seem, by a singular Providence, for directing the cause of truth and right and order" (vol. i. pref. p. xii.).

That is the way in which Prior Vaughan construes Church history; but he has hit the core of the case, and, too, in one sense, its cure, without perceiving the drift of his expression, "All depended upon him who held the supreme command." But it was this "supreme command" which Rome, styling herself specifically *the* Church Catholic, embracing within herself all the prerogatives of the

Church Catholic, and wielding all the energies of the Church Catholic, determined to arrogate as her own, and her own exclusively, without the least admixture, abatement, or participation. St. Thomas—it may be without consciousness of anything like destination or subjection—was, nevertheless, to employ his mighty talents and amazing erudition to accomplish her fixed behests. He was foreordained by Rome, as her chosen agent, to cultivate and maintain her favorite theory of her supremacy, and especially to do this work by his grandest literary performance, his summary of all theology,—of theology as the queen of every science, and thrown into such a scientific and philosophic shape (image, one might say) as to command the worship of the acutest and the most enlightened. As a Dominican, he might be particularly gratified with his high commission; for Mr. Vaughan is careful enough to tell us that the Dominicans always aimed at impressions upon “the higher and more educated classes,” and “always had an eye to great centres” (vol. i. pp. 84, 310).

And we can see, as we contemplate the history of the times, that this was but the simple following up and out of a scheme which had its full development in the days of that gigantic ecclesiastical projector, Hildebrand. Then an explicit scheme was hatched for an undisputed and inapproachable, yet very definite supremacy of Church power. Hildebrand made exclusive and peculiar the before quite common word *papa*, father or pope; thus constituting himself, in his own estimation, the only spiritual father of the world. Of course, as such a father, no one was to be his judge, and none of his sentences were to be reversed; since the eighteenth and nineteenth of his celebrated twenty-seven dictates formally published such ideas.

But naked power, without the cincture and garniture of law to render it a thing of precedent and history and civil reason—in other words, to give it arms and armor—would not amount to much in this life’s checkered and incessant controversies. So, whatever *the* Papacy—the great terrestrial fatherhood of humanity—desired in the shape of law was provided for it, in the forged and false decretals and the compilations of Gratian. This gave power a code, *i. e.*, tools, to work with.

Nevertheless, with such might, and such aids to might, there was wanting clear scope, ample space, undisputed territory. And this next chief requisite was sought for under the guise of the plausible Crusades. There was then, as there is now—let Rome call herself, all days, all hours, *the* Church Catholic, and the Church

Catholic *alone*—a divided Christendom. There was a rival fatherhood, lifting a patronizing hand over the wide-spread East, the earliest home of Christianity. It bore an "image and superscription," as much dreaded and abhorred then as it is still. This *bête noir* was "the Photian schism," the Constantinopolitan form of our religion, which was then (and, very naturally, to a power claiming undivided sovereignty), and is now, and is likely to remain, the object of concentrated and inextinguishable aversion.

That rival must be put down,—nay, routed and annihilated. And what pretence so plausible as the Crusades—well-equipped and well-sustained *military* missions—for the recovery of lost or alienated Christian territory?

The object, the indirect object, of the Crusades was readily penetrated by the Orientals. For, as old Thomas Fuller said in his "Holy Warre," the Eastern emperor "seemeth to have entailed his jealousies on *all* his successors, who never cordially affected this war, but suspected that these Western Christians made but a false blow at Jerusalem, and meant to hit Constantinople" (book i. c. 15). If practical commentary is necessary to establish the justice of these suspicions, we have it in the fact that by and by the Crusaders actually attacked and captured, and sacked also, the capital of Eastern Christendom, or, as the old canons uncomfortably called it, New Rome. They attempted such a deed, as Mr. Finlay tells us, upon the avowed plan of giving the Orientals an imported emperor, who should be "the man best able to govern the new conquests for the glory of God and the advantage of the Holy Roman Church." And they did their work up so thoroughly that, as he adds, in sorrowful description, "Well might the Greeks contrast the conduct of this army of the soldiers of Christ, under the especial care of its holy father, the Pope, with the behavior of the Mussulman troops under Saladin, who conquered Jerusalem. The Christians had bound themselves by an oath not to shed the blood of Christians; they had made vows of abstinence and chastity. What attention they paid to these vows when they turned their arms against a Christian state which, for many centuries, had formed the bulwark of Europe against the invasion of the Saracens, is recorded by the Pope himself" (Finlay's *Byzantine History*, from 1057 to 1453, pp. 328, 334, 335).¹

¹ So thorough was the determination to let the East have no "better resurrection" till Rome was ready, that Montesquieu says they ruined its capital utterly. "During the sixty years the Latins were possessed of Constantinople, the conquered people being dispersed; and the victors engaged in war, all

Well, the Pope had now nearly reached the culmination of his theoretical fatherhood of all humanity. The West had long been prostrate under his broad paternity, and no part of it more so than England, whose very crown John Lackland had formally surrendered. The East at length promised to be quite as downtrodden under Petrine slippers. And the wearer of such marvellous foot-gear might now prepare to copy the self-congratulation of Nebuchadnezzar, as recorded in the Book of Daniel (Dan. iv. 30).

But, as in the hour of his elation there was an incubus brooding over the monarch of Babylon in the East, such seemed the not dissimilar predicament of his self-flattering compeer in the Babylon of the West. It was in the opening of the thirteenth century that Constantinople succumbed to Rome, and a *Latin* patriarch became her ecclesiastical lawgiver. But the honeyed triumph had bitter abatements. Intercourse with the East brought westward those unwelcome returns which Prior Vaughan calls "the highly-colored and exciting elements of thought, introduced from the East through the Crusades; the philosophical mysticism of Egypt and the dreams of India; the importation into Europe—into France and Italy and England—of the neoplatonism and gnosticism, and pantheism and naturalism of the Arabian commentators on Aristotle; and then the heat produced by the introduction of dialectical methods of disputation; and, finally, the rise in opulent cities of great emporiums of knowledge,—of large universities, filled with the youth of every land, and with professors of almost every hue" (i. pp. 11, 12)¹.

Consequently, there was a *new enemy*, and a most versatile and

commerce was transferred to the cities in Italy, and Constantinople became divested of its riches" (Complete Works, iii. 179).

Even Southern Italy was once a part of Grecian Christendom; and a Council was held at Bari in Apulia, A.D. 1097, to turn it into a part of Latin Christendom. The effort failed. But the Crusaders came to the rescue with what Hudibras called "infallible artillery," and Grecian Christianity in Italy ceased to be. Of course it did not die under gunpowder, but under what was then its equivalent.

A memento of Archbishop Sibour's opinion of the late war against Russia, as virtually a new crusade against "the Photians," has fortunately been put on record by Dr. J. M. Neale (*Liturgiology*, p. 257, second edit.).

¹ No new affair, such things, in Oriental climes. As far back as the times of Daniel, say 600 years before the Christian era, we find the exiled Israelites competing with their neighbors, by becoming "skilful in all wisdom, and cunning in knowledge, and understanding science" (Daniel, i. 4). And Moses paid the same sort of compliment, either voluntarily or from necessity, to "the wisdom of the Egyptians" (Acts, vii. 22). But they did such things for God's sake, and not a Pope's sake.

subtle, and agile and elastic and obstinate one, still to be confronted. Rome had theoretical preëminence in perfection. She had girded her loins up with all the law which was necessary to maintain it, and to give it practical efficiency. She had a fair field, and an undisputed one, to work in. But the worst of all foes remained behind, yet to be dispossessed and exiled,—a free will and a self-guiding intellect. This was a Canaanite of the most formidable kind. And to complete her conquest, and give assurance to her triumphs, she must have dominion, not over religion only, or over law only, or over territory only, but over *mind*.

Here Philosophy took issue with her. And she inaugurated a new departure—one of Dr. Newman's fond developments—the plan of making Philosophy a part and parcel of Religion; or perhaps its reverse side, or shadow. And forthwith we find Religion (in order to render Philosophy not its attendant simply, but its waitress; not its handmaid, but its bondmaid) converted not into a science merely, but the science of all other sciences. And this was insisted on with such vehemence, that, as Mr. Vaughan says, "The one absorbing science of the middle ages was theology" (i. 329).

This is the work which Anselm opened, when, in his *Cur Deus Homo*, he added to the old *loci theologici* the *probatur ratione* (i. 169); when he took it upon himself to say, in reason's name, and under reason's sanctions, *why* and *wherefore* God propounded the grandest event in this world's history,—an Incarnation of Infinity! This is the work which Albertus Magnus followed up, and which St. Thomas labored to complete and crown in his Summary of all Theology. He intended to put all human wit and wisdom, sagacity and erudition, beneath the sceptre of Religion, to make that sceptre sovereign and world-wide; and then to place it in the hands of an ecclesiastical emperor at Rome! Mr. Disraeli talks in the tone of a Lord Chancellor, as he says, "When the Scholastics employed themselves in solving the deepest mysteries, their philosophy became nothing more than an instrument in the hands of the Roman Pontiff" (*Curios. Lit.* i. 63).

What an unearthly structure their Angel would fain have contributed to build! without a rival or a parallel beneath the sun! all power, all law, all territory, all mind, enclosed in the compass of a single grasp; and that grasp an immunity of the one head, of the one Church Catholic! Empire of all empires, it would not need the endowment of infallibility to give it the coronation of a king of kings! It would be practically and universally infallible, for all places, persons, and subjects; and had it wrought out its projected

and longed-for destiny, the Council of the Vatican, in 1870, might have been coolly dispensed with as, what the lawyers call, mere surplusage.

Such was the magnificent and all-plastic work which, as we read history, the *Summa Totius Theologiae* sublimely—we must say it—sublimely aimed to do. Still Aquinas was—there is nothing which Mr. Vaughan strives more earnestly to bring out in his long biography—a man of the profoundest submission to superiors. And such submission he aimed to transmit to others; not to say inflict it on them. Yes, the great schoolman would have schooled the world's whole mind into captivity to the obedience of Rome. Could he have accomplished as much by his example as by his logic, Rome might now be, not a prison, as Pio Nono calls it, but the palace of a colossus like the woman in the Revelation, who had the moon for a footstool, the sun for a mantle, and the starry canopy for a diadem ! (Rev. xii. 1.)

No wonder—as our author toils most industriously to show—that the Council of Trent, the council of all councils for Romanism, tried to render itself, doctrinally, but an echo of the *Summa*. Yet, alas for its presumption ! it has all the dogmatism of the *Summa*, without the sugar of its philosophy. It deals in scorching anathemas as much as that does in soothing, beguiling subtleties ; and the dire result is but a sort of skeleton of its original, as grim as that is winning. For there was—to say nothing of his superb person—something singularly magnetic in the scholastic Angel ; so that even as a preacher, it was entirely needless for him to employ the adventitious aids of continental oratory. Mr. Vaughan says of him, quite attractively : “ It was not after the modern fashion that the Saint preached. His power did not proceed from violence of manner, fierce gesture, theatrical display, or artificial warmth. There was nothing of brute oratory about him. The exaggerated and excited method of announcing the Gospel imported from the continent—and which might suit the market-place, but ill beseeems the dignity of the pulpit—was unknown to the great Dominican ” (i. 444).

There is some comfort in thinking, in these vociferous days, that a man may be a reputable divine without being a sensationist or a mountebank. And so we appetizingly quote this, though less germane to the winding up of our paper than such a conspectus of the *Summa* as anxious critics may have looked for. There is no time left us to present much more than the grand intention of its architect, and a hint at some of the attractions which enabled him to give his mighty achievement charm, sway, and perpetuity. Nothing

would be easier than to dilate upon its direct merits. Henry VIII. (no mean judge) admired them, and battled for them against Martin Luther; and the Pope was in such a rapture, that he dubbed him "Defender of the Faith,"—a title which graced royal brows in England for actual centuries! Has Rome forgotten this? Why should she execrate the champion of her Angel? (Soame's "Reformation," i. 166, 167.)

But we cannot forget the indirect tendency of the *Summa*, its mischievous left-handed influences. Hume, *e. g.*, is said to have gleaned quite as much from Aquinas, for the aid of scepticism, as he did from Bishop Berkeley. The bishop taught the unbeliever how to annihilate matter. He improved upon his tutor, and annihilated mind. Aquinas toiled, like Dunstan, at his nightly forge, to show how Philosophy might be made subservient to Religion. Hume turned the tables with the Saint also, and showed how Religion might be so subservient to Philosophy, that a miracle should become an empty nullity. And he did this—one is tempted to believe there is sarcasm in the imitation—with the Saint's characteristic calmness and self-possession.

Unquestionably, Hume is an Aquinas in disguise; with sheep's clothing covering up a wolfish aim and appetite.¹ And Rome might have learned from his perversities—what Jonathan Edwards might have learned from the miscarriages of his hyper-Calvinism, on which many a free-thinker has battered—that her efforts to accomplish scientific subjugation have given pretences and suggestions to scientific insubordination, not to say insane and fierce rebellion. Mr. Vaughan complains, half angrily, that one of the predominating evils of the day is "an instability of mind, and an infidelity of heart, which, like some terrible disease, is eating into the vitals of all genuine belief" (i. 802). 'But who can wonder at the development or excrescence or abortion,—or whatever men please to call it? Why, the Church of Rome is so interfering and so imperinent, that it has never surrendered the right to dictate about such a science as astronomy. Paul V., Pope from 1605 to 1621, "appointed a commission to inquire into the opinion of the Pole, Copernicus, concerning the motion of the earth. The issue of that inquiry terminated in permission being granted to assert the motion for scientific reasoning, but inhibited persons from treating it as a

¹Dean Milman says of Aquinas, "He is nearly as consummate a sceptic, almost atheist, as he is a divine and theologian."—"Latin Christianity," vi. 283 (Eng. ed.).

truth. They allowed it as an hypothesis, but forbade it as a doctrine, conceiving it contrary to Scripture" (For. Quart. Rev. xxvi. 23). The Syllabus of Pius IX. would make modern science the bond-servant of *his* Church, and without one particle of the influence of the *Summa*, though bolstered with the dread assumption of downright infallibility.¹

But Rome will never win in such a battle. Lord Bacon (no wonder she hates him) has solemnly and oracularly declared his opinion of the "extreme prejudice which both religion and philosophy have received, and may receive, by being commixed together; as that which undoubtedly will make an heretical religion, and an imaginary and fabulous philosophy" (Works, ii. 129, Montagu's ed.). *Da fidei quas fidei sunt*,—give unto faith that which unto faith belongeth, says this Angel of our English schools.² Science is one

¹ Even Mr. Vaughan would make Philosophy do homage to Religion, by devoting some hundred elaborate pages to show how Aquinas surpassed Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; and how, especially, he handed "over Aristotle to the uses of the schools, purified of paganism, divested of Oriental coloring, and conveying the true meaning of their author." The *true* meaning! As if Aquinas understood Aristotle better than Aristotle himself! (ii. 703.) Doubtless, something besides syllabuses would be tried, if now possible. Says Disraeli, "This monstrous tribunal [Inquisition] of human opinions aimed at the sovereignty of the intellectual world, without intellect" ("Curios. Lit." i. 170).

² It is the more remarkable that Bacon should take this stand, when great minds in England had not given up the old idea of recommending Religion under the guise of Philosophy. Thus Milton says, in his "Comus:"

"How charming is Divine Philosophy!
Not harsh and crabbed as dull fools suppose;
But musical as is Apollo's lute,
And a perpetual feast of nectared sweets,
Where no crude surfeit reigns."

To understand this precisely, we think a peculiar emphasis is to be placed on the word *Divine*. To add a single allusion from a modern poet, we may say that Tennyson understands the case better than Milton. This is *his* verdict:

"Hold thou the good: define it well:
For fear Divine Philosophy
Should press beyond her mark, and be
Procuress to the Lords of Hell."

"In Mem." No. 52.

Bacon, Milton, and Tennyson, all use the same phrase, "Divine Philosophy." It must have been proverbial.

thing, and Revelation is another. Science is the reason of man, and Revelation is the reason of God. They may appear to conflict and be antagonisms,—just as the creeping and carping reason of a child appears to come athwart the erect and decretive reason of man. We cannot harmonize and blend the two, till we “put away childish things.” When we stand in the open presence of the Infinite, we shall doubtless be astounded, overwhelmed, and stricken prostrate by our petty quarrels with what we call mysteries and miracles. Why, unity amid diversities begins, as we believe, at the summit of the Universe, in the self-existent Godhead, and travels downward through all creation. And so contrarieties and seeming contradictions are always possible, to all minds but the grand central one. There is but a single point where progress terminates its voyage, where change is anchored, and succession never rolls a wave; and that point is God. In God, accordingly, and in God only, is there an everlasting calm. And agitations, differences, and even conflicts, are the sure inheritance of the finite and the imperfect; while faith and patience become to them, not propriety only, but a constitution and a law.

The differences between Religion and Philosophy are like those which exist between the sexes; and it may need a Paradise (as it once did) to blend such differences under a single “bond of perfectness.” So we look forward to their sincere and abiding union, beyond all earthly variance and incongruity. Their immortal marriage may be solemnized in that supernal realm where there shall be no night, and they will need no candle, neither light of the sun; for the Lord God will give them light from His unveiled countenance. In that realm they may be conjointly ascendant forever and for evermore. So mote it be!

We have omitted much,—much, no doubt, which the learned will think too precious to have been passed by. But we must make a conclusion, if not a close, and end this paper with a succinct allusion to the last hours of the most remarkable religious philosopher of the central ages of the Church.

It is more impressive than it is novel, to see his soaring mind, when about to take flight for another existence, depreciate its labors in this. Even a prophet, like Isaiah, could say, “Who hath believed our report?” and despondent Jeremiah mourned that he was born; though, if any one could claim it, *he* had immaculate conception (Jer. i. 5). And, in a not stranger vein, Aquinas saw all his outspread acquirements dwindle to a speck. He exclaimed, in utter weariness of soul, to an intimate friend who wanted him to toil on,

"I cannot, Reginald; for everything that I have written appears to me as simply rubbish" (ii. 917).

Yet his self-depreciation did not evacuate his confidence in a Redeemer. It is most gratifying to find his last moments untarnished by invocations to the Saints and appeals to the Virgin Mary; while they seemed to have been absorbed and filled by legitimate devotions to the Bishop of Souls. They who surrounded his last couch "heard from the lips of the dying theologian how there is no strength, or peace, or light for man, in earth or heaven, without the charity of Christ and the merits of His Cross" (ii. 924). And we are quite willing, therefore, to say of the scene, in Mr. Vaughan's own language, "See them, then, for the last time, bending over him. See the Prince of Theologians passing out of life, or rather advancing through his labors into rest, to realize, away from the twilight of earth, the one dream of his soul; to see the King in His Glory, and the Blessed adoring before the Everlasting Throne!" (ii. 927.)

And, finally, having shown that Aquinas died, on a journey to the Council of Lyons, in a Benedictine convent, he closes the records of his life in the touching words that follow: "He was taken from exile on the early morning of the seventh of March, in the year twelve hundred and seventy-four, in the prime of manly life, being scarcely eight and forty years of age. It is but natural, it is but beautiful, that he who in early boyhood had been stamped with the signet of St. Benedict, should return to St. Benedict to die. He had gone forth to his work and to his labor in the morning, and he returned home to his brethren in the evening-tide."

P.S.—We had intended to say something about Aquinas's mistakes in his controversy with the Greeks, whom he expected to confront in the Council of Lyons. In his tract against them, he employs, under the sanction of a Pope—he was blind when a Pope wanted him to be—manufactured or false quotations from the Fathers. Time and space are wanting, and we merely add that the fact brought out by Père Gratry, in his tracts published at this office in 1870, is by no means a new one. Thomas James, in his "Corruptions of the Fathers"—a book thought worthy of reprint in 1843—exposed this matter, and a multitude of similar matters, in 1611; the year which gave to the public King James's version of the Bible. In one of the old editions of his book, he shows, *e. g.*, how Aquinas erred grievously in quoting, against the Greeks, sentences from St. Cyril which St. Cyril never wrote (pp. 217–19, ed. 1688); and he adds, "This is not the first wilful corruption or manifest error, by


many hundreds, that he hath committed." The word *wilful* we are quite disposed to cancel, although Haag, in his history of Christian doctrines, uses even stronger language. Aquinas was honest and honorable. If he erred, he was deceived by those whom he trusted implicitly,—as he always did a Pope, through thick and thin. So Gratry maintains, and we are gladly willing to believe him. James had the testiness of a librarian; he was chief keeper of the Bodleian. A book-hacker was with him a regular imp of Satan.

It may gratify some of our readers to have a specimen of the prayers of Aquinas. We quote the following from the "Christian Observer," vol. xxiii. p. 535 :

"Ineffably wise and merciful Creator ! Illustrious source of all things ! True fountain of light and wisdom !

"Vouchsafe to infuse into my understanding, some ray of Thy Brightness ; thereby removing the twofold darkness under which I was born,—the darkness of sin and of ignorance. Thou that makest the tongues of infants eloquent, instruct, I pray Thee, my tongue likewise ; and pour upon my lips the grace of Thy benediction. Give me quickness to comprehend, and memory to retain. Give me a facility in expounding, an aptitude in learning, and a copious eloquence in speaking. Prepare my entrance into knowledge, direct me in my pursuits, and render the issue of them complete. Through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen."

This was his prayer before study. The word "learning" should be understood in its old sense of *teaching*. Thus says Shakespeare, Henry V., " And they will learn you by rote."



THE SEVENTEENTH ARTICLE.

WE are quite aware of the dangers which beset one who attempts to write on the questions that are connected with the Seventeenth Article of Religion. If he ventures the suggestion that the magic word predestination can bear any other significance than the Calvinistic one, he incurs the horror and scorn of those with whom the word, wherever found, means just that and nothing else. If he dwells on the structure and phraseology of the Article itself, he is forthwith accused of special pleading. Many whose ears are only open to the clatter of what they are pleased to call "Questions of the Day," no matter how puerile, petty, and ephemeral these may be, regard him as a sort of church-owl, blinking and "moping" in his "ivy-mantled tower," while others still, scorning alike the Articles and their compilers, look down from those lofty heights of theological intuition to which their "fresh-imped" wings have borne them, with contemptuous pity upon one who can waste time or study on things so utterly *effete* as the Articles of 1562. He runs some risks who dares these dangers.

Nevertheless, the risks must be run. For people will ask, from time to time, whether the Articles are not Calvinistic, and whether they and the Book of Common Prayer do not contradict each other. There are never wanting persons to repeat Lord Chatham's stale witticism about a "Calvinistic creed, a Popish liturgy, and an Arminian clergy." And there have been, and are just now,

teachers in greater numbers than one could wish, who are ready to assert the contradiction of Articles to Prayer Book, and Prayer Book to Articles, and then to clamor, according to their separate and widely-differing positions and wills, for revision of the Prayer Book on the one hand, or abolition of the Articles on the other.

Now, Article XVII. affords an opportunity of instituting a sort of *experimentum crucis* in regard to both these questions. Why this is so need not occupy our attention now. If the reasons do not suggest themselves to our readers at once, they will become apparent as we proceed. It may be true (though we are persuaded the writer whose words we quote has made quite too sweeping a generalization) that "the educated thought of the nineteenth century, with some notable exceptions, is content to recognize the existence of the truths of the perfect knowledge of God on the one hand, and of the freedom of the human will on the other, and to sit down contentedly under the utter impossibility of reconciling them."¹ This, however, will not prevent people from asking whether the Articles, and especially the one now under consideration, do not undertake to accomplish what the "educated thought of the nineteenth century" turns away from; and whether, in so doing, they do not further take up a line of doctrinal speculation alien from, if not contradictory to, the teaching of the Book of Common Prayer.

I.

Now, before we advance to an examination of the structure and phraseology of Article XVII., it is necessary to consider, somewhat at length, the general drift of the Articles in regard to the several points of Calvinism. This is a question of no slight importance, though it has not always received the attention it deserves. For on the answer to it must depend the position and ground from which we approach the Article itself. If the points of Calvinism, other than its doctrine of predestination, are asserted in the Articles, then there is a strong *a priori* probability that it is asserted also. If they are not asserted, and, still more, if they are denied, then the *a priori* probability takes an opposite direction. Article XVII. cannot be intelligently dealt with till we have thus settled the temper of mind and drift of thought in and from which we are to consider it.

The five points of Calvinism may be thus stated: (1) Predestination, including (a) unconditional predestination, or election to life

¹ Bishop Forbes on the Articles, vol. i. p. 247.

eternal, and (b) unconditional reprobation or predestination to damnation; (2) particular or limited redemption, *i. e.*, that Christ died only for a chosen few; (3) total depravity; (4) irresistible grace; (5) final perseverance.¹ And the question before us is this: Leaving out of view, at present, the teaching of Article XVII. as to predestination to life eternal, what do the Articles teach on the other points enumerated?

1. As to reprobation, the Articles are pointedly silent. The word itself is not found in them. Nor is there anywhere a statement like that of the Presbyterian Confession of Faith: "By the decree of God, for the manifestation of His glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others are foreordained to everlasting death."² Yet, beyond all doubt, Calvin considered the theory of reprobation to be essential to his system. For, speaking of those who accept election, but refuse reprobation, he says they do it "ignorantly and boyishly, since election itself cannot stand unless it is opposed to reprobation."³ In such a case omission is surely tantamount to denial.

2. As against a particular or limited redemption of only the elect, the Articles speak with no "bated breath." Article II. sets forth our Lord as "a sacrifice not only for original guilt, but for *all actual sins of men*;" Article VII. asserts that "everlasting life is offered to *mankind* [*humano generi*] by Christ;" Article XV. says of our Lord, "He came to be the Lamb without spot, who, by sacrifice of Himself once made, should take away the *sins of the world*;" and Article XXXI. declares that "the offering of Christ once made is that perfect redemption, propitiation, and satisfaction, *for all the sins of the whole world, both original and actual*." Language cannot be plainer than this. There needs no comment on its outspoken denial of the limited redemption of Calvinism.

3. The Calvinistic doctrine of original sin implies and includes at least the three things following: (a) The imputation of the sin of Adam to all his descendants;⁴ (b) the utter, total, and positive depravation and defilement of the whole man, "in all the faculties and parts of soul and body;" and (c) that concupiscence, or evil desire, is, in itself, "truly and properly sin."

¹ Bishop of Ely on the Articles, p. 403, n. 1 (Am. ed.).

² "Confession of Faith," chap. iii. § 3.

³ "Institutes," book iii. chap. xxiii. 1.

⁴ "Calvin himself made little of this, but his followers strongly pressed it." —Abp. Laurence's "Bampton Lectures," p. 69.

Now, the first of these three points is found neither in Article IX. nor elsewhere. A mere scholastic speculation at the best, held by Papists as well as Calvinists¹—though worked out by each in widely differing ways—it lies entirely outside of all the Articles, which know and say nothing about it.

As to the second point, the “*very far gone* from original righteousness” of the Article, even if we take its Latin version, “*quam longissime*,” by no means comes up to the Calvinistic statement. The Assembly of Divines, in 1643, feeling the insufficiency for their purposes of this language, changed it into “*wholly deprived* of original righteousness;” and the Westminster Confession says that by the Fall man became “*wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts* of soul and body.” This change was needed to bring the Article into an accord, which before it had not, with the teaching of Calvinism. That teaching has been very fairly stated as follows: “The Calvinists taught that the corruption of man was so great that no spark of moral goodness was left in him; that he was utterly and totally bad and depraved; that, however amiable he might be in regard to his fellow-men, yet, as regards God and goodness, there was no relic of what he once was, any more than in lost spirits and damned souls.”²

As to the third point, the Article asserts that “concupiscence and lust *hath of itself the nature of sin* ;” phraseology in exact accordance with St. Paul’s own words, “Let not sin reign in your mortal bodies, that ye should obey it in the lusts thereof;” and, again, “Nay, I had not known *sin*, but by the law: for I had not known *lust*, except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet.”³ But this language did not content the divines of 1643, who replaced it by the words, “is truly and properly sin.” While, then, the Article, as against the slur of Trent, retains the Apostle’s language, it again by no means comes up to the demands of Calvinism.

It is easy to say that all this involves “verbal niceties.” It does; and if it did not, the character for intelligence and honesty of the framers of the Articles would be seriously compromised. It involves just such verbal nicety as led the first Ecumenical Council to refuse, as it did, to insert an *iota*; an act which, while it has pointed many a stupid jest, can only be jested on by those who have not culture enough to comprehend that “the value of a letter in an algebraic

¹ Abp. Laurence’s “Bampt. Lect.” pp. 57–69, and notes.

² Bishop of Ely on the Articles, p. 246 (Am. ed.).

³ Rom. vi. 12; vii. 7.

problem, or a formula of the calculus, is not greater"¹ than is the value of the *iota* in the test-word of the Nicene fathers. There is all the care in wording the Articles that their importance demands. The more they are studied, the more clearly this appears. That they are faultless in this regard no one can claim. But that is a shallow criticism which speaks of them in general, and as a body of theological statements, as unsystematic, inaccurate, or ambiguous.

4. Irresistible grace and final perseverance may be considered together; and are, indeed, sometimes combined as forming one point of Calvinism. In some sort, they mutually imply each other. If grace is irresistible, then once given, it cannot be lost. If it is indefectible for the elect, then by the elect it cannot be resisted. Now, Article XVI. expressly declares that we *may* fall from grace, and that we *may* rise again from our fall. Calvinism, on the other hand, asserts that we cannot fall *finally*, and that we *must* rise again if ever we have received grace at all. So that the Article cannot be called Calvinistic in this regard; and we see at once why Dr. Reynolds, at the Hampton Court Conference, moved that to the words in Article XVI., "After we have received the Holy Ghost we may depart from grace," there should be added the further words (absolutely needful in the interests of Calvinism), "yet neither totally, nor finally."²

There remains of the system of Calvin only the one point of predestination to life, which is the subject-matter of Article XVII. itself. On all the other points, as we have passed them in review, the Articles are either utterly silent, or when they speak, they speak in full denial of the Calvinistic system.

All this teaching, we may remark in passing, is in full agreement with the "*lex supplicandi, lex credendi*" of the Prayer Book. To enter on the detailed proof of this would, however, lead us too far aside from our present purpose. Here it is sufficient to observe that we have shown the drift of the Articles to be anti-Calvinistic; and have, therefore, established the position that the probabilities are all against the asserted Calvinism of Article XVII. We are not, then, to approach this Article with a Calvinistic bias, and we are bound, at the outset, to rid ourselves of the prevalent, but unfounded, idea, that the word predestination must, of necessity, and always, carry with it a Calvinistic meaning.

¹ Shedd's "Hist. of Christian Doctrine," vol. i. p. 374, n. 1.

² Cardwell's "Conferences," p. 178.

II.

Taking up now for exposition this crucial Article, we must not forget that the general law of interpretation to be observed here, as elsewhere in the Articles, is this: We are to bring out from itself the meaning of the Article, and not undertake to import into it some previously conceived meaning of our own.

This law is so obviously just, that it needs no defence. It was, no doubt, intended to be set forth in the royal declaration of 1628, which ordered "that no man hereafter shall either print or preach to draw the Article aside any way, but shall submit to it in the plain and full meaning thereof; and shall not put his own sense or comment to be the meaning of the Article, but shall take it *in the literal and grammatical sense.*"

Just and sensible as this is, in how many instances has it been disregarded! To say nothing about the one point of Calvinism now under consideration, Calvinistic divines have been obliged, from the days of Queen Elizabeth onward, to import all the other points into the Articles, utterly ignoring their "literal and grammatical sense." The House of Commons, when the royal declaration quoted above was issued, passed an "anti-declaration" in these words: "We, the Commons, in Parliament assembled, do claim, protest, and avow for truth, the *sense* of the Articles of Religion which were established by Parliament in the thirteenth year of our late Queen Elizabeth, which, by the public act of the Church of England, and by the general and current expositions of the writers of our Church, have been delivered unto us. And we reject the sense of the Jesuits, Arminians, and *all others wherein they differ from us.*" Passing by the great blunder, or something worse, of mentioning only the act of Parliament, with no allusion to Convocation, all this, "done into English," simply means, "We are Calvinists, and, *therefore*, the Articles must and shall be Calvinistic."¹ Christopher Davenport (Franciscus a Sancta Clara) undertook to import into the Articles Tridentine doctrine. And these two attempts, in opposite directions, thoroughly illustrate and justify Hooker's shrewd and caustic remark: "Two things there are which trouble greatly these later times; one, that the Church of Rome *can not*, another, that Geneva *will not*, err."² Dr. Newman, in Tract XC., laid down

¹ Heylin's "Life of Laud," pp. 188-192. Baines's "Life of Laud," pp. 62-64

² MS. note on the "Christian Letter;" Keble's "Hooker," vol. i. p. 140 n. 34.

much the same law of exposition as the one given above, and then, to use his own words, endeavored to "go as far as was possible in interpreting the Articles in the direction of Roman dogma."¹ Of later attempts of the same kind it is not necessary to speak. We proceed to the interpretation of the Article. It is worthy of careful observation that it consists of three distinct parts. The first of these contains the statement of the doctrine of predestination. The second comprises two practical cautions, designed to guard individual believers against two real dangers. The third sets forth two canons or rules for the exposition of Holy Scripture, which must also, of necessity, govern and regulate the interpretation of the Article itself. Surely, this lay-out exhibits a degree of carefulness and painstaking, which must commend itself to any thoughtful mind.

I.—THE STATEMENT OF THE DOCTRINE.²

"Predestination to Life is the everlasting purpose of God, whereby (before the foundations of the world were laid) He hath constantly decreed by His counsel secret to us, to deliver from curse and damnation those whom He hath chosen in Christ out of mankind, and to bring them by Christ to everlasting salvation, as vessels made to honor. Wherefore, they which be endued with so excellent a benefit of God, be called according to God's purpose by His Spirit working in due season: they through Grace obey the calling: they be justified freely: they be made sons of God by adoption: they be made like the image of His only-begotten Son Jesus Christ: they walk religiously in good works, and at length, by God's mercy, they attain to everlasting felicity."

No one can read this statement without seeing at once that it is expressed in the identical words of Holy Scripture. Indeed, "it exhibits nothing more than a series of texts, with a word or two connecting them together."³ It can hardly be necessary to quote all the passages brought together *in extenso*. The table of texts given in the note below⁴ will enable any student to ascertain the careful exactness with which this statement of doctrine has been framed,

¹ "Apologia pro vita sua," p. 162.

² We use the word statement instead of definition for reasons which will appear in the sequel.

³ Hey's "Lectures in Divinity," vol. iv. p. 11 (Camb. ed. 1797).

⁴ The texts should be read in the order in which they stand: Eph. i. 4, 5, 11; II. Tim. i. 9; Gal. iii. 10, 13; Eph. i. 4, 7, 10, 11; Rom. ix. 23; Rom. viii. 28; I. Peter, i. 2; Rom. vi. 17, 18; Rom. iii. 24—compare viii. 30;

and will show a general reader what numerous passages of God's Word have been condensed in it. We do not press this fact as proving that the Article is not Calvinistic, but simply as showing the great care that was taken to conform the statement to the language of Holy Scripture, and not to force Scripture into accordance with the statement. It does, however, suggest a very sufficient reason why persons who suppose that the word predestination can only mean the predestination of Calvin, claim this Article, as they do also the Scriptures, as maintaining the theory of their master.

We are now prepared to consider the definition in its several parts.

(a) "Predestination to life," says the Article, and it speaks of no other predestination. We have seen above how important to the full statement of his doctrine Calvin himself considered his point of reprobation.

The omission, therefore, of all mention of it here is very significant. The very title of the Article, "Of Predestination and Election," marks also this meaning omission. Dr. Hey says, and well says, "Predestination is sometimes a generic term, including election [*i. e.*, to life] and reprobation; sometimes it signifies only predestination to happiness, which is its sense here, as appears from its being joined with election."¹

Significant, however, as the omission is, it brings the definition into perfect accordance with Holy Scripture, and the teaching of primitive antiquity. For (we quote the words of Bishop Pearson in his *Lectio XXIII.*) "neither Holy Scripture nor the ancient Fathers use the word reprobation in that sense in which scholastics and controversialists have employed it;" while the "word reprobate, wherever it is used, refers rather to the present condition of wicked men, than to the eternal ordinance of God."²

To the same purpose writes Dean Jackson: "It will be hard for any man to prove that the word *ἀδοξίμος* doth anywhere in the New Testament punctually answer unto that use or notion which custom hath now in a manner prescribed for in many theological

Gal. iv. 5, 6; Eph. i. 5; Rom. viii. 29; Eph. ii. 10—compare Titus, ii. 14, iii. 8; Matt. xxv. 34; Titus, iii. 5; I. Peter, i. 3, 4. See Welchman, "Articuli," etc., p. 50; and compare Hey's "Lectures," vol. iv. p. 12, ff. There are some admirable remarks on the way in which Predestination is taught in Holy Scripture in Mozley's "August. Doctrine of Predestination," pp. 38-49.

¹ Lectures, vol. vi. p. 11.

² Minor Works, vol. i. pp. 244-246.

disputes; that is, for men irreversibly fitted or designed to everlasting destruction."¹

Bishop Pearson again (and we quote his language, and that of Hooker and Bull, because, having no space here for detailed proofs, we prefer to rest our assertion on other authority than our own word) says: "Unless my observation or my memory deceives me, few, or, rather, not one of the ancient fathers use the word 'reprobation' in this [*i. e.*, the Calvinistic] sense."² And even more distinct is Hooker's declaration: "All the ancient fathers of the Church of Christ have evermore, with uniform consent, agreed that reprobation presupposeth foreseen sin as a most just cause whereupon it groundeth itself."³ Equally clear is Bishop Bull: "In truth, for almost the first four centuries no Catholic ever dreamed about that predestination which many, at this day, consider the basis and foundation of the whole Christian religion."⁴

The statement, then, in its omission of reprobation, is fully in accordance with "Holy Scripture and ancient authors," and fully out of accordance with Calvinistic confessions and writers.

Another omission, not without significancy, is the omission of the word "eternal" before "life." We venture to think that, in a statement made in the interests of Calvinism, this omission would not occur. It is true that "everlasting salvation" and "everlasting felicity" are spoken of later on, but in both cases they appear as the conclusions and consummations of godly lives, and are not, therefore, unconditional bestowments. Meantime, we are left quite free to interpret the word "life" to be that life of holiness which, beginning here in the glory of godliness, will end, at last, in the glory of salvation.⁵

(b) The statement proceeds: "Is the everlasting *purpose* of God, whereby (before the foundations of the world were laid) He hath constantly *decreed*."

Now, it must occur at once to a careful reader that it does not indicate Calvinistic views when God's *purpose* is spoken of before

¹ Works, vol. vii. p. 154. Oxf. 1844.

² Minor Works, vol. i. p. 246. It is obvious to refer to Faber's well-known work.

³ Keble's "Hooker," vol. ii. p. 576.

⁴ "Apologia pro Harmonia," Sec. vii. § 81. Works, vol. iv. p. 461. Oxf. 1846.

⁵ It is worthy of notice that, unless in the one disputed passage, Rom. viii. 30, the verb *δοξάζω* is never used in the New Testament to signify the condition of the saved in final glory.

His *decree* is mentioned. Calvinism naturally puts the decree into the forefront, and throws the purpose into the background. Thus Calvin, distinguishing between prescience and predestination, says of the latter: "We mean by predestination the eternal *decree* of God, whereby He determined with Himself whatsoever should be done in the case of every individual man."¹ To the same purpose speaks the Synod of Dort: "That some, in this life, are endowed with faith from God, and that others are not so endowed, proceeds from His eternal *decree*."² Even if the "counsel" or "purpose" of God should be spoken of, a Calvinistic statement must include words which would show that it was unconditional and absolute. No statement which should fail to do that would come up to the requirements of Calvinism.

But our statement fails in this very point. It leaves it open to any man to make that distinction between the "antecedent" and "consequent" (or, as it may equally well be called, the "absolute" and "conditional") will of God, which Hooker made in his sermon at St. Paul's Cross, and for which Mr. Travers called him afterward to account, because it "seemed to cross a late opinion of Mr. Calvin, then taken for granted by many that had not a capacity to examine it."³ A Calvinistic statement could make no such omission, and leave no such liberty.

(c) "By His counsel secret to us." Here, again, the statement fails in that vital point of Calvinism, the unconditional and absolute will of God. Let us hear Hooker once more: "They err, therefore, who think that of the will of God to do this or that there is no reason besides His will. Many times no reason known to us; but that there is no reason thereof I judge it most unreasonable to imagine, inasmuch as He worketh all things *κατὰ τὴν βουλὴν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ*, not only according to His own will, but 'the counsel of His own will.' And whatsoever is done with counsel or wise resolution, hath of necessity some reason why it should be

¹ "Institutes," lib. iii. c. xxi. 5. The entire passage is: "Praedestinationem vocamus *aeternum Dei decretum*, quo apud se constitutum habuit quid de *uniquoque homine* fieri vellet. Non enim pari conditione creantur omnes; sed aliis vita aeterna, aliis damnatio aeterna praeordinatur. Itaque, prout in alterutrum finem *quisque* conditus est, ita vel ad vitam vel ad mortem praeordinatum dicimus."

² Jud. Synod. Nat. etc. See "Sylloge Confessionum," p. 372.

³ Keble's "Hooker," vol. i. p. 22; vol. ii. pp. 215, 216, and note 61; vol. iii. p. 576; but see, especially, "Fragments of an Answer to certain English Protestants," discovered and verified by Archdeacon Cotton and Dr. Elrington, and printed in Keble's edition, vol. ii. pp. 537-597.

done, albeit that reason be to us in some things so secret, that it forceth the wit of man to stand, as the blessed Apostle himself doth, amazed thereat.”¹

Besides, the word *secret* takes these counsels out of our possible cognizance or consideration, except in so far as they appear in their results, viz., in those promises to all men, and that “expressly declared” will of God, which will be spoken of when we reach the third paragraph of the Article.

(d) “To deliver from curse and damnation those whom He hath chosen in Christ out of mankind, and to bring them by Christ to everlasting salvation, as vessels made to honor.” To see the full force of this language, we must recur to the theory of the schoolmen, remembering that with the omission of the ideas of *congruous* and *condign* merit it is to all intents and purposes the Calvinistic theory also. No words can be needed here other than those of Archbishop Laurence: “They [*i. e.*, scholastics] believed predestination to be God’s everlasting purpose to confer grace and glory upon individuals, who deserve the first congruously, and the latter condignly; conceiving us competent by our own virtues to extricate ourselves from crime and its alarming consequences. Our Church, on the other hand, always keeping the idea of redemption in view, states it to be the everlasting purpose of the Almighty to deliver from a state of malediction and destruction (*‘a maledicto et exitio liberare’*), from a guilt which none can themselves obliterate, and to render eternally happy, through Christ or Christianity, as vessels before dishonorable thus formed to honor, those whom He has elected, not as meritorious individuals separately, but as a certain class of persons, as Christians collectively, ‘whom He has chosen in Christ out of mankind.’”² Again, the same writer says: “In the Institute it is said, ‘*Praedestinationem vocamus æternum Dei decretum, quo apud se constitutum habuit, quid de unoquoque homine fieri vellet*’ (lib. iii. cap. 21, § 5). Here the effect of God’s predestinating decree is plainly asserted to be the decision of every man’s individual fate. Our Church, on the other hand, as plainly asserts it to be the salvation of Christians, or a liberation from the consequences of transgression, and an adduction to eternal life, through Christianity, of those who are chosen *out of the human race*, ‘*ex hominum genere.*’”³

¹ Keble’s “Hooker,” vol. i. p. 208.

² Laurence, “Bampton Lectures,” pp. 170, 171.

³ “Bampton Lectures,” p. 172, note.

(e) "Wherefore, they which be endued with so excellent a benefit of God, be called according to God's purpose by His Spirit working in due season: they through Grace obey the calling: they be justified freely: they be made sons of God by adoption: they be made like the image of His only-begotten Son Jesus Christ: they walk religiously in good works, and at length, by God's mercy, they attain to everlasting felicity."

The words, "working in *due season*" (in the Latin Article, "*opportuno tempore operanti*"), are not precisely the words which would be used to express an *irresistible* act of the Spirit working at a *predetermined* time. Here again, as in truth everywhere, the statement falls short of the Calvinistic requirement, and, by so falling short, fails to express it. It cannot "frame to pronounce" the shibboleth "right." It will not come up to the out-and-out statement.

Moreover, as they stand connected with the preceding clause—and they may not be severed from it and its meaning words, *ex hominum genere*—they describe "not the election of men, preferred one before another on account of their personal qualities, but of Christians, distinguished as an aggregate from the remainder of the human race, by a characteristical discrimination, by being called, justified, and sanctified, through Christianity."¹

II.—THE TWO CAUTIONS.

We proceed to the two cautions of the second paragraph of the Article, which reads as follows:

"As the godly consideration of Predestination, and our Election in Christ is full of sweet, pleasant, and unspeakable comfort to godly persons, and such as feel in themselves the working of the Spirit of Christ, mortifying the works of the flesh, and their earthly members, and drawing up their mind to high and heavenly things, as well because it doth greatly establish and confirm their faith of eternal Salvation to be enjoyed through Christ, as because it doth fervently kindle their love towards God: So for curious and carnal persons, lacking the Spirit of Christ, to have continually before their eyes the sentence of God's Predestination, is a most dangerous downfall, whereby the Devil doth thrust them either into desperation, or into wretchedness of most unclean living, no less perilous than desperation."

(a) The first caution relates to the basis, the ground, the stand-

¹ "Bampton Lectures," p. 174.

point from which we may properly and usefully consider "Predestination and our Election;" the Article still, we must observe, refusing to make the Calvinistic distinction between these two, and by the insertion of the word *our*, calling our thoughts off from the individualism of Calvinism, and directing them to Christians collectively.

That stand-point is declared to be the finding in ourselves "the working of the Spirit of Christ, mortifying the works of the flesh, and their earthly members, and drawing up their mind to high and heavenly things;" in other words, the knowledge, which it is within the power of each one of us to attain, that we are living in obedience to the Law of God. Here, and here only, *in a present and actual godly life*, can we take our stand, and find a basis for our hopes.

And more than this is necessarily involved in the words. For, since no such godly life can be lived by any who, being able to be admitted into the Body of Christ and "grafted into the Church," are not so admitted and grafted, it follows that membership in the Church of God must enter into the qualifications necessary for "the *godly* consideration of Predestination." A member, then, of Christ's Church, and he a living member, living a godly life, is the only one who has any right to find comfort in meditating on this doctrine.

And this is no far-fetched idea imported into the Article. It comes necessarily out of it, when we remember that it must be so interpreted as to reconcile it with what other Articles—as has been shown above—teach concerning the universality of the redemption effected by the death of Christ. "God's predestination is bestowed on every baptized Christian. . . . The fact of God bringing men to baptism is synonymous with His choosing them in Christ out of mankind,—with His calling them according to His purpose by His special working in due season." The Article says, "in exact opposition to Calvinism, that God will not act in a tyrannical, arbitrary way, but according to His mingled justice and mercy; that we may comfort ourselves in the thought of His predestination for us, His preparation of good things in store for us, with full assurance and trust, only never leaving out of sight that, as a result of our free will, we may make vain all that He has put in our power."¹

The caution precisely agrees with what Bancroft urged in the Conference at Hampton Court: "The Bishop of London took occasion to signifie to his Majesty, how very many in these daies,

¹ Bishop of Brechin on the Articles, vol. i. p. 254. *O si sic omnia!*

neglecting holiness of life, presumed too much of persisting of grace, laying all their religion upon predestination. If I shall be saved, I shall be saved; which he termed a desperate doctrine, shewing it to be contrary to good divinity, and the true doctrine of predestination, wherein we should reason rather *ascendendo* than *descendendo*, thus: 'I live in obedience to God, in love with my neighbor, I follow my vocation, etc., therefore, I trust that God hath elected me, and predestinated me to salvation;' not thus, which is the usual course of argument: 'God hath predestinated and chosen me to life, therefore, though I sin never so grievously, yet I shall not be damned; for whom He once loveth, He loveth to the end.'"¹

(b) As the first caution brings before us those who are in a condition to undertake the "godly consideration of Predestination," so the second declares who they are that have no right to consider it at all; and points out the two opposite, but equally wretched, results, to one or the other of which, if they do dwell upon it, they will be sure to come.

The persons to whom this consideration is forbidden as full of danger, if they are members of Christ's Church at all, are in no wise living members of it. They "lack the Spirit of Christ," and cannot find in themselves its "workings" unto godliness. They are "curious" persons; that is, persons who, instead of regulating their lives, through Divine grace, by the clearly-revealed law of God, take to speculating about His decrees and His secret purposes as bearing on themselves; reasoning *descendendo*, and not *ascendendo*; prying where they have no possible right to; and so becoming the victims of notions which "unsettle all principle, and perplex but never convince." They are "carnal persons;" that is, persons of "debauched morals" and evil lives, "wholly alien from the Spirit of Christ."

And these are led, the caution asserts, by their prying speculations and questionings, to utter despair on the one hand, or, on the other, to careless, unconcerned persistence in ungodliness, as something which predestination prevents from being of any practical importance to themselves.²

Now, there can be no doubt that the practical effect of these cautions must be to discourage just that line of speculation which Calvinism encourages and delights in. So far forth, then, their drift

¹ Cardwell's "Conferences," pp. 180, 181.

² It is worthy of remark that Calvin seems to recognize only the latter of

is away from Calvinism. They do not come up even to St. Augustine's idea of the usefulness of preaching on predestination, though they do fall in with other words of his in which a Catholic belief and temper triumph over the requirements of a speculative system. "In this matter, let not the Church wait for laborious disputations, but pay heed to her daily prayers. She prays that unbelievers may believe; it is God then that converts to the faith. She prays that believers may persevere; it is God then that grants perseverance unto the end."¹

III.—THE TWO CANONS OF INTERPRETATION.

What settles, however, beyond cavil or question (and that apart from all *a priori* probabilities derived from the Articles themselves, and all *a posteriori* historical arguments), the true interpretation of Article XVII. is found in its third and concluding paragraph.

"Furthermore, we must receive God's promises in such wise, as they be generally set forth to us in Holy Scripture: and, in our doings, that Will of God is to be followed, which we have expressly declared unto us in the Word of God."

Here are two clearly enunciated canons of interpretation; first, God's promises are to be received "as they be *generally* set forth to us in Holy Scripture;" and, secondly, in our doings we are to follow the "expressly declared will of God."

(a) What, precisely, does the first clause mean? Many persons, no doubt, are misled by a false definition of the word *generally*. They take it to mean ordinarily, commonly, usually, or sometimes, perhaps, what men call "in a general way," lacking definiteness and distinctness. Scholars do not need to be told that the word means nothing of the kind. In the Latin Article it reads, "*generaliter* propositae sunt." It is a dialectic, scholastic word. It is synonymous with *universaliter*, *generi humano*, and it signifies universally, to the whole human race.

Now, this is squarely opposed to the Calvinistic idea, which takes into account not what God has promised, universally, to all men, but what He wills to do in the case of each segregated and separated individual of the race; "*de unoquoque homine*," as Calvin himself says, in a passage already quoted. This canon of interpreta-

these dangers, and says nothing of the former (Inst. lib. iii. c. xxiii. 10). "Was it," says Abp. Laurence, "because he could not, consistently with his principles, refute the objection by urging the universality of grace, and a serious disposition on God's part to promote the salvation of all men?"—"Bampt. Lectures," p. 177, note. ¹ Works, vol. x. p. 829 (Bened. ed.).

tion, then, is a death-blow to Calvinistic individualism. That theory cannot stand before it for an instant. It sends it at once to its "own place," the region of abstract, presumptuous, and profitless speculation.

(b) The second canon looks in the same direction. Whatever "secret counsels" there may be with God, whatsoever mysteries of will that man can never fathom, there is a clearly-revealed will and purpose of our Heavenly Father set forth to us in His Holy Word. And that will is that "all men should be saved and come unto the knowledge of the truth;" "that the Gospel should be preached to every creature;" "that God sent not His Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world through Him might be saved;" and that "the grace of God that bringeth salvation, hath appeared to all men." This "expressly-declared" will is set forth in the clear statement of Article VII., that "everlasting life is offered to *man-kind* in Christ;" offered, not in an unconditional decree, but in conditional promises.¹

We may sum up our two canons in the words of Archbishop Laurence: "Assuming God's universal promises as the groundwork of predestination, it requires us to embrace them, not as confined to certain favorites previously ordained to bliss, but as general to the whole human species, to whom our Church elsewhere considers eternal life as offered without discrimination, and not to indulge every evil propensity of our nature, under the pretence of being overruled by a secret will of heaven, which we can neither promote nor resist; but to act in conformity with that will, which is clearly revealed to us in Holy Scripture; a disposition in the common parent of all men to effect the salvation of all who obstruct not his operations on their part, discarding 'the means of grace, and the hope of glory.'" ²

We cannot refrain from adding Bishop Pearson's keen and searching comment: "The Seventeenth Article of Religion established in our Church, orders the doctrine of predestination to be so delivered, as that we shall embrace the Divine promises as they are *generaliter* set forth to us in Holy Scripture, and in our actions follow that will of God which is expressly revealed to us in His Word. That is, unless I am mistaken, that we confess all promises made in the Gospel to the entire human race to be

¹ We refer nowhere in this analysis to the language of the Prayer Book, not because it is not in entire harmony with the Article as analyzed and interpreted, but simply because we are just now dealing with the Articles alone.

² "Bampt. Lectures," p. 178.

true and real, and not feigned or fallacious; and that we declare that every precept concerning faith, good works, and perseverance, has an actual binding power in respect to all men. That promises universally made to all men can be true and real in respect of those who are reprobated to damnation from all eternity, that precepts and laws should strictly bind those who, from mere gratuitous grace, are predestinated to eternal life, is, perhaps, an easy thing to say; it is, certainly, a very difficult thing to explain."¹

Suppose, now, to bring the matter to a practical test, that the former preaching of New England had been set to the key-note of these canons, what would have been the result? In all probability, that *πρώτον ψεύδος* of Calvinism, which forgets "that (there being neither first nor second as to time in God, who seeth what is past, present, and to come, with one view, therefore) there is no such thing as predestination, *strictly taken*,"² would have been avoided. At all events, that ingrained idea of unconditional bestowments, which, coupled with the entire confusion of redemption and salvation, has worked itself out into Universalism, could never have made such disastrous outcome. Nor could the substitution of an unconditional decree, touching individuals, in place of a freely gracious, but still conditional offer to all mankind, have prepared the way for those two sore evils which to-day infest New England; that intensely subjective individualism which finally ends in mere emotional sentimentalism, and that toughest and roughest form of infidelity, the infidelity of indifferentism. Instead of this, the wind was sown, and the whirlwind must be reaped.

Returning now, after this analysis of its several parts, to the Article as a whole, we ask our readers' attention to a most remarkable contemporaneous exposition of it, which has been preserved to us. A contemporaneous exposition of a disputed document must always possess some weight. And in the present instance, as we shall directly see, the circumstances under which, and the persons by whom it was made, invest the one now to be considered with an interest and value that are not merely peculiar, but unique.

As early as the year 1533, the "Act of Submission" had provided for the appointment of thirty-two commissioners to compile a code of ecclesiastical laws, and to give them legal effect under the great seal; a provision twice afterward renewed, in 1535 and 1543. "In conformity with these acts, so much progress was made in the

¹ Minor Works, vol. i. p. 258.

² Robert Calder, quoted in "Harmony of Anglican Doctrine," etc., p. 44.

compilation, that letters patent were prepared before the death of King Henry VIII., for the purpose of issuing the code, and giving it legal effect." They were not, however, issued. In 1549, a new reign having begun, an act was passed empowering the king to appoint thirty-two persons "to compile such ecclesiastical laws as should be thought by him, his council, and them, convenient to be practised in all the spiritual courts of the realm." No appointment having been made under the act, a royal commission was issued, November 11, 1551, intrusting the prosecution of the revision to Archbishop Cranmer and seven other persons; and a transcript of the previous compilation was made for their use. This transcript, with the alterations of Cranmer and Peter Martyr, is still extant. The result of their labors was the work known as the *Reformatio Legum*. It never became law, for reasons which are of no consequence at present.

What we need to observe here is, that it was put in shape in 1551-52, the very time when the Forty-two Articles of Edward were in process of construction, "and that it was the work of nearly the same hands." We rarely obtain a contemporaneous exposition which so exactly coincides in time with the document to which it is to be applied, or proceeds so entirely from the very persons who framed the document itself.

But this is not all. This *Reformatio Legum* was revised by Archbishop Parker, and first printed in 1571, the very year in which the Thirty-nine Articles of Elizabeth were finally subscribed by Convocation, and ratified by Parliament. So that, again, this document, under revision at the same time with the Forty-two Articles, and revised by the same persons who had them in hand, becomes a second time a contemporaneous witness to the meaning of the Articles. Never, probably, before or since, has any document had such a history. The value of its testimony, when we are seeking in the exposition of any of the Articles the *animus impo-nentis*, can hardly be overrated.

The first title of the work is, "Of the Holy Trinity and the Catholic Faith;" the second title is, "Of Heresies;" and here, in chapter xxii., we find the first, the last, and the only mention of predestination, in these words:

CHAPTER XXII.—OF PREDESTINATION.

"Finally, there live in the Church many persons of untamed and ill-regulated character, who, while in point of fact they are
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curious, puffed up with luxury, and altogether alien from the Spirit of Christ, are always in their discourse prating about predestination and rejection (or, as they are wont to call it, reprobation) in such a way that, where God hath in His eternal counsel arranged anything certain, either concerning salvation or concerning destruction, they seek from it a cloak for their evil deeds and crimes, and for perversity of every sort. And when their pastors reprove their careless and disgraceful life, they lay the blame of their crimes on the will of God, and think that, by this defence, the reproaches of those who admonish them are overthrown; and so at last, under the guidance of the devil, they either are cast headlong into present desperation, or else, without either penitence or consciousness of guilt, fall away into a sort of lax and unmanly carelessness of life; which two evils seem to have a diverse nature, but the same end. But we, being learned in the Holy Scriptures, lay down the following teaching in this matter, inasmuch as we have undertaken a diligent and careful consideration of our predestination and election, whereof it was determined by the will of God before the foundations of the world were laid. Now, this diligent and serious consideration of these things, of which we spoke, soothes with a certain sweet and very pleasant consolation the minds of pious men, inspired as they are by the Spirit of Christ, and bringing the flesh and the members into subjection, and tending upward to heavenly things; for it confirms our faith in the eternal salvation which is to come to us through Christ; it lights most fervent flames of love toward God; it wonderfully arouses us to thanksgiving; it leads us far toward good works, and it draws us far away from sins, since we are elected of God and made His sons; which peculiar and excellent condition requireth of us the greatest healthfulness of character and the most excellent perfection of virtue; in fine, it diminisheth our pride, that we may not think that that is done by our strength which is granted by the free kindness of God and by His infinite goodness. Moreover, we judge that no one can draw from this matter any excuse for his faults, because God hath arranged nothing unjustly in any matter, nor doth He, at any time, urge our wills to sin without their consent. Wherefore, all must be warned by us, that in undertaking actions, they should not refer themselves to the decrees of predestination, but should frame the entire manner of their lives according to the laws of God, while they consider both the promises to the good and the threats to the wicked, as they are *generally* [*generaliter*] set forth in the Holy Scriptures. For we ought to enter upon the worship of God in those ways, and to

rest in that will of God, which we see laid open before us in the Holy Scriptures."¹

Apart from all historical testimony, no one, we are sure, can read this document without recognizing at once the identity of its phraseology with that of Article XVII. The same minds must have shaped, the same hands have written both. There is no escape from this conviction. Nor does the conclusion to which the phraseology of the document brings us need any urging or explaining. It is perfectly obvious to any reader. No persons holding Calvin's system, or writing in its interests, could have been content to permit the only mention of predestination to be found under a title treating of heresies. No such persons could speak of predestination, and especially of reprobation, as the writers of the *Reformatio Legum* do. And yet these very persons drew up the original Articles of 1552; and others of like mind with them, and who adopted their words, were concerned in that revision which was finally settled in 1571.

Coming, therefore, to Article XVII. with the certainty that every point of the system of Calvin, unless it be, possibly, unconditional predestination to life, is either directly contradicted or significantly omitted in the Articles as a whole; finding that this very Article, when fairly analyzed, always refuses, in speaking of predestination to life, to come up to the requirements of Calvinism, in some cases flatly denies them, and imposes two canons for expounding God's Word (and, *a fortiori*, itself) which are absolutely fatal to their claims; taking into account the important bearing of a contemporaneous exposition, which is, in character and value, absolutely unique; remembering that against all this there is really nothing to allege, but the vague notion that the word predestination *must* mean Calvinism; we have a right to say, and to be thankful to God that we can say, If this is Calvinism, make the most of it!

There still remains to be considered a most important confirmatory line of argument, derived from a succession of historical facts. This, however, must be reserved, together with something in the way of positive exposition, for another paper.

¹ Cardwell's edition, p. 21.



JOHN SKELTON.

THOUGH he was Master of Arts and Poet "Laureat" from both Universities, besides a "Laureat" degree from Louvain, royal orator to Henry VII., and after to his son, tutor to this son, and some time Rector of Disse, in Norfolk, and, above all, a witty, fearless writer of strong, racy, idiomatic English, on subjects that were, if of temporary, yet of absorbing interest, and in every way a notable man in his day,—John Skelton is wellnigh a forgotten worthy. Once, he held responsible office and filled high duties in the second rank of those in public service around the able statesmen who guided the rapid course of events from the Field of Bosworth to the Field of the Cloth of Gold; now, a short notice, a few lines, a sweeping condemnatory epithet, comprise all he gets from our ordinary works on the literature of his day. Consequently, rare copies of single poems, known to have existed not long ago, have irrecoverably perished. His few surviving works even have been carefully collected and collated only in our day. Yet he has not really deserved this treatment. None of the writers of his day could compare with him in facile and ready style. He was no mere rhymster; as he claimed for himself, he had pith in his manner as well as his matter, and few could do weightier justice to their subjects than himself. But Pope pilloried him with the phrase, **BEASTLY SKELTON**, and it has been the religious duty of every scribbler since to pelt him with some ugly epithet. It is not

fair. His works are not near as coarse as many a standard writer of Queen Anne's day, nor would the freedom of his writings have called up a blush on the cheek of any lady of his acquaintance, however rude it may seem to our nicer moods. But there are reasons why he has suffered in ill-deserved neglect, or, more truly, in deserved neglect that he has compelled most readers to inflict. He gave to selfish ends, and to local, temporary events, powers that were intended for better and broader purposes. He had, at an early age, the name of an able scholar, and had the opportunity of leading English scholarship; he wasted it in a tutorship over Prince Henry, and sought the eminence he might have gained by other paths in court intrigue and solicitation, and, failing that, vented his spleen in satires that would be bitter and powerful if we could only understand them. Yet to us he becomes, by this very selfishness, a representative of the temper and modes of thought of the Englishmen of his day. He, probably, in his own circle (and it was not a limited one either), led opinion, and was equally a glass to reflect the strong feeling current in all classes, from the House of Commons down to the country squires of his parish. His characteristics were wit, energy, and a restless, penetrative, satiric talent, which he was at no pains to hide, and which he finally expended in full upon Cardinal Wolsey. A partisan of the guerilla sort that commands popularity—a literary Bohemian, if there ever was one—in the broader traits of his character, he was English to the core; English in his prejudices, English in his likings, in his hatreds, in his fearlessness, in his moral cowardice. His power of invective and his quaintness would give an interest to poems which are too obscure in allusion to enjoy. He had a wondrous facility in rhyming, and real poetic capacity which could have risen to nobler themes; but his passion bore him recklessly into extremes. Almost Aristophanic in his mad waggishness, almost Rabelaisian in his grotesque word-pictures, yet not the peer of either, he is one of the big Lanterns in Pantagrueian Lanternland.

So very little is known of his career in its details, so few central dates can be recovered, so few facts can be gleaned from his own writings, vain as he was of himself, that the very meagreness of detail has lessened the interest we think he ought to command. The "Merie Tales" come under the *ben trovato* class, for certainly they are not too truthful; but perhaps they give us the best clue to his character,—biographical they are not.

Owing allegiance to five kings in succession, from meek Henry VI. to "Bluff Harry," he passed through times eventful enough to

furnish somewhat more matter than the few dates we can set down. His birth is supposed to have been about 1460. A side-note in his "Replycacion" tells us that Cambridge was his Alma Mater, and, supposing him to be the person mentioned in an entry on the college records, he took his master's degree in 1484. Probably he soon after made his first venture in verse, "Of the Death of the Noble Prince, Kynge Edward the Forth." An eager scholar, he was winning a reputation that promised greater things, in stirring times when Europe was yearning for the New Learning. Italy, Germany, France, were filled with young and eager students, who afterward left a name, not only for letters, but for politics also. The revolutions that were occurring can hardly be estimated now. Edward V., Richard III., were rapidly followed by Henry VII. The selfish, avaricious Maximilian I. succeeded the generous, if weak, Frederic III. in the imperial throne. Crafty Louis XI. was followed by Charles VIII., who in turn left France to Louis XII. Italy was in a ferment from the Alps to the Straits of Messina, for Ferdinand of Aragon and Louis of France were intermeddling; and, besides, every petty state had a private war on its hands. A weary Genoese scaman was going from court to court with a notable scheme of a new route to India, meeting only with rebuffs. Here, then, were open lists for scholars, soldiers, statesmen, in which to win world-wide fame. The times demanded men of brain as well as men of sinew. If Skelton's range of work was finally fatally narrowed, yet now a noble opportunity was stretching out golden hands to him. His classical attainments were already well known on the Continent, for, in 1489, Louvain "Laureated" him abroad, and Oxford at home. It was a degree in rhetoric of which he was rather vain. In the next year Caxton entreats "Master John Skelton late created poete Laureate in the vnyuersity of oxenforde to ouersee and correcte this sayd booke, And t'addresse and expowne where as shall be founde faulte to theym that shall requyre it. For hym I knowe for suffyicent to expowne and Englysshe euery diffy-culte that is therin" (Preface to "The Boke of Eneydos," compiled by Vyrghyle). Where he was and what he did for the next three years we cannot tell; but, in 1493, Cambridge, with a caution that seems unaccountable, at last admitted her studious son to this same degree of Laureate, *i. e.*, in versification and rhetoric. The mention of Caxton's "Boke" suggests a topic we have never seen minutely traced. It would be amusing, and quite an addition to our information regarding the restoration of learning, to have sketched out the contrast between the current studies of the day and the fresh facts

that were being brought out by the eager students of the New Learning, as it was called; to note the gradual rise of a purer Latinity which replaced the barbarous jargon of the chronicles of the tenth and eleventh centuries. There are many little notes and facts that could be made to shed a curious light upon it. "Master John Skelton" must have been as much amused as Vyrghyle would have been astonished at the contents of the "Boke."

But this reputation was, under the guise of advancement, soon to do him real harm. By this time (1493) he was royal orator, and was, in true poetic vanity, wearing a brodered robe of office, Henry VII.'s gift.

Calliope,
As ye may se.
Regent is she.
Of Poetes al.
Whiche gaue to me
The high degre
Laureat to be
Of fame royall;
Whose name enrolde
With silke and golde
I dare be bolde
Thus for to were.

A blank of five years brings us to 1498, when the great evil befell him in the shape of the responsible office of tutor to Henry, Duke of York, whom his father destined to become Archbishop of Canterbury. For this duty Skelton probably took Orders (being made sub-deacon March 31st, deacon April 14th, ordained priest June 9th, by Thomas of Rochester, in one of the London churches), to fit him for the task of training the young Prince in theology. The next date we are comforted with is that of a poem by Erasmus, who, in a complimentary copy of verses to the royal family, gives his own high opinion of Master Skelton.

Tutorial duties do not present many points of public interest; but, privately, we would like to know if Skelton was permitted to birch the young Prince. If he *was*, and did not, much of the burden of Henry's future sins must lie heavily at Skelton's door. However the time may have been spent, pass it did, quietly enough. In 1501, Prince Arthur died, and the whole current of the court policy changed. The Prince Henry became heir-apparent, and the importance of Skelton's post was much enhanced. In 1504, Cambridge, more like a jealous stepmother than a justly proud *Alma Mater*, reaffirmed his degree of Poet Laureate, with her per-

mission to wear his finely-trimmed robe. Can it be that he had already lampooned the heads of his college, and so received only such tardy favors as could be wrung from wincing masters and chancellors? We do not know when he was presented to the parish of Disse, in Norfolk, but we find this date appended to some rhyming epitaphs upon some of his deceased (?) parishioners, notably upon his sexton.

This is no chronological catalogue of his productions, so we will only refer to his wild dithyramb on the "Tunnyng of Elynour Rummyng," which is one of the quaintest extravaganzas in the language. It describes, in rough rhyme, the persons who crowded from far and wide to taste the ale at Dame Eleanor's tavern. It is as strong, and foaming with wit and sarcasm, as the stinging October ale brewed by that renowned and, probably, slatternly alewife.

These *jeux d'esprit* already struck out the short jingling rhyme of which he afterward was so thoroughly the master as to give it his own name. But, probably, his official duty and his student training made the full and pompous versification then in use much more pleasant, as it was more dignified and courtly.

His "Solacious Dyties" and "Balettys" were much more to his taste, and, perhaps, added more to his immediate fame than the free caracoling tags of rhyme by which he is now remembered. That he was capable of true feeling it is needless to assert; nor did his irreverence rise to irreligiousness. His solemn verses, "Woe-fully Arraid," show a power that would have made him the pulpit orator of the day, but for his luckless wit, for which, indeed, the actual preaching of that age gave an opening. Not a single authentic mention is made of his sermons or addresses, and apparently his office as royal orator was a sinecure, if not purely honorary.

Events were rapidly succeeding each other, and materially changing the course of affairs. Prince Arthur died in 1501, and Skelton's royal pupil became heir to the throne. This should have secured Skelton a step upward,—a canonry, at least. His learning and ability were undoubted. But his writings give us the key to the causes that kept him down, so sorely to his disappointment. Men in office need discreet tongues, and should be at least "practicable" men. But he had too little craft, was—and prided himself upon being—a sturdy Englishman, and, probably, trusted too much to his offices and his ability to fear rivals; yet his rivals in favor were the members of the royal household, or literary opponents, and not those of higher rank. In truth, he was not fitted for high preferment in the Church. Political place would have suited him

much better, had he been *serviceable* enough. But, for all that, he deserved much better treatment than he obtained. Rector of Disse he was, rector of Disse he died. Even in an age when such honors were too carelessly bestowed, it would have been too much to have had a waggish dean playing mad pranks with a thievish miller, or a satirical bishop pinning a temporal lord with a lampoon. Besides, Skelton took to himself a wife, though he would not, or, rather, could not, publicly own her. He shrank before that public opinion which denied to a holy priest a wife, but allowed him a concubine. But for this he felt the force of his diocesan's wrath, not so much for his sin—it was too common with others too—but because he had attacked the Dominican friars; in fact, Skelton had not too great a love for any one of the Four Orders. The social position of a priest was, at that time, quite as anomalous as the later position sketched out by Macaulay. If his talents were of an order equal to his true office, his office gave him a vantage of vast power. But mediocrity in the man sank the office to become an oracle with the poor and middle classes, and an endured necessity with the higher ranks, which was not at all relieved by his celibate state. Then, too, the mode of life—so much of it passed at taverns and ale-houses as places of common resort—tended (at least, if measured not unfairly, and with allowances from our different mode of thought) to lower his authority, if it added to his popularity. With Skelton, probably, these evils were much enhanced. He was a resident at court, but had perforce to spend much time at his rectorate, where, it is not unfair to suppose, both from purely legendary sources, it is true, yet showing at least the character he popularly bore, and from his own rhymes, that he was not inattentive to his priestly duties. But to ride back and forth from parish to court was a disagreeable occupation, and if we may judge of the sketches of travel in those days, given in the Paston Letters, in Erasmus's Epistles—not to omit the wagoners at Gadshill—we are not surprised that good cheer of the most substantial sort was the main solace of the traveller.

In 1509, the death of Henry VII. put his pupil on the throne. But this did not advance the tutor a whit, who, in fact, became a sort of laureated jester to his majesty for a time. He had learned the habit of hanging about the court in hopes of preferment, as is evident from his subsequent fortunes. His post as royal orator gave him a proper footing, and his hopes were rising, till graver matters gave a different turn to affairs.

Henry had at first gathered around him his father's old councillors, and seemed inclined to adopt their cautious policy. But they were

too old, wary, trained in the parsimonious ways of the preceding reign. This could not last long, for their young master was self-willed, impetuous, and profuse. In the preliminary struggle for place, the contest seemed to be between Fox, the able Bishop of Winchester, and the young chivalrous Earl of Surrey, when a new aspirant for political power stepped forth. Thomas Wolsey, some time (after varied fortunes) chaplain to the Marquis of Dorset, then chaplain and almoner to Henry VII., and Dean of Lincoln, chiming in with the royal humor, and insinuating acceptable hints, soon outstripped both the earl and the bishop in the royal favor, and began that wondrous career, surpassed only by Becket's, which has stamped his name indelibly upon the history of England.

Skelton, we hinted, was airing his witticisms for the royal amusement. It is probable that Sir Christopher Garnische, afterward one of those useful gentlemen for third-class work in public affairs, had provoked Skelton's ready sarcasm. Sir Christopher may have rivalled the tutor in Henry's good graces; at least, that fits in with the tone of the "*flyting*," or possibly his majesty may have been at the bottom of the quarrel, by setting Garnische on at first,—at any rate, to Henry's amusement. Skelton had an angry rhyming quarrel with Sir Christopher; but he had shrewdness enough to find that he gained nothing by it, and broke it off. To Wolsey's rising influence Skelton now tuned and worshipped. Full dearly he paid for it later.

His time was now occupied with writing for the king's amusement, or with making foes on every hand by his biting gibes and unbridled epigrams. Barclay, Dundas, Gaguin the French ambassador to England, felt his scathing pen, and resented it as best they could. The battles of Flodden and of the Spuy (in France) were duly celebrated, the former both in rambling rhyme and in the official hexameter; the latter only in Latin verse, over which he shows considerable mastery.

When so many intermediate dates are conjectural, we feel at liberty to put many poems at dates when we deem it most probable that they were composed, without positively asserting these to be the actual years when they were written. To this interval, while Henry and Wolsey were occupied with their continental schemes, we assign the "exquisite and original poem" of "Philip Sparrow." Our main reasons are, that now he had the freest time to write it light-heartedly, and that it shows a well-practised pen. It is easy to rhyme in his peculiar metre, but it is not easy to put the same flow and facile gracefulness into the seemingly rugged verses with-

out long practice. The cantering pace he so thoroughly appropriated was not new. It had been in use both in England and on the continent, where a contemporary satirist, Coquilart, employs the same rhythm to bear his bitter attacks. The cynical poet of Rheims, while having much in common with his English compeer, yet wanted the geniality which saved Skelton's hacking and hewing satire from downright cruelty. Both found this metre the most convenient vehicle to carry their invectives. But the English satirist used it with untrammelled license, developing its resources, and bending it to serve his purposes, whether of pathos, tenderness, waggery, raillery, up to abusive invective and indignant reproach. With such an instrument fitted to his peculiar bent he produced "Phyllyp Sparowe." All that a vigorous fancy and an unrivalled command over a language which was fast expanding into new power and richness could gather around the loss of a pet bird, Skelton heaped in careless profusion, that bespoke an unlimited wealth of imagination yet behind. If the novice of the Black Convent at Carowe could have known what celebrity her bird was to obtain, she would have stuffed it (and the cat too) for the readers of the poem to look at. The anathema against the cruel cat is unsurpassed for force and mock indignation :

That vengeance I aske and crye,
 By way of exclamacyon,
 On all the hole nacyon
 Of cattes wilde and tame;
 God send them sorowe and shame!
 That cat specially
 That slew so cruelly
 My lytell prety sparowe
 That I brought vp at Carowe.
 O cat of carlyshe kynde,
 The fynde was in thy mynde
 Whan thou my byrde vntwynde!
 I wold thou haddest ben blynde!
 The leopardes sauage,
 The lyons in theyr rage,
 Myght catche thé in theyr pawes,
 And gnawe thé in theyr iawes!
 The serpentes of Lybany
 Myght styngé thé venomously!
 The dragones with their tonges
 Might poyson thy lyuer and longes.
 The mantycors of the mountaynes
 Might fede them on thy braynes!
 Melanchates, that hounde

That plucked Acteon to the ground,
 Gaue hym his mortall wounde,
 Chaunged to a dere,
 The story doth appere,
 Was chaunged to an harte:
 So thou, foule cat that thou arte,
 The selfe same hounde
 Myght thé confounde,
 That his owne Lord bote,
 Myght byte asondre thy throte!
 Of Inde the gredy grypes
 Might tere out all thy trypes!
 Of Arcady the beares
 Might plucke awaye thyne eares!
 The wylde wolfe Lycaon
 Byte asondre thy backe bone!
 Of Ethna, the brennyng hyl
 That day and night brenneth styll,
 Set in thy tayle a blase,
 That all the world may gase
 And wonder vpon thé,
 From Occyan the greate se
 Vnto the Iles of Orchady,
 From Tyllbery fery
 To the playne of Salysbery!
 So trayterously my byrde to kyll,
 That neuer ought thé euyl will!

Was ever cat so cursed out of each and all of her nine lives before? When we have finished the fourteen hundred lines of the elegy, we feel that Skelton pauses only because it so pleases him.

Let us place here, too, the sharp and well-deserved "Ware the Hauke," in which he lashes a sacrilegious priest who flew his falcon in the parish church at Disse. Who this clerk was, except that he was rector of Whipstock (no inappropriately named benefice for such a parson) is now probably past finding out. In the correspondence of Henry VIII., some years after Skelton's death, there is a letter from the king commending a certain priest, who had trained a fine cast of hawks for him, to the patronage of one of his ministers. Some such an unclerical clerk Skelton set up for public reprobation, and made the target for every epithet of scorn he could cram into his ragged lines.

It is not so very difficult for us to realize the real life of John Skelton. A comparison of dates makes it more than probable that he took Orders to fit himself—the foremost English scholar—for his

post as tutor to the intended future Archbishop of Canterbury. The curriculum of the day had made him necessarily a theologian of some skill. But—a layman during the years his true habits of life and thought were forming and hardening, filling only a canonical residence down in Norfolk, spending most of his time at court, an acknowledged wit—he does not represent the typical life of the parish priest in the reign of Henry VIII. His religious opinions were as strictly orthodox as those of his royal master. The New Learning, as it was called, was just beginning to gain real ground in England as he closed his career, but his sharp verse was already levelled at the Lutheran opinions beginning to get a foothold in the universities. And the unmeasured application of his knout to the sacrilegious rector of Whipstock for his desecration of his (Skelton's) parish church at Disse is proof enough of his sense of reverence, though our measure of clerical dignity may be far different from that applied in the year of grace 1509. His faults are such as make him rather kin to ourselves than a hero of biography. He stands forth as the sturdy, witty, able Englishman, not above or in advance of his day, but, rather, intensely pervaded by the thoughts and opinions then current, with more than average humor and courage. He showed truer manliness later in attacking Wolsey as he did, though urged on by the goads of disappointment and anger over broken hopes, than did the train of wary, gnawing intriguers that smiled, plotted, and hated the Cardinal, who towered above them as the mastiff above the pack of yelping curs by the roadside.

Keeping residence at Disse, as his allusions intimate, and residing at court, was but sorry work. It kept him shifting between London and Norfolk, and was undoubtedly very annoying. His patience was getting somewhat threadbare. But such weary waiting helped to develop into something higher than careless jesting the powers of satire hidden in the man. A certain amount of disappointment is needed to foster that bitterness that turns a sarcastic wit into a satirist. There is usually too much of the milk of human kindness in men of strong powers to permit them to attack even notorious social vices without a personal motive or provocation.

The "Bowge of Courte" (a dialogued attack upon the license of the court, in the popular allegory of a ship) seems to have been his first serious effort as a satirist. Its stately seven-line stanzas exhibit a good deal of force. The impersonations of Flattery, Riot, Deceit, and Disdain, recall the energetic sketches of Envy, Waste, Coveteise,

and their comrades, in the far-older Piers Ploughman. Here, again, we feel that the rector of Disse is only putting into words the popular temper. It fits in best when, as yet, Wolsey's administration was in its first lustre, and attacks could not be ventured upon him. Its tone is serious and temperate, with but little of Skelton's jesting vein. To this date we would assign his powerful poem, "Woffully Araid;" a poem that will bear comparison with many a more pretentious piece, in dramatic force and true eloquence:

Woffully araid,
 My blode, man
 For thé ran,
 It may not be naid;
 My body bloo and wan
 Woffully araid.

Beholde me, I pray thé with all thi hole reson,
 And be not so hard hartid and ffor this encheson,
 Sith I for thy sowle sake was slayne in good seson,
 Begylde and betrayed by Judas fals treson;
 Vnkyndly entretid,
 With sharpe corde sore fretid,
 The Jewis me thretid,
 They mowid, they gynnied, they scornid me
 Condempnid to deth, as thou maist se,
 Woffully araid.

Thus nakyd am I nailid, O man, for thy sake!
 I loue thé, then loue me; why slepist thou? awake!
 Remembir my tendir hart rote for thé brake,
 With panys my vaynys constreyned to crake;
 Thus toggid to and fro,
 Thus wrappid all in woo,
 Where as neuer man was so,
 Entretid thus in most cruell wyse,
 Was like a lombe offerd in sacrifice,
 Woffully araid.

Off sharpe thorne I haue worne a crowne on my hede,
 So paynyd, so straynyd, so rufull, so red;
 Thus bobbid, thus robbid, thus for thy loue ded,
 Onfaynyd not deynyed my blod for to shed;
 My fete and handes sore
 The sturdy nailis bore;
 What might I suffir more,
 Than I haue don, O man, for thé?
 Cum when thou list, wellcum to me,
 Woffully araide.

Off record thy good Lord y haue beyn and schal bee;
 Y am thyn, thou artt myne, my brother y call thee;
 Thé love I enterly; see whatt ys befall me!
 Sore bettyng, sore thretyng too mak thee, man, all fre.
 Why art thou wnkynde
 Why hast nott me yn mynde.
 Cum y ytt and thou schalt fynde,
 Myne endlis mercy and grace;
 See how a spere my hert dyd race,
 Woyfully arayd.

Deyr Brother, noo other thyng y off thee desyre
 Butt gyve me thyne hert fre to rewarde myn hyre:
 Y wrought thé, I bowght thé, frome eternal fyre;
 I pray thé aray thé tooward my hyght empyre,
 Above the oryent,
 Whereoff y am regent
 Lord God Omnyotent
 Wyth me too reyn yn endlis welthe
 Remember man thy sawlis helthe.

Woofully arayd
 My blode, man,
 For thé rane.
 Hytt may not be nayed;
 My body blow and wane
 Woyfully arayde.

This is the best of four or five hymns, which evince much power and deep feeling. But softer and more mundane thoughts were crowding his brain as well. About 1520, he wrote one of the most extraordinary poems it ever entered into the thought of any English poet to indite. He was visiting the castle of Sheriff Hutton, the seat of the Duke of Norfolk, in the train of Lady Elizabeth Stafford, Countess of Surrey, and daughter-in-law of the Duke. There, upon the incident of the ladies twining for him a garland of laurel, he wrote his singular and self-laudatory verses, the "Garlande of Laurell," in which he gives a list of his works. It has, indeed, some fine lines, and some very poetic images, but the author, for sixteen hundred lines, deliberately trumpets his own writings.

Its continuity is pleasantly interrupted by graceful verses to the several ladies of the party, and occasional hexameters and mysterious numbers whose computation is past finding out.

The poem opens with a vision given the entranced poet of the Queen of Fame and Dame Pallas, who discuss. Pallas finally suggests that the queen should have her trumpet blown, to see if Skelton will appear in her train. The thronging up of the aspirants

is very well described. As he watched the motley crew, Gower, Chaucer, and Lydgate summon him to join their company, which honor he modestly declines, till they use a gentle force to bring him to Dame Pallas, who sends him to the Queen of Fame. The various descriptions are very well done, and we wish we could find room for extracts. Brought before the queen, "Occupacyoun" joins them, and is ordered to show the park and its denizens to the poet. After the interludes of the verses to the ladies, as we mentioned, "Occupacyoun" shows Skelton a list of his works inscribed in the wondrous book of fame. After much discoursing, the thunderous slamming of the book wakes the dreaming poet.

The inordinate vanity which led him to write the poem finds its climax in the hexameters with which, as his wont was, he closed his poem :-

"Dicite, Skeltonis vester Adonis erat
Dicite, Skeltonis vester Homerus erat."

He certainly did not underrate himself.

The closing lines of the "l'Autre Envoy," a dedication to the king and the cardinal, find him still hopeful, but faint with delay.

His next essay—we speak hesitatingly, when we can only conjecture from the maturity of thought and style, or from the subject-matter, for allusions are surprisingly few to leading events—his next essay, "Colyn Cloute," goes a step beyond the "Bowege of Courte." He shoots his shafts at the clergy and their ill-living,—a much more open mark for a satirist than it happily is nowadays. We cannot help but think that hope deferred gave a sting to his invective, and that it was intended as a gentle reminder to the Cardinal, upon whose pleasure he had waited so long. His "Little Books," written for his Grace, had brought their author no advancement, though they were orthodox enough. His rude rhymes against the Scots, though most violently patriotic, did not forward his suit to the king a whit. Indeed, he was wellnigh awearry, and was evidently meditating a break with his ecclesiastical patron. The king was too dangerous a patron to show any disappointment. If he found Wolsey deaf to his softer pleadings, he should soon hear from him in a different tone.

Skelton had by him probably a satire which was jotted down at different times, as occasion presented fit topics for his verse. And now his disappointment supplied him with new material. The earlier part has perished, perhaps was sacrificed to the later and more powerful portion. It is the "Speke, Parrot," to which he

refers in the "Garlande of Lanrell," but which could not have then existed in the shape we have received. It is very obscure to us, but we can at least appreciate the severity of the attack upon the minister. We transcribe a stanza or two almost at hazard, to show the *vim* of his onset and the curious style he chose. The stanza first quoted may pertain to the tax that Wolsey tried to levy on the city of London:

Now, Galathea, let Parrot, I pray you, have his date;
Yet dates now are dainty, and wax very scant,
For grocers were grudged at and groaned at but late;
Great raisins with reasons be now reprobitant,
For raisins are no reasons, but reasons currant.
Run God, run devil! yet the date of our Lord
And the date of the devil doth shrewly accord.

Dixit, quod Parrot, the popagay royall.

Galathea.

Now Parrot, my sweet bird, speak out yet once again;
Set aside all sophisms, and speak now true and plain.

Parrot.

So brainless calves' heads, so many sheep's tails;
So bold a bragging butcher, and flesh sold so dear;
So many plucked partridges, and so fat quails;
So mangy a mastif cur, the great grey hound's peer;
So big a bulk of brow antlers cabbaged that year;
So many swans dead, and so small a rovel,
Since Deucalion's flood I trow no man can tell.

So much privy watching in cold winter nights;
So much searching of losels, and is himself so lewd;
So much conjuration for elvish midday sprites;
So many bulls of pardon published and shewed;
So much crossing and blessing; and him all beshrew'd;
Such pole axes and pillars, such mules trapped with gold,
Since Deucalion's flood in no chronicles is told.

Dixit, quod Parrot.

Oreocet in immensum me vivo Psittacus iste;

Hinc mea dicetur Skeltonidis inclita fama.

Quod Skelton Lawryat.

Orator Regius.

84.]

This was certainly plain writing. When it came out we have no means of ascertaining. Probably the recent discovery of long-closed archives in various family seats in England will help to throw
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light upon this part of Wolsey's career, and the meaning of much that Skelton wrote; but "Speke, Parrot," could not have preceded the "Why Came Ye Not to Courte" by any great length of time; which last onset exhausted the Cardinal's forbearance. As in other things, so now here we feel that Skelton is holding up the glass of popular opinion. Though expressing private wrongs, real or fancied, it matters not at this distance of time, yet he does not stand alone in attacks which would have then been but sheer recklessness. If the odds were against him as an individual, they were against Wolsey in the aggregate of men's opinions. The curiosity, and perhaps even pride, which Wolsey's magnificence excited at first, in after years turned to hatred deep and implacable as the people found that they were taxed with high-handed insolence to maintain his state. This hatred was indeed of slow growth, but it was all the deeper for that, and could wait the many years that were to intervene before the withdrawal of his master's favor precipitated his fall. But having private wrongs to revenge, and strong in the support of the common resentment, Skelton gave ready, fierce, and fearless expression to his angry feelings. But he had to flee to sanctuary at Westminster from the Cardinal's officers. This was in November, 1523. Whether he had foreseen such a close to his career or not, he had not attempted to restrain his pen. If he could not obtain, by pleading for it, what he deemed should have been given because promised, he determined to make Wolsey wince for his broken pledge, and spared no topic that so vulnerable a career as his Eminence's gave him. This description of Wolsey's conduct we have too good assurance from other sources to doubt as true:

The chief of his own council,
 They cannot well tell
 When they with him should mell,
 He is so fierce and fell.
 He rails and he rates,
 He calleth them doddypates:
 He grins and he gapes,
 As it were a jackanapes.
 Such a mad bedlam
 For to rule this realm,
 It is a wondrous case.

For what is a man better
 For the king's letter?
 For he will tear it asunder;

Whereat I much wonder
 How such a doddypole
 So boldly dare control,
 And so malapertly withstand
 The king's own hand,
 And not set by it a mite.
 He saith the king doth write,
 And writeth he wotteth not what;
 And yet for all that
 The king his clemency
 Dispenseth with his demency.

Wolsey's personal appearance, his birth, his private conduct, his public duties as Chancellor, his policy as Prime Minister, are all attacked with a sarcasm, scorn, and bitterness as only hate could express.

Skelton found a safe asylum under the wing of his friend the Abbot Islip. Here his career seems to have closed as suddenly as his liberty was abridged. Within the precincts of Westminster he passed the last six years of his life, from November, 1523, to June 21, 1529, when the irresistible sergent 'Death arrested him with the writ of *exeat mundo*. When dying, he is said to have made a tardy reparation to the woman he had married by acknowledging her and her children. He died just before Wolsey's fall was effected by the party which gathered around and used the ill-fated Anne Boleyn for their own selfish designs.

John Skelton was emphatically a representative man. His virtues, his faults, his failings, were the virtues and faults of the English of his day. His beliefs and his manners were the current ones of his day. His opinions he formed for himself, and yet they were deeply tinged with the prejudices of his time. His courage, both in its quality and in its exhibition, was peculiarly characteristic. A scholar of high repute, who, by a fatal court appointment, failed of the highest attainment open to him in the walks of pure literature; a poet of no mean capacity, endowed with exuberant fancy and true feeling; a humorist and wit, whom disappointment soured into a savage satirist; a master over English rivalled but by very few; bold and unsparing of his tongue and pen even to recklessness, John Skelton above all things hated humbug and cant, and mercilessly exposed them. Had he been a little more pliant, a little less sarcastic, his advancement would have been secured. Every line he has left but shows how his ambition wasted itself uselessly, and that capacities for better things were trifled upon unworthy themes. Vain as his valuation of himself was in making himself

the peer of Gower, Chaucer, and Lydgate, yet he was equal to either, save Chaucer. That he produced nothing positively to justify such a claim was the result of a mistaken career, not of inability. The fancy, the wit, the mad rhyming raillery of "The Tunnyng of Elynour Rummyng," the tenderness and humor of "Phyllyp Sparowe," sharply-drawn sketches of vices in the "Bowge of Courte," and the devout tone of the "Woffully Araid," prove a claim to powers equal to far better things than these even. But he hid his rare talent under a worthless heap of abusive and temporary satires. By these he has been judged and condemned. And then the contemptuous reference in a passing couplet by the poet who ruled under Queen Anne has sealed the fate of the reputation of a man remarkable for what he had done, and deserving a juster award.



LOCAL DEACONS.

MOST members of the "Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America" are acquainted with the following formula: "It is evident unto all men, diligently reading Holy Scripture and ancient Authors, that from the Apostles' time there have been these Orders of Ministers in Christ's Church,—Bishops, Priests, and Deacons." In this formula, which introduces the series of offices provided for setting apart those who are, in one capacity or another, to serve at her altars, our branch of the Church authoritatively instructs her members that the Church Catholic has, from the beginning, been possessed of three sorts or grades of ministers. Good Churchmen, then, even if they spare themselves the diligent reading which is suggested to them, will rest in the conclusion that the presence of all these grades is essential to the completeness of the ecclesiastical system; they would be excusable if they accepted the conclusion that if any grade were lacking, the Catholic Church would be incomplete. They will not tolerate the absence even of the lowest of the three. Repeating to themselves the words of the Apostle, "Nay, much more those members of the body, which seem to be more feeble, are necessary" (I. Corinthians, xii. 22), they will, while confronting the advocates of parity with the ancient war-cry, "No Church without a bishop!" be ready, if they can find anybody to oppose them on such an issue, to cry, "No Church without a deacon!" We propose to show with what a

cheerful courage this last watchword may be uttered whenever our adversaries, grown weary of forever assailing the episcopate, shall make a sudden charge on the diaconate.

We find, on pursuing our examination of the ordinal, that the Church gives the fullest sanction to the utterance of this note of defiance by her champions. The first rubric under the office for "making deacons" prescribes a "sermon or exhortation," which shall declare, among other things, "*how necessary* that order is in the Church of Christ." This rubric, repeated in the next office of the ordinal, is not repeated in the third, so that we feel a little more sure of deacons than of bishops, and become very stubborn in affirming that no Church can exist without them. And as we turn to contemplate the English and American Churches, and prepare to invite the scrutiny of any captious antagonist who may be conveniently at hand, we remark, with a gratification which we do not wish to conceal, the evidences that they possess the diaconate. We can appeal even to our laity to bear witness to its existence. There are probably not many laymen of mature age who have not at some time or other seen a deacon. But there is accessible documentary evidence in the shape of journals, diocesan and general, which is not less convincing than the personal recollections of the laity. The journal of the very last convention in Connecticut assures us that on or about the first of June, in the year 1872, as many as nineteen deacons were canonically resident in that diocese. A careful inspection of the list shows us, it is true, that these nineteen were not all locally resident, but we find that when every abatement has been made, at least eight ministers of this grade were at the time specified officiating in Connecticut. There was, in short, one for every county in the State. Indeed, the number is so great as to occasion us some uneasiness; for it appears from ancient authors that the Council of Neo-Cæsarea, held in the year 315, ten years before the Council of Nicæa, fixed the number for each diocese, or city, at seven. Connecticut had, therefore, it would seem, one deacon too many actually at work, without including the eleven supernumeraries who were fortunately doing nothing, or were busy at a safe distance from the jurisdiction of their diocesan. It is very painful to lie under the censure even of a provincial synod, of the ante-Nicene period, and we learn with great satisfaction that we are relieved from censure by the decrees of the second Council in *Trullo*, which set aside the embarrassing canon of Neo-Cæsarea. It is clearly proven, therefore, not only that deacons are necessary, and that we have them, but that in one diocese, at any rate, we have no more than we can

lawfully make use of. It is only reasonable, then, to suppose that our captious antagonist will have been driven back to the position of a candid inquirer. In this character he will undoubtedly ask us what deacons have to do. And while we are casting about us for a suitable reply, he may have time for some inferences of his own. Combining with the facts which we have set before him another fact which he has somewhere picked up respecting the close relation subsisting in very early times between the deacon and the bishop, he reasons as follows: It is plain that the deaconship is not a parochial, but a diocesan ministry, directly dependent on the episcopate. And inasmuch as in Connecticut there are exactly as many deacons as counties, it is probable that they are each charged with a subordinate jurisdiction; they are a species of presiding elders, or, very likely, of suffragan bishops, appointed to instruct and counsel and admonish the parochial clergy. Or, perhaps, their office respects the laity rather than the clergy; they journey from parish to parish to enlighten and rouse the people; they are, by eminence, the preachers of the diocese. Or, perhaps, finally, since the office of deacon appears at one time to have had something to do with the dispensing of charity, they are the diocesan almoners, the trustees of gifts and legacies, the bishop's council of advice in matters of finance.

By this time, we have refreshed our memories with regard to the functions of the diaconate, and we hasten to impress upon our disciple the magnitude of his errors. "You are wrong," we tell him, "in your primary inference as to the deacon's place in the system of the Church. You have only to open our Prayer Book in order to discover that every deacon is told, when he is admitted to his office, that he is to assist, not the bishop, but the priest, the clergyman who presides over the local Church; the parish is expressly named as the field of his labors. You are, of course, equally wrong in all your secondary inferences, in the various suppositions which you make as to the nature of his duties. How can you imagine that he is to superintend and teach the parochial clergy, when his knowledge of theology need not extend beyond the Prayer Book and the English Bible?¹ How can you imagine that he is to spend his time in circuit-preaching, when he is not to preach at all unless 'licensed thereto by the bishop himself?' How can you imagine that he is to administer the pecuniary affairs of the diocese, when he generally contrives to get through with his diaconal work by the time he is four and twenty?"

¹ Digest, Title I. Canon 2, § V. [1]; Canon 4, § III. [1].

The ignorance of our candid inquirer being thus far dissipated, we proceed to admonish him, with due severity, to respect and accept the claims of a Church with three orders, when he surprises us by begging leave to ask a few more questions. We have, of course, supplied him with a Prayer Book; we have also called his attention to the journal of our Diocesan Convention; he has somehow got into his hands a copy of the lately published journal of our last General Convention. Thus equipped, he proceeds, in that spirit of candor which we have so much admired and commended, to extract from our text-books and from us further information about the third order. "I perceive," he remarks, "that the object which you have in view in maintaining this order, is that the presbyters may have helpers in their parochial work; first, in the offices of worship and teaching, and, secondly, 'where provision is so made,' that is, I presume, in all well-regulated parishes, in the care of the poor and sick. The deacon is, by virtue of his office, the priest's assistant; the necessity for his office must lie in the fact that the priest—that is, the parish priest—needs assistance. Now, will you be good enough to make it clear to me how eight deacons can perform the functions which you declare to be so necessary, in almost one hundred and fifty parishes? And will you also explain to me why, in view of the immense demand which this necessity must create for the services of these eight men, only two of them, as the list of your diocesan clergy shows me, are engaged in the specific duties of their office? It would appear that the law of supply and demand has been repealed in the Diocese of Connecticut. I am still further perplexed by the wider view of the condition of the Protestant Episcopal Church which is given me in the journal of your last General Convention. If I understand its statistical tables, the presbyters of your Church, numbering, a year ago, two thousand five hundred and sixty-six, could command the services of just two hundred and thirty-one deacons. If the deacons were evenly distributed through your various episcopal jurisdictions, one of them would be allotted to every eleven presbyters, or thereabout. Making due deduction for unemployed clergymen of the second order, each of your parish priests would perhaps be entitled to so much assistance as he could get out of the ninth part of a deacon. But the distribution is very far from even. The one diocese in which equal and exact justice is done to the presbyters, I find, by careful computation, to be the Diocese of Illinois. There the third and second orders stand to each other in the proportion of one to eleven and a fraction. But in New Hampshire, Mississippi,

and Texas, the supply of diaconal ministrations is unreasonably large, the proportion being, in each case, one to three and a fraction. This extravagant allowance can only be maintained at the expense of other dioceses, and I accordingly find that in Central New York, on the 1st of October, 1871, there was one deacon to every twenty-nine presbyters; in Massachusetts, there was one deacon to every thirty-nine presbyters; while in Ohio there was one deacon to ninety-five presbyters, the whole number; and a deacon was, at that time, a rarer sight than a bishop. My sleep forsakes me for the thought of this unhappy man, catechising the youth and searching for the 'impotent people' of one hundred and twelve parishes, scattered over forty thousand square miles of territory. And I tremble for the harmony of the Ohio presbyters, who must be more than human if they can take peaceable possession of their respective fractions of the Ohio diaconate. Relief comes to me, however, with the reflection that probably the same usage obtains in that diocese as in your own, and that the deacon of Ohio, when she happens to have one, probably makes no attempt to act as a deacon, but does his best to be a presbyter.

"Now, since the necessity for an order of ministers inferior to the priesthood grows, according to your highest authorities, out of the wants of the local Church; since the number of ministers of this lower grade is, according to your official statements, hopelessly inadequate to the supply of those wants; and since it is notorious that a large proportion of the presbyters-in-novitiate, whom you choose to style deacons, do not even try to supply them, permit me to ask you whether you prefer to contradict your Church by denying the necessity of the diaconate, or to annihilate her by denying that she possesses three orders. The result of my diligent reading of the ordinal and the clergy-lists has been to satisfy me that your deacons have about as much claim to be called a distinct order as the fringe of bells and pomegranates on the high-priest's robe had to be called a distinct vestment. And I trust, for the sake of a religious body which I respect, that its members will not take up the watchword, 'No Church without a deacon,' for if the principles involved in it are once established, the Protestant Episcopal Church, in nineteen-twentieths of its parishes, will immediately become extinct."

Thus far our candid inquirer. Now, what are we going to say to him? He has merely elucidated by statistics, within the reach of us all, what we all knew, in a general way, before, and what we never think of denying. Such remarks as these, "We have practi-

cally no deacons," "The diaconate is only a stepping-stone to the priesthood," are heard from our clergy almost daily. So far as his facts are concerned, we have nothing to do but to admit them. With his unpleasant inferences we have to deal in some such way as this: Deacons are certainly necessary, for both the Church and the New Testament tell us so, and most of us know by abundant experience how hard it is to do our work without them. And, on the other hand, our Church cannot be said to have forfeited her charter through the lack of them; for, in the first place, she has more than two hundred ministers who are neither bishops nor presbyters, and of these there is here and there one who does occupy himself in assisting the priest in Divine Service, and in looking after the sick and the poor. And, in the second place, so long as we have the historical episcopate, the ministry through which other ministries are kept in being, the Church continues to exist in that; the root, or, if you please, the trunk, of the tree is alive, though on one side it can scarcely be said to bear any fruit. But this fact of unfruitfulness is manifest, and is, or ought to be, very painful. Labors for Christ, wellnigh the noblest and most effective of any which are undertaken in His Name, efforts to bring His grace, under its forms of help and consolation, into contact with human wants,—those ministrations which commend the Church to the world as the good Samaritan, and incline men to welcome her higher spiritual gifts, are done imperfectly, or left undone, because the organ to which such functions are assigned is virtually absent. The hand which lifts and wields the sword of the Spirit is not wholly unequal to its task, but the hand which should offer the oil and wine is withered and powerless. The priests of the Church attempt to discharge the duties of those helpers whom the Church describes to them, which she does not furnish them; but they are compelled to see occasions for showing Christ to their fellows as the Friend of the sorrowful, continually escaping them, simply because one man cannot do the work of seven, in addition to his own. The laity, inspired by Christian zeal, or by mere humanity, supplement his labors with more or less activity and wisdom, but their efforts are oftenest irregular and spasmodic, for the lack of that authorized leadership of which they hear, whenever the origin of the primitive diaconate is narrated, by the appointment of the Church, at the ordination of her deacons. And in the meantime, those whom the Church, according to our present usages, exhorts to complete their preparation for the presbyterate by "using the office of a deacon well," are seldom allowed to use it at all. The work of the pres-

byter, to the full extent of its labor and responsibility, is thrown upon them at once, while they are denied its most sacred privileges. They discharge its duties under the embarrassment of restrictions which are as irrational as they are vexatious. We expect them to perform a presbyter's office, while we refuse to give them a presbyter's authority and commission. If we must preserve the fiction of a third order, we might ordain men deacons in the morning, and priests in the afternoon. The diaconate would be quite as much of a reality as it is now, and we should not see the work of the priesthood undertaken by a body of unqualified priests. It would certainly seem that so long as a man may perform the characteristic functions of the deaconship by simply refraining from celebrating the Eucharist, from pronouncing the absolution, and from saying the longer benediction, his term of service might be shortened without much loss to the Church. And any advantage which there may be in having a period of probation is rather dearly purchased by laying one or two hundred parishes under an interdict.

The Church has not been wholly unconscious of these lamentable facts, nor wholly indifferent to them. An attempt has been made to secure a permanent diaconate by providing for the ordination of deacons who do not possess the literary qualifications which are required of candidates for the priesthood. The attempt has, however, met with very limited success, and for obvious reasons. Just so far as the ministry is regarded as a profession, through the exercise of which are to come one's means of support and one's place in society, so far will the inducements to enter it be influenced by the prospect of securing an average position in it. The ministry *is* a profession, though it is something more and higher, and it must sometimes be looked at and treated as one. Now, when we ask young men to adopt this profession, and, at the same time, consign themselves to permanent inferiority, we are making a vocation, which seems to be already quite unattractive enough, absolutely repulsive. It is not very difficult to reconcile one's self to the thought of being always a journeyman, but nobody wants to be an apprentice for life. The natural consequence is that the "restricted deacons" endeavor to get rid of their restrictions as soon as possible. They either acquire the qualifications which they lack—a course commendable in itself, but in no great degree increasing their efficiency as deacons—or else they persuade their bishop to dispense with the qualifications, and admit them to the priesthood without them,—a course which may be proper enough in exceptional cases, but which cannot be followed as a rule without

serious injury to the Church. This disposition on the part of deacons "under the new canon," constitutes a grave objection to the increase of their numbers; and probably most clergymen would be inclined rather to repress than to stimulate the desire of young men to enter what, in our dreamy moods, we call "the permanent diaconate."

But is there no remedy? Is the Church actually unable to provide herself with that ministry, the lack of which is at once her weakness and her shame? There is a remedy, and a very simple one; too simple and obvious not to have suggested itself to many presbyters, forced, day after day, to "leave the Word of God, and serve tables," and longing for the relief which deacons would give them. Before stating it, it will be well to notice two theoretical difficulties in the way of using it, which the action of our Church in trying, however ineffectually, to meet the want, has virtually disposed of. The first is the idea that deacons who "well behave themselves in this inferior office" are to expect to be raised to the priesthood. If this idea were to govern the legislation of the Church, not only must a permanent diaconate be condemned as unsound in principle, but the supply of deacons, being limited to such candidates for the priesthood as are passing through one short stage of their preparation, must be forever unequal to the demand. The theory in question rests chiefly on a doubtful interpretation of a single passage. St. Paul says to Timothy that "they that have used the office of a deacon well purchase to themselves a good degree" (I. Timothy, iii. 13). The Apostle has been supposed to refer to the advancement of faithful deacons to the next grade or step in the ministry, and to prescribe, by implication, the law of ecclesiastical preferment. This interpretation is set aside, however, by so accomplished a critic and so excellent a Churchman as the present Bishop of Gloucester (Commentary *ad locum*), on the ground that it is out of harmony with the spirit of the passage. In this opinion he has the support of Professor Plumptre (in Smith's "Dictionary of the Bible," article DEACON), as well as of other students, both modern and ancient. Neither Bishop Ellicott nor Professor Plumptre believe that the deaconship was in the primitive Church regarded as a probation for the eldership, and they both understand the Apostle's "good degree" to indicate the honor with God, if not with man, which comes from the conscientious performance of duty. However this may be, our Church has abandoned, if not the interpretation, at least the position which rests upon it, by making provision for permanent deacons. She

certainly does not assume that those whom she encourages to seek the lower office without looking forward to the higher will not use their office well; she has not set about organizing unfaithfulness by establishing a body of ministers whose business it shall be to neglect their duty. What she has practically told us is this: that the principles of ecclesiastical order no more require every deacon to expect to be a presbyter, than they require every presbyter to expect to be a bishop.

The second difficulty respects the temporal support of the deacon. He cannot ordinarily be as well supported as a presbyter, nor, in virtue of his office simply, enjoy the same social consideration. Now, the experiment which the Church has been making appears to have demonstrated that men are unwilling to be deacons for life, if their temporal condition is to be determined by their place in the ministry. And it needs no argument to prove that, if we could succeed in securing anything like the number of deacons that we need, there would be no possibility of providing for their support out of any resources which the Church is likely to control, in this generation, at any rate. The inference is plain: permanent deacons must, for the most part, support themselves. They must be allowed to pursue whatever honorable secular calling they may see fit to select, reserving time, of course, according to the circumstances of the case, for the performance of their spiritual functions. And if it shocks us to think of a minister of the Church making his living in a counting-room or a workshop, we must consider how many, not only of our deacons, but of our priests, are forced to complement their salaries by teaching or authorship, or even by labors still more remote from the kind of work to which they have consecrated themselves. If these examples do not quiet our uneasiness, we must even fall back on Paul the tent-maker. What we do not find disgraceful in the ancient episcopate, need not disgrace the modern diaconate. It is proper enough that a presbyter should be enabled to devote his whole time to the work of his ministry. If he is to be the religious guide of thoughtful men in these days, he can afford to stand in the market-place even less than he can afford to serve tables. But the duties of the deaconship can be performed, the number of deacons being large enough, by those who have little time, comparatively, for study or meditation. In certain respects, they can be better performed by such persons, for there is sore need in some of the ministrations now commonly undertaken by the parish priests, of that practical knowledge of human nature, that shrewd common-sense, which belong to men of affairs, and much

less often belong to scholars. And even as a teacher, within the proper limits of his ministry, the deacon could speak more effectively with regard to matters of every-day duty, in the field and the factory and the office, for being supposed to have some knowledge of his subject. As the permanent deacon must be something besides a deacon unless he is to starve, so he may be something besides a deacon with a positive increase of his efficiency. We may fairly say, then, first, that the Church has distinctly told us that she wants men who will hold the diaconship for life; and, secondly, that she has plainly proved to us that she cannot get what she wants, unless she permits these men to engage in secular pursuits.

The remedy which we are looking for can now be stated, if, indeed, it needs to be stated. Persons possessing the canonical qualifications for deacons' orders are to be found in almost every parish; in many parishes are men who do actually perform most of the functions of the deacon, and for whom their rectors would gladly ask, if they might, the laying on of hands, which would make those duties theirs by the most solemn obligation. Let the parochial clergy be encouraged to prefer this request, and let discreet and pious laymen, having "first been proved," be persuaded to accept the sacred commission, and we have the permanent diaconate. Such men, having their support and their place among their fellows secured to them independently of their ministerial functions, would be under little temptation to press on to the priesthood, and the danger of having a body of imperfectly educated presbyters would disappear. And if, under the stimulus of ministerial work in this lower grade, there should be disclosed or developed, here and there, such qualities as, in the judgment of those whose place it is to judge, should fit their possessor to serve in a higher grade, the ranks of the presbyterate might be strengthened by accessions of the utmost value.

But a fresh difficulty occurs to us. Would the simple request of a rector, even when supported by the advice of a bishop, be sufficient, in most cases, to overcome the natural reluctance of a layman, accustomed to regard himself as invested for life with a secular character, to enter by ordination upon holy functions? Probably not; and in order to know how to meet this difficulty, we must address ourselves to the diligent reading of a very ancient author, namely, St. Luke. This historian informs us that before the first deacons received ordination the Apostles had said, not to the elders, but to "the multitude of the disciples," "Look ye out among you seven men of honest report, full of the Holy Ghost and of wisdom,

whom we may appoint over this business." If the seven men then chosen were indeed deacons, as there seems no good reason to doubt, we have here a primitive usage of great importance and significance, and one which, in our communion, has been strangely lost sight of. The deacons were originally, it appears, the representatives of the laity; through their office the democratic element of the Church had its just expression; they were the ecclesiastical tribunes of the people; they were the leaders of the Christian brotherhood in their common work of ministering to the children of want and sorrow. Let the Church, through the enactment of her highest council, if need be, summon her members as a whole to aid her, by the powerful influence of their free suffrages, in filling the thin ranks of her diaconate. Men called to this ministry, not alone by the voice of a pastor or a bishop, but by the voice of the assembled flock as well, would find it hard to doubt that they were "truly called according to the will of our Lord Jesus Christ;" they would seldom fail to become conscious that their own hearts were responding to the call, and to trust that they were "inwardly moved by the Holy Ghost to take upon them this office and ministration."

The choice of the people would, in accordance with the spirit of our system, be subject to the approval of the higher ministers, and we should by no means dispense with the examination in the Scriptures and the Prayer Book. This examination corresponds, in part at least, to the "proving" spoken of by St. Paul, and would serve to show whether those honored by the popular choice "hold the mystery of the faith in a pure conscience" (I. Timothy, iii. 9). Security would thus be furnished against the admission into the diaconship of the grossly ignorant, or of those by whom the office might in other ways be degraded. The license to preach, now generally granted at the time of ordination, would become what it was clearly designed to be,—exceptional. And yet it need not be a rare exception, for there are very valuable gifts of exhortation and admonition, now almost wholly lost to the Church, which could be turned to account through a wise use of the bishop's right of licensure. Deacons could surely preach without being lecturers on theology. They would not be disposed to assume, nor is there any reason why they should assume, the title of "reverend." They would be known to be ministers in the congregation which they served, and the use of a distinctive title elsewhere would occasion misunderstanding and confusion.

It may be asked why a class of men so little distinguishable in their ordinary life from devout and active laymen should be em-

braced within the ministry; why they might not be chosen and set in their place without ordination, as lay-assistants, receiving authority to read service, perhaps to address the congregation, and certainly to superintend all charitable work. It may be said that in giving them this semi-clerical character, we shall put them into a false position, and tempt them to mischievous interference and improper assumption of authority. They will be neither one thing nor the other, and we shall be spoiling useful laymen without getting qualified clergymen. To all this it should be enough to reply that this way of remedying an acknowledged evil is, for us, the logical way. The duties just named are, as far as they go, the very ones which the Prayer Book assigns to the deacon; the man who performs them should be a deacon. And the additional functions of administering baptism, and of assisting in the Holy Communion, require no additional qualifications, intellectual or spiritual, while it is very desirable that there should be more than one man in a parish authorized to discharge them. But it may be replied farther, that those who engage in the charitable labors proper to the diaconship, will be greatly aided by the consciousness, on their own part, and on the part of those to whom they are sent, that they hold the commission which was originally given for the ministry which they exercise. And their peculiar position, midway between the clergy and the laity, whatever might be its trials and temptations, is one which ought to be occupied by somebody. There is a "missing link" at this point, a chasm between pastor and people, and the primitive deacon is just what is wanted to supply the link, to bridge the chasm. Unless we desire to perpetuate one of the worst of the mediæval errors, we shall feel that it would be an immense advantage to have the clergy and the people united in a closer sympathy, and coming to a better understanding of each other's wants and rights, through the mediation of an order placed thus between the two. And if, as has been sometimes suggested, there is anything in the touch of a bishop's hand, in the weight of a surplice, which tends to make a man less manly, we can hardly do a better thing than to oppose this tendency by influences which proceed from habitual contact with life. The man who goes from the chancel to the warehouse or the shop will be sufficiently protected against any excess of the "clerical consciousness," and the presbyter who is brought into the closest official and personal relations to such men will breathe a more bracing atmosphere, and get a broader and healthier development for his own manhood. And a new force, elevating and hallowing, will be brought to bear upon the whole body of the laity, when each one of

them shall learn to regard himself as in some sense a candidate for Holy Orders.

It must be a needless, as it would be an endless task, to enumerate the further benefits which would accrue to the Church from such a development of her third order. She would be true to her own theory, and, being true to it, could show it to all Christian people as illustrated in practice; she would be able to reach and to hold multitudes whom she can now only mourn over; she would see her presbyters relieved from burdens which she has no right to lay upon them, and free to give themselves to strictly pastoral duties, and to the studies so indispensable in an age which stands more and more in need of accurate scholarship, and of earnest, honest thought, in those who attempt to be its teachers; she would see vacant parishes always supplied with some form of ministration, and never wholly destitute of spiritual leadership, the work of the parish going forward on the removal of its rector with little greater interruption than the work of a diocese now suffers on the removal of its bishop.

But one more difficulty thrusts itself upon us; it is a very grave, perhaps a fatal one. The deacons who have been described bear an alarming resemblance to the Congregational deacons, to say nothing of the Presbyterian ruling elders, or the Methodist local preachers and class-leaders. Now, if we must regard these Christian people as the natural enemies of the Christian Church, why, then, *fas est ab hoste doceri*,—it is lawful to be taught by an enemy. But if we recognize them as, with whatever imperfections, our spiritual kinsmen, one with us in the great Church Catholic, the fellowship of the baptized, then we shall be ready to confess, what it will do us good to confess, that our brethren have kept or have recovered, lawfully or otherwise, a primitive institution which we have lost all but utterly. We shall thank them, and thank God, for the witness which they bear to the ancient order of His Church; we shall learn, it may be, to thank God and them for a lesson of humility, for helping us to see that the loss and the sin of a defective ministry are justly chargeable even upon us, for bringing home to us the wholesome though unwelcome truth, that in what belongs to the local Church, to the agency by which Christ must chiefly be shown to a suffering, sinful world, our own communion is wellnigh the weakest in Christendom. It should be remembered, however, that deacons who receive a solemn ordination at the hands of a bishop; who minister in the Church habited, as becomes those who so minister, in the decent vestments of their office; who recognize

the authority which commissions them, as well as the popular voice which calls them; who feel upon them the restraining, elevating influences which act so powerfully within our system, will not be altogether like those who fill this or kindred offices in other Christian bodies.

There will be differences of opinion about the utility and the feasibility of the measures which have been advocated in this paper. But all will agree that the subject is one of supreme importance, and that it calls, more than almost any other, for sober thought and for efficient action. And the time is propitious for action. The laity are beginning to have a clearer discernment of the truth that "the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man." They are earnestly addressing themselves to Christian work under the forms of philanthropy, kindling with those impulses to human sympathy and helpfulness of which the diaconship is the Divinely-constituted organ. Their attitude is itself an invitation to the Church to supply them with leaders. And the movement which has been actually begun for rightly organizing the efforts of Christian women, by restoring to us the ancient deaconess, makes the revival of the true diaconate amongst men a matter of still more urgent necessity. The deaconess should find the deacon at his post, ready to guide and counsel and support her. If we of the parochial clergy, the presbyters, will join our demands to those which the times so loudly utter, and ask for the "helps" whom God set in the Church at the beginning, the Church cannot refuse them to us. And our three-fold ministry, completed by that which has so long been lacking, enriched with varied gifts, of which the worth is almost unknown to us now, may fulfil such a task of manifold blessing as has scarcely been seen since Stephen and Philip began their ministrations to the widows of the Grecians, "AND THE WORD OF GOD INCREASED."



THE SPIRITUAL ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY.

PRELIMINARY.

ANY one who buys the new books, and subscribes to the various periodicals of the day, will have no difficulty in discerning that what is called the "current of modern thought" is taking a certain peculiar direction in relation to the Christian religion. Nowadays, the general subject of religion appears to be awakening considerable interest,—of a certain kind. The "development of the religious consciousness" is attracting the attention of the student of humanity. The many various religions, or phases of religion, which have arisen in the world, are being made matter of critical investigation, with a view to ascertain their bearing on the history of human development, their influence on the practical life of mankind. The records of extinct and the institutes of stagnant civilizations, the prehistoric obscurity of the Christian races, and the native wilds of existing aborigines, are alike explored for traces of the origin and hints toward the explanation of every creed and cultus; and thus "comparative religion" is taking place beside comparative philology, and becoming recognized as a separate, special field in the great domain of scientific inquiry. It is in consequence of this study of religion after the method of natural history that Christianity is coming to be regarded no longer as something absolutely unique, but as merely one among the many religions of the world, to be contrasted with them only as they are

contrasted with one another. In the words of a recent writer: "The time has gone by forever when it is possible for an educated person to maintain that Christianity is true, and every other religion false. Christianity must take its place in the history of the world among other religions, and must be regarded as a point in the harmonious religious development of the race." The intention, it appears, is to classify Christianity with other religions, as merely one of a series. Now, classification is certainly a scientific procedure, but it is one that must be undertaken with caution. To classify is simply to identify several objects through their common properties by neglecting their peculiar differences. For example: melons, grapes, and peaches are classified as fruit. Hence, that classification only can be legitimate and sound which collects into specific unity such things as resemble each other in what pertains to their essence *more* than they differ from each other. It is the vice of the scientific men of the day (to speak in the large) that they do not generalize with caution, but in a hasty and arbitrary way. They identify on insufficient grounds. They classify where differences overbalance similarities, because they shut their eyes to differences they do not wish to see. A notable instance of this crude and thoughtless way of generalizing is to be found in Mr. Huxley's now famous essay on the "Physical Basis of Life," in which all existing organisms, vegetable and animal, are declared to be essentially alike in substance, in form, and in faculty; a theory which his critics almost immediately exploded by simply bringing in again the *difference* which Mr. Huxley had consistently left out. Another instance may be suggested in Mr. Darwin's classification of man with the apes,—a classification effected through the common animality, which is *unessential* in man, by steadily ignoring or denying the spirituality which is his *essence*. Such over-eagerness to "gain remote conclusions at a jump," is quite the precise opposite of the genuine scientific temper, and will not be long in destroying the general respect for scientific assertion which was deservedly gained by the caution and the patient labor of former generations. Now, it is from this same spirit of hasty and careless generalizing that Christianity is being swept in as alike in kind with all the forgotten religions of the world; and it is our present attempt to do with regard to all those who are helping to bring about such a result¹

¹Max Müller, Spencer, Mr. Lecky, Professor Jowett, Matthew Arnold, Mr. Blackie, Mr. Clark, and a host of others, among whom may now be mentioned that most singular of Christian ministers, the Rev. H. R. Haweis, from whom the quotation in the text is taken.

what was done with regard to the Protoplasm Essay of Mr. Huxley, —namely, to point out the difference which, in the one case as in the other, outweighs the likeness, and resists the identification which would obliterate it. The matter for statement in the following papers is, therefore, the distinctive essence, the logical *differentia* of Christianity, so far as that religion is considered as a practical rather than a speculative system. For religion is wholly a practical matter with the writers we refer to. Their interest in any form of faith is measured by its influence on the advance in civilization and the general progress in the human race. And this being the case, it is easy to insist on the *fact* of an important *differentia* in Christianity, by asking how and whence it comes that the Christian religion has exerted an influence of this kind, so enormously greater in degree than that exerted by any other. For while Buddhism and Brahminism extend over a wider area, and have prevailed for a longer time than Christianity; while they have controlled the practical life of their votaries more despotically, and, apparently, have modelled their civilization with a more single sway; yet, in what properly concerns human progress, in all that educates the higher faculties, stimulates the higher energies, and ministers to constant growth toward higher development, there is absolutely no comparison between the religion of Christ and those of Brahma and of Fo. No one who reads history, even superficially, can fail to see that Christianity wrought the greatest revolution that has ever been accomplished in the practical life of mankind. In less than three centuries it overthrew the religions of the civilized world, and fought its way through opposition the most bitter, of powers the most colossal, to that sole supremacy over the mind of the progressive races which it has ever since maintained. From the moment when it emerged from despised obscurity, it went forth to change the face of the world. Such irresistible power was in its new principles of action, that, at the very outset, the Apostle could exclaim: "Old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new." It undermined the system of the ancient world, transformed old ways of thought and feeling, and planted germs of a civil and social life unknown before and undreamed of. And then it went on so to nourish and nurse the mental growth of Europe, that it is fair to say the history of Christianity is one with the history of modern civilization.¹ Now, whence, we say, is this?

¹ A single striking reference in confirmation of this may be made to the writings of Voltaire. It is plain to all readers that the one aim of all those

What is it in Christianity that has enabled it to do what no other religion has done? The modern theorists, who "clash them all in one," have nothing here to answer. They are as silent as Mr. Huxley would be, if he were asked to state what it is in his identical substance, protoplasm, that makes one lump develop into a mushroom and another into a man. Surely, it is at bottom a cheap enough generalization, however it take on a big air as scientific, which would collect a variety of objects into the unity of a common principle by simple omission of their distinctive properties.

For us, however, the *differentia* of Christianity is now the easier to state, in that these writers have shown us where not to look for it. It is an inherent peculiarity of their view of the Christian religion to regard it almost, if not quite, exclusively as a system of morals. Reference to any of the writers I am speaking of will abundantly establish this assertion. Wherever Christianity is spoken of as only one among many religions, as merely a "point in the harmonious religious development of the race," there it will also be spoken of as if it were simply an ethical code or a moral influence. As matter of fact, these two views go essentially together. The *differentia*, then, is not to be sought for in the sphere of morals. Professor Jowett, indeed, says expressly: "We might cull from past religions all the principal ethical doctrines of Christianity." This may strike us as a strong assertion, but we will not stop to dispute it, for it is evident that here we stand precisely on the ground of the identification of Christianity with all other religions, and it is a ground of distinction that we are looking for. It is by their common ethical principles that all religions, and Christianity among them, are classified together, because it is supposed that only by its ethical teaching a religion has influenced the general progress of humanity. And so the question, what is the *differentia*, or the essence of practical Christianity, comes to this: What is there in it beside the moral, as such? It is this question that the following pages attempt to answer.

For a reason which will appear later, this distinctive essence of Christianity, which is thus something else than morality as such, is nevertheless to be first sought *in* that system or theory of morals which the Gospel sets forth.

writings, more or less distinctly and emphatically expressed, is to inaugurate a crusade against Christianity; and it is no less plain that what Voltaire means by this is not Christianity, as such, but the old Gothic civilization which sprang from it, and grew up with it.

I.—THE SPIRITUAL IN CHRISTIAN MORALS.

Granting Professor Jowett's statement that Christianity has no new ethical doctrines peculiar to itself, it is none the less true that the whole spirit of its ethical teaching is entirely novel and peculiar. It puts the whole subject in a new light. Unlike any other religion, it teaches morality not as an end, as something not to be valued for its own sake, but as a means, as an economy, and a principle of progress toward something else. And not only does it thus embrace the ethical sphere within a higher, it also imports into that sphere a new originating principle. Not only does it reveal the moral final cause, it assigns the moral motive as well. And thus, objectively, the moral law is charged, impressed, transfigured, with a new meaning; and, subjectively, the attitude of the individual toward it is completely changed. These propositions loosely phrase a thesis which requires first to be drawn out in full statement, and then to be established.

1. To explain what that peculiarity is which, it is asserted, belongs to the moral teaching of Christianity, will necessitate a brief consideration of morals in the abstract, which, though somewhat close, will, we trust, be clear to the attentive reader. To come at once to our point, morality only concerns conduct. The moral law simply requires certain deeds, which it qualifies as good, to be done, and certain deeds, which it qualifies as evil, to be abstained from. This law is one of inward, as well as of outward deed. It concerns all voluntary thought and word, and feeling and purpose, as well as overt act. But such *extension* of jurisdiction nowise alters its *character*. The moral law remains always a simple abstract imperative: Thou shalt; thou shalt not. It simply declares the right to be obligatory on the will, and commands obedience to it. That is all; it looks no further; it says no more. To the questions, *What* is the right? *why* is it right? *why ought* it to be obeyed? it returns no answer. It requires and expects unquestioning obedience. Thus presenting itself as an abstract limit, as *the* abstract limit, to the will's volitional capacity, or power of choice, there arises an opposition between abstract duty, on the one side, and abstract freedom, on the other. The thing to be done appears as a constraint upon the doer. The substance and end of the will's action stand over against its acting capacity as an alien and arbitrary compulsion. Hence, the moral law, when it obtains obedience, secures good *conduct*, but in the nature of the case cannot secure anything more. It cannot produce good *character*. For consider the matter. What

is to be seen at this moral stand-point? Nothing but the naked command of the moral law, and the naked submission of the will. Duty is prescribed, and performed; that is all. No regard is paid to the inward disposition of the will in its performance. The will is not allowed to "have a will of its own" in the matter. Now, what is thus left unconsidered and uncared for is really of equal moral consequence with that which is made all in all. It is not more important, morally, that the right be performed, than that it be performed freely and willingly.¹ In fact, bare right-doing, apart from the intention to do right, is morally worthless. There is an obvious difference between the man who is honest from policy, and the man who is honest from sense of duty. The one is morally worthy, and the other is not. Thus the moral law admits that there is nothing about a man that gives him moral worth but the inward intention of his will, his acting from principle, as it is happily expressed. It admits that deeds obtain a moral valuation, as regards the doer, solely in so far as they are realizations of his inward purpose and wish. And yet, while it thus takes account of inward disposition in *particular acts*, *universally* it is compelled to disregard it. For, as we said, the character of the moral law is not changed by extension of its jurisdiction. It says that to be truly honest one must be so in purpose, disposition, and wish, but even in saying this, it is still the same abstract imperative; here, as always, it is only, You must; you shall. And so its command is of course self-nugatory; you *must wish* to be honest; you *must voluntarily* do right. Such is the persistent contradiction the moral law falls into when it attempts to deal with inward character as well as outward conduct. It recognizes that the righteous deed, to have any moral worth, must be the free and willing act of the will, and then it simply *adds* to its command imposing the duty that it be *freely* done. It recognizes that the deed is morally indifferent unless it springs from free choice, and then it constrains, and so destroys, that very freedom. "You must do right," it says; "but that is nothing, unless you like to do it, so you must like to do it." This is certainly binding a burden too heavy to be borne. You may compel a man to do some-

¹ This may be thought over refining. It may be said that whenever a man does right without constraint from his fellow men, he does do it freely and willingly. But if he does so only in blind obedience to the command of his conscience, at the sacrifice of a contrary inclination, with a struggle between the "law of his members and the law of his mind"—and these are precisely the conditions of the moral opposition—then he does not act with such perfect freedom and willingness as is conceivable.

thing; you cannot compel him to like to do it. Obedience to duty by coercing opposite inclinations is one thing,—that is possible; performance of duty from inclination is another thing,—that also is possible; but performing from inclination a duty which is against our inclination,—that is forever impossible. Thus the antithesis between the duty and the capacity of doing persists, for the moral sphere is precisely the sphere of this antithesis. The moral law appears to the will simply as abstract obligation, which it only passively and mechanically obeys. By such obedience the will performs righteous deeds, behaves righteously, but how can any amount of *such* obedience make the will itself inwardly a righteous will? It is not roused to life and action, it is merely required to submit. Its *character*, therefore, remains unchanged, for character cannot be formed by commandments, nor by any external influence; it must be a self-formation. No system, religious or philosophical, which teaches morality as its own end and self-sufficient can get farther than this. Its one principle is abstract obligation; its one virtue is unquestioning obedience.

Now, into this sphere of mere morality Christianity enters, not with new ethical doctrines, but with a new principle, which does away with all other ethical systems by embracing morality proper within a higher sphere, and revealing it as a vehicle of progress to a higher condition. It takes up the moral antithesis, and resolves it in *concrete unity*. Concrete unity is not mere synthesis. That is a bringing together of opposite elements, in which each remains what it was before, unmodified by the contact. The bringing together is something external to the individuality of the separate elements. On the other hand, concrete unity is a *growing* together of opposite elements, a vital union in which each is mediated by the other, and in which a new something appears, comprehensive of both, preserving both distinctly, but annulling their separate independence by their mutual mediation. The new something; which is only the concrete unity itself, appears to thought, *after* the view of the elements, as separate, or abstract, but nevertheless it is seen to be their *præ*, their inward truth, and that in which alone they have reality. Now to direct this insight to the matter in hand.

The two opposite elements of the moral antithesis are abstract liberty and abstract law. The first is free choice, pure volition, the universal, unlimited impulse. The second is the universal limit, the eternal imperative that prescribes, negatively and positively, the action of the volitional capacity. Now, in this antithetic statement, these two opposites are set against each other as mutually exclusive,

as essentially irreconcilable. But if attention is paid to the *implication* of each with the other, which underlies the *statement* of each separately, it will be perceived that these opposites are, in fact, correlatives; that the relation between them is not extrinsic, but intrinsic, and involves, not merely distinction, but, just as much, coreference and connection. Look at the first. It states itself as unlimited potentiality. But observe, potentiality contains, not the possibility only, but the necessity that it shall actualize itself. It is the precise character of potentiality that it *is to be* what it can be. It is power or force that *e natura*, must *become*. If it does not realize itself it is abortive; it loses its true character; it is no longer "is to be," but "might have been;" it is no longer power, but impotence. But power cannot act without acting somehow; it cannot do without doing somewhat; its universality is only realized by particularizing itself. Therefore, the power of volition *implies* in its own statement an object, an aim to determine it. So, conversely, in the statement of the second element, its implication with its relative opposite is plain. Law states itself as duty, the universal rule of action, and in such statement implies a free power of action. Thus each is what it is only in reference to the other. The special determinateness of each is simply its relation to the other; and so the two principles are properly not antagonistic, but complementary. For if the antithetic statement presents the two opposites as separately independent, the underlying implication reveals their mutual dependence. If viewed as immediate, they appear to be two distinct complete principles; viewed in mutual mediation, they are seen to be the complementary abstract factors of one concrete principle. With this the organic movement of this principle, which gives birth to the antithesis, comes to light, and may be described in a few words.

Free-will *first* appears as bare capacity of willing; but as simply this, it exhibits its insufficiency to itself. For, being entirely indeterminate, without motive or direction, it lacks necessary conditions of self-realization, and it must realize itself in order to be. Hence, *secondly*, its simple unity falls into duality, through relation to an implied opposite, its determiner; and there arises over against the immediate independence of will its own self-mediation,—over against the subjective form of freedom its own objective substance, which appears in this antithesis as law, the abstract obligation of the right.¹ In the antithesis, law appears as something foreign

¹ The term subject and object, used to express the terms related in sense-perception, mean simply the perceiving mind, and the external thing per-

to will, rather than merely the negation of its immediacy, but, *thirdly*, the antithesis is removed by this, that there is *only one* principle under consideration, namely, the will. The negation that appears is, therefore, immanent negation, which develops from within the will, and is not imported from without. The moral law is the determiner of the will; but will is in its essential nature a self-determining capacity; therefore the moral law is itself the will. It is the will's own essence and true nature. And so the will is free only when it wills the moral law, because then only it wills itself—wills the will. When it wills anything except the moral law, it wills what is foreign to itself; and when it does this, it is dependent on that foreign motive; governed by an alien power; not self-governing, not free. Thus the absolute law of right is identical with absolute freedom of will. Thus free-will is a concrete unity whose subjectivity is volition, and whose objectivity is law; and in its freedom it is ever the law unto itself. For freedom and autonomy are precise synonymes. Exemption from law is not freedom, but chaos. Perfect liberty is simply liberty to rule one's self. The fancy that there is something freer than this freedom, and more unrestricted than this liberty, may correct itself before the fact that self-limitation, and not unlimitation, is the freedom of Omnipotence.

Now, in this, its ideality, in which will is perfectly free, the antithetic opposition does not arise; the two abstract *momenta* do not set themselves against each other as independently valid; the unity of the spirit is not divided against itself. And so, just for this reason, it may be objected here that the above dialectic, being that of will in idea, has no application to the human will—which actually is so far from being free, in the sense in which that term has been taken, that it is warped and estranged from the right—nor any practical bearing upon morality, which has been described as precisely the sphere of the antithesis of abstract freedom and abstract law. But, in fact, the direct contrary of this is the true inference. It is just because of the human will's actual condition that its

ceived. But there is a deeper and stricter use in which both terms of the relation fall within the mind. In self-consciousness, both pure and practical, the externality opposed to the energy of mind is found to be not another, but the mind itself as opposed to itself. The mind is *itself* the object; its other is itself. The relation of subject and object is seen to be self-relation. These terms name only an abstract distinction in the unity of the mind's being. The *Noumenon* which constantly escapes sense-perception, not because of the limitation of mental faculties, but because it does not exist in finite nature, is now found, and found to be the mind itself.

ideality, the whole truth of its own nature, has practical importance for it. For by this it appears that the holiness which is set before it as its aim, is not something impossible, or barely possible to realize, but even its own inner nature, and as such, naturally capable of fulfilment. It is true that perfect freedom, or perfect holiness, is realized only in the Divine will, but it is equally true that it is potential in the human. Free-will, that likeness to God in which man was created, is one, immutable, and homogeneous; it does not admit of degree. Human will is ideally the same as Divine will. For the Christian revelation centres in the incarnation of God. Christ is at once "truly" God, and "perfectly" man. While perfect man, He is yet completely sinless. Thus, it is shown, sin is no essential element of human nature, in *itself* considered. Its actual sinfulness is a loss, a fall, a degradation from its true estate. The single personality of Christ shows the essential oneness of spiritual being. Human nature, Christianity teaches, is, as originally stated, essentially at one with the Divine. And to realize this, their nature's ideality, to gain through Christ that unity with God for which they were created, is, according to Christianity, the one object of the moral probation of human beings, the one goal of their moral striving.

This, then, the unity of the moral objective with the moral subject, is the new principle of spiritual freedom by which Christianity transfigures the whole face of morality, and carries it up to a higher plane. This resolves the moral antinomy; this supplies to ethical science a basis, and a *raison d'être*, and to practical morality the motive power it lacks; this reveals a higher state of being, which the moral law darkly hints of, and to lead to which is its one purpose and function. And so the abstract ought,—that moral fatality which men ignorantly worship, this principle declares unto them. It reveals the law as not the *limit*, but the *medium* of self-determination; as not the foreign despot of the will, but its own native sovereignty; drawing its Divine right of government over the will from the fact that it is itself that will. And, in this revelation, the old relation of enforced obedience and grudging service dissolves and vanishes. The glad spirit recognizes in the right its own essence, its own freedom, its own life. The current of natural inclination *turns*, and sets the other way. The law is fulfilled in love.

2. Such is the statement of our thesis; such the distinctive peculiarity which, it is claimed, characterizes the Christian treatment of morals. Should it now be disputed whether, in fact, Christianity does set forth the principle stated above, there is but

one way to decide the question, and that is by reference to the Christian Scriptures,—to an intelligent and careful study of which we submit the point with confidence. It is impossible to present the results of such a study in the space now at our command; we will attempt only to point out some prominent features of Christ's moral teaching, and to bring together some passages of the Apostolic Epistles bearing upon that teaching, which may show what lawyers call a *prima facie* case.

The characteristics of Christ's teaching alluded to are, briefly, its novelty and its authoritative tone. Nothing is more evident to the reader of the Gospels than the independent attitude assumed by our Lord toward the Jewish law. We read of his principal popular discourse, that "the people were astonished at His doctrine, for He taught them as one having authority, and not as the scribes." That is, He taught not as a mere expositor of the sacred books, but as one having an authority to preach independent of, and even superior to, those great institutes of the theocracy. His language was: "Ye have heard that it was said to them of old time; . . . but I say unto you." It was "He that heareth *these sayings of Mine*, and doeth them"—not he that faithfully observed the Mosaic law—whom he likened to the wise man that built his house upon a rock. When the young man asked Him what he should do to have eternal life, Jesus' first answer was, "Keep the commandments;" but to the rejoinder, "These have I kept from my youth up; what lack I yet?" He said, "If thou wilt be perfect, sell that thou hast, and give to the poor, and come and follow Me." To follow Him was the way to a higher life than that of the most righteous servant of the law. Such an assuming tone might well give offence to the rulers, and excite apprehension lest this new teacher should shake and weaken the people's submissive reverence for the law. They listened with anxiety to His harangues, and watched with growing alarm the infection of His influence spread among the lower classes, His familiarity with whom they distrusted as the art of the demagogue. But an occasion was not long in coming, which, precipitating a direct collision between the new teaching and the legal ordinances, turned their dislike to deadly hostility, and their vague apprehension to a sense of imminent danger. For it was then seen that the bold Galilean would not hesitate to overrule the law, and set it aside whenever it conflicted with His own pretended inspiration. The point in issue was the observance of the Sabbath day, and, humanly speaking, it was Jesus' persistent violation of the law on this point that brought His fate upon Him. This was

the turning-point of His career, when the toleration and even acceptance which He had met with at first gave way to active and relentless persecution. We read in the Evangelists that the Pharisees were "filled with madness," and "straightway took counsel with the Herodians," and "held a council against Him, how they might destroy Him." But it may be thought that this goes wide of the mark. It may be said that, in this matter, the Saviour was simply a reformer; that He intended, not the abolition of the Sabbath, but merely the restoration of its primitive simplicity of observance. We believe, however, that the true purpose and the true significance of Christ's action in this instance will be found to lie deeper. On the one hand, its effect upon the Pharisaic party shows that they saw in it a blow struck at the foundations of their government,—at the root of the theocratic constitution. They said with sincerity, "This Man is not of God, because He keepeth not the Sabbath day;" and of His followers, "This people which knoweth not the law is cursed." On the other hand, Christ justifies their view of the issue between them as fundamental, and touching essentials, by proclaiming in defence of His conduct a principle applicable to the whole law, which, in such application, was irreconcilable with the spirit of Judaism, and fatal to the permanence of the Judaic system. His declaration was, "The Son of man is Lord of the Sabbath." The Sabbath, that is—and, if the Sabbath, the law—was made for man, not man for the Sabbath. Man was the final cause of law, not obedience to law the final cause of man. Hence, the Representative and Head of humanity had the legal institutes in His own power. It detracts nothing from the force of this declaration that Christ elsewhere defended Himself by alleging the example of David and of the priests, and His interlocutors' own practice in circumcising on the Sabbath day, any more than His answer when they were about to stone Him for blasphemy militates against the deeper sense of His quite superhuman paternity and coequal Divinity with the Father: "Is it not written in your law, I said, Ye are gods? If he called them gods to whom the Word of God came, and the Scripture cannot be broken; say ye of Him, whom the Father hath sanctified, and sent into the world, Thou blasphemest; because I said, I am the Son of God?"¹

If the relation of Christ's teaching to the law be viewed as

¹ This view of Christ's intention seems plainly, that of St. Paul: "Let no man therefore judge you in respect of . . . the Sabbath days, which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is of Christ. . . . One man esteemeth one day above another: another esteemeth every day alike. . . . He that

antagonistic only to its ceremonial and its formal observances, but conservative of its inward spirit, the significance of that Divine life-work is missed. There was more in the principles Christ taught than their application to minute particulars. Else He had been a merely human reformer, and the scope of His work merely national. While, most certainly, "the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy, and truth," were preserved inviolate—while, that is, its whole *intent* was not destroyed, but fulfilled—yet the whole spirit of legal morality was changed and transformed, and its standpoint was abandoned when its principle of obligation was embraced in the higher principle of Freedom. And it was this change and transformation and abandonment, which they could not see to be fulfilment, but took to be destruction, which was the spring of the Jews' bitter hostility to Christ, and of that of Judaism to Christianity ever afterward. Moreover, if it be admitted that Christ attacked ceremonies, what the history of the Reformation makes evident is to be remembered, namely, that, practically, ceremonial and doctrine are essentially united, and one cannot be touched without the other being sooner or later affected. The Jews saw this clearly. It was opposition to something deeper than ceremonial, as such, for which they killed the prophet of Nazareth. They felt that His preaching was revolutionary; that this "kingdom of heaven" was something subversive of their whole system of civil and religious life. They said to each other, "If we let Him thus alone, all men will believe on Him, and the Romans shall come and take away both our place and nation."

And there were utterances of Christ's that might well give ground for this alarm. He said to the people: "Except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of (taught and required by) the Scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven;" "Among them that are born of women there hath not risen a greater than John the Baptist, notwithstanding he that is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he;" "If ye continue in My word, . . . ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free. . . . The servant abideth not in the house forever: but the Son abideth ever. If the Son therefore shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed;" "No man putteth a piece of a new garment upon an old; if otherwise, then both the new maketh a rent, and the piece that was taken out of the new agreeth not with the old. And no

regardeth the day, regardeth it unto the Lord; and he that regardeth not the day, to the Lord he doth not regard it." Such teaching leaves absolutely nothing of the *obligatoriness* which was the essence of a legal institution.

man putteth new wine into old bottles; else the new wine will burst the bottles, and be spilled, and the bottles shall perish. . . . No man also having drunk old wine straightway desireth new: for he saith, The old is better."

A word on this parable. It teaches forcibly the complete distinctness of the Gospel dispensation from the old economy. The new *doctrine* could not be grafted on the old, for that was a worn-out garment. The true course was not a vain attempt at patching; but to throw away the old garment, and put on the new. Again, the new *life* that transcends the relation of obedience to law, and moves in the freedom of unity with Christ, these Jews wearing with pride the legal yoke, and blinded by obstinate prejudice, could not enter into. Such old vessels could not have contained that new wine. Their settled convictions would have been shocked and overthrown, while they would have found no others to take their place; the only stay and guide they knew in life would have been snatched away without their finding a surer and truer. The moon that had lighted their path through the night would have set, and left them in darkness, before they could have seen the sun.

In this moral chaos the wine of regeneration would have been spilled and lost, and the burst bottles would have perished with it. Modern history has more than one such spectacle of the fatal excesses of Antinomian fanaticism. Once more, the Jews could not enter into the new life, because they would not. They had drunk the old wine of the Mosaic law, and they desired none new, for they said the old was better.¹

But we are not left to our own interpretation of such utterances as these, or our own inferences from them. In Hooker's words: "If we doubt what these admirable words may import, let him be our teacher for the meaning of Christ to whom Christ was Himself a schoolmaster; let our Lord's Apostle be his interpreter,—content we ourselves with his explication." And when with this purpose we turn to the writings of St. Paul, we cannot but see that the moral revolution wrought by Christ was one not narrowed in range to a single race or to a single age, nor limited in effect to the advancement of ethical doctrine; but a change affecting universal humanity, and reaching so to the very roots and vitals of morality as to lead to the entire transformation and reconstruction of all ethical theories or systems.

We find that the Epistle to the Romans starts out from the

¹ See Trench's "Studies in the Gospels," p. 168, ff. (Am. ed.)

truth of the unity of human nature and the equality of all men in relation to the moral law. "For there is no difference between the Jew and the Greek: for the same Lord over all is rich unto all that call upon Him. For whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved. . . . For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness."

Thus those who live under natural law, the law of conscience, are morally in the same position with those who live under a positive enacted law. Jews and Gentiles are on the same footing, and that is a footing of equal sinfulness.

The Apostle refers to the old Scripture for this latter statement: "As it is written, There is none righteous, no, not one." He quotes the whole passage descriptive of the utter wickedness of all men, and then reaches this conclusion, that righteousness is not attained by obedience to the moral law, whether that be promulgated in outward enactment or in the voice of conscience. ("Except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven.") St. Paul's words are: "Therefore by the deeds of the law shall no flesh be justified in God's sight;" and he adds: "For by the law is the knowledge of sin." That is to say, in accordance with what was said under our first head, the moral law leads into an insoluble antinomy. The law posits itself as *check* to the natural *impulse*, as *limit* to abstract free-will. And, so doing, it simply makes the moral consciousness, and brings us to the knowledge of sin. This the Apostle considers its whole purpose: "The law entered that the offence might abound."

He proceeds: "I had not known sin, but by the law: for I had not known lust (the impulse or motion toward sin), except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet." This motion a man would not perceive who was simply *moving with it*. The law then reveals the sinfulness of all desire contrary to or averse from that which it prescribes. It reveals self-will, selfish will, as essentially sinful. "For I was alive without the law once; but when the commandment came, sin sprung into life, and I died;" that is, fell into the unhappy consciousness of sin and of helplessness against it; a condition St. Paul always speaks of by this term, death. This condition, if not that worse one of open rebellion against the law on the part of the self-will, is the practical situation which results from the antithetic opposition of abstract free-will and abstract obligation.

St. Paul's vivid description of the aroused and restless consciousness, with its dim discernment that its struggle is one *against itself*, that what is opposed to its natural inclination is really its own higher and truer nature, that what seems a check upon its freedom is really alone that freedom's self,—is familiar to us all: "That which I do I allow not: for what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I. If then I do that which I would not, I consent unto the law that it is good. Now then it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. For I know that in me (that is, in my flesh,) dwelleth no good thing: for to will is present with me; but how to perform that which is good I find not. . . . I find then a law, that, when I would do good, evil is present with me. For I delight in the law of God after the inward man: but I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members. O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" It will be perceived that there are two aspects of the moral antinomy,—a speculative and a practical. The dialectic which formed the first part of this paper contemplated only the speculative aspect; in this description of St. Paul's, the practical aspect is chiefly prominent. He cries out for a practical deliverance, for a *power* to perform that which is good. It would be of no use to him to solve the difficulty in a merely speculative way, and say that there ought to be no struggle here, for the truth of the matter is the concrete unity of abstract freedom and abstract law,—that just this is the nature of the freedom of spiritual being. He would still call for some *power* to enable him to *realize* this ideal nature. We merely note this to say that this practical aspect of the matter, and the consideration of the Gospel as the power unto salvation which is needed, is not the subject of the present paper, but of a following one. At present we adduce St. Paul merely to confirm the positions we have taken as to the insufficiency and contradictoriness of the merely moral stand-point, and the escape from this through the principle of spiritual freedom. This is that of which Christ said: "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." *How* it shall make us free, we have not now to consider.

Here, then, it is simply to be noted that St. Paul's practical result is inclusive of and based upon that speculative truth. He answers his own despairing question, "Who shall deliver me from this death?" with the exclamation: "I thank God (who has delivered me), through Jesus Christ our Lord. . . . For what the law could not do in that it was weak through the flesh, God (did by)

sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh." And a little further: "Christ is the end (object or aim) of the law of righteousness." Now, as the practical escape from the death of sin is through the Gospel of Christ, so through that Gospel is the speculative escape from the moral antinomy. Christianity centres in the person of Christ. His words, "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free," stand in vital connection with His other words, "I am the truth." The solution of the whole moral problem is the revelation of itself made to humanity in Christ. In His single person truly God yet perfectly man, Christ reveals the "truth" that human will and Divine will are ideally identical. The Divine will, or the moral law, is not a stern fate opposed to our will,—it is the ground and substance of our own will, it is our own inner spiritual self. No less, therefore, can be affirmed of human nature, considered in its original ideality, than its essential oneness (living union) with the Divine nature; and this the Apostle declares: "As many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. . . . The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God: and if children, then heirs; heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ. . . . For whom God did foreknow, He also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of His Son, that he might be the first-born among many brethren."¹ This declaration, that we are the children of God, and brethren of the Only Begotten, expresses most fully the result arrived at by our dialectical consideration of the ideality or external nature of will.

It follows from the Apostle's declarations that "what the law could not do in that it was weak, God did by sending His Son;" that "Christ is the end of the law;" and that we are "not under the law, but under grace,"—that the law, *as law*, is done away with.² We find that he insists upon this course. The law, he says, is binding only during the lifetime of those whom it controls. For instance, death dissolves the legal obligation of marriage, and the survivor is free to marry again. In like manner the death of Christ has dissolved the legal obligation between the law and us, for in His death we too are dead, having been "baptized into His death," according to His previous words. He concludes: "Now we are deliv-

¹ "Both He that sanctifieth and they who are sanctified are all of one; for which cause He is not ashamed to call them brethren."—Hebrews, ii. 11.

² "For there is verily a disannulling of the commandment going before for the weakness and unprofitableness thereof. For the law made nothing perfect, but the bringing in of a better hope did; by the which we draw nigh unto God."—Hebrews, vii. 18, 19.


ered from the law, having died to that wherein we were held, so that we serve in newness of spirit, and not in oldness of letter."¹ This language seems to justify my statement, made above, that in the light of the Christian principle, the old relation of obedience to law dissolves and vanishes. It is true the Apostle has said before: "Do we then make void the law? God forbid: yea, we establish the law." And to the same effect Christ said: "Think not I am come to destroy the law; I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil." But just this is the effect upon the law of the dialectic we have pursued. By that dialectic, law is not abrogated as to its *matter*, but merged as to its principle in a higher. Not *what* the law commands, but that it should *command* it; not the right, but the right as an obligation (something *bound upon* freedom) is done away with by the truth of the unity of subject and object in spiritual being. The law is "fulfilled" when it is seen to be properly *not* law, but the will's own freedom.

This point of the worn-out worthlessness of the law is the main subject of the Epistle to the Galatians. Indeed, that Epistle reads like a commentary on the parable of the old garment. As Archbishop Trench remarks, it was just the patching that the parable condemns which the Galatians attempted, and for which the Apostle rebukes them. The Apostle opens with warning against, and condemnation of, any retention of the Judaic system, which he calls a "perversion of the Gospel of Christ," and solemnly declares: "Though an angel from heaven preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached, let him be accursed." Nor is it Jewish ceremonial, *as such*, that is in question, but ceremonial as significant of a moral position which Christianity leaves behind. "I say unto you, that if ye be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing. For I testify again to every man that is circumcised, that he is a debtor to do the whole law. Christ is become of no effect unto you who are justified by the law; ye are fallen from grace." ("Among them that are born of women there hath not arisen a greater than John the Baptist; notwithstanding, he that is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he.") The whole argument of the third chapter is a forcible restatement of positions taken in the Epistle

Romans, vii. 6. The rendering of our version: "*That being dead where-in we were held,*" tangles the thread of the Apostle's argument, which, it is plain from v. 4, rests on our dying with Christ, and so being freed from the law. It is satisfactory to know, therefore, that the English renders not St. Paul, but Beza, who "conjectured" ἀποθανόντος in place of the ἀποθανόντες of all the great MSS. Alford, *in loc.*

to the Romans. Those under the law are under a curse, for it pronounces a curse against those who do not perfectly keep the injunction. From that curse Christ has redeemed us, having Himself become a curse for us, according to a symbolical saying of the law itself, as to the manner of his death. The purpose of the law is stated in similar language to that used in Romans: "It was added because of transgressions. . . . If there had been a law given which could have given life, truly righteousness should have been by the law. . . . The law was our schoolmaster to bring us unto Christ. ('I am come that ye might have life, and that ye might have it more abundantly.') . . . But after faith is come we are no longer under a schoolmaster, 'for ye are all children of God by faith in Christ Jesus.'" The fourth chapter returns to the heirship of Christians under the Gospel. During his minority the heir is in some respects as much under subjection as if he were a servant. Thus, hitherto, men had been under the bondage of the legal dispensation. But Christ came to give them their inheritance of sonship. "Wherefore thou art no more a servant, but a son; and if a son, then an heir of God through Christ." ("The servant abideth not in the house forever, but the Son abideth ever; if the Son therefore shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed.") The argument closes with the exclamation: "After ye have known God, or rather are known of God, how turn ye again to the weak and beggarly elements whereunto ye desire again to be in bondage?" and the exhortation to "stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage."

Hasty and superficial as this glance at Scripture has been, it yet may serve to indicate—what thorough study will make abundantly clear—that even here in its moral teaching, that sphere in which is sought the identification of Christianity with other religions, there is to be found a ground of essential difference; much more strikingly, then, it is to be expected, will the distinctiveness of Christianity appear, and the consequent futility of all attempts to class it with other religions as substantially alike with them, when attention is directed to another sphere of content, which such comparisons have overlooked, and which belongs to Christianity alone. It will be the purpose of a following paper to treat of this central pith or marrow of the Christian dispensation; and the reason that Christian morals have first been considered is that in morality the transition to spirituality takes place. The moral law is the schoolmaster that leads unto Christ, in a speculative as well as in a practical sense.



CONFLICTS OF CHURCH AND STATE.

1. The Pope and the Kingdom of Italy.
2. The Austrian Concordat.
3. Prussia and the Bishop of Ermeland.
4. Father Paul's Rights of Sovereigns and Subjects. Translated from the Italian. London: 1722. With his life prefixed.
5. The History of the Quarrels of Pope Paul V. with the State of Venice. Translated from the Italian of Father Paul. London: 1626.
6. Foulis's History of Popish Treasons and Usurpations. A folio of 726 pages. London: 1671.

“THE thing that hath been, it is that which shall be, and that which is done is that which shall be done; and there is no new thing under the sun.” So said Solomon in the Book of Ecclesiastes. And so said he, we apprehend, as a student of his own and of bygone times, as a reflector upon a much-checkered life, and as a political prognosticator for the future. The Book of Ecclesiastes is never contemplated under a fitter or more intelligible theory than when regarded as a tract in autobiography, or as embracing what has since been called one's confessions. We are even disposed to fancy that St. Augustine wrote his confessions, looking back to the confessions of Solomon.

Now, as a confessor for the past and the present, and a diplomatic conjecturer for the future, we are inclined to believe that Solomon is eminently and profoundly right as to eventualities

in human history. This history is wonderfully given to running in cycles, and, particularly, as to all matters in which the Church Catholic has a part. For the starting-points and stand-points and highways of the Church are always essentially the same; and when error crops out within her pale, or she is assailed by political forces from without, the results, though under different names and with somewhat different aspects, will always be quite similar.

Nobody, *e. g.*, familiar with Church history, is surprised to hear it said of a schism or a heresy, "This is but the revival of such and such a thing, in days long gone."¹ No observing person was astonished to find Milton criticising the Puritans (once the stern enemies of Church-power, but the loving friends of it when it was in their own hands), and saying of the transubstantiated prelatists, "New presbyter is but old priest, writ large."

And as it is with schism and heresy, things within the Church, so is it with the Church in her outward relations,—her relations with the state. The antagonisms and conflicts which grow out of these relations are things which are continually reviving and developing themselves in the history of eras and of governments, as they did in periods which now have passed away, and are numbered with years beyond the flood.

The question is as rife as ever, Shall the Pope rule states, and must they submit to him on his own conditions? And, again, when states enter into compact with him, *as civil corporations*, is this compact binding on *religious* grounds, of which he has the sole control, and failure in which he may consider a sin against God, which he can avenge by excommunications, interdicts, and other punishments purely ecclesiastical? Can an ecclesiastic inflict a Church penalty on a citizen, blameless toward the state—a penalty which will affect an individual, not as a member of a Church only, but as a citizen—and the state be powerless to give relief? Is Church property, set apart for a Church by civil authority, and held under civil authority, never to be touched by the state, for reasons of state, as private property often is, but to be held inalienable and inapproachable forever after?

¹ So curious is this, that it runs down into *minutiae*. For example, the *nasal twang* practised by the old Tascodrugitæ, in Phrygia, and perpetuated by the canters and whiners of modern times. Even Mr. Cave thought the Tascodrugitæ worthy a passing notice ("Historia Literaria," i. p. 75, col. A). From *tascos*, a finger, and *druggos*, nose; because they put one finger on a nostril to produce the sound desired. And yet, perhaps, they were not the originators of ecclesiastical nose-music, but the copiers of others. Comp. Ezek. viii. 17.

These are such questions as brought about most serious issues between the Pope and civil governments in former days. The Henrys of England and the Henrys of Germany, the Louises of France, and many lesser powers, knew very well what they had to expect from the head of that ecclesiastical corporation, which has its apex in Italy and at Rome; and what, too, they had to expect from it, if they had not garnered up power and powder, counsel and cannon enough, to put excommunications and interdicts at defiance. The present Emperor of Austria had reason to expect both these annihilating visitations when he vacated his concordat with Pío Nono. But for one of the shrewdest of answers, which he gave that *quasi* infallible dignitary, he might have fared as did the hapless John Lackland of England, more than six hundred years ago. He told his Imperial Sanctity that he must give up his own imperial dominion or the Concordat; and that, for *him*, it was altogether better to retain a friend, instead of risking an enemy on the Austrian throne. It looked as if the great Hapsburger had condescended to let a Yankee stand at his elbow for a cabinet counsellor. The Pope was wary enough (as he always is) to take care of his own expediences, and the concordat took morphine, and went into a sound sleep.

The recent trouble in Prussia—terminated, at length, in Rome, by the summary departure of the Prussian minister—is but the old difficulty born again, or risen again, as people may prefer to phrase it. A bishop, whose allegiances are at the Tiber, and not at Berlin, declares that he will execute the decrees and sentences of a Tiberine liege-lord, come what may, to men as citizens of a Prussian dynasty. If the skies come tumbling about his head, he will not budge, but keep on denouncing and excommunicating to the bitter and rasping end. And so the state has to match his sturdiness. It asserts an equipollent power, and excommunicates the bishop as a civilian. If the bishop is omnipotent ecclesiastically, the state is omnipotent politically, and will pay him in coin, an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth, as far—so the ancients used to say—as the Riphean mountains.

If the state is not a subordinate and subjected affair—if it has its rights and its independence apart from and clear away from the Church—the bishop has no right to complain. He is executing *his* functions, and the state is executing *its* functions; and, if the two conflict, nothing remains but the power of the stronger to overbear the other.

It will not do for the Church to say that it has an inherent

superiority over the state, and that, therefore, when the two come into collision, the state must of necessity succumb. This is what logicians call *petitio principii*,—a clear begging of the whole question. No doubt, such a statement of the case is axiomatic truth with the Jesuits, just as it was with the Puritans in Old England, in the days of the grand rebellion, when “new presbyter” got his lease of Church power; just as it was with John Cotton and the Puritan popes of New England, who defended “The Bloody Tenent” against Roger Williams, the Broad Churchman of Rhode Island.

Apostles and early Christians never undertook to rule the state, still less to assert over it anything like dogged absolutism. Our Saviour Himself respected the excise laws of the Roman Empire; and an Apostle, not a whit behind “the very chiefest,” appealed to Cæsar. And the prince of the Apostolic order—according to Roman theories—while he demanded no especial homage for himself, and put himself down to an elder’s level, admitted it as a maxim of Christian ethics that the king, though a Nero, should be held in honor (I. Peter, ii. 17; v. 1).

So the question has come up, and, for aught we see, must come up again and again, and through the cycles of the future, as among the cycles of the past,—Which shall rule, which shall dominate, when the provinces of the Church and of the state are incompatible, and beyond reconciliation? Questionless, it would be easy, most easy, to settle the point, if the Church were always, as the Roman Church claims ever to be, right, and right infallibly. But, setting infallibility aside, as we can now afford to do, with men like Döllinger and his growing school of sympathizers,—How are we to know when an excommunication is a valid and a binding one? If it be administered by whim or prejudice, or against New Testament law, it is good for nothing, even under the rules of casuistry. *In odiosis non est ampliandum*. A man is not bound to submit to it, when excessive, any more than the Old Catholics do, any more than Father Hyacinthe will do, who is going, it is reported, to begin saying mass again, as freely and as complacently as ever. The excommunications against Henry VIII. and Queen Elizabeth were not merely ill-tempered and vengeful ones, they were anti-Catholic and anti-Christian, and the Church of England has gone on maintaining and exercising her independence, as if those excommunications had been uttered by a grand Mufti of Constantinople, or a grand Llama of Thibet.

Who shall decide the right and the wrong in such a case? The

Pope, unquestionably, would decide it as peremptorily as by a flash over telegraphic wire. But the Pope is not what he claims to be, say such councils as he, in part, at least, recognizes,—the councils of Pisa, Constance, and Basle; say such national Churches as that of France, in the great assembly headed by Bossuet, in 1682; say such divines as Hontheim and Launoi, Döllinger and Pereira. And with his own councils, nations, and divines to give him such slender backing up, who is obliged to bow down with the impulsiveness of a Cullen, or the suppleness of a Manning, and say we must read Christian ethics and Christian canon law only under a Pope's dictation? The thing is simply a downright impossibility. We must turn the Pope's *non possumus* backward, and commend it to his own acceptance. We cannot (as Mr. Ffoulkes said, with threats buzzing about his ears, like mosquitoes in August), we cannot recant. History. History is against the Pope, flatly, and Bossuet would tell him so, in baritones of thunder, if he were still among the living. When Louis XIV. asked the great ecclesiastic what he would have done if, in a certain case, he had not listened to him, "What would I have done?" exclaimed he. "Why, then, your Majesty, I would have raised my voice one hundred times louder." We should tremble for the Pope's ear-drums if Bossuet had to be his counsellor.

Questions between Church and State are not, then, of self-evident settlement or easy determination, even when Rome undertakes to arrange them, after the counsel of her own overbearing will. Some of her own children refuse her allegiance, in questions which go to the very core of independent and absolute authority. And so she found it, some two hundred and fifty years ago, when she made one of her most desperate efforts in the line of absolutism, and was foiled completely.

This was at the opening of the seventeenth century, when, most unfortunately for herself, but most fortunately for history and for mankind, one of the most positive of Popes (Paul V.) was on the throne Pontifical, and his would-be victim was the equally positive and equally persistive republic, which was mistress (*Papessa*) of the Adriatic Sea.

It is in reference to this conflict, which may be taken as a type and a key to future ones, that we have placed at the head of this article the titles of some of the most important works which the heat of the contest struck out.

Father Paul Sarpi, the celebrated historian of the then fresh Council of Trent, was the author of two of them; and Henry Foulis,

B.D., of Oxford, followed in his steps, giving a sketch of Father Paul's labors and of the contest generally, and producing a volume which made so profound an impression on Mr. Disraeli that, in his "Charles I.," he pays homage to it as "an extraordinary folio." Mr. Foulis devotes twenty of his tall pages to an abstract of the conflict between "Paul V. and the Venetians." As to Paul himself, it may not be amiss to give some brief account of him, and the struggles he so ardently engaged in. He was born August 14, 1552, at Venice, and, consequently, espoused the cause of his home and country. He died, worn out by toil and study, January 14, 1623, in the seventy-first year of his age. Paul V., his implacable opponent, was made Pope May 16, 1605, and died January 28, 1621. The strife between Paul and the Republic of Venice culminated in an interdict, in 1606, which was dissolved, mainly under the mediation of Henry IV. of France, in 1607. The republic put on a bold, firm, and military front. A belligerent Pope found it expedient to give way, and accepted a mediator, with such grace as he found it indispensable to exercise. He yielded with a reluctance sometimes grimly ludicrous; but yield he did, at last.

Now, the battle between these parties was essentially that between the Pope and Victor Emanuel, between the Romish Bishop of Ermeland and the government of Prussia, and reminds one of the incompatibilities which occasioned a divorce between Austria and its Concordat. It was a contest of jurisdictions; the same which Anselm waged with William Rufus, and Becket with Henry II. And, as we have said, the contest is now brought on afresh, with the strategy of the Roman Curia, employing the ecclesiastical authority to eject all intruders upon its temporal domain, and defending the ecclesiastical authority, when it is possible to do so, with temporal auxiliaries, even though they come in the bristling shape of bayonets and "red artillery."

This assumption of two distinct provinces of power—one to fight with, and the other to fend off with, and *vice versa*—makes Rome, of course, doubly difficult to deal with, and has rendered her the most unmanageable of all earthly governments. She has always been ready for the quirks and shifts of old Proteus in fabulous mythology. When she wanted an excuse for a political encroachment, she found it in a spiritual prerogative; and when she was offended or maimed politically, in *e. g.* her temporal possessions, this was a crime which spiritual deprivations could avenge. If she lost territory, as in Italy, her resource was a spiritual one, an excommunication; delivering over to the prince of darkness, if he would espouse

her cause, or to any other prince, the property and lives of her despoilers, to say nothing of sadder mischances, in the realm of severest retributions. The King of Italy stands in dread of this excommunication, every hour; and shrunk from entering the walls of the seven-hilled city, till he was almost dragged there. The Emperor of Austria feared it, when he allowed the Concordat to expire; and would hardly have saved himself, but for the implied promise to reserve as much for a sinking cause, as the safety of his sceptre would permit. The King of Prussia is familiar with Romish contests, since the days of the late Archbishop of Cologne, who took it into his head to play high dudgeon, and would not recognize Protestant marriages. He might have put constraint on that archbishop, as he may upon his coworker in Ermeland. But he had his own method of dealing with an impracticable Church adversary. "Have your own way," said the good-natured but wary monarch, "and I will imitate you. I will not recognize Roman Catholic marriages." This brought that adversary to terms *instantly*, as such treatment ever will.

Constraint, and not entreaty, is the infallible argument with Rome. Prince Bismarck knew this, as well as his master, when the see of the individual alluded to becoming vacant, the names of three personages were sent to Rome in nomination, according to established usage. They were the names of liberals, and the Pope dashed his pen through every one of them. "Very well, again," said his Prussian majesty, who may have a vein of caustic humor in him, "I think I can get along without an Archbishop of Cologne as long as the Pope can." During the vacancy of a see, the revenues revert to the crown. But the thing became insufferable to Rome, for other causes. Ecclesiastical business was impeded and thwarted, and an archbishop there must be. So Prince Bismarck quietly tells the Prussian minister at the Vatican to demand his passports, if one of the obnoxious names was not accepted within twenty-four hours after the receipt of his despatch from Berlin.

The archbishopric was filled *within* the time specified; but, alas! when will Rome's carking jealousy end? The records of that act were ordered to be committed to flames, that they might never be known or admitted or acknowledged as a precedent.¹ Precisely the

¹ Just so when the Pope was disposed to trim a little to propitiate the Venetians, he wanted secrecy and *suppressio veri*; but the Venetians hated muzzling as much as the Prussians.—Father Paul's "History of the Quarrels," etc., p. 886.

same sort of jealousy induced the Puritans of New England to entrust to careful hands the execution of the infernal statute which allowed tongues that pattered heresy to be "bored through," as the old phrase went. That statute was put into the hands of justices of the peace because,—*because* they kept no records.

We used to think the tremendous law had never been enforced, till an unmistakable case let the horrid secret out. It had been preserved in *family* records, though there was no evidence whatever of the infliction of the penalty of fire and blood upon the records of *public* justice. We obtained our authority from reliable and documentary private sources, as Father Paul did many of the curious secrets of the Council of Trent. He had an intimate friend who was secretary to one of the cardinals. The cardinal himself was disgusted, and spoke freely to his secretary, and his secretary supplied many of those facts which rendered Paul's memorable history of the Trentine Council so racy and so stinging (Paul's "Life," p. iv.).

Not that he was ill-tempered; he was marvellously quiet and retiring. But he wielded a lively and a very potential pen, and possessed a memory which retained everything. And Rome felt this keenly, displaying her sensitiveness in a characteristic way. The life of Paul was several times endangered by Italian stiletos,¹ and so shamelessly cruel were these efforts, that even Bellarmine, who was his assailant, and sharply too, with ink and pen, accorded him generous esteem as a man, and sent him warnings of his perils ("Life," p. xli.).

Friar Paul outlived his plotting persecutor, since his papal namesake died a considerable time before him. He died in an estimation which surrounded him with a radiant halo. His fame and honor overspread Italy, and shone into France and England; for the books to which the quarrel of Paul V. with the long-celebrated republic gave rise, called out responsively the best talent of Papal Italy, were translated into French, and finally into English, and published at London, under the auspices of men distinguished not as ecclesiastics only, but as civilians and as statesmen.

It seems a sort of marvel that a man whose death the Court of Rome accepted as a Divine intervention, and whose days it had tried so industriously and feloniously to shorten, should not have been

¹ Once a stiletto was driven into his jaw-bone with such force that the assassin could not withdraw it, and it was left sticking in.—Foulis's "History," p. 686.

brought up *before*, in reference to questions which are now among the most momentous mixed questions of the day. Italy, Austria, Germany, Spain, and Great Britain are now agitated about the mutual bearings and antagonisms of Church and state; and if France is not as much disturbed about such affairs as she was in the days of Bossuet and Louis XIV., it is simply because she has had such sore experience in temporal matters, as to take less interest than she once did in matters ecclesiastical. But her feeling and anticipation on the subject is most clearly evinced by the almost deprecation of President Thiers, to be delivered from any admixtion (at present) in agitations for the Pope. France, indeed, in her palmyest days, would never have equalled the Italian Jesuit who ascribed a work to Paul V. as a vice-God (Paul's "Life," p. lxxviii.). Now, all she can offer him is merely a personal home.

But we shall beguile ourselves away from Father Paul's most thoughtful treatise on the rights of sovereigns and subjects; quite as pertinent for these days as for the times of Paul V. and of Venetia, when "the lady of kingdoms." He shows himself at once as a profound canonist; to say nothing of his acquirements as a theologian, to which Cardinal Bellarmine could render homage. His work embraces no less than twelve most important questions, which he arrays for comment, and the discussion of which he seems to approach as coolly and fearlessly as if he lived not amid Italian daggers and poisons, but under the balmy canopy of our own republic, along the shores of the Atlantic. He first discusses these questions abstractly, and then, in a second part, like a cautious logician, gives their results and applications.

It will be impossible to afford the whole so much as a passing notice; but the whole are deserving of the fullest consideration, and good service might be rendered to the English public at large if the edition of 1722 were repeated, with such additional notes and authorities as might render it perfectly applicable to present necessities. If the name of Phillimore, which made Burns's Ecclesiastical Law so conspicuous in 1842, could be attached to such a volume, we are sure that all anti-papal Christendom would bestow on it a benediction.

In respect to excommunication—the subject he first notices—Paul lays it down as a fundamental principle, that an excommunication cannot lawfully be pronounced against a person who has not been arraigned and never tried; subjoining, very shrewdly, that the Almighty himself did not excommunicate Adam and Eve from Paradise until He had called them into His presence and confronted

them with their failures. But he adds that if a bishop do excommunicate *unjustly*, the inflexible rule of the Council of Trent is, that the magistrate who interferes shall be held guilty ("Treatise," pp. 14, 15).

Questionless, under this rule, the Bishop of Ermeland considers his situation impregnable against the menaces of Prussian autocracy. He defies that autocracy; and between the Prussian government and the Council of Trent, in other words, between the monarch of Prussia and the Pope, there is now a distinct and imminent *casus belli*. If the Pope felt strong enough—and he would, perhaps, if the late Emperor of France had been reseatd on his throne—he might summon the government of Prussia to retract, or suffer the extremest consequences. So the peace of Europe is hanging about this case, and, for very broad and portentous reasons, it *must* be settled. How shall it be settled? The Church of Rome never surrenders a fixed principle. The Council of Trent is, to her, what the soul is to the body, and giving it up would be like uttering the cry which befitted another occasion, "It is finished." We cannot expect her to do this; and so Prussia and the Pope are as wide asunder as the poles. Politics will inevitably decide who shall be the conqueror. As to mediating for union or unanimity between antagonists who both cry out, "*Non possumus*," one might as well attempt to bridge "the great gulf" between Gehenna and Paradise!

But, while attempts at harmonizing inflexibilities may be an effort as vain as it is comfortless, Father Paul holds distinctly to the doctrine that excommunicated public authorities—the representative heads of nations especially—have a remedy, as truly ecclesiastical as it is rational. And this is an appeal from Papal adjudications to a genuinely free and a genuinely constituted Œcumenical Council.

This idea is one familiar to the English reformers, and is one which Henry VIII. or Queen Elizabeth would unquestionably have acted on. The difficulty, the exact one, Queen Elizabeth made, when the idea was presented to her of sending delegates to the Council of Trent (which did not end for some years after her accession) was, that her delegates could not stand upon the council's floor on the footing of equality. An Œcumenical Council of Christendom, in which *all* Christendom shall be represented in *all* its parts, may be, under the present aspects of Christendom, a stark impossibility. But, speaking Christian-wise, it is a perfect propriety, and ought to be a perfect feasibility. Every baptized man is a member of the Church Catholic, and a representative in his person of

the Church Catholic, and an inheritor of the rights of the Church Catholic. It is one of the most precious of these rights for the Church Catholic to act in a representative way, afterward submitting her acts to the acceptance or non-acceptance of those who constitute her whole. None of the conciliar acts or decisions of a council—of even an Œcumenical Council, and in reference to a definition or attestation of the faith, as in a creed—have force, *ex vi termini*, upon their mere promulgation. The voice of the Church in a council is but a key-note for the Christian republic, and does not become the Church's consentaneous and *actual* voice, until responded to by at least the great majority of her children, and adown the descent of ages. A parallel political case is the settlement of constitutional or organic law. Such settlement, even if made unanimously by the convention proposing it, does not become obligatory until it is accepted by the people.

This is simple and legal enough with those who comprehend that the Church Catholic must be a *communio* of saints, to ratify the proper utterances of Christendom; and that a part of the Church Catholic, not in communion with other parts, has no right in equity, in reason, or in the nature of a Christian economy, to legislate for parts which, though constituted Christian by baptism, are not recognized by other parts as belonging to the great community of Christian believers.

And such doctrine as this gives a complete *ecclesiastical* answer to all actions of the Pope, to all councils summoned by the Pope, and sanctioned by the Pope, and held up *in terrorem* to all persons of political and governmental consequence. Christendom is a catholic or universal republic, though even republicans do not seem always to understand the fact, nor to estimate its weightiness. It ought to be such a republic, also, as the Creed calls "the Communion of saints," *i. e.*, a body whose parts, however separated by distance, nationality, history, or other causes of human divarication, should be intercommuning in relation to all matters essential to unity.¹ Unity, we say, and not uniformity; since unity in funda-

¹ We do not undertake to deny that, in its *broad* sense, "the communion of saints" includes departed saints, as well as living ones. But, in its *narrower* sense—its first and oldest sense, since it was introduced into the Creed as a protest against schism—it means the Church on earth, as an intercommuning body. The Catholic Church means the Church in its diffusiveness. The communion of saints means the Church in its consolidation. Both phrases are necessary to describe the Church in its entirety (King on the Creed, p. 325, fourth edition).

mentals, and for matters involving actual existence, is all the general unity which is practicable,—all, perhaps, which is desirable, or was ever intended. “We have no such custom,” said St. Paul to the queasy Corinthians (I. Cor. xi. 16). And added, in the vein of a catholic theologian, “neither the Churches of God.” Still, he would not denounce such a custom, but silently endured it; and with his example before us, we ought to extend endurance to those to whom, it may be, we have heretofore denied its gentleness and patience. If the Church of Rome had followed St. Paul in such a precedent, her canon law—now one of her most objectionable features—would lose many a frown, and forbid many a curse, to her unutterable gain and glory.

Wherefore, human governments are safe enough against Rome’s severest ruling, on the principle that Christendom must decide all great questions for itself, and must decide them in a council as free as it is wide, whose action must afterward be submitted to the review and acceptance of Christendom, before it can be acknowledged as belonging to and as incorporated with “the communion of saints.” Acts of “the communion of saints,” and not acts of councils, are the things which really commit Christendom. These are what constitute irrepealable and continuous precedents; and civil governments and provincial Churches and national Churches must make more of the Ninth Article of the Creed, which tries to give this communion eminence and prominence,—must make it of altogether more consequence than heretofore. When the Pope arraigns a ruler or a nation, let the reply be, “When ‘the communion of saints,’ the Church in intercommunion and consolidation, as really and comprehensively one, sustains your action, we will bow to it, nay, revere it, with religious fidelity. Till then, we shall treat it as *ex parte*, one-sided, and a mere expression of wishes or opinions, without the buttress of authority.”¹

There is, then, no difficulty—no difficulty ecclesiastically—in

¹ And this is the proper doctrine of respect for majorities. The Church of Rome (or, as Father Paul says, full knowingly, the Curia of Rome) is sometimes apt to plead, when convenient, the power of a majority. Our old divines knew how to turn the tables on her. Thus says old Matthew Scrivener, in his profound “Course of Divinity:” “If four of the patriarchs of the Church may be hereticks and schismaticks, and so continue for many hundred years together, what becomes of that argument for the true Church, taken from the universality of its profession?” (p. 235.) Scrivener was a divine, valued by such a scholar as Bishop Van Mildert; for we own his copy, which has his book-plate and private marks in it.

treating the heaviest sentences of Rome as *bruta fulmina*, thunders without lightning. But when they touch *temporal* matters, the difficulty, as Father Paul shows, is even smaller. We had marked passages for quotation, but, for brevity's sake, must refer to his thirty-sixth and thirty-seventh pages.

Father Paul lets the temporal sovereignty of the Pope, as a *religious* matter, go by the very board. And so, in fact, does Gosselin, who represents "the principal ecclesiastical college in France," and whose great work is mainly devoted to proving—and this shows the chief pinch of the case, with a genuine ecclesiastical historian—that temporal power was a free gift to the Popes from Christian rulers, and that the clergy did not ambitiously intrigue for it.

All this may be freely admitted, for it surrenders all "right Divine," makes the Pope's temporal sovereignty a mere condonation, or an issue of historical circumstances, like the sovereignty of any other crowned head, and reduces him, *as a Pope*, to shorn dimensions, and to spiritual functions solely. And this makes him very harmless in all acts which have a temporal bearing, and which, accordingly, we may look at from a political stand-point, even if he insists on looking at them from a stand-point ecclesiastical and spiritual. Prince Bismarck, we doubt not, would be perfectly willing that a Pope should claim the sovereignty of the states of the Church, or any other temporal sovereignty whatever, under what may be called political right, or international law, and might condescend to argue out the case with him, or his astuter Antonelli, to a diplomatic conclusion. But if, in the midst of his arguments, the Pope should come in with his "right Divine," and his infallible dogmatics, we should not be astonished if the Prince arrayed against him the right of armies and infallible artillery. Temporal power does not, it cannot, follow logically from spiritual power. The reasoning of Rome, which infers the one from the other, is a *non sequitur* in the superlative degree; and the best way for human governments to treat it would be to let it pass along in silence, "like the idle wind." It has but the ephemeral energies of a protest; give it a place upon the record, and let it glide into oblivion.

The conflict between Paul V. and the Republic of Venice did not last long. The Venetians, as Paul said, had an ugly habit of not obeying laws or sentences passed out of their own dominions ("Rights," etc., p. 274). This habit, with military force enough to sustain it, was a thing too unmanageable for even a Papal Hercules

to strangle. And so he, *as it were*, made peace with them, at the instance of a French monarch, though they sent his Jesuits packing, and treated his bulls with as little ceremony as Martin Luther himself. He was a plucky Pope who assailed them, or he would have tried easier victims. He was an unscrupulous one, or he would not have tried those arts of assassination which Philip II. of Spain was a far better adept in. Father Paul defied him, and survived him. And such may be the fortune of those fancied opponents of Pio Nono, when he obeys the Jesuits, and attempts to do with his bitter allocutions what Paul V. did with his bitterer interdict. Rome is shut out from all formidable *action* now, and if civil governments will only let her severely alone—reply to her *non possumus* with another *non possumus*—a power which has done its utmost to “weaken the nations” will go down to “the sides of the pit.”



HOW TO TREAT MODERN SCEPTICISM.

IN their characterizations of what is called the "spirit of the age," Christian writers are somewhat at variance. While one class is hopeful, another class is despondent, in view of the tendencies of modern thought. It is an age of faith, says the one; and he points to the multiplicity of books that are written from the stand-point of Christian faith and experience, to the eagerness with which religious literature is read, to the Christian savor that abounds in so much modern poetry and fiction, to the intense interest that is almost everywhere manifested in ecclesiastical matters, to the vast and prosperous enterprises of philanthropy and evangelization that are supported by Christian generosity and devotion, to the firmness of loyalty to Christian truth which is displayed in Christian communities, notwithstanding the severe assaults that are made upon it, and to many other signs. He affirms that Christ was never in so wide and large honor among men as now, that the churches were never so full and prosperous, that the Gospel was never preached more ably or faithfully, and that the genuine fruits of the Christian life were never fairer or richer or more abundant than now.

It is an age of doubt and unbelief, says the other; and he points to the developments of rationalism in the Church, to the materialism and pantheism and positivism of modern science, metaphysics, and criticism, to the new departures in theology, to the religious sentimentalism of such current literature as is not downrightly

sceptical, to the corruptions and disorders that abound in political and social life, and to the intense "worldliness" that is everywhere displayed. Each of these representations contains no little truth, and it may safely be asserted that our age is one of great and vigorous and fruitful faith, and also one of bold and dangerous scepticism. And, moreover, the believing and the doubting are coming into close quarters, and the conflict between them waxes hot and mighty. Christian men perceive and feel this, and ask the pertinent question, "How shall Christianity treat the sceptical tendencies of the times?" Before any good answer can be given to this question, it is necessary to gain some definite conception of the nature and spirit and drift of modern scepticism. Scepticism, like disease, is a manifold thing. Its causes, its forms, and its character are varied. It is not to-day what it was a century ago, and cannot be successfully met with just the same, and with only the same, arguments which then sufficed to refute it.

First of all, modern scepticism is a form of thought. It is intensely intellectual and inquisitive. Indeed, many of its errors are the result of the exclusively intellectual nature of its methods of inquiry, and of the vain expectation of solving all the hard problems by no other instruments than those of observation, analysis, and induction. But as determined on knowledge, and intent on searching and proving all things, it must be distinguished from that sad state of mind that despairs of attaining any certain knowledge, from religious indifference, and from the coarse infidelity that springs up out of a selfish and worldly conduct of life. Of course, there are lower and higher grades and qualities of it. It is now gentle and kind, then violent and arrogant. It is here reverent, and there flip-pant. It is in one case a kind of pious uncertainty, and in another case an intolerant positivism. But if we regard it in the persons of those who are its acknowledged and ablest representatives, its spirit is, in the main, one that must be credited with earnestness and honesty. It is not usually low and abusive, but courteous and dignified and fearless.

Those who best represent it in the several departments of intellectual inquiry, are mostly gentlemen as eminent for personal purity and nobleness as they are for mental culture and professional devotion. Notwithstanding an ill-concealed and most unbecoming contempt for what has been for ages, and still is, the sacredly-cherished faith of Christendom, it must be admitted that the leaders of scepticism are honorably distinguished from their predecessors of almost every age by a careful effort to repress this contempt and impa-

tience, and to treat their believing opponents with respect; and while this is true, whatever inconsistencies we remark between their claims, on the one hand, that science is essentially progressive, the discoveries of to-day modifying and even exploding the theories of yesterday, and their constant assumptions, on the other hand, of ultimate certainty for their theories and hypotheses, should be exposed with no less courtesy and respect.

The quiet and covert assumption that theology is not in any true sense a science, but only a tradition, must be regarded by Christian men as an offensive impertinence, and the habit of attributing established certainty to novel hypotheses upon which scientific men are hopelessly divided, must also be considered as unjust as it is unscientific. But notwithstanding the numerous evidences of what can only be regarded as superficial and shallow on the part of those who so summarily dismiss the theology which they decline and disdain to take into consideration, and who so confidently bring forward bold conjectures in the name of established truth, it is gratefully acknowledged that modern scepticism has very little of mocking manner or scoffing tone, and that its zeal, however unchastened, is, in the main, both earnest and honest.

As to the drift of this scepticism, it is evidently strongly in the direction of the idolatry of natural law. Such idolatry involves the ultimate dethronement of Christ and the complete destruction of Christianity. It involves more than this. It substitutes for a personal God, the unknowable. It gives for worship some blind reverence for an unthinkable what-is-it. It confounds sensation with thought, and so achieves the triumph of materialism. It identifies matter and spirit as but "convertible names for imaginary substrata of groups of natural phenomena." Mr. Huxley, whose words have just been quoted, says: "We know nothing of matter except as a name for the unknown and hypothetical cause of states of our own consciousness; nor of spirit, except that it is also a name for an unknown and hypothetical cause of states of our own consciousness." Herbert Spencer says: "We can think of matter only in terms of mind. We can think of mind only in terms of matter. The antithesis of subject and object, never to be transcended while consciousness lasts, renders impossible all knowledge of that ultimate reality in which subject and object are united." And he thinks that the "religious sentiment" may find its highest sphere in the belief that the "ultimate power" is not representable in terms of human consciousness, any more than human consciousness is representable in terms of a plant's functions.

By a shorter process still, the positive philosophy cuts all communications between the spirit of man and the Divine spirit, by practically identifying the two, and gives us for an object of worship, humanity instead of God. The tendency of such efforts to expel the supernatural from the system of things, and to confound the spiritual and material, must be to produce the most deplorable results in the sphere of morals, of society, and of politics.

Enough has been said to show that modern scepticism cannot be treated by Christianity with indifference. We cannot safely or honorably stand apart and let it alone. It is an aggressive force. It boldly attacks our positions. This is not one of the instances when Christians are to sit still and behold the salvation of the Lord. Moreover, the spirit of true Christianity is also aggressive. The kingdom of heaven, as represented in Christian institutions, inspired with Christian life, is an on-moving kingdom, which purposes to subdue all things to itself, and gather all things under its one head and name. It cannot be faithful and true to itself, without grappling with these forces of error which tend to undermine and supplant it. Not only to preserve ourselves from being carried away as captives to such delusions, but to deliver such as are already bound with its chains, and, much more, to anticipate and thwart its power in the cases of innumerable multitudes whose safety depends upon the preoccupation of their minds and hearts with Christian principles, we must resist the encroachments and turn the positions of this manifold force of error, and treat it with the utmost earnestness of opposition. Here are stones of stumbling and rocks of offence lying in the way, over which, if they be not diligently gathered up and cast out, thousands of heedless souls will fall and perish.

Nor can this scepticism be treated with ridicule and denunciation. Horace Greeley may have been ridiculed to death, and there may be two opinions concerning the value and decency of many of Nast's political cartoons, but Horace Greeleyism (right or wrong) does not succumb to ridicule. Wit can never supply the uses of reason. Making jokes in ghastly merriment upon certain isolated observations of Mr. Darwin does not refute the doctrine of evolution. And of all stupidity, theological lampoonery is the stupidest. Caricatures of theories may raise a laugh, but they do no serious damage, save to the authors of them.

Nor will the treatment by denunciation and anathema prove any more effectual.

The terrors of the Church are, perhaps, not sufficiently regarded in these degenerate days, but, as a matter of fact, almost nobody

stands in any awe of ecclesiastical or clerical thunder. The Pope ought to have an undisturbed monopoly of that business. What can be more pitiful than the spectacle of clergymen vehemently denouncing "modern scepticism" in vague terms that indicate their utter ignorance of what they are condemning! What is gained to the cause of truth by publicly calling Mr. Huxley a fool or a liar? Men who never read anything but superficial reviews of Darwin, Huxley, or Spencer, and who evidently know nothing whatever of the observations and theories of these gentlemen, pour out their vials of wrath upon Darwinism, and the other philosophies, with a confidence that excites only contempt and pity. This treatment of abuse is worse than the disease. It is quackery and charlatanism. It excites suspicion of the real strength of Christianity. It provokes sympathy for the errors and errorists. It is simply a form of brow-beating, as disgusting as it is ineffective. Christianity, in dealing with scepticism, must manifest just that fair, candid, discriminating, kind, and patient spirit which it requires of sceptics in their inquiries. It must excel, and be exemplary in this. There is no dogmatism or intolerance that can exceed that which some modern scientific men manifest in dealing with Christianity, and therein is a fatal weakness betrayed. Let Christian men beware of manifesting a similar weakness. The pride of theology may be as great an obstacle in the way of discovering truth, and of harmonizing the contradictions of philosophy and revelation, as the pride of science. The spirit of a supreme love of truth must prevail. Not to make out a case, not to carry off a prize, or to gain an intellectual triumph, but to establish and manifest and honor what is really true, must be our aim. Moreover, it must be remembered that both the personal characters and the scientific aims and labors of these same sceptics are such as entitle them to respectful and candid treatment. They are not always deliberate and intentional destructives. Many of them have no malice, and are seeking for truth. Criticise their methods, point out their errors and fallacies with all the severity of sincerity, but do so fairly and kindly, remembering that an Apostle knew only in part that all our knowledge is but seeing through a glass darkly, and that without love our highest knowledge of all mysteries profiteth nothing. He who merely *assumes* that he is in possession of unchangeable forms of religious truth, and that the propositions of his theological science are as expressed, unalterable, and that traditional interpretations of specific texts of Scripture are as authoritative as they are venerable, is thereby disqualified to deal with doubts, or with doubters. It is historically true that the

progress of philosophical and theological science has been indirectly, but powerfully, promoted by what we call scepticism. In the overrulings of God's providence, this free-thinking serves some very important ends and interests of truth. Its questionings and scrutiny compel the frequent reconsideration and modification and correction of beliefs. Its discoveries throw light upon dark questions, and suggest difficulties, in the surmounting of which other greater difficulties are also overcome, and new prospects are gained. Often, indeed, scepticism is the inevitable hesitation of minds constitutionally cautious and exact. One of the Twelve seems to have been of a doubting temperament. It was said of Dr. Arnold that his doubts were better than most men's certainties. When it is considered that a good deal of scepticism is only an honest, earnest, reverent, but misdirected, effort of inquiry to discover the solid and substantial grounds of belief, it will be readily conceded that not only kindness, but generous sympathy should, in such instances, characterize all Christian endeavors to correct it.

"The *fool* hath said in his heart, There is no God." But because some who say this in their hearts are fools, deserving to be answered only according to their folly, it does follow that all whose *minds* ask for the grounds of faith are also fools, who deserve no gentler and better answer. Who, that thinks for himself with any degree of vigor and courage, is without an experience of Doubting Castle?

And the man who has not known what it is to struggle and contend with overwhelming doubts, and whose faith has not been tried in the perils of a sceptical period, is not most eminently qualified, to say the least, to deal with individual cases or theoretic problems of scepticism.

Passing now from the spirit of a proper treatment of scepticism to the forces to be employed by Christianity in resisting the evil tendencies, we say that Christianity is bound to put forth its whole and manifold strength in this resistance. Christianity is not represented by a multitude of isolated and unrelated individual believers, but by a compact and strong Body, having many members, indeed, but one spirit. There are diversities of gifts and powers in the Church, and all these should be brought into exercise. Whatever learning, whatever eloquence, whatever art, whatever skill, whatever virtue or grace is anywhere baptized by the spirit of Christ, is a constituent part of the total power of Christianity. How to bring to bear all this diversity of power, and every arm of the service, is the question. "To every man his work." And if the scepticism of

the day is not resisted, not only by Christian scholars and preachers, but also by that immense majority of the Christian brotherhood who can neither teach nor preach, then our resistance will be a thousand-fold weaker than it might and should be. There is no Christian man or woman who has not a part to perform in this great struggle, and it must be so understood. In a war for a country's preservation, it is not enough to send forth soldiers and officers to fight the battles. Every patriotic man and woman knows and feels that the army's strength and success depend upon a support to be supplied by those at home. A great defeat is not so dispiriting or so dangerous as demonstrations of unfaithfulness at home. In the first place, scepticism as an intellectual force must be fairly and manfully met, by a competent Christian scholarship and culture, in the lists of argument and discussion. In its scientific and metaphysical aspects and tendencies, or as a form of scientific investigation and metaphysical philosophy, it must be treated by Christian scholars and thinkers of consummate ability, who are perfectly familiar with the progress of scientific investigation, and with the developments of modern philosophy, and with the canons and methods of historical criticism. It is somewhat fashionable of late to sneer at metaphysics, but we make bold to affirm that the decisive battle between the contending forces of faith and scepticism will be fought on metaphysical grounds. Indeed, it is curious to see physicists, like Mr. Huxley, continually transcending the bounds of natural science, and entering the domain of psychology with their argumentations. They are carried thither perforce. It is not extravagant to say that the advent of Herbert Spencer has created an epoch in the history of philosophy. Of his very great ability there can be no question. His mind is comprehensive and acute. He walks at ease on those high places of thought where most men grow giddy and fail. His analytic power is hardly more wonderful than his omnivorous observation. He pushes forward to the principles of things with remorseless logic, pouring upon his pages a wealth of illustration, and writing with the utmost simplicity and lucidity. He is in earnest. He is by no means irreverent. We feel his nobleness and seriousness. Moreover, he is very widely read and studied. He is the apostle of the unknowable. There may be a God, but we cannot know Him! How long a time will be required to popularize that proposition? Christianity must produce men who can follow Herbert Spencer's philosophizings, detect their errors and omissions, and sift and winnow them in the sight of all men. So in the fields of natural science and historical criticism, and with respect to such

men as Huxley or Darwin. It is utterly useless to stand on the Book of Genesis, and declare that the doctrine of evolution cannot be true. It is a simple question of facts. And if the facts support the doctrine, it must be accepted, and Christian doctrine adjusted and reconciled thereto. If we cannot have competent men, of reverent disposition, patient to investigate, apt to generalize, ready to face all the facts in the case without fear or prejudice, and ready, also, to accept whatever shall be proven, with dignity and peace to meet the difficulties thrown up in the way of faith by the developments of rationalism, then there will surely be experienced a most disastrous and overwhelming inundation of popular infidelity not many years hence. If three fourths of the phenomena of the case are completely ignored by the new philosophies, and brilliant and startling hypotheses are promulgated as scientific conclusions, let us be able to point out the omissions, and expose the assumptions. If some scientific man boldly (but not, perhaps, irreverently) brings the war to our very doors, and challenges us to prove that prayer has any physical value whatever, let us furnish some more satisfactory and convincing answer than an outcry of indignation, or a mock-dignified refusal to entertain so shocking a question. It is a fair question. It must be answered. Of what use is all our praying, unless we firmly believe that prayer has a physical value? If we firmly believe that, on what grounds do we believe it? If prayer has such a value or effect, can it not be shown and proven? The progress of scientific and philosophical investigations brings forth continually new materials of knowledge. What is the relation of this new material to our accepted forms of faith? We must have men who are capable of grappling with such problems.

The old apologies will not suffice. One might as well take old armor and weapons from the Tower of London wherewith to equip an army for modern warfare, as to go merely to the Fathers, or merely to the Christian champions of the last century for arguments wherewith to meet modern unbelief. Hence the necessity of carefully selecting, and as thoroughly preparing men, by the broadest kind of culture, for the service of the Church. This also is missionary ground. The common people who read and think somewhat, are just a trifle uneasy. They are not disposed to surrender Christianity, nor to dismiss the supernatural from history and faith, because these seem to stand in antagonism with a present tendency of scientific thought, which may be only in appearance true, and may, in short time, be found laden with errors; but they want to see some gallant, generous, satisfactory defence and vindication of their faith.

It will be at once perceived that only a few persons out of every generation can be reasonably expected to be competent for such labors as have just now been indicated. Some such Christian knights there must be, but to rely upon their intellectual efforts alone, would be like fighting a battle with only one arm of the service. Christianity has other powers to be employed, and none more important than that which is developed in a simple and faithful preaching of the Gospel of Christ.

If we accept St. Paul's estimate of the power of Christian preaching over the minds and hearts of men, then it is evident that it is an instrument of incalculable efficiency for the counteraction of sceptical tendencies. But the preaching, to be effective, must be that which has proved itself to be effective in the hands of the Apostles and the Fathers, who faithfully followed them. The testimony of Christ is the spirit of prophecy. Philosophic, scientific, and critical dissertations in the pulpit will be as barren in results as exhortations or homilies would be in the lecture-room of the academy. Now and ever there is an altogether singular attraction for men in Christ crucified. The Word of God is the sword of the Spirit, and thousands of devoted men, who are quite incapable of performing such services as we have shown to be necessary, are perfectly competent to perform this service of holding forth the true and lively Word of God, of declaring Christ, of wielding the sword of the Spirit; and this blessed service they may render, in the encouragement that Divine assistance has vouchsafed to attend upon all faithful efforts to spread the truth which has been Divinely revealed, and that by the foolishness of preaching it hath pleased God to confound the wisdom of this world, and lead men into that higher wisdom which consists in the knowledge of Him. Here is something which we believe to be the "wisdom and power of God unto salvation." In the faithful use of this, there must be a suitable and effective treatment of many forms and phases of unbelief. For let it be remembered that Christ is Himself the door to the Holy Scriptures. Through Him men enter into them, and not conversely. Men perplexed with critical doubts, and historical and scientific difficulties, must be led "through Christ to the Bible," and the preacher has the manifold opportunities which the vicissitudes of life afford for making an impression of Christ, in some of His gracious aspects, upon the hearts of sinning, sorrowing, suffering, dying men. Once bring a sceptical mind to perceive in Christ a Saviour for the sinful soul, and you have put him in the way of the gradual dissolution of a multitude of doubts and difficulties which no argu-

ments could have shaken. The preaching of Christ in all simplicity and sincerity cannot fail, therefore, to be of incalculable service, both in convincing such as are in error, and in preserving men from the influence of error. And its effectiveness for this end will depend upon the degree in which it assumes the Gospel to be true, and speaks to men, as to sinners, of the grace of God in Jesus Christ, "in whom we have redemption through His blood, even the forgiveness of sins." The old, old story, truthfully and simply and heartily told, will never cease to touch and stir the hearts of sinful men. Moreover, it cannot be denied that some, if not much, of the scepticism of the times springs from moral causes. The unbelief of the mind may often be traced to disobedience of the will. The Scriptures speak of an "evil heart of unbelief in departing from the living God." So far as this unbelief prevails, the dispensation of the Gospel will prove the most powerful remedy for it. "Preach the Word." Preach Christ, simply, earnestly, faithfully. Declare that which has been heard from the beginning. Not as a dead Christ, not as a far-away Saviour, not as a mere historic person, nor yet as set forth in some human theories of atonement which have no authority, but as a risen, ascended, reigning, interceding Lord and Saviour, able to save unto the uttermost, the Head of a Living Body, in which, by the power of the Holy Ghost, all who believe in Him are spiritually united in Him, and have fellowship in His resurrection and eternal glory. There will be power and sufficiency in such preaching. The Word thus sown in never so great weakness will be raised in power.

But the Christian scholars and preachers are, in point of numbers, to the great body of believers, what the officers of an army are to the army itself. Is there no service to be rendered to the cause of truth, in its opposition of error, by the myriads of Christian men and women who are not called to preach or to reason? Shall we attempt to oppose the forces of unbelief without calling into action the great power that must be stored up in these innumerable Christian lives? The power to which we refer, and which must be more earnestly invoked and more completely evoked, is that of a life-manifestation of the truth. There is no greater power than this which Christianity can command and employ. "Living Epistles, known and read of all men," are the most effective. Christianity incarnated is Christianity in its most convincing form. Consider how St. Paul's wonderful life, in which the Word of God is remanifest in the flesh, furnishes the world with one of the most convincing arguments for the truth of the Christian religion.

Truth in life is irresistible where truth in any forms of precept or proposition or doctrine would be resisted.

“And so the Word had breath, and wrought
With human hands the creed of creeds
In loveliness of perfect deeds,
More strong than all poetic thought;
Which he may read that binds the sheaf,
Or builds the house or digs the grave,
And those wild eyes that watch the wave
In roarings round the coral reef.”

What the world needs is the light of Christian lives; “the light of the knowledge of the glory of God as it shines in the face of Jesus Christ,” shining into human hearts, and thence visibly outshining. There is such a thing as being too exclusively concerned for personal salvation. The true significance of God’s gracious elections is not that the elect may be drawn out of the mass and multitude of perishing mankind, and so saved, but that they are chosen to become instruments of blessing, and distributors of salvation to the world. And this idea needs to be more generally recognized than it seems to be. It becomes more and more necessary to get rid of a selfish type of piety. They have the healthiest souls who care most for other souls.

The saintly Monica went to St. Ambrose to tell him of her wayward son. He told her to go home and pray, and be comforted, for it could not be that the son of such tears could perish. The gentle bishop did not over-estimate the power of a holy life and love, and the faith of the woman was answered in the conversion of Augustine.

In the preface to the English edition of his Commentary on the Psalms, Professor Tholuck says:

“My conversion to the faith of the Gospel was brought about by the instrumentality of a noble Christian layman who belonged to the small number of those who had, in a period of universal infidelity, kept alive the faith in the Word of God’s truth. *His luminous example* of a Christian walk, more than what he told me, led me to think, and assured me at least of this, that Jesus is the Son of God. Then I believed in Christ and was able to kneel before Him and pray to Him.” Every word of this testimony deserves close attention. Many such testimonies might easily be adduced, and, accordingly, we maintain that among all the means or agencies which God is pleased to employ for the conversion of men from error and sin, and for the neutralization of the leaven of scepticism, none are more evidently honored and effective than this manifestation of the

truth in the lives of faithful Christians. The Church cannot dispense with scholarship or preaching, or missionary and benevolent societies, but neither can it depend upon these alone. Christian lives must bear witness to the renewing and sanctifying power of Christianity. The Church must not only proclaim a doctrine of regeneration, but must abound in undeniable fruits of regeneration. And this treatment, modern scepticism should receive. It must be met with argument, with the word of truth, and with the life of faith and love. And thus the whole Church, clad in her complete panoply, shall be arrayed to resist, with all her diversities of gifts and in all her plenitude of power, the encroachments of error, and to spread abroad the most holy faith, and enlarge the dominions of her King, till the kingdom that is not of this world shall subdue to itself all kingdoms of the earth, and the prayer of our Lord, and the purpose of our God, shall be gloriously fulfilled.



PRESBYTERIANISM AND EPISCOPACY IN SCOTLAND.

1. Stephens's History of the Church of Scotland. London: Longmans. 1848.
2. Lawson's Annals of the Church of Scotland, from the Reformation to the Revolution. Edinburgh: Gillie and Bayley. 1844.
3. Wodrow's History of the Sufferings of the Church of Scotland, from the Restoration to the Revolution. Glasgow: Blackie and Son. 1835.
4. The Scots' Worthies. By John Howie. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1853.
5. Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Dr. Chalmers. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1852.
6. Strype's Annals. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1824.
7. Zurich and Original Letters. 1537-1602. Parker Society, Cambridge.
8. Burnet's History of the Reformation.
9. Stanley's Lectures on the History of the Church of Scotland.

DR. CHALMERS, lecturing in defence of the system of national Churches established by the state, urged, as his leading argument, that "the establishment and extension of national Churches afforded the only adequate machinery for the moral and Christian instruction of the people." He regarded it as the chief distinction, the proudest glory of an established Church, that by it, and by it only, the whole mass of the community, down to the meanest and most worthless, could be reached and thoroughly pervaded. He dwelt particularly upon the advantage and efficacy of that territorial arrangement, by which a certain definite district

of town or country was assigned to each clergyman, to be cultivated by him, while there was no house which it was not his duty and his privilege to enter, with a commission and authority recognizable by and intelligible to the inmates. Let there be such districts, small enough to be well worked by zealous, faithful, able men; this seemed to him the only method by which the multitudes, already suffered to wander into ignorance and irreligion, could be reclaimed, and the universal Christianity of the country be upheld. He saw, as plainly as every other thinking man, that this method itself could only be successful when the great mass of those who believed in Jesus Christ were united in its application; when the territorial pastor was recognized and respected by the main body of believers, and no other pastor opposed him, denied his authority, and intruded into his sphere; and his prescription for the attainment of this was that the state should select and employ some one Church for the accomplishment of the work, should adequately endow and progressively extend it; that this body should be broad enough in its constitution and character to admit a wide variety of views and tastes in subordinate matters among its members; and that all dissenting bodies should be ready to merge themselves and their differences within it. The value of such a body, possessing such a power, by which, if rightly used, the pure and holy truths of Christianity might be carried into every hamlet, and brought to bear upon every conscience and every heart, appeared to him so great that he would have had all the Evangelical dissenters of England to sink, as he himself would have been ready to do, all their objections to Episcopacy; and to gain the same great end he would have had the Church of England give up all her claim, based on an exclusive and peculiar commission, "all that is transcendental and mysterious in her pretensions," and base her claim to general acceptance upon her ability to do the work required, and the fact that the state had given it to her to do. He thought that then she might be the "great standard and rallying-post for all those who would unite their efforts and their sacrifices in that mighty cause, the object of which is to send throughout our families in more plentiful supply those waters of life which can alone avail for the healing of the nation."

This reasoning, of course, assumes that the mass of the people will recognize the appointment of the state as sufficient to give authority over them in spiritual things to the clergy of the establishment; and that it will have greater power than the idea that a clergyman has a distinct commission from the Divine Head of the Church Himself, since it advises the surrender of all claims to this

latter kind of commission, in favor of the former. Or else it proceeds upon the assumption either that there is no such commission in the possession of any body, or that the people cannot be made to believe in it; and that all commissions being equal in their eyes, that which is accompanied by State recognition and State pay will be the one in which they will be ready to acquiesce. He did not seem to realize the fact that the popular conviction that a Church is possessed of transcendental and mysterious pretensions, that its authority is Divine, not human, that it is the very system and organization established by Almighty God Himself, is the only thing that gives it the position and power to do the work that he desired a national Church to do. Yet the history of his own Church might have taught him better, while his own experience must have soon shown him the feebleness of these considerations of expediency to restrain men moved by principle or passion. Five years after he had argued so warmly in favor of all men sacrificing their private sentiments to the support of a united national Church, he himself was at the head of a movement which ended in the secession of himself and four hundred other ministers from the Scottish establishment, and in the organization by them of an independent body. Similar secessions had taken place before, so that there are now no less than five distinct Presbyterian organizations in Scotland, each with its ecclesiastical mechanism complete, and to all appearance, as much of a Church as any of the others; while several others have risen up and died out in the less than two hundred years since the final establishment of Presbyterianism in that land. In fact, we may find in the history of Christianity in Scotland the plainest evidence that something more than a legal establishment is required to give an ecclesiastical system power to hold the place and do the work of a truly national Church.

The region now included within the realm of Scotland was not originally a united kingdom, inhabited by a homogeneous people. The southern part, from the Tyne and Solway to the Roman wall, between the Friths of Forth and Clyde, was part of Romanized Britain; and, after the conquest of the south of England by the Saxons, formed part of the *Regnum Cumbrense*, or British Kingdom of Strathclyde, where reigned, among other Pendragons, the famous Arthur of the Round Table. The people of this territory had received the knowledge of Christianity before the departure of the Romans; indeed, St. Ninian, himself a Briton, though educated as a monk in Rome, had, in the fourth century, founded in Galloway the monastery of Whithorn, and is said to have established

-a bishopric in connection with it. Immediately north of Strathclyde the Scots—a tribe of Irish Celts—had seized the promontory of Kentire, and established a vigorous community upon it. They, too, had been early evangelized, bringing with them from Ireland the faith taught there by Patrick; and, in the sixth century, Ciaran was laboring successfully among them, while Kentigern was doing the same in Strathclyde among the Britons. From Ireland also came Columba, the apostle of the Picts, the inhabitants of the northernmost portions of the island. Laboring, it is said, under the ban of a portion of the ecclesiastics of Ireland, he, with twelve companions, in the year 568, embarked in an open boat, and landed upon one of the western isles of Scotland. Abandoning it, because he could still see from it the shores of the country he had left, he resorted to the island Hy or Iona, which he made the centre of missionary activity and of learning, not only for Scotland, but for the north of England, and even some portions of continental Europe. From his monastery above three hundred churches were supplied with learned pastors, who regarded him with that sentiment of obedience due from a monk to his superior; and this made him, though a presbyter, more truly the primate and governor of the Church than were the bishops, of whom we read as ministering and ordaining in the same territory. For these bishops do not seem at first to have had any settled diocesan jurisdiction. They were missionary bishops, heading bands of clergy on missionary tours, and returning to Iona, or some other monastery, thence to start afresh or send out presbyters and other bishops ordained by them, into quarters where their services were required. In this way, Aidan was sent into Northumbria after its conquest by the Saxons, where, after the pattern of Columba, founding his monastery at Lindisfarne, or Holy Isle, he sent forth from it missionaries, and gathered into it, for instruction in Christianity, the Saxon youth of the mainland adjacent. Thus we find the Christian Church established in the three communities, whose union, begun under Kenneth Mac-Alpin, and completed under Kenneth III. and Malcolm II., composed the nation and kingdom of Scotland; but it was established, not by force of law, but by the power of a spiritual conviction. The founders of the Church all belonged to the one great organization which claimed to have been established by the Son of God upon the earth, and continued and extended by His Apostles. The heathen who came to believe in Christ at all were compelled to submit to the authority of His ministers, bearing His commission to administer the Sacraments in His Name, to pronounce forgive-

ness of sins in His behalf, certified by His Church to be qualified teachers of His truth. As such they were received and revered, and it was in testimony of their character, to enable them to impress it upon the nation, to bring all into subjection to the truth, and obtain for all the favor of the Church's Head, that a support was given them by Christian monarchs, and they were endowed with dignity and power.

And here we can see what great advantage to the early propagation of Christianity throughout the West accrued from the peculiar position and prestige of Rome. There was no nation so rude as not to have heard of Rome's greatness, and to have felt some measure of Rome's power. There was an awe awakened at the sound of that majestic name, which gave peculiar dignity to everything connected with it. So when Patrick came to Ireland from Rome, the message which he brought commanded a respectful hearing, which might otherwise have been denied; when Augustine landed in Kent, as an ambassador from Rome, the king of the country came to greet him, and gave him a position of supremacy over Christian Churches and bishops already existing, but previously despised. It was found an endorsement of the religion of Christ that it was the religion of Rome; and this, among other reasons, accounts for so many of the successful missionaries to heathen Europe resorting either first or last to that city, and obtaining a special authority and commission from the bishop of that see. This, too, gave an advantage to those who sought to introduce any usages of the Roman Church over the maintainers of a different use, and fostered their arrogance and intolerance. Thus we find that the bishops and missionaries coming northward from the Roman missions into contact with the missionaries from Iona and Lindisfarne pushing south, refused to hold communion with them, or even recognize their orders, because they favored the Oriental rather than the Roman usage in celebrating Easter,—an incident used by Dean Stanley and some Presbyterian writers to support the gratuitous assumption that the Scottish ministers had received Presbyterian ordination, and were questioned on that account,—a theory which has no historical evidence whatever to support it.

And as, with the dignity belonging to the name of Rome, there was connected a peculiar spiritual dignity for the Church of that city as an Apostolical see supposed to have been established by St. Peter, the first of the Apostles, so the missionaries from that see throughout the West found it not hard to obtain a degree of reverence almost excessive for themselves, with an unquestioning

acceptance of the doctrines that they taught and the rites and usages they introduced. When Malcolm Canmore married Margaret, the Saxon princess, sister of Edgar Atheling, she earnestly desired, and found no difficulty in introducing, a hierarchy and ritual derived from Rome, in place of that prevailing before her day. Partly from love of her, partly from reverence for her religion and its source, Malcolm, though he could not read, frequently turned over her prayer books, and kissed her favorite volumes, had them adorned with gold and gems, and presented them to her in token of his devotion. Religion had this power over him and over her, evidently, not because it was established by their authority, but because they believed it to have an authority from above, which they might recognize, but which was not made and could not be abrogated by them.

Such were the conditions under which the Church in Scotland became established as the national Church, supported by the civil government of the nation. The civil government did not choose it from other similar bodies in the exercise of its own judgment, and give it authority to minister to the people of the realm. It accepted it because it had such authority from Christ; and, with the instinct of wise rulers and Christian believers, the heads of the civil government felt that in providing for the preaching of the Gospel to all classes, they were using the best means for securing the happiness and peace, the civilization and morality, of their subjects. This feeling was not confined to sovereigns. It would be a mistake to suppose that the maintenance of the Church at first, and its great wealth afterward, came originally or principally from the state. The best possible use of land or money was felt to be that which aided in conveying the knowledge of the Gospel and the Sacraments of the Church to a greater number of souls, and from generation to generation; and thus endowments by individuals preceded and increased the legal tithes which became imposed by civil ordinance. The habit, originating in proper feelings, became, indeed, a superstition, and was encouraged by being connected with false doctrines as to the effect of money so given upon the condition of sinful souls after death; but, still, there was, even to the last, much of true religious principle and Christian spirit in the bequests and donations made for religious uses. There was then throughout Europe an abiding sense of the authority and spiritual power of the Church, and especially the Church in its dependence upon Rome, which proved strong enough to stand the tremendous strain brought to bear on it in the middle ages, from the fierceness and lawlessness of the

laity, and the corruptions in faith and morals of the clergy of the Church itself. Through all, the conviction still survived that to be in the Church was to be within the Fold of Christ, and entitled to His pardon and His grace; to be cut off from that Church was to be an outcast from the Saviour, and given over to the power of the devil; and to be at enmity with the Church, to do injury to its ministers and trespass on its possessions, was to be directly at war with Christ. There were, undoubtedly, occasional outrages committed, like that of the Wolf of Badenoch, in 1390, who, in revenge for a sentence for adultery passed upon him by the Bishop of Moray, attacked the cathedral town of Elgin, and destroyed it, with the cathedral and Church property; but, in general, the reverence for the Church was so strong, and its spiritual power so great, that the offenders themselves were brought to penitence and restitution, and all others shrank from incurring the same guilt. Excommunication subjected the offender to the withdrawal from him of all support and affection on the part of the larger and better class of the community, those who revered the Church; and an interdict was regarded with dread, as leaving the nation, and every individual within it, under the load of all their unforgiven sins.

Such was the position of the Church when, upon the revival of learning and the opportunity for thought and study which came to Europe with the rise of settled civil governments strong enough to enforce order and keep the peace within their jurisdiction, men began to investigate the actual condition of the Church, and its claims to their allegiance. From the study of the Scriptures and the history of the Church, men found cause to question the correctness of much that the Church required them to receive as true, and to assert that she had exceeded her authority in imposing and defending certain practices and customs. It was in opposing these inquiries, and resisting the efforts for reform that followed them, that the Church began to depend upon her position as a state establishment to supply the weakening energy of her spiritual authority. Her spiritual censures lost their force upon men who denied the right to pronounce them in defence of false doctrines and corrupt practices; but material chains had power to hold them, material swords to slay, material fires to burn; and the Church turned to the civil magistrate, that he might thus cut out and cauterize the local irritation, instead of confining herself to spiritual weapons, and being thus brought to such a reformation as would have restored her full spiritual power with her spiritual health. In some places, indeed, this appeal to the civil force did not produce the same evil

effect as in others. Spain, Italy, the southern and eastern parts of Germany, had been long used to see the sword of the ruler employed in the necessary defence of the faith against the infidels; and so its employment against heretics seemed to them merely a part of the same sort of Holy War; but in England and Scotland, where men's minds had received no such peculiar bent, it impressed them at once as a persecution—as the substitution of force exerted upon the body for the spiritual authority which had power over the soul—and its effect was to produce a greater disregard for the spiritual authority which had confessed, in this way, its distrust of itself. Thus, each exercise of the power of the civil magistrate in defence of the authority of the establishment, really undermined the foundation which supported it as an establishment, the popular belief in its supreme spiritual authority, and hastened instead of retarding the time for its final fall. That this was the case in Scotland, a brief summary of the incidents connected with the Reformation will plainly show.

The first victim in Scotland was James Resby, an English priest, who had fled thither from the persecution raging against the followers of Wickliffe. Seized by Lawrence Lindores, the Papal Inquisitor-General at St. Andrew's, in the year 1422, he resisted the attempt to crush his convictions by the weight of Papal authority, on the ground "that the Pope was *not* the vicar of Christ, and that a man of a wicked life ought not to be acknowledged as Pope." Nine years later, a Bohemian physician, named Paul Craw, sent from the Reformers of Prague to open communication with the opponents of Popery in Scotland, was condemned and burned at the same place. In 1494, thirty persons, of both sexes, resident in Kyle, in the county of Ayr, and thence called the Lollards of Kyle, were arraigned before the Archbishop of Glasgow, for views particularly strong against the Papacy, and the corruptions upheld by its authority. They denied that the power to bind and loose was committed exclusively to St. Peter and his successors; that in the mass the bread ceased to be present, and the *natural* body of Christ took its place; that relics of saints should be worshipped, and that the clergy should be compulsorily celibate; and asserted roundly that "the Pope exalts himself above and against God, and deceives the people by his bulls and indulgences, and that the souls said to be in purgatory are not profited by masses."

Bearing in mind that the Pope had, to the popular view, become the embodiment of all the spiritual authority of the Church, we can see, by these instances, that it had begun to lose its hold.

It had, in fact, been used as a cover for corruptions of doctrine, discipline, and morals; as a means of compelling submission to them, and of resisting all efforts for their reform, until the original ground of reverence for it was undermined. Instead of its censures being regarded as approved by God, and carried out by Him, the Christian conscience, especially when enlightened by the Scriptures, began to feel that resistance to them met with God's approval. That point once reached, the contest became merely that of the state to impose the religious establishment of its choice upon an unwilling people; and the result was a disastrous defeat.

It may be well to notice some of the corruptions which contributed to destroy the spiritual power of the Papal Church in Scotland over the faith and consciences of the people, as they occasioned complications which materially affected the character and fortunes of the establishments which successively took its place.

First, as regards the property of the Church. In return for services done or desired, the Pope had granted to the King the right of presentation to all benefices. The King, using it for purposes of political intrigue or favoritism, had adopted the practice of granting many of the more desirable ecclesiastical positions to laymen, sometimes even children, who drew the incomes while incapable of discharging the spiritual functions. Thus, Patrick Hamilton (the first to suffer for Lutheranism in Scotland, and whose execution produced such an effect that the archbishop was advised to burn his next heretic in some cellar, "for the smoke of Mr. Patrick Hamilton had infected all on whom it blew") had been Abbot of Ferne from childhood; and, at the same date, several of the bishoprics were held by laymen, who were, nevertheless, styled bishops, and allowed to sit as such in Parliament. Not only were the people thus familiarized with the notion of an unordained hierarchy, but many persons high in place, even among the leaders of the reformers, had a vested interest in maintaining it, the regent Earl of Moray being himself the Prior of St. Andrew's. Indeed, the secular nobility hit upon an admirable method of recruiting their finances in the troubles of the Church. The Papal prelates, seeing the inevitable subversion of religion, had no interest in maintaining intact the revenues of the Church; and they were glad to give deeds of their estates to relatives or patrons powerful enough to secure them in return from personal violence. Others, again, finding their incomes difficult to collect from a disaffected people, conveyed their property to persons able to collect the revenues, in consideration of a certain share to be conveyed to them. And

when bishoprics or abbeys fell vacant, the nobles took care to have them filled with *Tulchans*, or *Bishops of Straw*, as they were styled, in whose name what was left of the revenues could be drawn by the baron who had influence enough to secure the appointment of his nominee. Thus, the Earl of Argyle drew the revenues of two sees at one time,—those of Brechin and the Isles; and an investigation, made in the year 1665, proved that, at that date, one marquis, fifteen earls, three viscounts, five barons, besides many of inferior rank, were holding lands of the archbishopric of St. Andrew's. Thus, in a very short time, the wealthiest ecclesiastical establishment in Europe became the poorest, and its bishops, though legally existent, were incapable of any exercise of the ministry.

While this was the situation of the bishops, the inferior clergy suffered from an equally serious incapacity. Their ignorance was absolutely astounding, as displayed, for instance, in their strenuous controversy, whether the Lord's Prayer was to be addressed to God only, or to the saints also, of which Bishop Spottiswoode relates an anecdote. The servant of the sub-prior of St. Andrew's, noticing the frequent meetings and conferences of the clergy, asked his master what they were all about. "We cannot agree, Tom," answered the sub-prior, "to whom the *Pater-noster* should be said." "Sir," said Tom, "to whom should it be said but to God?" "But," said the sub-prior, "what shall we do for the saints, man?" "Give them *aves* and *credos* enow," said Tom, "for that may suffice them." It required a provincial synod, however, to settle the matter, when, after due deliberation, it was decided that the *Pater-noster* ought to be addressed to God, but *in such a manner* as that the saints ought also to be *invoked*! which luminous statement was accordingly officially presented by the sub-prior to the members of the university.

But even the ignorance of the clergy in theology was less than their ignorance of Scripture; and this ignorance was encouraged by their superiors. Thomas Forrest, Canon-regular of St. Colm-Inch, and Vicar of Dollar, being accustomed to preach to his people every Sunday on the Epistle and Gospels for the day, was taken to task for it by the Bishop of Dunkeld. "If you can find," said he, "a good Epistle or good Gospel that setteth forth the liberty of Holy Church, you may instruct your people in that, but leave the rest alone; for I thank God that I have lived well these many years, and never knew either the Old or New Testament. I am contented with my missal and my breviary; and if you, dean Thomas, leave

not these fantasies, you will have cause to repent,"—as he had, for he was burned at the stake soon after, his copy of the New Testament being snatched from his hand even there, as a *book of heresy*, by Lauder, Archdeacon of Lothain, who added, "Do you not know that it is contrary to our canons and express commands to have a New Testament or Bible in English, and that this of itself is enough to condemn thee?"

Indeed, the custom of preaching, or giving religious instruction regularly to the people, had entirely passed away. Archbishop Hamilton, in the year 1549, endeavoring, by some show of reformation within the Church, to stay the defection from it, enacted that all bishops should preach, at least, *four times a year*, but he was constrained to direct that those who were unfit for this duty, *for want of practice*, should endeavor to qualify themselves, and, for that end, should entertain in their houses learned divines capable of instructing them; and the same injunctions were laid on rectors.

Thus we see that the reformers of the Church had not only to do without the spiritual aid of bishops, while the office of bishop was, nevertheless, filled in the eye of the law, but they had to extemporize some method of supplying the spiritual wants of the great body of the people. Though they had no legal authority for their enactments, they found a better support in the popular consent, which included the acquiescence of a very large proportion of the parochial clergy. For though there was no such transfer, as in England, of the whole establishment, by the power and patronage of the state, from the side of the Papacy to that of the Reformation, yet a large number of the inferior clergy sympathized with the doctrines of the reformers, and, perhaps, as large a number were swayed by their dependence on their patrons, the reforming nobles, who, under the title of the Lords of the Congregation, formed, with the leading preachers, the nucleus which afterward developed into the General Assembly of the Kirk. The directions which they gave were eminently practical and judicious, under the circumstances. They were as follows:

"I. It is thought expedient, advised, and ordained, that in all parishes of this realm the Common Prayer [meaning, thereby, the Service Book of Edward VI. of England] be read weekly on Sundays and other festival days, publicly in the parish churches, with the lessons of the Old and New Testament, conformably to the Book of Common Prayer. And, if the curates of the parishes be qualified, to cause them to read the same; and, if they be not, or if they refuse, that the most qualified in the parish use and read the same.

"II. It is thought necessary that doctrine, preaching, and interpretation of Scriptures, be had and used privately in quiet houses, without great conventions of the people thereto, *while afterward* [until] that God move the prince to grant public preaching by faithful and true ministers."

These articles were issued in the year 1557, soon after the people, pressed by John Knox's eloquent denunciations of the idolatry and offensiveness to God of the Romish mass, had withdrawn from attendance upon the established worship; and in the number of cases where the Papal curates were unable or unwilling to read prayers, and the still greater number where they were unqualified for preaching, had familiarized the popular mind to the notion of an unordained ministry. This ministry was in the full exercise of its functions, when, after a tremendous agitation, in which the passions of both parties were excited to the utmost, and deeds of wanton violence were done, the doctrines of the Roman Church and the usurped authority of the Pope of Rome were formally abolished by Act of Parliament, in 1560, and a Confession of Faith established, which is still the standard of the Episcopal Church in Scotland, and was that of the Presbyterians until the substitution for it of the Westminster Confession. It is unnecessary to say more of it than that, like most of the Confessions of that time, it is identical in doctrine and spirit with the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England. It was not strange that the reformers should be tempted to maintain the sufficiency of this ministry by every argument which they could devise. That which they adopted was ingenious and peculiar. They denied the necessity of any ordination whatsoever. "Albeit the Apostles used imposition of hands," says the First Book of Discipline, set forth by Knox and his preachers, though somewhat sneeringly laid aside by the lay-lords in Parliament, as a "*devout imagination*," "yet they did it to confer miraculous gifts; and, seeing the miracle is ceased, the using of the ceremony we judge not necessary." So, for more than twelve years, there was no ordination by laying on of hands, even of presbyters, in Scotland; admission to the office of minister being by public approbation of the people, and by a declaration from the chief minister, after due examination by the neighboring pastors, that the person was found fit, and appointed to that place. The chief minister was the superintendent appointed to visit and regulate ecclesiastical affairs, over a region generally corresponding to the former dioceses; though the Bishop of Galloway, the only consecrated prelate who joined the reformers, was, for a long time, expressly inhibited from acting

as superintendent in his diocese. The necessity of some such officer, not tied down to one fixed place, was felt acutely, from there being only fourteen ministers, qualified to preach and exercise the pastoral office, to supply the whole of Scotland; and the duty of administering the Sacraments to the whole county of Peebles, for instance, having to be committed to a single individual. This system seems thus to have taken form, partly from the circumstances of the case, partly also, however, from intense hostility to Romanism, and a desire to banish everything tainted at all by its corruptions. Thus, even the names were altered. Congregation, instead of Church; superintendent, pastor, and reader, instead of bishop, priest, and deacon; admission, instead of ordination. And this feeling grew more intense. All vestments but the Geneva gown very quickly disappeared. Then, after seven years' use, the English Service Book was given up for the looser form composed by Calvin and John Knox, originally for the English Congregation at Geneva, which permitted much extemporaneous prayer and exhortation as an alternative for the use of that provided. Sitting, instead of kneeling, at the reception of the Lord's Supper was also rigidly enjoined, to guard against any possible remnant of the adoration connected with the doctrine of transubstantiation. But all these things found acceptance with the people, not so much because they were established by the law of the land, or even because they were regarded as of Divine authority in themselves, as because they were an evidence of freedom from the spiritual yoke under which the people had been held so long. For we must bear in mind the fact that, in spite of all the causes that contributed to its decay, the original sense of a special spiritual authority in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, and a special spiritual virtue in their acts, was planted deep in the hearts of a majority of the Scottish people, and was only dragged out by inability to resist the force of Scriptural evidence brought to bear against the priesthood by the preachers, and then burned away by the revulsion caused by the persecution which seemed the only answering argument on which the hierarchy felt they could depend. If was, in fact, the executions of George Wishart and Walter Mill, with the circumstances of treachery and cruelty attendant on them, which drove the revolt of the Scottish people to such an extreme from the system under which they happened.

George Wishart was, in one respect at least, fitted to be a reformer of the age, and, by natural instinct, to rise up in enthusiastic protest against a system which held up for imitation such

specimens of unsavory piety as the mediæval saints. He is the first Cambridge student upon record who regularly *tubbed*. "He had," says one who was his room-mate, "commonly by his bedside a tubbe of water, in the which (his people being in bed, the candle put out, and all quiet) he used to bathe himselfe; as I, being very young, being assured, often heard him, and, one light night, discerned him,"—without apparently being moved to emulation. This enthusiastic devotee of cleanliness was an equally fervent and more successful apostle of the kindred virtue godliness, and, as such, preached with great effect in many places in Scotland. The perfection of his character is somewhat impaired, in modern estimation, by his having been the agent of communication between Henry VIII. of England and the factious lords of Scotland in distinctly treasonable designs, and his having been undoubtedly privy, in that capacity, to a plot for the assassination of Cardinal Beaton; but this was not known at the time, and, even had it been, would probably have appeared a virtue to the majority of the people. He was deliberately betrayed into his enemies' hands, and after a trial, in which his learning and piety came out in strong contrast to the character of his adversaries, he was committed to the secular arm, and burned. So fierce was the feeling excited in his friends by his death, that they swore never to rest until it was avenged, John Leslie vowing that his hand and dagger should be priest and confessor to the cardinal, who was accordingly set upon and slain in the castle of St. Andrew's, in exactly three months, to a day, from the time when he had presided at Wishart's condemnation.

The case of Walter Mill awakened even deeper and more general sympathy. He was a priest, and in his eighty-second year when arraigned for heresy before Archbishop Hamilton, the cardinal's successor, in the year 1558. His venerable aspect called forth the commiseration of the spectators, his clear and undaunted answers won their admiration and assent; so that, when he was condemned, and handed, according to the form, over to the secular arm for judgment, not a civil magistrate in the city could be found to pronounce the sentence, not a rope or tar-barrel could be purchased by money, to be used at the stake. The archbishop had to bribe one of his own domestics to act as a temporal judge, and his servants had to cut the cords from his pavilion to bind the victim. Thus died Walter Mill, prophesying that he would be the last to present that dismal spectacle to Scotland.

We must remember, then, in considering the hostility of the Scottish people to the hierarchy and all the accessories of the

Romish Church, that this thing had been associated with scenes of cruelty and persecution. When we notice the "rude vehemency and unconsidered affirmations, which may appear rather to proceed from choler than of zeal and reason," acknowledged without excuses by John Knox to have characterized his style, we must consider that his zeal was not directed against theological ideas alone, but against spiritual wickedness in high places exerting tremendous temporal power; against Mary of England, and Philip of Spain, and Alva, and the Guises, and the Medici, and the Popes, and the spirit which animated them to wield the sword of the state, the rack and fagot of the Inquisition, the poison and the dagger of the fanatic monk; and that, unless the power was wrested from their hands, it would continue to be exerted in the same way. When we see Knox passing from city to city, ascending pulpits, and preaching against the idolatry of the mass, and animating the people to break down all shrines and tear in pieces all vestments, we must consider that these things, while left in the hands of the priests, were real elements of power; that, so long as the people regarded them at all, they must give a subjection to the Papal priesthood, to which Knox and his fellows had no means of acquiring the same claim; and we can understand, therefore, the wild triumph with which the preachers saw even the beauty of the sanctuary broken down, because with it the pomp of the priesthood was trampled in the dust. They, therefore, stimulated to the utmost the hatred of all things tainted at all with Popery, and made Scotch worship the cold and barren business that it is. They churched like Scythians, as Jewel said; but, by so doing, they made thorough work.

But, though the new system had been established by law, and was supported by hearty popular assent, it lacked one important element of the power that existed in the old. The new system had not even any pretence to a specially sacred origin or a Divine authority. Any other plan, consistent with hatred of Romanism and the preaching of the pure (Calvinistic) Gospel, would have done as well. There was no assured basis of permanency in it, and it was, accordingly, subject to continual modifications. One cause of these was the difficulty as to ministerial support; another was the laxity of discipline which arose from the lack of a special spiritual authority in the ecclesiastical rulers, acknowledged and submitted to by the consciences of those who were placed by the law beneath them to bind and loose in the Name of God.

With regard to clerical support, the situation was very serious.

The old incumbents of the parishes survived, with that wonderful tenacity which seems to attach to the holders of sinecures, especially when other people want them; and though, after great pressure, one third of their incomes was sequestered by the Crown, to be divided between itself and the ministers, that third seemed mysteriously to evaporate in the collection. Even when any living fell vacant, it was found that its property was in the hands of some layman, who, however devoted to the cause of the Gospel in the abstract, could not see that it was his duty to surrender the tithes in his possession to maintain it. Thus the main dependence of the reformers had to be upon such of the ignorant Papal curates as had accepted the Confession of Faith, upon those few whose personal qualities called forth the free-will offerings of the people in their behalf, and upon those who were possessed of property of their own. Owing to the deficiency of support, the ministers were very unsettled, changing from place to place without regard to anything but their own necessities and choice, and without any authority in the superintendents to restrain them. In consequence of these changes, of the prevailing ignorance, and of the discouraging prospects of support for those who entered the ministry, no less than six hundred parishes at once were without any ministry of the Gospel at all. To supply the lack and to improve discipline, the regent Morton united two or three parishes together, and placed a single minister to supply the whole, and secured the restoration of jurisdiction to the titular bishops, in whose behalf he revived some of the old ecclesiastical laws. But this revival of episcopal authority carried with it no real power over popular hearts, especially as the bishops were seen to be still the instruments through which the nobles obtained the revenues of their sees; and their prospect of securing any influence was ruined by an epigram of Patrick Adamson's, distinguishing between My Lord's Bishop of Papal days, My Lord's Bishop of the present, and the Lord's Bishop, or every true pastor,—wit which he must have grievously repented, when, having accepted one of the bishoprics himself, he was persecuted and even excommunicated by the presbyteries under the sway of his special enemy, Andrew Melville.

Melville and his coöperators succeeded in supplying, though imperfectly, the main deficiency of the Knoxian system. They believed in Presbyterian government as not only expedient, but of Divine authority, and they preached this with the same intensity of conviction which had animated Wishart and Knox in their crusade against Romish idolatry and corruption. From the year 1574 to

the year 1580 they continued their vigorous assaults upon the existing system, until they at last succeeded in obtaining an Act of the General Assembly to "devise a plot of the presbyteries." Up to this date there had no such thing as a presbytery been known in Scotland, though a convenient nucleus existed in the provision of Knox's Book of Discipline that, while so many men of inferior talents and no education were in the ministry, "the country ministers and readers should meet upon a certain day of the week, in such towns within six miles as had schools, and to which there was repair of learned men, to exercise themselves in the interpretation of Scripture." The Melvillians took these *weekly exercises*, as they were called, formed them into local ecclesiastical courts, gave them jurisdiction, and declared them to be presbyteries. They followed this up by other changes. Up to this time Knox's Prayer Book had been in general use, including the recital of the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the Doxology. Now these were all discontinued, the Lord's Prayer being condemned as "a Papistical charm," the Apostles' Creed being declared not to be of Scriptural authority, and being, accordingly, left out of the Westminster Confession in later days, and inserted as a postscript at the end of the Shorter Catechism, with an apology for placing it even there, "because," say the compilers, "there is no necessity for inserting the Creed;" and the Doxology, which, since the Reformation, had always been recited after the Psalms, being peremptorily forbidden. A congregation in the County of Angus, not knowing of its discontinuance, is said to have begun singing it, as usual, and to have been arrested by the minister with the startling announcement, "No more glory to the Father in this kirk."

Though the conviction produced by Melville was only in the Divine authority of Presbyterianism as a system of Church government, not of any such authority in Presbyterian orders, which, indeed, could not be said to have existed in the Church; though, therefore, there was no special spiritual virtue regarded as connected with the exercise of his functions by the pastor; and though thus the Scotch Presbyterian minister can never speak to his people with the same authority, or his official acts be valued to the same degree as in the case of the priest episcopally ordained; yet still a great advance was made on what before existed, and something of the coherence and power of a Church upon the conscience began to be seen in the establishment existing by state law.

It was this which gave Melville, Bruce, Black, Row, and others, their confidence and success in opposition to the encroachments of

the royal power upon the spiritual independence of the Church; and it was the peculiar character of Presbyterianism, as a system of government rather than a mystical agency for the dispensation of spiritual grace, which caused the peculiar intervention in political, business, and social matters, that moved the king and his assistants in state administration to labor so pertinaciously for the substitution of Episcopacy. It was found that, instead of devoting themselves to the general moral and spiritual improvement of the people, as is natural in those who value their ministerial office mainly because it makes them dispensers of the grace of the Holy Ghost; instead of endeavoring simply to inculcate the *spirit* by which men are to be guided in the different departments of secular life, whose laws and principles the ministers are not always qualified to understand and apply correctly, the Presbyterian ministers busied themselves about all the details of life, and fulminated decrees about them in a most arbitrary way. They claimed the right of denouncing political persons and measures from the pulpit, and asserted that "speeches delivered in the pulpit, albeit alleged to be treasonable, could not be judged by the king till the Church first took cognition thereof." They enacted, in General Assembly, "that none professing religion within the Church of Scotland should, from thenceforth, repair to any of the King of Spain's dominions, where the tyranny of the Inquisition is used, for traffic of merchandise or other like negotiations, till the king doth obtain liberty from the King of Spain to his subjects for traffic in these bounds, without any danger of their person or goods for the cause of religion, under the *pain of excommunication*;" which involved the sequestration of all property within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical court pronouncing sentence. The ministers of Edinburgh, in a like spirit, attempted to abolish the weekly market held on Monday, under the plea that it interfered with the due observance of the Sabbath; whereupon they encountered such a riotous demonstration, headed by the shoemakers, that they were compelled to yield the point; and King James, rubbing his hands in uncouth glee, exclaimed that "rascals and souters could obtain at the ministers' hands what the king could not in matters more reasonable."

By watching his opportunities, however, and following, to some extent, his Lord Chancellor's counsel to "leave the ministers to their own devices, and in a short time they would become *so intolerable* that the people would chase them forth of the country," James succeeded in securing, bit by bit, the mastery of the assemblies. He secured their subscription to an acknowledgment of the royal

jurisdiction over *all* persons and in *all* causes; he obtained the right of calling the assemblies, and of nominating three or four persons from whom the moderator was to be chosen; he secured the appointment of a number of ministers, corresponding to the former number of bishops, to act as his permanent council of advice in ecclesiastical affairs; and, despite the cry of Davidson, "Busk, busk, busk him as bonnily as you can, and bring him in as fairly as you will, we still see him weel enough, we can discern the horns of the mitre," he obtained the assent of the assembly that certain of the clergy should sit in Parliament to represent the Church, thereby transferring to that body the supreme authority in ecclesiastical legislation, which the assembly had maintained heretofore in itself. Though there were occasional outbreaks, as when Lord Lindsay told James fiercely to his face that they would not suffer religion to be overthrown, and the cry of "The sword of the Lord and of Gideon" was raised, nevertheless the king succeeded, sooner or later, in imprisoning, banishing, or suspending every minister who prominently opposed him, and in bringing back again the titular hierarchy into power.

So far, he advanced without enduring opposition on the part of the people, and even with some considerable measure of approval; for the oppression of the presbyteries, and the way in which, as their books of record show, they meddled in the most sacred affairs of domestic life, had made numbers of the people as glad to see their powers modified as they had been before to be freed from the "oppression of the clergy;" but, in his next proceedings, he roused against him the patriotism and prejudices of Scotland in their intensest form. If there was anything which the Scot of that time hated, it was the idea of subserviency to England in any form; if there was anything at which his conscience took alarm, it was at anything approximating to the doctrines and symbolical rites of Rome; and James now began to bring both of these on him together. He gave valid orders to his titular bishops by English consecration; he ordained the introduction of the English Liturgy, vestments, choristers, and organ, into the Chapel Royal at Holyrood, and he strained his prerogative to the uttermost to enforce the attitude of kneeling at the reception of the elements in the Lord's Supper. The stronger Presbyterians lost no time in sounding the alarm; the churches, when the Lord's Supper was administered to the kneeling, were almost deserted, and the congregations often gathered into the churchyard, or in neighboring houses, to celebrate a communion after their own heart; and though, at the

time of James's death, the vigor of the opposition had somewhat subsided, owing to the judicious and conciliatory management of Spottiswoode and the other bishops, still the Presbyterians had a hold on the passions of the people much greater than they possessed about twenty years before.

Charles I. added one more passion to those enlisted against the Episcopal Establishment, which proved as powerful in the worldly as hatred of Romanism was in the religious; and this was their dislike to surrender money which had once come into their hands. James had expended thirty thousand pounds sterling of his own in restoring the dignity of the episcopate; Charles attempted to carry on the work with money belonging to other people. He issued a decree of the Privy Council, revoking the titles to Church lands in the possession of the laity, and transferring them once more to the Church. Though the storm of opposition which he encountered led him to suspend action in this wholesale way, yet, with the persistency of his natural disposition, he pursued his design more underhandedly, prosecuting those poor and less influential gentry who were unable to make their causes good against him. While the suspicion and hostility of the nobility was thus kept alive, he proceeded to make a direct assault upon the prejudices of the people. By Act of Council, he ordered a Book of Canons to be compiled and imposed on the ministers without assent of either Parliament or ecclesiastical synod, in which there were laws for the use of a Liturgy yet to be compiled. The popular sentiment jumped at once to the conclusion that this was to be more of "an ill-mumbled mass in English" than the English book so designated by King James in his callow Presbyterian days; and all was made ready for an outbreak in Edinburgh when it should be read, the women stipulating that the assault should be made by them, to save the men from prosecution by the High Commission. Sunday, the 23d of July, 1637, was the day appointed for the reading of the Liturgy in the Cathedral Church of St. Giles. As soon as the dean began, a "wonderful sturre" arose among a number of the meaner sort of women occupying movable seats in the lower end of the church, who were generally employed to keep seats for the higher ranks until service commenced. "They are going to say mass! Sorrow, sorrow, for this doleful day! They are bringing in Popery among us!" Such were the cries from the remote corners, gradually increasing till nothing could be distinctly heard. The dean's courage failed him, and he paused, when the bishop called on him to proceed with the collect for the day. "Deil colic the wame o' ye,"

cried Janet Geddes, the keeper of an herb-stall near the Tron Kirk, throwing at the dean's head the stool on which she sat. It was not in human nature not to dodge; whereupon, a storm of other stools, clasped Bibles, stones, sticks, cudgels, and whatever else was within the people's reach, were hurled against the dean, and some, coming nearer, tried to pull him from the pulpit. The church was cleared by the magistrates, and the service proceeded in dumb show, the noise and breaking of windows by the rioters outside creating such distraction that no attention could be given to the service. Though the book had been used without opposition in the Dioceses of Ross, Dunblane, and Brechin, since the preceding Easter, from that date its use was given up in Scotland; and with this defeat began the downfall of the reëstablished Episcopacy in the Church.

The disaffected preachers, headed by Alexander Henderson, began to accumulate signatures to petitions against the Liturgy, and to send them, in constantly increasing numbers, to the court. When meetings of petitioners were prohibited, it suggested another device. In the time of the Holy League of France, and under the agitation and excitement caused by the massacre of St. Bartholomew, the nation, from the sovereign down, had entered into a bond or covenant to continue in the true Protestant religion, and defend and support one another in it against their common enemies. It was now suggested to renew this covenant, which was done, throughout Scotland, with prayers and tears and uplifted hands, the roll making the round of the churches, and then being handed out into the churchyards, many opening a vein and subscribing their names in blood.

The king attempted to circulate an opposition covenant, but met with small success. The Covenanters, meanwhile, were organized under the government of certain committees, styled the Tables, established the preceding year,—one of four lords, one of four gentlemen, one of four ministers, one of four burgesses; a further delegation of one from each Table constituting the General Table of ultimate resort; and there were subordinate Tables of gentlemen organized for the different counties. These Tables, from the year 1637, were the really authoritative government both of Church and state in Scotland. Bit by bit the king gave way before them. In 1638, he consented to the calling of a General Assembly on the old Presbyterian plan, instead of the Episcopal Synod, and issued instructions to the Marquis of Hamilton, his High Commissioner, revoking the Liturgy, the Canons, the High Commission Court, and the Perth Articles, which had enjoined the

keeping of the great festivals and kneeling at the Lord's Supper; and declaring that the "Episcopal government already established shall be limited to stand with the recognized laws of this Church and kingdom." The Assembly convened at Glasgow, and was met with protest on the part of the archbishop and bishops, and a declinature to acknowledge its jurisdiction. The Marquis of Hamilton attempted to dissolve the Assembly on the ground of certain informalities, but was met with a direct refusal to dissolve. The bishops, and numbers of the clergy who supported them, were declared deposed on various and often very frivolous grounds, one of Dr. Robert Hamilton's offences being that he was "an ordinary swearer, *as we call it*," because he used such expressions as "Before God; I protest to God; by my conscience; on my soul!" Two witnesses declared that they had seen Bishop Lindsay, of Edinburgh, "bow to the altar;" and two others that they saw him "dedicate a kirk after the Popish manner." "He was proven to have been a presser of all the late novations, an urger of the Liturgy, a refuser to admit any to the ministry who would not first take the order of a preaching deacon, a bower to the altar, a wearer of the rochet, a consecrator of churches, a domineerer of presbyteries, a licenser of marriages without banns, to the great hurt of sundry, a countenancer of corrupt doctrine preached at Edinburgh, an elevator at consecration, a defender of ubiquity in his book. We pronounce him to be deposed and excommunicated." After the sentences were pronounced, Henderson, the Moderator, is reported to have exclaimed, "We have now cast down the walls of Jericho; let him that rebuildeth them beware of the curse of Hiel the Bethelite." Two or three of the bishops were sunk so low as to make submission, and assume the position of Presbyterian parish ministers; but the rest, with large numbers of the clergy, especially of the North, remained faithful to their principles, in spite of great distress, and bitter persecution. In the next year, the king, attempting to put down the resistance to his authority in Church and state by arms, was met by the army of the Covenant, with blue banners inscribed with the motto, "For Christ's Crown and Covenant," above the arms of Scotland; but his heart failed him, or he suspected the fidelity of his troops, and he entered into negotiations with General Leslie. He acquiesced in the Acts of Parliament ratifying the proceedings of the Glasgow Assembly, and entered Holyrood under the banner of the Covenant.

It is needless to go into further details of a history so familiar as that of the "Great Rebellion." The proceedings of the Covenant-

ers in their triumph over the Church of Scotland are of some interest, as well as the incidents that followed the revival of Episcopacy as an establishment at the Restoration, and its fall at the Revolution of 1688; but this article has already extended to a length that precludes their consideration at this time. Enough, however, has been written to show that no religious establishment, no matter how excellent in itself or vigorously supported by the state, can do its work for good upon the people, unless in some way they can be made to recognize in it an especial and peculiar Divine authority apart from that imparted to it by the state. Religious indifference is only one degree less fatal than religious hostility to it.



PROTESTANTISM IN GERMANY.

A Critical History of Free Thought in reference to the Christian Religion. Eight Lectures preached before the University of Oxford in the year MDCCCLXII., on the Foundation of the late Rev. John Bampton, M.A., Canon of Salisbury. By Adam Storey Farrar, M.A., Michel Fellow of Queen's College, Oxford.

Religious Thought in Germany. Reprinted, by permission, from "The Times." London: Tinsley Brothers, 18 Catherine street, Strand. . 1870.

PROBABLY, no event in the history of the world has had more influence on its destiny, for weal or woe, since the "great schism" between the Churches of the East and the West, than the religious revolution of the sixteenth century, which commenced in Germany, and is known to the world as the "Protestant Reformation." In England it failed to attain its full development. It encountered there a Church unwilling to divest itself of Catholic tradition and Episcopal authority, and a nation whose motto had long been, "*Nolumus leges Angliæ mutari* ; so that in Britain it became a wide-pervading influence, rather than an all-controlling power. If we would contemplate Protestantism, pure and undefiled, developing itself in its own way, unfettered by Church or state, we must go to Germany, where it had its birth, attained its full maturity, and is now in "the sere and yellow leaf" of its declining years. If we consult the friends and foes of the Protestant Reformation, we

shall find, of course, that the most contrary judgments have been formed touching that great event.

The majority of Christians, embracing under that term the Roman Catholic Churches, and some members of our own communion, have looked upon the event as a Divine scourge, sent upon the Church to chastise its faults, and try its faith; it has been called a "deluge of wrath," and its leaders, even within our own fold, have been described as guiltier men in the sight of God than those monsters of the French Revolution,—Danton, Marat, and Robespierre. On the other hand, the adherents of Protestantism, comprising all the non-Episcopal communions, and a large proportion of the members of our own Church, have been taught from their very childhood to regard it as the choicest of Divine blessings. It has been extolled as second only to the original Gospel tidings; as the beginning of a new era in the world of light and liberty and heaven-sent grace. It is but just to say that these views are equally erroneous. The Protestant Reformation was neither an unmixed blessing nor an unmitigated curse. Like many great movements, it began well, and it ended ill. It reformed many old abuses and superstitions, which had long disfigured the Church; and in their stead it introduced an atmosphere of doubt and unbelief, which hovers about it, becoming more miasmatic with the lapse of time. It tore down the mediæval scaffolding which had been erected around the Church, concealing its fair proportions from the world; and, at the same time, it managed to take down large portions of both nave and transept. To reverse the simile, it was like the thunder-storm which purifies the air from its pestilential vapors, while it destroys life and property with its lightning-bolts. If ever Protestantism had a fair field to labor in, it was in Northern and Central Germany, where it had its birth. It found there a people, intelligent and moral and religious, in the Catholic way; it broke down the ecclesiastical hierarchy which resisted its progress; it was fostered by the patronage of the state; it fought and bled for its principles in the thirty years' struggle with the Austro-Spanish Empire. If it has failed *there*, its failure is the more conspicuous, because of the favorable circumstances by which it was surrounded on every side. Protestantism then started into life with "*The Supremacy of the Bible*" as its rallying cry. So far as this was a reassertion of the principles of the primitive Church, obscured by the darkness of the middle ages, the Reformation was productive of good. So far as this was set forth as a *new* doctrine, the Gospel of Luther was a snare and a delusion. No doctrine was more stanchly asserted and defended

by the ante-Nicene fathers, than that of the authority of Holy Scripture as the rule of faith.¹ But the tenet that the Bible is everybody's handbook, to be expounded by every one, learned or unlearned, was simply impossible before the discovery of the art of printing. Prior to that era, the wages of a laboring man, earned during a long lifetime, would not have sufficed to purchase him a manuscript copy of the Holy Book. The mass of the people, for the first fifteen centuries after the birth of Christ, were largely dependent on the oral instruction of the Church, and the discovery of printing alone made Protestantism a possibility. A deep spiritual impulse launched it into the world. The impassioned hymns of Luther and his colleagues bear witness to this. The champion of reform in his lonely cell at the Wartburg, sees, or thinks he sees, the arch-enemy of mankind mocking and resisting him, and he hurls his inkstand at him in defiant scorn. As Farrar well remarks, it was this spiritual principle alone which saved Protestantism, at its very outset, from becoming a system of scepticism. Those of its champions who were deficient in it (*e. g.*, the Socini) soon overstepped the limits of orthodoxy.

But as this impulse died away with the causes which gave it birth; as Protestantism found itself an established religion, with its schools and professors of theology, it passed into the era of bald literalism. The supremacy of the Bible became the supremacy of an imperfect Hebrew and Greek text, and there were not wanting those who (like Cotton Mather in New England) maintained that the Masoretic vowel-points were of Divine authority. To this school a man's eternal salvation might depend on a Yod or a Vav! This school was necessarily a transition one, and the absurdity of its extreme position naturally led to a violent reaction in the opposite direction. The worship of inanimate paper and ink could go no further, and the bibliolater, like a disappointed fetish-worshipper, fell to cursing his deity. The proximate cause of German rationalism, however, was the promulgation of the Pantheistic system of *Spinoza*, the silver-tongued Jew of Amsterdam. Christianity had become such a lifeless form of dogmas and syllogisms, that the ardent pagan,ism of an apostate Jew seemed refreshing, and was, to a great extent, adopted. The spirit of free thought was abroad, and every petty professor had his little stone to fling at some book of the Bible. From the universities the contagion rapidly passed to the pulpits

¹ See ante-Nicene library, *passim*; and for a collection of the passages, Bishop Browne on Article VI., and notes to Dr. Pusey's "Eirenicon."

and the desks which, in the days of Luther, had thundered forth denunciations of Roman error, and in later days had lectured on metaphysical theology, now proclaimed the uncertainty of all religious systems, or, in a more practical vein, gave instruction on the proper cultivation of the crops, and the correct management of vineyards! The infidel court of Frederick the Great threw all its influence on the side of irreligion; so that, from one hundred to fifty years ago, a believing minister was a rare spectacle in Protestant Germany. But the faith, which had been banished from the cathedra and the pulpit, still survived in the humble cot of the peasant. The people had their open Bible, their catechism, and short liturgy, their evangelical hymns, and they still believed, though their pastors had ceased to feed them with the Bread of Life. This was partly due, also, to the fact that the ministry did not always feel it incumbent on them to proclaim their peculiar tenets publicly.

The first dawn of a better day was seen in the teachings of *Schleiermacher*, a man not much more orthodox in his views than Theodore Parker, and yet in such marked contrast to the bold and scoffing infidels who had preceded him, that he was considered evangelical. "Yearning for some indissoluble tie to bind him to the invisible world, still too deeply imbued with the sceptical lore of his country to accept the literal inspiration of Holy Writ, he endeavored to effect a compromise between the two as yet irreconcilable extremes of rationalism and belief." To him succeeded the converted Jew, Neander, and the evangelical school of Tholuck, Dorner, and Müller, so that the universities became gradually purged of their rationalistic teaching. The political commotions of 1848 also helped on the reaction toward orthodoxy. The revolutionists inscribed on their banners, "Free Thought in Church and state," and at the present moment, in Germany, a republican is almost invariably an infidel. This naturally alarmed the governments, and the clergy dependent on them for patronage. They no longer dared to toy with scepticism as a plaything, but made common cause against the rising flood which threatened to engulf them; and orthodoxy is now the order of the day in court and university circles throughout the German Empire.

Protestant Germany, therefore, at the present day, presents the curious spectacle of a clergy, either honestly renouncing their rationalistic views, or, from interested motives, concealing them; and a laity which, taken as a whole, has lost its faith in Christianity, and simply tolerates its outward forms with but ill-concealed contempt. "There are, indeed, plenty of orthodox individuals—nay,

even some orthodox districts—to be found in Prussia; but the vast majority of the Protestant middle classes, and even a large portion of the lower strata of society, are estranged from the religion of their ancestors, and take no interest in the Church, or the religious lessons thrust upon the schools by Church and government combined.”¹

“The preachers, who in Protestant Germany were dragged along by the current of popular opinion from 1740 to 1840, were frightened at last to see how far they had been led, and saved themselves by swimming to shore. The stream had carried them to a cataract, and they effected their escape just in time. Slowly, but surely, advancing in its self-assigned course, public opinion, from impugning the truth of Biblical history, had come to deny, by degrees, the necessity, the probability, and the possibility of miracles. It has now reached the extent of negating the efficacy of prayer, and with it the interference of the Almighty in the course of events.”²

The situation, then, is about as follows: We have first the school of rigid Lutheran orthodoxy, so small in numbers, and so insignificant in influence, that it is scarcely worthy of mention. Although it has numbered among its exponents such eminent names as Hengstenberg and Krummacher, its influence upon the masses is scarcely appreciable. It includes, no doubt, in its ranks, worthy and devout men; but it also numbers among its votaries ecclesiastical mountebanks like the notorious Pastor Knack, of Berlin. This eminent divine, in his zeal for Scriptural orthodoxy, finds it necessary to assail the Copernican system of astronomy. The Bible speaks of “the rising of the sun, and the going down of the same;” it is evident, therefore, that the sun revolves around the earth, and Pastor Knack devotes the major part of his time to a laborious effort to prove this point, amid yells of derision from press and populace! The most interesting feature of this school to a Churchman is its strong tendency toward ritual development. Most of its members are Catholic by nature, but fed on the dry husks of a barren theology, their natural craving for a sound faith must go unsatisfied. Lutheran Protestantism, we must remember, retained many things which have disappeared from most Anglican Churches. In all its places of worship, you find the high altar, with its massive crucifix and two wax candles, lighted only during the saying of the service; the communicants receive the wafer bread, and, in absolution and benediction, are blessed with the sign of the cross. In most city

¹ “Religious Thought in Germany,” p. 11.

² *Ibid.* p. 15.

churches the service is choral, and in many there are boy choirs, and you find the carved images of saints and the old confessional boxes left standing, but now unused. In the high Lutheran school the tendency is, as we have said, to a moderate degree of ritual development. To illustrate this, let us describe a service which we attended in the parish church of Glaucha (Halle) on Christmas-eve 1868. The church itself was famous because it once belonged to the illustrious Herman August Franckè, the great philanthropist and pietist preacher of the seventeenth century, the founder of the Halle orphanage. Its incumbent now is Pastor Seiler, one of the most rigid defenders of strict Lutheranism, having published some years since, in imitation of his great master, ninety-five theses in defence of his doctrine. He was the officiating minister, and the congregation was quite respectable in point of numbers. We had often attended the services of this church during our student life in Halle, ten years previously, and the ritual development within that space of time was very marked. The church was built in the curious style of architecture so prevalent in Germany, with several galleries arising one above another, like a theatre. The altar, of course, was in the chancel, though no rail surrounded it; directly *over* the altar was the pulpit, with a door of entrance in the rear, as in some of our country churches, and still above that a very fine organ. The altar was covered with a dark altar-cloth, embroidered with gold, and on it were two unlighted wax candles, two white vases filled with the long, glossy, dark green leaves of the *gummi* plant, an open Bible, and a large crucifix. During the organ voluntary, Pastor Seiler came in, attired in a black Geneva gown, cut like a surplice, and embroidered with velvet, with white bands. He stood before the altar, with his back to the people, in an attitude of silent devotion. This position he occupied through the entire service, except that he turned toward the people when he addressed them. The service was choral throughout, antiphonal between pastor and congregation, without the intervention of a choir; purely Gregorian except in the hymns, and most exquisitely rendered. We had not, at that time, heard better chanting, but the Latin vespers at the Cathedral of Cologne, and the chanting at All Saints', Margaret street, London, proved superior to the best efforts of St. George's, Glaucha. The inflection of voice in the Roman and Lutheran collects is more pleasing to the ear than the bare monotone of the Anglican intonation. The congregation stood through all the service, except that they sat during the singing of the hymns and delivery of the discourse, and knelt only during the saying of

the Lord's Prayer, and the collect immediately preceding it. It may interest some of the readers of this article to have a translation of the entire service.

LITURGIC VESPERS FOR THE HOLY EVE BEFORE CHRISTMAS.

Pastor. O Lord, open Thou my lips.

Congregation. And my mouth shall show forth Thy praise.

P. O God, make speed to save me.

C. O Lord, make haste to help me.

P. Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost.

C. As it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, world without end. Hallelujah.

P. Come, let us worship.

Jubilate Deo (First Gregorian Tone).

P. O be joyful in the Lord, all ye lands.

C. Serve the Lord with gladness.

P. Come before His presence with a song.

C. Be ye sure that the Lord, etc.

P. The Lord be with you.

C. And with thy spirit.

P. Let us pray. (A collect was intoned.)

C. Amen.

P. read the First Lesson. Luke, ii. 1-14.

C. sang Luther's Christmas Hymn, *Vom Himmel hoch.*

P. To you this day a Saviour is born. Hallelujah.

C. Which is Christ the Lord. Hallelujah.

P. read the Second Lesson. Luke, ii. 15-20.

C. sang the Hymn, *Es ist ein Ros'.*

P. delivered the Address.

C. sang the Hymn, *O Jesulein süß, O Jesulein mild!*

P. The Word was made Flesh. Hallelujah.

C. And dwelt among us. Hallelujah.

P. Let my prayer be set forth in Thy sight as incense.

C. And the lifting up of my hands as an evening sacrifice.

Magnificat (Eighth Tone).

P. My soul doth magnify the Lord.

C. And my spirit hath rejoiced in God my Saviour, etc.

P. Lord, hear my prayer.

C. And let my cry come before Thee.

P. Collect, followed by Lord's Prayer.

C. Amen.

P. The Lord be with you.

C. And with thy spirit.

P. Bless we the Lord.

C. Thanks be to God.

P. pronounced the Levitical Benediction.

C. Amen. Amen. Amen.

A large Christmas-tree was in the font, filled with lighted candles, but without other ornaments. The pastor stood through the service, with the palms of his hands joined, but when he turned to the congregation to pronounce the benediction, he thrice separated them, and at the last words, made distinctly over the congregation the sign of the cross. The Creed was not said, but is used in the Morning Service. It is a noticeable fact, however, that none of the Protestant Churches in Dresden use it in their public services.

Passing on from the "*Alt-lutherisch*" to the "*Evangelical*" school of German theology, we find included in this latter body most of the opposition to rationalism. Prior to the year 1817, the Lutheran and Reformed (*i. e.*, Calvinistic) "Churches" had been two distinct bodies in Prussia; often fiercely antagonistic the one to the other. Since that date, by order of the king, they have been united in one visible communion, known by the title of "The Evangelical Church." In its pale are included all the rationalists and moderate believers of the country. The few recusants of the school just described are known as "Old Lutherans" or "Old Calvinists." It may be well, also, to note that in Germany "an Evangelical" means a *believer*, and "a Protestant" a *rationalist*. The Evangelical school in Germany controls most of the universities, and has a considerable following among the people. The imperial court favors it, but the people generally regard it with a placid sort of contempt. Its orthodoxy is by no means ultra, and its tenets are essentially the same as those of the "Broad Church" party in the Anglican communion. Dean Stanley would be quite at home among the Prussian Evangelicals. We do not know of a single Protestant theologian of note in Germany, of any school, who believes in the eternal punishment of the wicked.

It is perhaps not venturing too much to assert that the majority of the Lutheran clergy are still rationalists. Their tenets are less openly avowed, their revolutionary tendency is more obvious; the court and the universities frown upon them, yet they are still cherished, and, at opportune moments, expressed. Let us narrate a case in point.

We brought with us to Dresden letters of introduction to some of the principal Lutheran ministers in that city. In the month of February, 1869, we were invited to the fortnightly meetings of the pastors at Helbig's Restauration. We attended several, but the first will suffice as an example. About one half of the twenty Protestant ministers of Dresden were present. The meeting opened with no religious exercises; but we sat about a long table,

with our mugs of beer before us, and, amid dense clouds of tobacco smoke, discussed the welfare of the Church at home and abroad. Several of the pastors had never before conversed with an Anglican clergyman, and all seemed anxious to ascertain our views. We stated to them, as succinctly as we could, the Church's platform of unity, viz.: "The Nicene Creed without the *Filioque*, and the Three Orders of the Ministry in unbroken Apostolical Succession." Accustomed to the arguments of Dissent at home, we were not surprised to hear Episcopacy scouted, and "grace oozing from the tips of fingers" derided in the genuine meeting-house style. But we were pained to find that the Church's Creed was as much an object of contempt and derision *there* as its historic Episcopate. We were solemnly assured that it was a piece of ecclesiastical rubbish, of no value apart from its historical interest. One of the ministers present informed us in a pleasant way that "Arius was as good a Christian as Athanasius;" and that "*the Lord's Prayer* is creed enough for Christendom." To these positions the rest gave an unhesitating assent. In the course of the evening we entered into conversation with this impartial friend of Arius and Athanasius; and he stated his position very frankly, in words to this effect:

"I can only appreciate your horror of sectarianism, when I consider how sect-ridden your country is. Here in Saxony we are much better off. The government manages everything for us, and keeps us together in one body, in spite of our differing views. I (*e. g.*) am a *Baptist*. I don't believe it does infants a particle of good to baptize them; but the state makes it my duty to christen them, so I go through the form. My neighbor over there in America would be a Methodist, and so on. But here we manage to get along in perfect peace and harmony." We could not help thinking that, where nobody believes anything, there is but little danger of quarrelling over creeds! Dr. Liebner, the *Oberhofprediger*, or chief pastor of the kingdom of Saxony, himself a very decided Evangelical, admitted, in conversation with us, though reluctantly, that if the hand of the state were withdrawn, the majority of the people would renounce even the outward form of Christianity.

An American lady of talent and culture, a communicant of the Protestant Episcopal Church, who has resided some twenty years in Dresden, and is connected by marriage with some of its most influential inhabitants, thus truthfully sketches the condition of affairs about her in a little volume, printed for private circulation:

"I have heard Lutheranism defined, 'hatred of Catholicism.'

Religion, like apparitions, is everywhere spoken of, but few have seen the purified spirit stalking at noonday. There are glaring defects in the Lutheran system; in order to reform, they have reversed. For instance, the priestly influence was to be reformed; they have debased it. The office of clergyman is never sought by the higher classes; these men are looked upon as a body belonging to the community, who are to preach sermons, baptize, marry, confirm, and administer the Sacraments, all of which are matters of pounds, shillings, and pence. You barter whether you will have a first-class wedding, or a common one. If the former, the Church produces velvet cushions; if the latter, straw-bottomed chairs. Your child must be christened when six weeks old: this is the law; a dollar a week can defer it at your pleasure. At the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, each member brings his offering and lays it on the altar; this becomes the emolument of the priest [pastor], who quietly pockets it during the holy office. He is never expected to visit his parishioners. In fact, except in small country villages, no single clergyman, as with us, has a congregation he can call his own. There are, say twenty, in a large city, who preach in rotation in the different churches, and, of course, the most eloquent are followed, and have the largest audiences, as elsewhere. As there is no domestic intercourse between the clergyman and his people, his religious influence is confined to his pulpit. This probably is in contra-distinction to the old abused system of father confessors, and their influence in families. The confirmation of children is also a fixed law of the Church; not optional, as with us. Every Lutheran, to start in life, must be possessed of his certificate of birth, baptism, and confirmation. The confirmation day, as I have mentioned elsewhere, is a feast day; it is an era in a child's life, and a new suit of clothes is always provided for the ceremony. The girls are clad in white muslin, if the means of the parents can possibly compass the expense; the poorer class frequently borrow the white dress for the occasion; and about this period of the year [spring] you often see advertised, '*A Confirmation dress for sale.*' One great fault that is alleged against the Lutheran Church, is its laxity on the subject of divorce; of that I can say but little, when I compare the yearly records of our pious New England Puritans."¹

She well sums up the whole by saying that Luther may have "discovered the pearl of great price," but it has a "wonderfully poor setting in his own land!"

¹ Mrs. Griffin's "Impressions of Germany."

Sad as are these conclusions, they are nevertheless fully borne out by the experience of every well-informed and unprejudiced person. The faith of Protestant Germany is lost—to the human eye—hopelessly lost in the black mists of pantheism and unbelief. In this dark eclipse a few glimmering lights shine out here and there, yet they only serve to render the surrounding darkness more palpable and gloomy. In the volume, the title of which we have placed at the head of this article, the Berlin correspondent of the London “Times” has collected the leading facts which illustrate the condition of “religious thought in Germany.” Himself a native German, and an adherent of the national religion, he writes with all the calmness of a practised critic; and, while he portrays the utter irreligion of his countrymen, lets slip no expression which indicates his own satisfaction or dissatisfaction at the state of affairs. But few have ventured to impugn his narrative, and those who have attempted the task have met with signal discomfiture. One of them, indeed (Mr. Ernest de Bunsen), unwittingly confirms, in the concluding sentences of his letter, the position which he had attempted to assail:

“I thank your correspondent for his very correct statement that *the dogmatism of St. Athanasius and the statutes of the Council of Nice have entirely ceased to be a living power.* What the dogmas of the Bible are, and *to what part of the world* its leading doctrines can be traced, these are indeed *important questions*, on which I, for one, do not expect enlightenment from your correspondent at Berlin.

“As a son of the late Baron Bunsen, who caused it to be declared at his funeral, by the officiating Lutheran clergyman, that he died as a son of the Reformed or non-Lutheran Church,

“I have the honor to sign my name as, sir, Yours sincerely,

“ERNEST DE BUNSEN.

“LONDON, August 14, 1869.”

When it is borne in mind that “the late Baron Bunsen” was an advanced rationalist, and that his son, this German noble who affects a French title, is an ordained clergyman of the “Broad” school in the Church of England, the value of this testimony can be clearly perceived.

Out of a Protestant population in Dresden of over one hundred and fifty thousand, only from six to seven thousand attend public worship on the Lord’s Day. In Halle, in 1857–8, out of a population of 35,000, about 800 attended the Sunday morning service.

This is the result of personal observation. In Berlin the case is said to be no better. In that great centre of German power and civilization, "most of the churches are invariably empty, although the accommodation provides only for 25,000 out of a population of 800,000." In the Duchy of Baden the same rule holds good. In the Kingdom of Württemberg we are told that the attendance is better.

The popular attitude toward Church and clergy is rather that of silent contempt than that of open hostility. Occasionally, however, the wolfish spirit of the Parisian Commune crops out from beneath the cloak of the placid German philosopher. A notable instance of this occurred in Berlin during the summer of 1869.

On Sunday, August 8th of that year, as Pastor Heinrici stood before the altar of the cathedral church reciting the Apostles' Creed in the Liturgy, a young man deliberately rose from a front seat, and, with the words, "You lie," discharged a loaded pistol full at his breast. The ball missed its mark, and grazed the cheek of a choir boy. The assassin was immediately arrested, and dragged to the nearest police station, where he made the following statement:

"My name is Biland. I am nineteen years of age, a Protestant, and the son of a blacksmith in the village of Lank, county of Lower Barnim, a few miles from Berlin. My parents sent me to a grammar-school, wishing me to become a candidate for the ministry in the Established Church. But my eyes were soon opened to the falsehood of the creed I was expected some day to teach, and my dislike was increased to disgust when I perceived that many of those professing to believe it were liars at heart. I refused to pursue a career which had become so hateful to me, and resisted all attempts of my parents to force me to persevere. Eventually, I saw myself left by them to my own devices, and began to study art,—the dramatic art, I mean. I wished to become an actor, and to preach to the public in my own way; but the religious mendacity rampant around me gave me no rest. Some I saw uttering deliberate untruths, while others, knowing them to be such, listened with contemptuous indifference. Gradually, I taught myself that some striking deed was indispensable to rouse the public mind from its apathy and chase away the mists of superstition. I therefore determined to seize the first favorable opportunity that offered for shooting a clergyman while in the act of uttering his accursed perjuries. I have done it. I cast the ball myself,¹ and have done my best to

¹ From a tin medal in honor of the Schiller centenary.

render the shot fatal. I am sound in body and mind, and scorn the suggestion that I have acted under the disturbing influence of temporary insanity. I perfectly knew what I was about, and am convinced that there are many able to comprehend the disinterestedness of my purpose, though they may, perhaps, not approve the method chosen to compass it. My design was to shoot Herr Heinrich, and I was prepared to pay the penalty of the deed." Karl Biland was no more insane than all fanatics are insane. When put on his trial, he pleaded "Not guilty. Being convinced that man is not a free agent, I cannot be guilty. I determined to shoot a clergyman, because it is the clergy who have kept me so long in the dark. When studying mathematics I learnt to reason, and emancipate myself from the untruths they taught me. There is no God. Nature is a self-supporting machine." The unhappy youth was found guilty, and sentenced to twelve years of imprisonment, with hard labor, from which he was released after five months by the hand of death.

And how was the crime viewed by the public? With the utmost complacency. Very few approved of the criminal violence of the open assault, but most sympathized with the philosophical motives which had led to it. In fact, it gave rise to a very characteristic Berlin joke. A butcher, it was said, who had not seen the inside of a church for many a long year, was in the cathedral that morning to show the building to a friend from the country. Hearing the report of the pistol, but not comprehending the cause, he cried out in amazement: "Well, I declare, that's a new dodge! When I was a boy they never fired guns as an accompaniment to the Creed!"

This anecdote illustrates the popular feeling better than the murderous revenge of Biland. It is only when the government attempts to inculcate doctrinal religion that popular feeling is aroused. A short time since, a great outcry was raised in Hanover at the introduction into the elementary schools of a child's "Primer," containing the following curious story:

"Once upon a time there was a boy named Vitus. He was a good boy, and used to say his prayers every morning as soon as he got up. One morning he forgot to do so, and ran off to school without thinking about it. On the stairs he slipped, fell, and hurt himself. He picked himself up again, and while passing a butcher's shop, was again precipitated to the ground by the butcher's dog. An old woman who saw the mishap helped him up, and told him to leave off crying. 'I am sure,' she added, 'you

have not said your prayers this morning. Take my advice, go home, undress, go to bed again, say your prayers, and then go to school.' The boy did as he was bid, and when making his way to school for the second time, met with no accident. Never after did he forget to say his prayers before leaving his bed."

The objection to this ridiculous story was not on account of its intrinsic absurdity, but because it was thought to inculcate the doctrine of Divine interference with the affairs of men. In a similar spirit of opposition to dogmatism, the Eastern Province of Prussia remonstrated against a hymn book containing this singular religious ode:

"Almighty God, I am content to remain the dog I am. I am a dog, a despicable dog. I am conscious of revelling in sin, and there is no infamy in which I do not indulge. My anger and quarrelling are like a dog's. My envy and hatred are like a dog's. My abuse and snappishness are like a dog's. My robbing and devouring are like a dog's. Nay, when I come to reflect upon it, I cannot but own that in very many things I behave worse than the dogs themselves."

Little as we admire the good taste of such canine lyrics, the popular objection was not based on æsthetic grounds, but because the hymn was intended to teach the doctrine of Human Depravity, as the story did that of Divine Providence. The same spirit manifests itself when the clergy attempt to assume any spiritual power and authority; and sometimes it must be owned that these self-ordained men (especially those in the ranks of the ultra-orthodox) assert their prerogatives as spiritual rulers in a manner which savors but little of Christian meekness and humility.

Let us take a case in point, which occurred in Berlin during the same summer which witnessed the Biland outrage, but in a different church. The pastor was of French origin, and one of the strictest Calvinists in the country. Although cognizant of the facts ourselves, we will give the narrative in the pungent words of the "Times" correspondent:

"A bridal couple were standing before the altar to be married. Unfortunately for them, the officiating clergyman had heard that the young people would in a few weeks have again to request his services at the baptismal font. In the speech with which, according to custom, he opened the ceremony, he allowed himself to allude to the prospective event. Then, becoming heated with his theme, he took upon himself to enact the representative of an avenging Deity, reprimanded the weeping bride, and wound up by

boxing her ears! Against this terrible affront the bridegroom remonstrated with wonderful meekness. His one object being to be married, and by marriage to repair the past, he said only a few exculpatory words to the vituperative priest, and requested him to proceed. Amid the tears of the ladies and the rage of the gentlemen present, the rite was accomplished. On arriving at home the bride became ill, and the following day was delivered of a dead child. The thing got wind, and was discussed in the public press, though, of course, those immediately concerned would have preferred to keep it a secret. Upon this the pugilistic clergyman at once wrote to a Conservative paper, declaring the whole story a lie, and not even condescending to explain how it was that such an extraordinary invention could have been fabricated at his expense. At this juncture the young husband, a music master, finding concealment out of the question, resolved upon having the only satisfaction possible, and brought an action against the self-alleged innocent. At the hearing of the case, eleven persons took their oath that 'the blow had been given.' Unheeding their depositions, the clergyman persisted in his denial, and, as his sole defence, referred the judges to the evidence of his own conscience and God's knowledge of his inward thoughts. The court, in pursuance of the ordinary rules affecting the testimony of witnesses, left his conscience alone, and sentenced his body to three months' imprisonment. At the same time, the favor of 'extenuating circumstances' being accorded him, he was allowed the option of either going to gaol or paying a fine of three hundred thalers. But no sentence of a mere earthly judge could shake *him*. He knew too well his own worth, appealed for a reversion of the sentence to a higher court, and, in the meantime, appeared again in the pulpit to justify himself before his congregation. The ecclesiastical authorities did not interfere."¹ The upshot of the matter was, that the admiring friends of the pastor raised a subscription and paid his fine!

One of the most remarkable signs of the times is the existence and wide-spread organization of a religious society, known as the *Protestanten-Verein*, or German Protestant Association. Its branch in Dresden held several meetings during our sojourn there. "The members of this remarkable body have been recruited from those who, while they reject the inspiration of the Bible, yet differ from the vulgar rationalism of the day in this, that they acknowledge the duty of professing some modern form of religion, based

¹ "The State of Religion in Germany," pp. 40-42.

upon the moral teachings of what they regard as a venerable, but, in many respects, obsolete book. At its head are distinguished professors of theology, and many other men of wealth, rank, and erudition, who justly enjoy the respect of their compatriots."¹ Professor Schenkel, of Heidelberg, in his letter to the editor of the *Volks-Zeitung*, dated July 31, 1869, thus lays down the platform of the society: "The Protestant Association, as such, has but little in common with theology. It approves no theological system whatever, and has expressly and unmistakably pronounced against the preponderance of theological dogmatism of every shade. The association does not at all regard it as its legitimate object to reconcile our traditional theology, or any single dogma maintained by it, with common-sense. It cares as little for the crafty interpretations of myths and miracles. What it wants is not to revive theology, but to revive Christianity. . . . It looks upon Ultramontanism, hierarchy, *orthodoxy*, and the intolerance manifested by some of our Protestant Churches as *dangerous evils*."

Yet, with all its flourish of trumpets and parade of eminent names, the *Protestanten-Verein* makes no impression on the populace. The faith of Protestant Germany is *lost*,—we fear, hopelessly lost. The German burgher toils faithfully six days of the week to support his family, and spends his Sunday with them in recreation. He believes that he has performed his whole duty in leading such a life. No thought of a redeeming Saviour, or a sanctifying Comforter, intrudes upon his spiritual complacency any more than it would were he a native of India or Cathay. He only concerns himself about the *Gottes-idee* (the idea of God),—that he sometimes speculates upon in his leisure moments, or with his boon companions, but generally fails to arrive at any very definite conclusion on the subject. Strange as it may seem, we have been gravely assured by native Germans that their nation is the most religious people in the world! But they would immediately explain that religion is not a matter of creed or dogma, but a sentiment of the heart, prompting to the universal love of nature; in short, a poetic paganism, dressed beautifully in the garb of Christian sentiment. This, it must be confessed with grief, is, to a great extent, the present religion of Protestant Germany. The German never was, and never could be, a Puritan of the Church of Praise-god Barebones. No Prussian or Saxon Solon ever dreamed of legislating against Christmas mince-pies, or called his majestic

¹ "The State of Religion in Germany," pp. 58, 59.

organ, pealing through the dimly-lighted aisles of the grand old cathedral which he had wrenched from the hand of Rome, "*the devil's bagpipes!*" Such puerile warfare against the Church was beneath his notice. As in the early days of Christianity its most insidious foe, Neo-Platonism, took the old Homeric myths and dressed them up in the garb of allegory, so German rationalism essays to do with what it ventures to call "Christian myths." We have already remarked how much of the Catholic form still lingers about the Lutheran service. The same is true of the nation at large. The Christian year, with its varied round of festivals, is still a national observance. While on Ascension-day the voice of *our* worshippers is almost drowned by the roar of busy traffic in our streets, in Germany it is a universal holiday, and every city, town, and village is decked in its gayest attire. But, like the Easter flowers in our Unitarian meeting-houses, "*it means nothing.*" In 1869, the principal newspaper in Leipzig had for its leading article on that day a beautiful piece of poetry, entitled *Himmelfahrt*, i. e., "Ascension." It was to this effect:

"The reign of winter is over. The flowery spring has come, scattering its buds and blossoms like pearls upon the strand. All nature calls on man, her noblest product, to worship and rejoice. Therefore, on this bright and gladsome day, go forth into the fields, listen to the vocal melody of morning lark and evening nightingale, and let your heart *ascend* in praise and thankful adoration to the Great First Cause of all things. Then, when sunset-tints illumine the darkening sky, you can return in peace and quiet to your home, 'be it lofty palace or humble cot,' feeling that you have joined the world around you in keeping the true Ascension of the heart."

Could anything have been more heathenish than this? "The myth of *Olivet*" was not even honored with a passing notice!

In these sketches we have made no reference to the *Moravian* Christians (although an interested visitor at Herrnhut), because it must be confessed that, however valuable their testimony is to historic Episcopacy, they exert no more appreciable influence on German life, in the aggregate, than the Society of Friends does on that of America. Moreover, they have shown no zeal in extending their episcopate to other communions, nor in contributing to the reunion of Christendom on any other basis than that of their own *ecclesiola*. It is to some other source that the sore-stricken Protestantism of Germany must look for succor in this the hour of its need and evil. We watch, therefore, with hope the rise and progress of what is called the "*(Old-)Catholic*" movement in Ger-

many. We do not forget the misguided zeal of Johann Ronge, and how wretchedly "German Catholicism" plunged into the bottomless gulf of rationalism and infidelity. But our trust is that, by the blessing of God, the labors of a Döllinger and Schulte and Michellis will not come to such a miserable end.

If (Old-)Catholicism can maintain and secure its true position as the national Church of a vast empire—a Church loyal to the early creeds and councils, yet alive to the intellectual necessities of the nineteenth century, uniting faith and science in a golden bond; tenacious of primitive order, yet reaching out a friendly hand to all who call upon the Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity and truth; the friend of truth and liberty, but the uncompromising foe of Ultramontanism and scepticism—then there is, indeed, a brilliant future in store for it. It will not only prove the true *Catholic* Church of Germany, but it will draw to itself (as the magnet draws the iron) all that is still faithful and true in Protestantism, and, standing between the East and West, with a hand of fellowship extended to each, may prove hereafter the central point of the reunion of Christendom.

The subject of religion in Germany is one which should deeply interest every American Christian. A constantly-increasing flood of immigration is poured upon our shores, and already statistics show that at least one tenth of our population is of German origin. Our sons and daughters go to Germany in quest of the highest forms of intellectual culture, and return more or less imbued with the ideas and customs of that land. Germany will, ere long, be to America what England now is,—*the Fatherland*. The Lutheran denomination bids fair soon to outstrip all others in America in point of numbers. At this crisis it is gratifying to learn that the most intelligent and pious of that communion are turning to us for advice and guidance. They need an episcopate of their own lineage, a liturgy and offices in their own language and favorite forms,¹ and a code of canon law adapted to their national customs and peculiarities. Our communion is both Catholic and Anglican. Its *Anglicanism* proper² we must not attempt to force upon foreigners; its Catholic gifts it should always be our noblest pleasure to impart.

¹ It was partly with this in view that we translated at length the Hallensian "Liturgic Vespers."

² That is, all that is peculiarly *English* in its rites and customs.



BOOK NOTICES.

THE ABOLITION AND REJECTION OF THE ATHANASIAN CREED. A Letter to his Grace, Archibald Campbell, Lord Archbishop of Canterbury, Primate of all England, and Metropolitan, from the Rev. Frederic George Lee, D.C.L., Vicar of All Saints', Lambeth. Second edition. London. 1872.

Dr. Lee is one of the most pronounced of the Ritualistic school; and it is to be regretted that a person of milder prejudices and softer tone had not undertaken this remonstrance for England's foremost ecclesiastic. In his zeal for the Athanasian Symbol (which even a doctrinarian, than whom we have not a better, Bishop Williams, thinks should rather be called a hymn),¹ he does not hesitate actually to denounce our American Prayer Book as "starved and mangled," because it does not contain it. We should like to have an impartial judge compare the English Communion Service with our own, and declare which is the most starved and mangled, in view, not of Dr. Lee's standard, but of one truly catholic and primitive.

Still, Dr. Lee tells his metropolitan some wholesome and sting-

¹ The English Prayer Book seems to treat the Athanasian Confession as a hymn. It puts a *Gloria Patri* after it, just as it does after the *Benedicite*. It does not put one after the *Te Deum*, since that may be considered as an enlarged *Gloria Patri*. Doubtless, the *Te Deum*, for uniformity's sake, should have an Amen, which by some accident it has lost.

ing truths; as, for instance, in the following paragraph: "My Lord Archbishop, there is many a family which has good reason to mourn over the shipwrecked faith of some loved son at your Grace's old university—which was mine too. The wretched unbelief which, of late years, has in some colleges been painfully dinned into the ears of trusting and generous youths, has, for many a one, darkened life's pathway with the gloom of despair. Such cruel labors may have afforded a gleam of glee to the sceptical teachers, who, having, sometimes without due thought, sometimes with settled intention, successfully wrought a work of destruction, find, when it is too late, that their victims are utterly unable to build again the shattered fabric which has been destroyed, or to gain the once-loved olden peace for their troubled souls. I know of such, rich in intellectual abilities and rare natural gifts, some of whom have died the doubter's death, in fear and trembling; to man's sight, without contrition, without consolation, without hope" (p. 11).

We do really fear that the opposition to the Athanasian Symbol is not so much to the *saying* of it—for a rationalist would say it as quietly as if it were the binomial theorem—as to the faith it represents. When Professor Jowett signed the Thirty-nine Articles, without the slightest wincing, some one was heard to say he would have signed three hundred and ninety-nine with just as much composure. Perhaps so. And if so, how is the Athanasian Confession—to give it the title which the English Book puts foremost—to prevent hundreds from *saying* or *singing* it, who may treat it as Bishop Colenso says he does the Apostles' Creed, when he pronounces it as the Queen's officer? It was *Professor* Jowett, and not Benjamin Jowett *per se*, who signed the Articles *officially*. So *Professor* Jowett can doubtless say or sing the Athanasian Confession as loudly as anybody, in the chapel and halls of Oxford.

We are not of the number who disparage our American Prayer Book, and consider it "starved or mangled" because the Athanasian Confession is absent from its pages. The *hymnal* character of the document is all which the Greek Church, and Oriental Churches generally, give allegiance to. It cannot, then, be pronounced a *Catholic* Creed, when a very large part of the Church Catholic—when "the Communion of Saints," the Church Catholic considered as an intercommuning whole—has never received it, and does not now receive it, as standing upon the same basis as the Apostles' Creed and the Nicene. If *our* Church so received it, who knows but what it might violate the old Ephesian canon, which, probably, Dr. Lee, and

many others like him, have trained against that addition to the Nicene Symbol, called the *Filioque*?

Dr. Lee is a man of too much one-sidedness to lecture people whose views do not accord with his own. For example, he solemnly endorses a book called "Martyrs omitted by Foxe." And this book glorifies Edmund Campion, a deserter from the Church of England, and one of the most industrious of the unscrupulous tribe of Jesuits. He belonged to a camp which worked in the dark, and would have slain Queen Elizabeth a dozen times over, if as successful as they were remorseless. Secretary Walsingham, not over fond of persecuting, had no pity for such shy emissaries as Campion and others, who, to screen their aims, even became preachers among the Puritans! John Nalson, in his two old folios of documentary collections, tells the story of such people *ex abundanti*. In principle, they were not a whit better than Philip II. of Spain; who procured the assassination of William of Orange, and who would never have resorted to the prodigious expense of the Armada, if he could have got rid of Queen Elizabeth by poison or the dagger.

Yet we are willing to admit, and cheerfully, that Dr. Lee has told his archbishop some stinging truths about the dreary scepticism which has insinuated itself into the English universities. Yet it might be well to remember that this scepticism is now everywhere. And, very possibly, it is a reaction from multiplying articles of faith, and constraining people to accept too much. Puritanism engendered Unitarianism in England and America, Ultramontaniam begot the Encyclopedists and the French Revolution. The Vatican Council of 1870 begot the Old Catholics. It may be that there was more *philosophy* in the ancient Ephesine decree against the enlargement of creeds than we self-conceited moderns dream of. There certainly is peril from the developments of theologians, even though a Newman be their file-leader. Why, he himself (it is said), like Fear in "Collins's Ode on the Passions," begins to recoil from the sound which he himself has made.

Let the clergy but preach freely, firmly, and constantly the doctrines which "the Communion of Saints" still clings to, and such a course may do more good than battling for a Symbol, whose history is confessedly obscure, and whose acknowledgment but partial. As to the importance of preaching doctrine, even the New York "Herald" has lately taken up the matter, and said of pulpit affectation and sentimentalism—preaching for the multitude, and for excitement and entertainment, and *not* instruction—that it will draw the people away from all staid articles of belief, and plunge the community into downright atheism! What a warning!

We close this notice by saying that there are two items of history, respecting the Athanasian Confession, which may have great weight with some persons. One is, that Richard Baxter (of Saints' Rest memory) pronounced it the best exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity ever attempted; and the other, that the late Bishop Griswold, in one of his conventional addresses, said that its damnable clauses were no objection to it. If the doctrine which preceded those clauses were true, those clauses (he said) followed as a matter of course. They were then a single echo of the Scripture, "He that believeth not shall be dam-ned."

NEUTESTAMENTLICHE ZEITGESCHICHTE. Von A. Hausrath, Professor an der Universität Heidelberg. Heidelberg. 1872.

This work is in many respects a valuable one. It differs from those treatises which have had for their purpose to connect the life of the Lord with the history of His time, by being more extensive, and embracing the Apostolic age. It extends itself over a period from the beginning of the Roman rule in Judea to the death of St. Paul. In this respect it is more comprehensive than the work of Dr. M. Schneckenberger (1862), which has the same title, and the same general purpose, and which we have found very useful.

Of course, not all the historical events, but those only which stand in some relation to the New Testament history, are here considered. The writer divides his work into two parts, one the time of Jesus, the other the time of the Apostles. He begins with a geographical account of the Holy Land, then considers its internal religious and ecclesiastical condition, its sects and parties, the Roman rule and feelings with which it was regarded, Herod and his kingdom, and the appearance and work of Jesus Christ. In the second volume we have the condition of religious life in the Roman empire, the religious mission of the Jews in their dispersion, the relations of the Emperor Caligula to the Jews, the fortunes of Christianity in Palestine, the first Churches of the dispersion, and the history and labors of St. Paul.

The theological position of Professor Hausrath is that of a, in the German sense, moderate rationalist. He looks, for example, upon the appearing of the Lord to Paul on the way to Damascus as wanting objective reality, and to be explained as a vision, such as persons in a cataleptic state often see. Thus, indeed, all his visions are to be explained. So, also, if Jesus had in Himself the consciousness of His Messiahship, this was the result of His education amid a

people where the Messianic hope had generally diffused itself. Born in another country and educated under other influences, such a consciousness could not have found root.

But while there is much that is false and unwholesome in the book, in its theological aspects there is much that will help the judicious reader to understand better the external circumstances of the Lord's life. It is something to be kept always in mind that His life was a human one, that He was very man. Nothing gives so much meaning to His words and acts as to know fully the opinions and feelings of the Jews of His day; what prejudices He had to overcome, what errors to meet, what were the hopes and expectations of those to whom He spake. The Jews were a people that had long been under Divine training for the coming of the Messiah, and it was in the fulness of times that He came. Their history, in God's providence, had become deeply interwoven with that of the nations around them, and therefore the study of their political and social relations, as well as of their own internal moral and spiritual condition, is of high importance to the right understanding of the New Testament.

The work before us has decided merits in its historical portions, and if well translated, these would be of much service to the Christian readers of the Gospels and Acts of the Apostles.

SPECTRUM ANALYSIS. By Schellen. Translated by the Lassels and Dr. Huggins. London: Longman, Green & Co. New York: Scribner, Welford & Co. 1872.

Here is a prodigious treatise for a science of two or three years' growth. Spectrum analysis is only as old, in inception, as 1868, and was first used successfully in 1869; and yet here is a treatise on it of six hundred and sixty-two octavo pages! A treatise written in German, and translated into English! Printed in England, and reprinted in America! What, people are continually asking, is this wondrous thing?

Let the book itself explain what a spectrum is, and then we will hint at some of its uses, which is all that a book notice will allow:

"By *spectrum* is not understood in physics a spectre, or ghostly apparition, as the verbal interpretation might well lead one to suppose; but that beautiful image, brilliant with all the colors of the rainbow, which is obtained when the light of the sun, or any other brilliant object, is allowed to pass through a triangular piece of glass—a prism."

And this spectrum analysis, by means of the separate colors of a beam of light, enables an astronomer to say what metals exist in flames that surround the sun! Those flames are seen shooting out, behind the orb of the moon, in a total eclipse; and through them the astronomer is prepared to tell us what the sun is made of—to account for his spots, and many other wondrous matters in the solar constitution. Not so only, but light separated into what may be called its spectral elements, is a tell-tale not for the sun only, but also for the planets, and finally for the fixed stars! The stars (for astronomy) are fixed, no more! Astronomers begin to tell us, by the spectral colors they exhibit, whether or not they are in motion, and which way they are travelling, toward us or away from us!

It seems a marvel that light has such undreamed-of secrets wrapped up in it. But so it is; and if light has such secrets, then other constituents, of what we call Nature, may have more; and discoveries without number and without end may be approaching. All very well, however—all safe and profitable—if men, when they make these discoveries, do not fall away from duty before the temptation which occasioned the catastrophe in which Eve and Adam ended. They endeavored—under diabolic prompting—to “be *as gods*,” and they became less than they were created. Nothing is gained, but much lost, when a subordinate forsakes a great centre, and attempts to set up for himself. The peril that a successful scientist will make a god of himself is not a small one. If he will keep the First Commandment, and have no god before, or in preference to, the One Living and the True, he will never need any rebuke from religion; let him pursue his discoveries to the outskirts of creation, and do as Akenside represented the imagination as capable of doing,—“look back on all the stars.”

LUCRETIUS ON THE NATURE OF THINGS. Translated into English verse by Charles Frederick Johnson. With introduction and notes. New York: DeWitt C. Lent & Co. 1872.

Lucretius is one of those ancients who exist not in their biographies, but in their works. And why does he still survive? What do his writings contain to entitle *them* to live? This is not a question easily answered, since the poem, if such it may rightly be called, has well-nigh survived its usefulness, and contains comparatively little that can command attention at the present day. As regards the poet himself, we know that he was once on earth, and that he died; but exactly when and how he disappeared, it is perhaps impossible to say.

Selecting the systems of Democritus and the Epicureans as the groundwork of his philosophy, Lucretius proceeds, in the most laborious manner, to invest his thoughts with due rhythmical expression, which, for the most part, he accomplishes, though the work is pitched in a key of the deepest sadness, and gives the fullest illustration of what human genius must ever appear, when literally without God and without hope in the world. To his mind, the belief in God, like the belief of immortality, was a vain superstition; and while he dismissed the one thought, he poured contempt upon the accessories of the other. His opinions were powerful in his own age; but the world has rolled on, and this rhythmic treatise on Nature, whose facts he partially understood, but whose beauty he did not greatly admire, has been left behind. To-day this work of Lucretius is a literary curiosity of limited interest; and while many will admire the patience of the translator in persevering with so uninteresting a task, few will care to inquire, except as a linguistic exercise, whether he has done his work well or ill.

INDEX CANONUM; containing the Canons called Apostolical, the Canons of the Undisputed General Councils, and the Canons of the Provincial Councils of Ancyra, Neo-Cæsarea, Gangra, Antioch, and Laodicea. In Greek and English. Together with a Complete Digest of the whole Code of Canon Law in the Undivided Primitive Church. Alphabetically arranged. By John Fulton, D.D., Rector of Christ Church, Mobile. New York: Pott, Young & Co. 1872. Pp. 393.

Dr. Fulton has, in this volume, met a great want,—one that students of primitive Church history, and clergymen, and all those in fact, who wished to have, in compact form, and in a shape easy for reference, the decisions of the early Church on points of practice as well as of doctrine, have repeatedly felt and confessed.

The introduction gives a condensed summary, which is, at the same time, remarkably complete, of the history of the different councils, and of the way in which the polity of the Church was arranged and carried out. We have, for example, a carefully written statement of the provincial system of the Roman Empire; a remarkably clear and thorough description of the several officers and religious orders of the Church, and of the arrangements of houses of worship; a carefully-prepared account of parishes, provinces, and dioceses. Valuable as the main portion of this volume may be, it is, so far as a clear understanding of the Canons themselves is concerned, greatly enhanced by the information given in the introduction. The decrees enacted by the early Church seem, in some instances, strange and unnatural, until we ascertain the peculiar condition of things

which called them forth. A bare unexplained translation of the Canons would have been, to readers unfamiliar with the history of the age in which they were passed, and the practical needs of Christianity at the time, a curious, and perhaps amusing, but not always an instructive, record. Hence we consider the introduction a very important addition to the work.

The text which the author followed in the Canons is that "set forth by authority of the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece." In the English version, the translator has "aimed at such a conscientious accuracy as might justify its claim upon the reader's confidence."

The digest enables the student to refer at once to any particular point, and therefore supplies a great want. The work is an honor to American scholarship, and will be of invaluable assistance toward understanding the history of the early Church.



AMERICAN CHURCH REVIEW.

THE SEVENTEENTH ARTICLE.

IN a former paper on Article XVII., we considered the teaching of the Articles as a whole touching the five points of Calvinism. We showed that they either entirely ignored, or else plainly contradicted, four of those points; and that the fifth could not be found in the one Article especially under review, which, in fact, set it utterly aside. But we left untouched, with the single exception of the witness on one point of the *Reformatio Legum*, a line of historical testimony which strikingly confirms the conclusions arrived at on other grounds. This historical review we purpose to undertake in the present paper.

III.

The continuous line of testimony which is now to be drawn out covers a period of something more than a century. It does not bear solely on the one point of predestination. It embraces the entire Quinquarticular Controversy, the complete system of Geneva, with all its articulations and logical consequences.

It presents itself under two distinct forms, which are yet of equal cogency and value. It is positive, in so far as it proves that those who were concerned in the composition of the Articles of 1552, and their revision in 1562, did not hold the five points of Calvinism. It is negative, but not the weaker on that account, in

so far as it shows how persons who did hold those points were never satisfied with the Articles, but were always trying to tinker—or, as they called it, amend—they in the direction of their favorite dogmas.

Moreover, there will now come into view what we have not as yet spoken of,—the teaching of the Book of Common Prayer.

1. (a) We take our point of departure from the Ten Articles of 1536. The reason for their selection is, that they contain the first synodical action of the Church of England touching doctrine after the repudiation of the papal jurisdiction. It is not necessary to mention here the causes that led to their adoption, or the way in which they were drawn up. It is enough to say that they were the work of Convocation, and were set forth by royal authority. They have no legal force to-day, but they are competent witnesses to the opinions, at that date, of those by whom they were composed.¹

We should not, *a priori*, expect to find many traces of Calvinism in these Ten Articles. For Calvin's "Institutes" were not published till 1536, and they could not, therefore, have exercised any influence in the Convocation of that year.

Accordingly, we find the universality of redemption, the election of all the baptized, the conditional offer of remission of sins, grace, and salvation made to all men, the possibility of finally falling from grace, and the power of resisting the Holy Ghost, all asserted in the Articles, while no mention whatever is made of predestination or reprobation.²

(b) In 1537, the Ten Articles were expanded into the book known as "The Institution of a Christian Man." This was not the work of Convocation, but of a commission of forty-six persons, including all the bishops. Nor was it submitted to Convocation for approval or consideration. The list of the commissioners contains, however, the names "of the divines afterward engaged on the translation of the Bible, and the compilation of the Prayer Book."³

The doctrinal statements quoted above are all repeated in the "Institution," in which, therefore, the same line of teaching is con-

¹ Hardwick gives the text of these Articles in his "History of the Articles of Religion," App. i. Bishop Lloyd, in his "Formularies of Faith," etc., prints two recensions of them, so to speak; one from the Cotton MS., and the other from Berthelet's edition of 1536. J. H. Blunt exposes the characteristic way in which Henry VIII. altered the original title to suit his own purposes.—"Reformation of the Church of England," p. 438.

² Bp. Lloyd's "Formularies," pp. 10, 9, 6, 8, xxvii.

³ The list is given in J. H. Blunt's "Reformation," etc., p. 145, note.

tinued. Especially, the Church is defined to be the "society, communion, or company of the *elect* and faithful people of God,"¹ so that election is clearly synonymous with membership in the Church; and nothing is said, again, about predestination or reprobation.

(c) In 1543 appeared the "Necessary Erudition of a Christian Man." It was a revision of the "Institution," and was the work of Convocation. In some respects it was reactionary toward Romanism; in others, it was not so. It was, certainly, in some things, affected by the Six Articles of 1539, which were entirely reactionary; in others, it seems to have been affected by the counter-reaction to which they gave rise. Interesting as is the field of inquiry thus opened, it is nothing to our present purpose. What we have to consider is, first, the evident fact that the system of Calvin was not unknown to those concerned in the work; and, secondly, the way in which they spoke of the points involved in it. A few extracts will make these matters clear:

"All promises of God made to man after the fall of Adam for Christ's sake, be made under this condition, that man should believe in God, and with the grace of God, given for Christ, endeavor himself to accomplish God's commandments. . . .

"Whether there be any special particular knowledge which man by faith hath certainly of himself, whereby he may testify to himself that he is *of the predestinates* which shall to the end persevere in their calling, we have not spoken, ne cannot in Scripture ne doctors find that any such faith can be taught or preached. Truth it is, that in the sacraments instituted by Christ we may constantly believe the works of God in them, to our present comfort, and application of His grace and favor, with assurance also that He will not fail us, *if we fall not from Him*; wherefore so continuing in the state of grace with Him, we may believe undoubtedly to be saved. But forasmuch as our own frailty and naughtiness ought ever to be feared in us, it is therefore expedient for us to live in continual watch and continual fight with our enemies the devil, the flesh, and the world, and not to presume too much of our perseverance and continuance in the state of grace, which on our behalf is uncertain and unstable. For although God's promises made in Christ be immutable, yet He maketh them not to us but with conditions; so that His promise standing, we may yet fail of the promise because we keep not our promise. . . .

"In this assembly of men [*i. e.*, the Church], called by the word

¹ Lloyd's "Formularies," p. 52.

of God and received by faith and baptism, be many evil men, many sinners, many that turn by true penance to grace and sometimes fall again, some after their turn by true penance still persevere and increase in goodness, *some that fall and never rise again.* . . .

"For He [God] is naturally good and *willeth all men to be saved*, and careth for them, and provideth all thing by which they may be saved, except by their own malice they will be evil, and so by righteous judgment of God perish and be lost. For truly men be to themselves the authors of sin and damnation. God is *neither author of sin nor the cause of the damnation.* . . . Wherefore men be to be warned that they do not impute to God their vice or their damnation, but to themselves which by free will have abused the grace and benefits of God. All men be also to be monished *and chiefly preachers*, that in this high matter, they looking on both sides, so attemper and moderate themselves, that neither they so preach the grace of God, that they take away thereby freewill, nor on the other side so extol freewill, that injury be done to the grace of God. . . .

"Wherein it is to be considered, that although our Saviour Christ hath offered Himself upon the cross a sufficient redemption and satisfaction for the sins of the world, and hath made Himself an open way and entry unto God the Father for all mankind, only by His worthy merit and deserving, *and willing all men to be saved*, calleth upon all the world, without respect of persons, to come and be partakers of the righteousness, peace, and glory which is in Him: yet for all this benignity and grace, *shewed universally to the whole world*, none shall have the effect of this benefit of our Saviour Christ, and enjoy everlasting salvation by Him, but they that take such ways to attain the same as He hath taught and appointed by His Holy Word. . . .

"And here all phantastical imagination, *curious reasoning*, and *vain trust* of predestination is to be laid apart. And according to the *plain manner* of speaking and teaching of Scripture, in innumerable places, we ought evermore to be in dread of our own frailty and natural pronity to fall to sin, and not to *assume ourselves that we be elected*, any otherwise than by *feeling of spiritual motions in our heart*, and by the *tokens of good and virtuous living*, in following the grace of God, and persevering in the same to the end."¹

Seven years had intervened between the publication of Calvin's

¹ "Formularies," pp. 224, 244, 362, 365, 367.

"Institutes" and the compilation of the Erudition. Can any one read the passages here quoted and not be persuaded that those who wrote them had before their minds the system of Calvin, and intended to reject and set it aside? Why else do they dwell at such length on points touched so briefly and without elucidation, in the Ten Articles and the Institution? Moreover, let the language of Article XVII., and the chapter on predestination in the *Reformatio Legum*, be compared with these extracts, and it will be obvious that something more than the germ of both is here set forth. They are really little more than a reproduction of the teaching of the Erudition. The identity of the general line of thought, and even the verbal coincidences, are very noticeable.

(d) We pass on to the Forty-two Articles of 1552. In connection with these, four names come into special prominence: those of Archbishop Cranmer, and Bishops Hooper, Latimer, and Ridley.¹ They, more than any others, were concerned in drawing up these Articles, and it is, therefore, a matter of importance to ascertain their views touching the several points of Calvinism.

As to Archbishop Cranmer, there are but two places in his writings, so far as we know, on which any charge of Calvinistic predilections can be grounded. These shall now be considered.

When the "Institution of a Christian Man" appeared, in 1537, Henry VIII., who, like James I., had a fancy for dabbling in theology, wrote out a number of changes and corrections of the work. These were submitted to Cranmer, who criticised them under the title of "Annotations on the King's Book."² The Twenty-fourth, Twenty-fifth, and Twenty-eighth of these Annotations "may seem at first sight to countenance the doctrine of final perseverance; but they must be read in connection with the passages to which they belong. It will be seen, on referring to these, that they relate to that holy congregation which shall hereafter enjoy everlasting life."³ Under these circumstances, Cranmer's mode of speaking of the salvation of the elect has no bearing whatever on the Calvinistic doctrine of perseverance.

The other passage, which speaks after the same fashion, is found

¹ Hardwick's "History of the Articles," chap. v.

² Jenkyns' "Remains" of Cranmer, vol. ii. pp. 21, 65, ff. As the Institution was called the Bishops' Book, and the Erudition was termed the King's Book, the title of Cranmer's criticisms has misled several writers, who have supposed his Annotations to have been made on the Erudition. They preceded that work by several years. Jenkyns, vol. ii. p. 21, note [m]; compare vol. i. pp. 225-228.

³ Jenkyns, vol. ii. p. 74, note [f].

in the Answer to Smythe's Preface, first published in 1551, though written somewhat earlier.¹ To this the same remarks apply. And that they are well-founded, and present a true statement of the archbishop's meaning, is proved by the fact that, before he wrote the Answer to Smythe, he had written the Homilies of Faith and Good Works² (first published in 1547), and had also given his sanction (in 1548) to what was known as Cranmer's Catechism, in which he asserts the possibility of falling from grace finally and totally.

Now, this is the *only* one of all the points of Calvinism of which there is any appearance in Cranmer's writings.³ Were it not that the same form of expression occurs in the Answer to Smythe which we find in the Annotations on the King's corrections, we might be led to suppose that between the time when those Annotations were penned, probably in 1538, and the time when the Homilies above referred to were written, in 1547, the archbishop's views had changed. But since the words used in the Answer are so entirely the same with those found in the Annotations, and since the Homilies and the Catechism, in which the possibility of finally falling from grace is asserted, *precede* the Answer, this explanation is ruled out; and we are compelled to adopt the other quoted above. So that Cranmer is not justly chargeable with holding any of the doctrines of Calvin.

Bishop Hooper's extreme views on the subject of vestments and altars have led, in some cases, to the supposition that he was in full sympathy with the Genevan doctor. Whatever else he may have been, however, he was not a Calvinist. Bishop Bull, in his defence of the *Harmonia*, proves, by long extracts from his writings, that Hooper held, that (1) "in that state of sin and misery which we derive from the first Adam, the grace of Christ, the second Adam, is so equally bestowed on all, that no man will incur eternal punishment on account of original sin alone; (2) that Christ, in His cross, bore the burden of the sins of all men without exception; (3) that men are never drawn to salvation nor driven to hell by any law of necessity; (4) that the only cause of reprobation is sin in man; (5) that man was therefore elected by God from eternity, that in time he should be made a member of Christ."⁴

¹ Jenkyns, vol. iii. p. 19.

² Jenkyns, vol. ii. pp. 152, 168.

³ Cranmer's Catechism of 1548 contains a denial, *e contrario*, of the various points of Calvinism.

⁴ "Apologia pro Harmonia," Works, vol. iv. pp. 453, 454. Compare pp. 448, 457 (ed. 1846).

What is thus proved of Hooper may also be proved of Latimer. He taught that after we "are enrolled in the Book of Life, we may, by falling into sin, be blotted from it;" that any questions about personal predestination are "perplexing," "dangerous," and "foolish," and that we need not trouble ourselves with them; that the promises of the Gospel, and redemption, are universal to the human race, *sub conditions*; and that the sole cause of man's condemnation is his own sin.¹

Nor are we left in any doubt as to the sentiments of Ridley. He held distinctly the universality of redemption, going even so far as to say "that He [God] hath created and made all men, chosen and elected them to eternal life and glory, and to be heirs of the celestial kingdom." He taught that, "who be elected of God, and who be not, we cannot tell, but by the outward works that they do; that God willeth that all men should be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth; therefore, they that perish and be damned, by their own fault they perish and be damned, and not by any fault of God;" that "every man should not only think that he is in the favor of God, but also know it surely that God favoreth him." No comment can be needed on words like these.²

A curious bit of contemporary history may here be mentioned. In 1554—Neal says for the first time—disputes about predestination arose among the reformers. Bradford, who was Calvinistic, if not a Calvinist, wrote out his views in "a little treatise," which he sent to Cranmer, Latimer, and Ridley (then imprisoned in the Bocardo in Oxford), for their approval. It is clear that this approval was not given, and that Bradford wrote again, complaining of its being withheld. For, although the letter in which he makes complaint is not extant, there is extant a letter from Ridley, which so alludes to it, as to put its existence beyond doubt. He writes: "And where you say *that if your request had been heard*, things you think had been in better case than they be; know you that concerning the matter you mean [election and predestination] I have in Latin drawn out the places of the Scriptures, and upon the same have noted what I can for the time: Sir, in these matters I am so fearful, that I dare not speak further, *yea almost none otherwise than the very text doth*, as it were, *lead me by the hand*."

Now, in the letter from Bradford accompanying the "little

¹ Bishop Bull quotes the passages, *ut supra*, vol. iv. pp. 457-459. See, also, Johnson Grant's "History of the English Church," etc., vol. ii. pp. 358-361.

² See the passages quoted in Grant's "History," vol. ii. pp. 357, 358.

treatise," there is no such expression of complaint as Ridley quotes. It is clear, therefore, that he wrote a second letter; that the three bishops had not received his treatise as he wished it to be received; and that he complained of its reception, and of their omission to grant his request for its approval. From all which, as well as from Ridley's language, only one inference can be drawn.¹

From the sentiments of those chiefly concerned and consulted in framing the Forty-two Articles of 1552, we proceed to the Articles themselves. In regard to reprobation, limited redemption, utter depravation, irresistible grace, and final perseverance, they speak the same language which is uttered by the Articles, as we have them now; the only difference being that in what was Article X. of 1552 there was a somewhat more pointed denial of reprobation than appears in 1562.² So far forth, then, the points of Calvinism are ignored or contradicted.

Article XVII. of 1552 (which bears the same number and title in 1562) stood then substantially as it stands to-day. The alterations made in it, in 1562, will be considered in their proper place. They in nowise change the teaching of the Article; and what that was, has been shown in our former paper. If we seek for its origin, that will *not* be found in any of the reformed formularies, for the simple reason that, when the Article was framed, the only one from which a full Calvinistic statement could have been taken, *i. e.*, the *Consensus Genevensis*, published in 1551, could not have been before its framers. Nor was it taken from the Confession of Augsburg; for that Confession, in its chapter *De Fide*, declines to consider the subject of predestination at all.³ Neither can we find its original in those Thirteen Articles which seem to have been agreed

¹ Gloucester Ridley's "Life of Ridley," pp. 553, 554. Grant's "History," vol. ii. pp. 365-368. Neal's "History of the Puritans," vol. i. page 65 (Am. ed.). He is, of course, utterly incorrect and untrustworthy. Wordsworth's "Ecclesiastical Biography," vol. iii. pp. 361, 372. It is much to be regretted that the texts and comments, "in Latin," of which Ridley speaks, have never come to light.

² The title of the Article is "Of Grace." The words are: "No man when he sinneth can excuse himself as not worthy to be blamed or condemned by alleging that he sinned unwillingly or by compulsion."

³ "Non est hic opus disputationibus de praedestinatione aut similibus."—"Sylloge Confessionum," p. 143. The influence of the Augsburg Confession on our Articles seems to us to have been altogether overrated. The assertion of its influence was a "short and easy method" of denying Calvinistic characteristics, but it was not a very historical mode of treatment; and it is high time that it should give place to something better.

upon by the Lutheran envoys—the “German orators,” as they were called—and some of our own divines, in 1588.¹ It originated, indeed, from no foreign source, nor was it drawn up under foreign influences. It came, as has already been suggested, from the Necessary Erudition. It is native in its origin. It sets forth just that sound primitive theology touching predestination which had been preserved in England, and which found utterance first in the Erudition, and then in this Seventeenth Article. There is no need of any further search.

(e) We have next to consider that those who compiled the Articles of 1552 were concerned also in other works, which present a contemporaneous and invaluable testimony as to their sentiments. These are, especially, the Book of Common Prayer, the first Book of Homilies, and the *Reformatio Legum*. That all these are anti-Calvinistic in temper, tone, and utterance, is so clear as almost to preclude the necessity of specific proof. Indeed, in the case of the Prayer Book, the certainty of its opposition to Calvinism has led the favorers of that system to assert a contradiction between it and the Articles; and the fear lest the Articles might be Calvinistic, growing out of the vague and senseless notion that wherever the word “predestination” occurs, there Calvinism must be found, has led others, who ought to have known better, to fall into the snare. Still, while it is not necessary to draw out proofs in full detail, it may not be amiss to say a few words concerning each of the three works referred to.

There is, probably, no Office in, or part of, the Book of Common Prayer which is so utterly opposed to the dogmas of Calvin as the Office for the Baptism of Infants, as set forth in the Prayer Book of 1552. In it are either directly asserted or necessarily implied: (a) the universality of redemption; (b) the resistibility of grace, and the possibility of finally falling from it; (c) human coöperation; (d) the identity of election² and membership in Christ’s Church, and (e) the immutability of Christ’s promises coupled with conditions imposed on us.

And yet this Office, more than any other in the Prayer Book, was the special work of the very persons who compiled the Articles of 1552, and they must have been engaged in framing Office and Articles at the same time. Surely they could not, putting the case

¹ Hardwick, “History of the Articles,” chap. v. and App. ii. The question of predestination is not touched in these Articles.

² In our American book, the word *elect* is, unfortunately, omitted. But no one can claim that it was omitted in the interests of Calvinism.

at the very worst, have been so foolishly dishonest as to undertake to teach one thing in the Office, and its opposite in the Articles. And the Office, it must be remembered, is, so to speak, their very own. There is very little in it that is taken from the ancient offices. There was, therefore, every opportunity for the expression of their own sentiments; and to suppose that they did not express them, is an assumption as silly as it is gratuitous and offensive.

Equally distinct is the teaching of the Homilies of 1547. Many of the topics discussed in them are precisely those which would bring out Calvinistic opinions, if such opinions were entertained. A Calvinist, writing "on original sin, the salvation of mankind, faith, good works, declining from God, the Nativity, the Passion, the Resurrection, the descent of the Holy Ghost, the Grace of God, and Repentance," and yet giving utterance to no sentiment, opinion, or belief of Calvinism, and never speaking of predestination or reprobation, would surely be, if not a *lusus naturæ*, at least a *lusus theologiæ*. Yet this is the simple and absolute truth touching the Edwardine Homilies.¹

Enough was said of the *Reformatio Legum* in our first paper, to show how utterly uncalvinistic its language concerning predestination is. It need only be added here, that it also distinctly asserts the universality of redemption and grace, and the possibility of falling from God.²

Before we proceed to the Revision of 1562, we desire to call particular attention to the conclusions, thus far reached. It is, then, in evidence that, in 1536 and 1537, the system of Calvin was not, apparently, before the minds of our divines, and, certainly, received no attention from them; that in 1543 they had become acquainted with it, and, in the Erudition, contradicted and rejected it; that, in 1547, when the first Book of Homilies was published, however much their views on points of controversy with Rome had changed, they had not changed in respect to Calvinism; and that no change in that direction is traceable in 1552, as is proved, not only by the Forty-two Articles themselves, but also by the testimony of the Prayer Book and the *Reformatio Legum*. A clearer case can hardly be imagined.³

¹ It is not without significance that, in 1547, the "Paraphrase" of Erasmus, who was anything but a Calvinist, was ordered to be set up in the churches.

² Title, *De Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica*, chap. iii.; Title, *De Hæresibus*, chaps. ix. xviii. xxii.

³ Some confusion has arisen from not distinguishing between Calvin's doc-

(f) We advance to the revision of 1562. Were any changes made in it that were favorable to Calvinism? Is there any evidence that those concerned in the revision entertained, on these topics, opinions different from those of the reformers of 1552? However these questions may be answered, their answers will be conclusive, and they shall be considered in their order.

We have shown above that the Articles of 1552 and 1562 bear the same testimony and inculcate the same teaching in regard to all those points of Calvinism which lie outside of Article XVII. So far forth, then, no changes, affecting those doctrines, occurred. In Article XVII., two changes were made, which shall now be considered.

In the statement of doctrine—that is, in the first division of the Article—the reading of 1552 is: “To deliver from curse and damnation those whom He hath chosen out of mankind;” in 1562, the reading is: “Whom He hath chosen *in Christ* out of mankind.” In the two canons of interpretation contained in the last division, the reading of 1552 is: “Furthermore, *although the decrees of Predestination are unknown to us, yet* we must receive God’s promises,” etc. In 1562, the italicized words are omitted.

Neither of these alterations changes the substantial teaching of the Articles, but they both look away from Calvinism. For while the first, by inserting the words *in Christ*, strikes a blow at the individual predestination theory of both Scholastics and Calvinists, and applies election, not to any individual separately, but to a “certain class of persons and Christians collectively;” the second, by omitting all mention of “decrees of predestination,” thrusts out a phrase that might—and doubtless would—have been seized upon by the followers of Calvin. Archdeacon Hardwick is, therefore, abundantly warranted in saying that, in 1562, “the language of the Article on Predestination was somewhat softened or restrained, instead of contracting the more rigorous tone,” which was beginning to invade the English Church.¹

These changes become doubly significant in the light thrown upon them by two historical facts which have not, it seems to us, received the attention they deserve.

trines, as put forth in his *Institutes*, in 1536, and his defence of them, in controversial writings, which he began, at the close of the year 1551. This controversy could not have been much before the minds of those who drew up our Articles or Formularies. But it must not be forgotten that all the “points” may be found in the *Institutes*. Even Archdeacon Hardwick writes with some lack of accuracy on this subject.

¹ Hardwick, “History,” etc., p. 156 (Am. ed.).

In 1559, certain of the "exiles," as they were called, under the lead of Sandys (afterward successively Bishop of Worcester and London, and Archbishop of York), drew up "a Declaration of doctrine," which was presented to Queen Elizabeth. In this document, they set forth "the confession of their faith, in divers articles agreeing much with the Articles, concluded in Convocation, under King Edward, in 1552, but *more large*, as explanatory of them." In touching on Article XVII., they clearly indicate their dissatisfaction with it, and their wish for something stronger, in the direction of Calvinism. They speak guardedly, indeed, as if suspecting that they are not altogether in favor, but still urge strongly that predestination is to be more preached and pressed than it has been.¹

Immediately following this declaration, the Eleven Articles of 1559 appeared. These were a provisional formulary intended to serve until further action should be had. This further action appeared in the adoption of the Thirty-nine Articles, in 1562. Now, in the first named of these formularies, the Eleven Articles, no Calvinistic tenet is so much as alluded to; while, as we have seen, the Thirty-nine Articles of 1562 retained every denial of Calvinistic doctrine made in 1552, and, in the case of Article XVII., left its teaching unchanged, though its language was "somewhat softened or restrained." The declaration was ineffective.

Nor is this result any other than we should naturally expect. The Eleven Articles were drawn up, and the Forty-two were revised, under the eye and by the pen² of Archbishop Parker. And what he thought about various notions brought back from the Continent by those who had fled thither, while he remained in England, appears from a querulous letter of Sandys—the leader, it will be remembered, in the matter of the declaration just spoken of—under date of October 24, 1560: "I know your nature in shewing of humanity, which I never misliked. And as I judge yours to be good, so I think ye will not utterly condemn all *Germanical natures*. For Germany hath brought forth as good natures as England hath. And if ye mean of us *which were strangers in Germany for a time*, sure I am there be some of us that be neither big-hearted nor proud-minded, but can in all simplicity seek the Kingdom of Christ."³ This extract shows precisely how the archbishop regarded those who were beginning the Calvinistic move-

¹ Strype's "Annals of the Reformation," etc., vol. i. p. 172.

² To be strictly accurate, we should have said "red lead pencil."

³ Abp. Parker's "Correspondence," Parker Society ed. p. 125.

ment in England, where the revision of the Edwardine Articles was just about to follow the provisional Eleven Articles of 1559. That his sentiments did not change, except, perhaps, to become stronger as time went on, is clear from his own words to Cecil, in 1566: "As for the most part of these recusants, I would wish them out of the ministry, as mere ignorant and vain heads."¹

(g) The contemporaneous evidence of the Elizabethan Homilies must not be overlooked. It is not material to our present purpose to consider whether or not any parts of them had been previously drawn up, or how far Bishop Jewel is their author. What is important to be noted is that they were set forth by the same Convocation, that of January, 1562 (O. S.), which also set forth the Articles. Both formularies must have been under consideration at the same time, and are, therefore, fairly to be taken together. What, then, is the testimony of this contemporary witness?

(1) It teaches the universality of redemption, as in other places, so, especially, in the opening of the second Sermon of the Passion: "That we may the better conceive the great mercy and goodness of our Saviour Christ in suffering death *universally*, for *all men*."¹

(2) Its teaching as to election, involving freewill, is thus summed up in the Sermon of the Nativity: "But after He [Christ] was once come down from heaven, and had taken our frail nature upon Him, He *made all them that would receive Him truly*, and believe His word, good trees and good ground, fruitful and pleasant branches, children of light, citizens of heaven, sheep of His fold, members of His body, heirs of His kingdom, His true friends and brethren, sweet and lively bread, *the elect and chosen people of God*."² Nor is there anywhere any other teaching, or any allusion to unconditional predestination to life, or reprobation to damnation. (3) The caution of Article XVII., as to judging of our own state, is thus phrased in

¹ "Correspondence," p. 272. There is another paper given by Strype ["Annals," vol. i. p. 494], which, were its date known, would furnish important testimony. It is a strong, and yet modest, protest against the unrestrained tongues of the Calvinists and the intolerable habit they had of "calling to nought, all who did not go fully along with them." "Pelagians, papists, epicures, and anabaptists," are specimens of their choice vocabulary. Were it certain that this protest antedated Elizabeth's first parliament, in which Lord Keeper Bacon announced the Queen's pleasure that nicknames should not be bandied about, its evidence would be direct. Strype thinks it cannot be later in date than 1562. As, however, the date is only conjectural, the document cannot fairly be cited in evidence.

² Homilies, etc. (Am. ed. 1844), p. 373.

³ Homilies, p. 363.

the second part of the Sermon for Whitsun-day: "If any man live uprightly, of him it may be safely pronounced, that he hath the Holy Ghost within him; if not, then it is a plain token that he doth usurp the name of the Holy Ghost in vain."¹ (4) Touching the resistibility of grace and the possibility of finally and totally falling from grace, we are exhorted, in the Sermon of the Resurrection, to remember: "What an unkindness should it be, when our Saviour Christ of His mercy is come to us, to dwell with us as our guest, *to drive Him from us*, and to banish Him violently out of our souls;" and we are asked: "How dare we be so bold as to *renounce the presence* of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost?"² In the Sermon of the Nativity we are warned: "Seeing we are once delivered from their cruel tyranny [sin, the world, the flesh, the devil] by Christ, let us never fall into their hands again, *lest we chance to be in a worse case than ever we were before*."³ So, again, in the Sermon of the Resurrection, we read: "What a shame were it for us, being so clearly and freely washed from our sin, to return to the filthiness thereof again! What a folly, were it thus endowed with righteousness, to lose it again!"⁴ And, finally, in the first part of the Sermon of Repentance, it is said: "Whereupon we do not without a just cause detest and abhor the damnable opinion of them, which do most wickedly go about to persuade the simple and ignorant people, that if we chance after we be once come to God, and grafted in his Son, Jesus Christ, to fall into some horrible sin, repentance shall be unprofitable unto us; there is no more hope of reconciliation, or to be received again into the favor and mercy of God. And that they may give the better color unto their pestilent and pernicious error, they do commonly bring in the sixth and tenth chapters of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the second chapter of the second Epistle of Peter; not considering that in those places the holy Apostles do not speak of the daily falls that we, as long as we carry about this body of sin, are subject unto; but of *the final falling away from Christ and His Gospel* which is a sin against the Holy Ghost that shall never be forgiven, because that they do utterly forsake the known truth, do hate Christ and His Word, they do crucify and mock Him (but to their utter destruction), and, therefore, fall into desperation, and cannot repent."⁵

Nor are these, strong as they are, mere isolated passages. They are echoed all through the Elizabethan Homilies; they enter into

¹ Homilies, p. 418. ² *Ibid.* p. 391. ³ *Ibid.* p. 365. ⁴ *Ibid.* p. 390. ⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 473, 474.

their very warp and woof. They answer, and that not by accepting its suggestions, the appeal of Sandys and others in 1559. And here, inasmuch as in all the regards now under consideration the Articles remained unchanged in 1571, we close our line of positive historical testimony. It is clear, definite, and conclusive against those who would import into the Articles the system of Calvin.

2. We are next to present a chain of testimony, of which we have spoken as negative, and which is made up of a series of attempts to change the phraseology of the Articles for the behoof of Calvinism.

We have seen that this system, which may well be called Protestant Scholasticism, was no indigenous growth of the English Church. It was, in the strictest sense of the word, an importation. Beyond the fact that it was before the minds of those who composed the *Erudition*, and was rejected by them, we find scarce trace of it till we reach the unhappy disputes in which Bradford figured among those who were imprisoned in the early part of Mary's reign. Those disputes, however, were a mere passing echo of the controversies which began some three years earlier on the Continent, and they were scarcely heard, and produced no effect in England beyond the prison walls within which they occurred. If they reappeared at all, it was in a foreign land and under foreign influences.

Mary's fearful reign divided the English reformers into two classes,—those who fled to the continent, and those who remained in England, and faced the storm openly, or else withdrew to private life. Further subdivisions occurred among those who sought safety in flight. We need not go into much detail. It is enough to say that, while some of those who returned from exile after the accession of Elizabeth remained faithful to the Anglican Reformation, many brought with them not only an admiration for the polity and ritual—or, rather, no-ritual—of Geneva, but also doctrinal convictions in accordance with the system of Calvin. They settled, in time, into a bold, pushing, and energetic party. They made headway in the Universities, especially at Cambridge. They worked in and on the Parliament. They asserted, in the teeth of all historical fact and evidence, that they were the very and only representatives of the original English Reformers. They lost nothing for lack of claiming. Bancroft, after they had contrived to cast it into the shade, renewed, at St. Paul's Cross, in 1588, the identical doctrine of the Ordinal of 1552, and they cried out, and cry still, that such teaching was never before heard in England. Hooker, seven years earlier, and Baro, seven years later, preached precisely the doctrine which the Reformers held as to God's will touching man's salvation, and they

were accused of teaching novelties. And yet, all this while, and for long years after, many of these very men who thus claimed to be, what they never were, the representatives of the Anglican Reformation, were striving to overthrow or change the hierarchy, the ritual, and the Articles of that Reformation, and to bring in a foreign polity, ritual, and doctrine. The utter baselessness of their claim is only equalled by the way in which people have allowed themselves to be imposed on by it. It is one of the romances of history.

(a) What we have to deal with is their treatment of the Articles.¹ But that, it should be remembered, is only one point in their history, one count in the indictment of false pretences. The opinions which just *appeared* in the Declaration of Sandys and others, in 1559, had been spreading and spreading, till it came to pass that Calvin was regarded by a large body of English divines as a very "master of the sentences," and anything which so much as "demurred to his *dicta*," was denounced as Pelagianism and Popery.

Matters, *quoad hoc*, reached a climax in 1595. In that year Baro, Margaret Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, preached a sermon *ad clerum*, in which he "asserted three things:² (1) That God created all men according to His own likeness in Adam, and so, consequently, to eternal life; from which he chased no man, unless because of sin. (2) That Christ died sufficiently for all, showing that the denial of this doctrine is contrary to the Confession of the Church of England, and the Articles approved by the Parliament of this kingdom, and confirmed by the Queen's authority. (3) That the promises of God made to us, as they are *generally* propounded to us, were to be generally understood as it is set down in the Seventeenth Article." In the same year Barrett, Fellow of Caius College, violently attacked the system of Calvin, in another sermon *ad clerum*, in which he denied reprobation and indefectible grace. All this, especially Barrett's sermon, stirred up the wrath of the Regius Professor of Divinity, Whitaker, who determined to push Barrett's case to discipline. But here arose a difficulty. It was very easy to charge, in a general way, that Barrett had taught a doctrine contrary to that of the Articles, Jewel's Apology, the Catechism, and the Book of Common Prayer; but as no specific passages in proof were alleged, the charge resolves itself into one of those "glittering generalities" which religionists of the school of Whitaker delight in. Whitaker showed his own doubt of its force

¹ Hardwick, "History," etc., p. 158.

² We do not forget the difference between conforming and nonconforming Calvinists.

when he wrote to Archbishop Whitgift that Barrett had taught "untruth, *if not against the Articles*, yet against the *religion of our Church publicly received*."¹ The truth is, the Articles—and we are concerned with nothing but them—broke down under the weight that was put upon them. A new formulary must be devised to accomplish what the existing Articles could not, and to drive Barrett, and Baro with him, not only from the university, but from the Church. On the 20th of November, 1595, therefore, appeared the nine "propositions orthodoxal," the Lambeth Articles, bristling throughout with the harshest utterances of Calvinism, and incapable of being connected with the Articles of Religion "by any of the ordinary processes of thought."

We need not here speak of the conferences preceding the publication of the Lambeth Articles, or of the extraordinary and contradictory actions of Archbishop Whitgift; nor is it necessary to state otherwise than in the briefest manner that these Articles were in no sense a definition of the English Church, and were never of the smallest legal obligation. What does come out from this piece of history for our present purpose is, that for the furtherance of a prosecution—not to say persecution—in the interests of Calvinism, the Thirty-nine Articles were insufficient, and the Lambeth Articles were framed in the hope that they might meet the difficulty.

(b) The attempt, which thus failed in 1595, was renewed—with equal lack of success—at the Hampton Court Conference, in 1604. On the second day of the Conference, Dr. Reynolds, the "foreman" of the Puritan divines, exhibited their four heads of "matters disliked or questioned." The first of these was: "That the doctrine of the Church might be preserved in Purity according to God's Word." And under this head, "he moved his Majesty that the book of Articles of Religion, concluded in 1562, might be explained in places obscure, and enlarged where some things were defective. For example, whereas, in Article XVI., the words are these: "After we have received the Holy Ghost, we may depart from grace;" notwithstanding the meaning be sound, yet he desired that because they

¹ This is neither more nor less than the Ultramontane notion that orthodox doctrine is what is taught at *any given time*, without reference to antecedent teaching. The principle is the same, whether applied to the Roman Church or the school of Calvin. See Hardwick, "History of the Articles," p. 159, n. 4; p. 162, n. 2.

It is but fair to add here that Whitaker, and some, at least, of those who acted with him, accepted, after a fashion, the hierarchy and ritual of the Church of England.

may seem to be contrary to the doctrine of God's predestination and election, in the Seventeenth Article, both those words might be explained with this, or the like addition, 'yet neither totally nor finally;' and, also, that the nine assertions orthodoxal, as he termed them, concluded upon at Lambeth, might be inserted into that Book of Articles."¹

Thus, again, the conviction that the Thirty-nine Articles are not what Calvinists would have them, appears unmistakably in this demand that they be both supplemented and changed.

(c) We must turn for a moment to the Irish Church. Whether the English Articles of 1562 were accepted, in Ireland, till they were adopted by the Irish Convocation, in 1635, may reasonably be doubted. It is certain that from 1566, the Eleven *ad interim* Articles of Archbishop Parker were read by all incumbents, "at their possession-taking, and twice every year afterwards."² Calvinism, however, was vastly stronger, and exercised a much more pervading influence in Ireland than in England. At the period now to be considered, its power was greatly strengthened by the influence of Ussher, who was then, though not in later years, "the unflinching advocate of Geneva." The attempts, made in England, to supplement and change the Articles of 1562, having, as we have seen, signally failed, the scene of operations was transferred to Ireland, and the Calvinistic party achieved, for a time, the semblance, at least, of success.

In 1516, a body of Articles was drawn up, and adopted by the Irish Convocation, consisting of one hundred and four paragraphs or sections, arranged under nineteen heads. "They comprehended, 'almost word for word,' as stated in a notice prefixed, 'the Nine Articles agreed on at Lambeth, the 20th of November, anno 1595;'" but whereas it is stated that they were 'agreed on at Lambeth,' it is omitted to be added that they were immediately suppressed by Queen Elizabeth, withdrawn by Archbishop Whitgift, and afterward, at the instance of such men as Bishops Overall, Andrewes, and other luminaries of the English Church, disapproved and rejected by King James, when proposed to him by Dr. Reynolds, in the conference at Hampton Court."³ We need not here inquire into the constitution of the synod, the formality or informality of its

¹ Cardwell's "Conferences," p. 178. See, also, pp. 185, 186.

² Hardwick's "History," etc., pp. 121, 167. Bishop Mant thinks the English Articles were subscribed from 1562. "History of the Church of Ireland," vol. i. p. 382. Either way, the bearing of the action of 1615 is clear.

³ Mant's "History," pp. 388, 384.

proceedings, or the authority of the Articles themselves. These are important and interesting points, but they lie to one side of our present purpose. What we have to note is that these Articles (which, for twenty years, were accepted in Ireland, and which were virtually, if not formally, replaced by the English Articles in 1535) exhibit the one temporarily successful attempt of the advocates of Geneva to Calvinize our Articles.

(d) We have already spoken of the Royal Declaration of 1628, and of the action of Parliament which followed it; but it is necessary to turn to it again. The Declaration simply ordered that in expounding the Articles, their "literal and grammatical sense" should be adhered to. But this simply and eminently just law of interpretation aroused the ire of the Calvinistic House of Commons, who, "conceiving that they had power to declare religion as well as law," set forth a counter-declaration to the effect that they claimed, proposed, and avowed for "truth the *sense* of the Articles of Religion which were established in *Parliament* the thirteenth year of Queen Elizabeth, which, by the *public acts* of the Church of England, and the *general and current exposition of the writers* of our Church, have been delivered to us."

This curious document is worth analyzing. To begin with, its general *animus* comes out in the attribution of the Articles of 1562 solely to Parliament, without the smallest recognition of Convocation. Historically, this statement is false; theoretically and practically, it arrogates to Parliament a power which, apart from Convocation, never belonged to it. It is a usurpation. In the second place, the *sense* of the Articles is accepted, and not the Articles themselves; and this sense is determined by (a) public acts of the Church and (b) current exposition of writers. Now, it is easy enough to understand that the *writers* whose current exposition is accepted are the Calvinistic writers, who put their own gloss upon, and imported their own sense into, the text of the Articles. But what are the *public acts* to which allusion is here made? Archbishop Laud's comment will help us to answer this question. He says: "The public acts of the Church in matters of doctrine are canons and acts of councils, as well for expounding as determining; the acts of the High Commission are not in this sense public acts, *nor the meeting of a few or more bishops extra concilium*, unless they be by lawful authority called to that work." He has evidently in mind the bishops and others gathered at Lambeth, in 1595, by whom the nine "propositions orthodoxal" were framed.¹ So that here again we have an

¹ Heylin's "Life of Laud," pp. 188-191.

attempt to supplement the Articles by Calvinistic comments and the Lambeth propositions, and a very distinct admission that they do not themselves contain the Genevan system.

(e) In 1643, the Long Parliament sent to the Assembly of Divines, at Westminster, "an order to review the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church," and a committee "was appointed to consider what amendments were proper to be made in the doctrinal Articles of the Church of England." Neal says—and he is here an unexceptionable witness—that "the design was to render their sense more express and determinate in favor of Calvinism."¹ This committee debated matters for ten weeks, and dealt with the first fifteen Articles. Here they stopped. Archbishop Laurence² suggests two possible reasons for the abandonment of their undertaking; it might, he says, "be owing to a persuasion of the attempt being hopeless, *from the incorrigibility of the ancient creed*, or perhaps to a prospect which then began rapidly to open upon the Puritanical cause, not merely of *reforming* the Church, but of altogether *subverting* it." The progress of events, at the period under consideration, renders the second of these reasons the more probable of the two. For the Scotch commissioners were introduced into the Assembly, September 15th; the Solemn League and Covenant was adopted by Parliament, and the order for its promulgation passed, September 21st, and it was solemnly signed by the Commons, September 25th, in St. Margaret's Church, Westminster. To revise the Articles after the Church itself was so thoroughly—if, as yet, only virtually—set aside, would indeed be a work of supererogation. The revision, accordingly, was dropped before the end of the month.³

A specimen of the handiwork of the Commission remains in the proposed revision of the first fifteen Articles; and from their treatment of Article IX. we can see how little, as it originally stood, it satisfied the demands of Calvinism. Instead of saying of original sin, "it is the fault and corruption of the nature of every man," the revised Article reads, "*together with his first sin imputed*, it is the fault," etc. Instead of "very far gone from original righteousness," the revision says, "*wholly deprived* of original righteousness." Instead of "concupiscence and lust hath of itself *the nature of sin*," it asserts that "concupiscence and lust is *truly and properly sin*."⁴

¹ Neal's "History," vol. i. pp. 462, 463 (Am. ed.).

² "Bampton Lectures," p. 197.

³ Neal's "History," vol. i. pp. 464-467.

⁴ Neal, vol. ii. app. vii. pp. 454-457. Compare Jones's "Life of Bishop Hall," p. 311, and Hardwick's "History," etc., pp. 199-202.

This instance is sufficient to illustrate our point, though the entire revision is worth a careful study.

What the revisers would have done, had they proceeded to deal with Article XVII., we can easily conclude from considering what they did, in the Longer and Shorter Catechisms of 1647-48, in both of which the Lambeth Articles, "for substance of doctrine," find place.

And here we may close our line of negative testimony. It leads to the same result at which we have arrived by other paths, namely, that the Articles of the Church of England, including Article XVII., cannot be fairly claimed by the disciples of Calvin.

After all, it may be said: Grant all that has been asserted; grant that every point of Calvinism, except predestination to life, is either omitted from or contradicted by the Articles; grant that Article XVII., when fairly analyzed and interpreted, and especially in the light thrown upon it by the contemporaneous exposition of the *Reformatio Legum*, cannot be claimed as Calvinistic; grant that the line of historical evidence, positive and negative, covering more than a century, fully confirms the conclusions previously reached; still the question remains: What did Article XVII. undertake to do? with what purpose was it written? what does it mean? The question is a perfectly fair one, and is entitled to an equally fair reply.

From the days of St. Augustine and the Pelagians, predestination had been a question much debated in the Church. Lucidus had gone beyond St. Augustine, and been condemned in a synod at Arles, in 475.¹ The Second Council of Orange, in 529, had added to its twenty-five *Capitula* these declarations: (1) That, "by the grace received through baptism, all the baptized, Christ aiding and working with them, can, and, if they labor faithfully, ought to attain salvation;" (2) that not only does the Council deny that "God has predestinated any to evil," but it also "anathematizes with all detestation" those who so hold and teach; (3) that we do not begin good works ourselves, but that God's grace, with no merit on our part, precedes, inspires faith and love, brings us to baptism, and then continues to assist us. And it is further asserted that the thief on the cross, Cornelius the centurion, and Zacchæus, are instances in which this precedent grace wrought a living faith.²

We may observe, in passing, that this important declaration not

¹ Labbe and Cossart, "Concilia," vol. iv. col. 1041.

² *Ibid.* vol. iv. col. 1672.

only denied unconditioned individual predestination to life, and denounced reprobation; it also cut at the root of all subsequent scholastic speculations touching congruity and condignity.

Gottschalk had followed in the steps of Lucidus, and been condemned at Mentz, in 848.¹ The schoolmen had taken up the discussion. Aquinas and Scotus, and, with and after them, the Dominicans and Franciscans, had debated it. Luther and Melancthon had made their earliest fearful utterances as to that necessity by which men were constrained and driven, and had receded from and withdrawn them.²

Calvin had spoken, indeed, in 1536, in his *Institutes*, but the great controversy touching predestination did not break out on the continent till the close of 1551, and was really only in its beginnings when the Forty-two Articles were published in 1552.³ We do not, therefore, take this controversy into the account any further than as it helped to keep the question, already discussed for eleven hundred years, before the eyes and minds of men.

Still, it *was* before the eyes and minds of men. It was, in some sort, a question of the time, handed down through long centuries. It could not be passed by. No formularies dealing with the doctrinal questions that then disturbed western Christendom could ignore it, and the framers of our Articles did not attempt to. It met them fairly, and they grappled with it.

All along our reformers had thrown themselves upon "Holy Scripture and ancient authors," the "Word of God and the old godly doctors." Why should they do otherwise in this instance? What better could they do than go first to the Divine oracles, and next to the primitive fathers?

The result shows how, in what spirit, and with what purpose they went. That result is an unsystematized and (if one may so speak) an indeterminate definition. This proves that they brought to the appeal to Scripture no definite, systematized theory into which, as into a mould, Scripture was to be forced. Had they been committed to the theory of Calvin, or even to that of St. Augustine, this result could never have come to pass. The definition would then have been balanced, systematized, determinate, well-rounded, clearly-cut, and therefore, for reasons now to be given, worthless.

¹ Labbe and Cossart, vol. viii. col. 52.

² Laurence, "Bampt. Lect." serm. vii. and notes.

³ *Ibid.* serm. ii. note 14.

But, it may be asked, why were they thus unsystematic and indeterminate? And some persons will probably reply: Because they were glad to shuffle and to seem to say something, when they really said, and meant to say, nothing. There is a class of minds always ready to throw this slur on doctrinal declarations which they possibly do not understand, and certainly have an instinctive dislike to. They are minds not remarkable for intellectual grasp or moral tone. In most cases the slur is only an unconscious revelation of character. It shows what they who utter it would probably have done, had they occupied the position of the persons whom they criticise. It shows thus much, and, generally, nothing more. A man of average brains and ordinary honesty never charges it on another, unless he is compelled to by undoubted facts.

Now, in the case before us, the facts all look the other way. Nowhere in the Articles have their framers exhibited any desire to shuffle, to "palter in a double sense," to appear to say something where they really say nothing. On the contrary, their outspokenness and their plainness have brought upon them maledictions, deep if not loud, from many a restless spirit. To assume, then, the existence of that in Article XVII. which is found nowhere else in the Articles, is, as Bishop Butler once said of a fallacious piece of reasoning with which he had occasion to deal, "both invidious and weak." We prefer another line of explanation.

The moment we approach the statements of Holy Scripture touching predestination, we are brought face to face with three distinct truths. In the first place, there is declared to us the great truth which underlies the other two, that mankind are in their natural state powerless toward good, and can be brought out of that state only by Divine grace in Jesus Christ. Then follow the two other truths of God's foreknowledge and power on the one side, and of man's free will in Christ on the other side; by which last, through the grace gained by the redemptive sacrifice, in its universal efficacy, all men can meet their responsibilities and discharge their duties, if they will. In other words, God's sovereignty and man's free agency are both plainly declared.

But are these two truths equally capable of a clear, definite, absolute, and exhaustive statement? Surely not. The latter, undoubtedly, is so capable. It deals with a finite being, with the capacities given and the promises made to him, with the responsibilities laid upon him, and the possibilities to which he may attain. Such things are, of necessity, truths that can be completely stated. They can not only advance toward a limit, a conclusion, an absolute

statement, but they can reach it, and, in God's Word, they do reach it.

How is it on the other side, and in the case of the former truth? There we come in contact with the infinite God, His infinite will, knowledge, and power, for all these attributes enter into predestination. Is it any wonder, then, that such a truth comes to man, so to speak, as an imperfect truth? Has he, in the finiteness of his nature, any capacity even to receive, in its entirety, a truth involving such mysteries of the Divine nature? And is it, then, any wonder that there should be in Scripture no complete exhaustive statement of this truth; that there should be a "tendency to a truth, which tendency never becomes a conclusion;" that predestination, which, if stated absolutely, contradicts God's justice and man's free will, should be stated so indeterminately, and be so balanced and conditioned by other truths, as to indicate to us that there is an absolute truth somewhere which, nevertheless, lies all beyond us and our powers?

Does not the twofold line of statement in Holy Scripture precisely accord with these positions? On the one hand, God's "universal promises," and His "expressly declared will," in which are wrapped up man's free agency, and all the possibilities of grace for him, are stated determinately, absolutely, and exhaustively. On the other hand, that other truth, which involves the mysteries of God's will, power, and knowledge, is stated indeterminately, *ex rei necessitate*, is continually checked, as we may say, is held back by counter statements, and is nowhere laid out exhaustively, because, again, it cannot be. The matter has been well summed up, as follows: "Predestination is not, in Scripture, an absolute, but an indefinite, truth; Scripture has, as a whole, no consistent scheme, and makes no positive assertion; it only declares, and bids its readers to acknowledge, a mystery on this subject. It sets forth alike the Divine power, and man's free will, and teaches, in that way alone in which it can be taught, the whole, and not a part, of the truth.¹"

While, therefore, in speaking of God's promises to man, and man's possibilities under grace, we can and must speak definitely and determinately; touching predestination, we take refuge in the words in which St. Paul concludes that section of his Epistle to the Romans, in which he treats of the mighty mysteries that cluster around this subject: "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! How unsearchable are His *decrees*,

¹ Mozley's "Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination," p. 49.

and His *ways* past finding out!"¹ It would seem to follow, almost of course, that, in contemplating predestination as an abstract truth, we must place ourselves on the universal promises of God and His clearly revealed will, and from that position of complete and perfectly stated truth, consider that other truth which cannot be perfectly stated, and must, therefore, be imperfectly apprehended by us.

The corollary, as we may call it, contained in the preceding sentence, is that on which the entire mode of treating predestination hinges. We venture, therefore, to call especial attention to it. There are only two possible stand-points from which any one can undertake to consider predestination. The one lies on what may be termed its manward side, and is found in those fully stated truths of which we have just spoken. The other lies on what may be termed its Godward side, and is found in the essential nature of God, with its attributes of knowledge, power, and will. But, surely, if one undertakes to place himself upon this last named basis, he is doing something alike arrogant and dangerous. Those mysteries, into the outcome of which, in predestination, man has no capacities which enable him to enter, are not more (but rather far less) open to his comprehension when they are regarded in themselves and their inscrutable essence. He who tries to stand on them, and from them, as a basis, to think and speak of predestination, strangely forgets himself and his capacities, plunges into mysteries greater than those which environ the subject of his thoughts and words, and lays himself open to the keen and searching question of St. Paul, "Who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been His counselor?" All this throws us necessarily back for the basis from which we think and speak of predestination, to those distinct promises, and that clearly revealed will of God, in which "we *have* the mind of Christ." By these considerations, the form of the statements in Scripture touching predestination is largely explained, and the method of statement adopted in Article XVII. is wholly justified.

Moreover, when we regard predestination not merely as an abstract truth, but also as "a feeling or impression of the mind," arousing, exciting, encouraging, and comforting us—and so we must regard it—then, again, we must not leave out of sight other things which furnish needed counter-checks and safeguards. The subject cannot be better stated than in the following extract: "The sense of

¹ Rom. xi. 33. τὰ κρύψατα; αἱ ὁδοί; "κρύψατα are God's *decrees*, and ὁδοί His *ways* of bringing them to pass."—Bp. Wordsworth, *in loco*.

predestination which the New Testament encourages is connected with strength of moral principle in the individual; the Christian being supposed always to be devoted to his calling; so much so, that he is even by anticipation addressed as if he were dead to carnal desires, and in the enjoyment of the new and heavenly life. But no idea can be more opposed to Scripture, or more unwarrantable, than any idea of predestination separated from this consciousness, and not arising upon this foundation; the notion of the individual that, on the simple condition which he cannot violate, that of being the particular person which he is, he is certain of salvation. It is not to the person simply as such, but to the person as good and holy, that eternal life is ordained. Does a man do his duty to God and his neighbor? Is he honest, just, charitable, pure? If he is, and if he is conscious of the power to continue so, so far as he can depend on this consciousness he may reasonably believe himself to be predestined to future happiness. But to suppose that a man may think himself predestined, not as being good, but as being, whether good or bad, himself, is a delusion of the devil, and the gross fallacy of corrupt sects that have lost sight, first of duty, and next of reason, and have forgotten that the government of the world is moral. The doctrine of predestination is thus, in effect, a profitable or a mischievous doctrine, according to the moral condition of those who receive and use it. It binds and cements some minds, it relaxes and corrupts others. It gives an energy to some, a new force of will, bringing out and strengthening high aims; it furnishes an excuse to others, already disinclined to moral efforts, to abandon them, and follow their own worldly will and pleasures.”¹

Thus we find, in the first place, that in what Holy Scripture says touching predestination, there is no isolated, absolute, and exhaustive statement of the doctrine. There cannot be. For it deals with mysteries that lie beyond the capacity of man not only to discover, but even to receive. It is, therefore, manifoldly conditioned by other truths which can be and are stated absolutely and exhaustively. Secondly, we find that when we contemplate it as an abstract truth, we are bound to take our stand on the “universal promises” of God concerning His gifts of grace, and His clearly revealed will concerning our capacities in and under those gifts. Thirdly, we find that when we make it a source of encouragement, incitement, com-

¹ Mozley, as above, pp. 44, 45. The line of remark just preceding is mainly that which is worked out in the treatises here quoted.

fort we are to do that from the basis of a good life, and one in which, in inward character and outward conversation, we are "growing in grace."

Time and space forbid us to follow out the testimony of the "ancient authors" and "godly doctors" in detail. It will hardly be denied, however, that for more than four centuries they attempted no complete theory or exhaustive statement of predestination.¹ They made mention of God's sovereignty on the one side, and man's free will on the other. But they did not so much as speak of, far less theorize, on reprobation in the modern sense of the word.

They knew nothing of that scholastic series of *instants*, involving a first, second, third, and fourth as to time in God, and settling an order "*prioritatis et posterioritatis*" in the Divine decrees.² They could not, therefore, have held any settled, defined, rounded-out theory of predestination, and certainly not that of Calvin.

In all this we find the key to the language, first, of "The Erudition of a Christian Man," and next, of Article XVII., which is taken from it. We find on what principles the Article was constructed, with what purpose it was written, and what it means. Many words will not be needed to set this forth.

Holding fast to the great underlying truth of man's powerlessness without God's grace, and so avoiding the Scylla of Pelagianism, the Article rejects reprobation by actually omitting it, puts to one side all idea of unconditional decrees and grace unto salvation confined to certain individuals, as individuals, and thus stuns the Charybdis of Calvinism; it next states, keeping strictly to the language of Scripture, the fact of predestination in almost St. Paul's own words; and then, in Scripture language still, it goes on to describe the ideal of the process by which all this is worked out, the *óðoí* by which the *xpíματα* are brought to pass. It leaves the statement of doctrine, therefore, just in that indeterminate condition in which Scripture leaves it, not absolutely stated, not systematized, not carried beyond "what is written."

Secondly, guarding against practical perversions, against the two dangers of despair and recklessness—dangers which history shows to

¹ It is by no means certain that Clement of Alexandria intended to announce a theory of predestination in the well-known passage in his "Stromata." He may have designed only to state the undoubted fact that all the saved will be righteous. Bishop Pearson [Lectio xxiv.] makes the same statement, and also its converse, but he is not setting forth the theory of the Remonstrants.

² Pearson, "Minor Works," vol. i. pp. 244-252. He quotes the testimony of Prosper as to the Epistle to the Romans.

be not merely theoretical, but practical—it forbids any man to seek comfort, incitement, encouragement from the doctrine, unless he can seek it from the ground, honestly claimed and without self-deceit, of a good and godly life.

And lastly, it forbids us, in considering predestination as a fact, to look at it, as it rises in “tremendous mystery” into heights of the Divine will, power, and knowledge which man has no capacities to reach, from any other basis than that of other truths which can be fully stated to us, and which we can fully apprehend, namely, the *universal promises* and the *expressly declared will* of God, made to, and laid on, man in Jesus Christ.

Is this a process of paltering, trimming, dodging, seeming to say something, and saying nothing? It is rather the reverent utterance that keeps close to the oracles of God, and echoes the voice of the purest ages of the Church. It makes it possible for Article XVII. to be drawn into dispute, just as Holy Scripture is. It thrusts away metaphysical subtleties. It leaves room for reasonable movement of opinions, *salva veritate*. It carries out that noble warning of the Erudition, worthy to be printed in letters of gold:

“ALL MEN BE ALSO TO BE MONISHED, AND CHIEFLY PREACHERS, THAT IN THIS HIGH MATTER THEY, LOOKING ON BOTH SIDES, SO ATTEMPT AND MODERATE THEMSELVES, THAT NEITHER THEY SO PREACH THE GRACE OF GOD THAT THEY TAKE AWAY FREE WILL, NOR, ON THE OTHER SIDE, SO EXTOL FREE WILL THAT INJURY BE DONE TO THE GRACE OF GOD.”



THE CONTROVERSY ABOUT PRAYER.

THE suggestion made in England, not long since, that the efficacy of prayer for physical results should be determined by a definite and prearranged physical test, has drawn forth, on the other side of the water, a storm of excited controversy. The echoes of that controversy reverberate on our own shores, and it seems likely that the whole subject of prayer, including alike its proper objects and its value for any object, will receive a searching scrutiny before the matter is dropped. It is well that this should be so. In the end, truth can only gain from the fullest investigation. Time-honored beliefs have their value as such; but to retain their active power over men's minds, they must have some other hold upon our faith than their mere antiquity. Our age is certainly disposed to put in practice the first part of the Apostolic maxim, "Prove all things;" and whatever temporary unsettling of foundations may result, we believe the final result will be the carrying out also of the latter part, "Hold fast that which is good."

Theology, as the human science of Divine things, has had in modern times many a battle with advancing natural science; and, it must be confessed, has seldom or never come off conqueror. Individual scientific men, indeed, and particular scientific theories, have often broken their lances against assured theological truth. These same men and these same theories have been also overborne by the progress of natural science itself. Hence, it is by no means to be

assumed, when any new speculation in science inimical to theology is broached, that theology must go to the wall. It cannot even be considered that an issue has been fairly joined until the new speculation has had time to be examined and tested on every side, and then, being approved, has been placed among the accepted truths of science. Even then, in the rare cases in which opposition still continues, it is an opposition, not necessarily to revelation itself, but only to theology as its interpreter. It now remains that this interpretation should be examined and sifted as the scientific interpretation has been. It has never yet happened that when the process was complete, contradiction has still remained. We believe that it never can happen, because we believe nature and revelation to proceed from the same Source. Only the untrue interpretations, the ill-founded speculations, and the imperfect guesses of both the one and the other must be, and in time will be, corrected.

It has thus happened, historically, that the influence of physical science upon theology has been most wholesome, and it is so still. The two sciences cannot, as has been sometimes suggested, each pursue their independent way, uninfluenced by the work of the other; for not only do they frequently come in contact (as is illustrated by this very subject of prayer), and unavoidably touch each upon the ground of the other, but the whole realm of truth is one, and every part is so inextricably connected with every other part, that our ignorance or our knowledge of any one necessarily affects our view of all. It is in the nature of the human mind that any conviction, firmly held, must be in harmony with its other convictions; and if such be not the case, one or other must be cast out. The truths of theology and the truths of natural science must be seen to be consistent, or one of them must be rejected. The illogical habits of men may sometimes prevent this in the individual; but, in the long run, it must certainly occur in the community.

Chronologically, the science of theology had a very long start of the science of nature. In the earlier ages the former had neither check nor assistance from the latter. Consequently, theology, however sound in its proper sphere, was yet compelled, in order to complete its cycle of truth, and to link together assured realities, to go beyond its sphere, and speculate on many things of which it knew nothing, and for which it had no basis of knowledge. Hence, it was sometimes led to dogmatize about such things erroneously, and this the more easily and the more innocently because there was nothing to suggest even that it was wandering from the truth. It supposed that the sun went round the earth; that the

material universe was the work of six ordinary days; that the death of the lower animals was the consequence of the fall of man; that fossils upon the mountain tops were evidences of the deluge, and many such like things. Here were facts or problems in the world patent to the eyes of all. No one offered any explanation of them. The temptation to the theologian to form a theory which should bring them into what appeared from his stand-point, the most obvious harmony with his system, was irresistible. Errors upon such matters, though of secondary importance, theologically, yet had their debasing influence upon the high and unquestionable truths which were forced to be bound up with them into a completed system.

Modern physical science had its birth in that mental activity which accompanied a great theological reformation. It soon came to act as the deliverer of the most ancient of sciences from the thralldom of the absurd systems of nature it had begotten of itself. It showed theologians—sometimes reluctant enough to see—the errors into which they had unavoidably fallen when speculating beyond their province, and it gradually established, on firm grounds, the truths which were to take their place. The important service was thus rendered of replacing error with truth, in many points not indeed properly theological, but yet necessary to complete the circle of truth with which theology must deal. Its whole system has thus gradually become more complete, and a nearer approximation to absolute truth. A necessary consequence has been a certain amount of modification in the statement even of dogmas properly theological, but which had taken a false coloring from distorted views of physics. The process is not yet complete. Much, very much, yet remains to be done for theology by natural science, which, in due time, it will surely accomplish. The wise theologian rejoices in each step of advance positively gained, and looks forward with eagerness to the time when much that is still uncertain and obscure in the bearings and relations of his own speculations shall become clear by a better and fuller knowledge of the Divine method in nature.

Meantime, it is only in accordance with our human nature that this modifying process should at times, and to some minds, seem vastly greater than it really is. Such is just now eminently the case with the subject under consideration, and it is for this reason that these somewhat extended prefatory remarks have seemed necessary. The question proposed is, whether physical objects are the legitimate subjects of prayer? Or, in other words, whether it is consistent with the teachings of natural science that an answer to such prayers should be expected.

On purely theological ground, the knot may be cut at once by appealing to instances in Scripture (and perhaps, too, to some outside of Scripture) in which such prayers have received most direct and palpable answers. The believer, as such, may refer to instances in his own experience or in that of others; he appeals, too, to the abundant precepts in the New Testament which direct prayers for the sick, and in cases of danger, and of need from physical as well as from spiritual causes. In any fair view of life, a very large proportion of human desires and necessities will be found to come under this category. But for the purposes of the present argument, all such considerations may be ruled out of court, and the whole subject considered on a purely rational basis.

It is here assumed that there is a Personal God; that is, an intelligent, self-conscious Ruler of the universe. If this be denied, the controversy is transferred to an altogether different ground; as long as the question is about the proper subjects of prayer, it is necessarily presupposed that there is a Being to whom prayer of some kind may be addressed.

The first thing, then, to be said is a sort of truism, admitted by all as soon as mentioned, and yet which has been singularly overlooked by some of the disputants in this controversy. According to all the analogies of nature, according to every reasonable notion man can form of the Divine government, whether from the teachings of our own understanding or from the observation of the Divine works—not to speak of the plain disclosures of Revelation—the spiritual world, equally with the natural, is, and must of necessity be, under the government of LAW. And, more than this, the laws of the one as well as of the other must be uniform, because the Lawgiver is infinite and unchangeable. In neither the one nor the other is there place for anything of waywardness or caprice. The Universal Ruler is indeed a personal Being, an universal and active Intelligence, and not a mere abstraction; but philosophy and theology agree together in teaching that the Divine will is unchangeable. Natural and moral laws alike are but the expression of that unchanging will. The former, indeed, are not always fully ascertained; in so far as they are simply phenomenal, there must always remain the possibility that a wider observation will require a modification in the statement of the law. We may be quite sure of the sequences which have been already observed, and may generalize them in a formula which is called a natural law. But this is only the generalized statement of known sequences, not the expression of the ultimate *controlling* principle. For example: The tendency of bodies to contract with

loss of heat is one of the most general of phenomenal laws; in the particular case of water, the law holds good at every temperature down to $39\frac{1}{4}^{\circ}$, and as long as observation had extended only to this point, it might have been announced as absolutely general; but just there occurs a modification, and from that temperature down to the freezing point, water expands. We can never be quite sure that our observation of nature has included absolutely all the phenomena, and that the laws under which these are generalized are really the full expression of the will of the Author of nature. Nevertheless, we are sure that there are such laws, if we could but know them, and in many cases we have good ground to think that we do know them sufficiently. We are sure, at least, that all things are ordered as seems best to Infinite Wisdom, a Wisdom to which all past and future is ever alike present, and all relations known, so that a reason for change can never arise.

From these considerations it follows that the distinction between prayers for spiritual and for physical blessings is unfortunately taken. If the belief that prayer is heard and answered is inconsistent with the notion of government according to invariable law, then all prayer is a mistake. Prayer for things spiritual must be as much an impertinence in the spiritual world as prayer for things physical in the physical world. But if, on the contrary, prayer for spiritual ends is appropriate, and even a necessary duty, and hence is in entire harmony with the existence and activity of immutable spiritual laws, then it will follow that the same is true also of physical objects.

The attention should be fixed strongly upon this point, which needs to be reiterated with every possible emphasis; for in it is the key to the solution of the whole matter. If the Infinite Ruler is so exalted above human limitations that He can govern all things alike, whether spiritual or material, according to His own immutable will, or, in other words, according to invariable law, and yet can hear and answer the prayers of His servants in the one case, then He can do so in the other also. The lowest belief in God involves the recognition of His immutable will. It is a necessary result of His infinity and His wisdom. Were His government to change in any respect, then either that which has been, or that which shall be, would not be absolutely the best; but this is impossible. It is, moreover, to be borne in mind that whatever be the warrant for prayer of any kind, and whatever the grounds for expecting its answer, these are precisely the same in regard to spiritual and to physical results. In both cases they are quite beyond the reach and outside the scope of natural science, and could never have come to be

discussed from a scientific point of view, had it not been erroneously supposed that the progress of science and the investigation of natural laws had here introduced a distinction essentially modifying the teachings of theology. The error arose simply from not remembering that if theology had not known it most surely before, it ought long since to have learned from the analogies of science that the spiritual as fully as the material world is under the government of law.

Moreover, it is to be remembered that this distinction between prayers for physical and for spiritual objects is not only thus logically irrelevant, but is also practically impossible. In the ordering of the world, the two are inextricably connected together in mutual relations of cause and effect, and it would be in vain to attempt to disentangle their complications. The body acts upon the spirit, and the spirit upon the body. A mind made thoroughly submissive to the dispensations of Providence, suppose in answer to prayer, may often be the means to health; and a certain degree of health is the necessary condition of consciousness, and of every action dependent thereupon. On a larger scale: The arts of agriculture, with all their physical effects, and of civilization generally, may be the great assistant of the missionary in the conversion of the heathen; and, on the other hand, the conversion of a barbarous people has always proved a long step toward their civilization, with all the physical changes which are known to follow such a change in the condition of a nation. Certainly, we may not say that in the one case only the cause, in the other only the effect, is the proper subject of prayer.

A second fundamental proposition is another almost equally obvious truth which has yet been left too much in the background of the present discussion, viz., that the uniformity of law does not involve invariability of effects. The endless variety and the complicated harmonies of nature testify abundantly to this truth, without which all progress, and even all adaptation, would be impossible. It is amply illustrated in the historical revelations of every science, and eminently in those of astronomy, geology, and palæontology. To take an illustration, however, from the present: Over the laws of nature man has absolutely no control; over her sequences and effects it is hard to set a limit to his power. I gather the ripened seed-corn. In due time, if I please, I plant it again, and under the operation of natural laws a new plant appears, with fresh seed to perpetuate its kind; or instead, *if I choose*, I grind this same corn to be used for food for myself, or for the lower animals dependent upon me, and natural law again carries out my purpose, different though

it be from the former, and applies the food thus furnished to nutritious uses, and converts it into chyle and blood and muscle; but instead of dealing in either of these ways with my corn, I may, if the whim seizes me, throw it into the fire, and then the invariable laws of nature, still faithful to do my bidding, will resolve it into its chemical constituents, leaving as its chief residue, carbonic acid and ashes. In all these cases there has been an unvarying operation of uniform laws upon the same material; but the physical result has, nevertheless, been entirely controlled by the operation of my will. Such modification of nature, by the intervention of the human will, is carried out in the world upon an enormous scale. The population and the products of one country are transferred to another. Lakes are formed here, and drained there; rivers are taught to run in new channels; prairies are clothed with forests, and forests are changed, as the case may be, to a desolate wilderness or to a fruitful garden. All this affects the meteorology of vast districts, and so reacts upon the occupations and character of man himself. The bowels of the earth yield up their fuel and their stone and metals to the purposes of his arts, and the very lightning is harnessed for the conveyance of his thoughts. He seizes upon all the forces of nature, and just in so far as he understands and strictly regards the laws of nature, he compels them to do his bidding. Now, if results of such vast scope belong to the will of man, must not immeasurably greater belong to the present activity of the Almighty? Is it reasonable to conceive of that activity, as limited to arranging a course of things at the first, without regard to forces and conditions which should at any time come into action? To man natural laws are fixed modes of action quite beyond his reach; his part is so to avail himself of them, that they may accomplish that which he desires. He brings one law to bear in such a way that it may modify the action of another. To the Infinite these laws are but the expression of His own invariable will, and He surely cannot be more bound by their operation in controlling results than man is known to be. It is not necessary that He should change them or suspend them in order to bring out contingent and variable results, any more than in the case of man. In sickness, for example, the physician, by regimen and the use of medicines, produces a material change in the course of the disease, and often even holds death itself in abeyance; does such power belong only to the creature, and is it to be denied to the Creator? In one sense, indeed, the course, as well as the laws of nature, may be said to be fixed; for He has seen all things, the end from the beginning. Every movement of a leaf by the breeze, or of a pebble by gravita-

tion, has been eternally known to Him ; but these have been known, *and ordered*, as they are influenced and affected by the operation of a thousand million human wills in many generations. Is such play given to the will of man only when it uses physical means, and can no allowance, so to speak, be made for it when it resorts to the spiritual act of prayer? It is to be remembered always that while law does not change because it is the expression of unchangeable will, the course of things under such law is fixed only by Omniscience, and not by any necessity which hinders the Almighty from exactly adapting that course to His purposes. Even Spinoza did not conceive of Him as controlled by phenomenal laws, but only by the necessity of His own perfection.

All this is as abundantly true in the spiritual as in the material world ; for both are under one government, and are parts of one universe. We make a distinction between them in these respects only for the convenience of human thought and human study.

Hence, theoretically, it is plain, on scientific grounds, that answers to prayer, whether for spiritual or physical objects, are not at all inconsistent with uniform government by means of an unchanging will. In other words, the *course* of nature admits of variety and modification ; a difference in the results of the action of invariable laws is perfectly consistent with the existence of an Almighty and unchanging Ruler of the universe. Whether, as a matter of fact, prayers are answered, is to be determined on other evidence ; only it appears that in the supposition that they may be, there is nothing impossible or in anywise unscientific.

Before going farther, it may be well to guard against possible misapprehension by asking, "What is meant by an answer to prayer?" The controversy on this subject would have been freed from much of misunderstanding and confusion if this had been better defined. In order to the truth of the largest belief in the efficacy of prayer, it is by no means necessary to suppose that the particular request is granted in the form in which it is preferred. Among the various and contradictory petitions daily offered by the countless millions of the human race, this would be manifestly impossible. Such result is not considered necessary to the value and efficacy of human thought and of human labor in any other department. Seldom, indeed, does it happen that man attains the precise end of his exertions in the precise form he sought ; and yet no one considers his exertions as valueless or fruitless.

If prayer be, as is most firmly believed, a *factor* in the government of the universe, it is yet but one factor. It would be mani-

festly absurd to say that gravity had lost its power because the fountain throws its jet upward, or that the sun had ceased to shine because we do not see it in the night, or because its brightness is eclipsed by the intervening moon. There are many factors concerned in the complex result of the action of natural forces, and yet each one has its appropriate power and its due bearing upon the result, although the final issue be oftentimes very different from that which this force alone would have produced. No one pretends to assert that prayer is the sole factor in the government of the world, or that however truly it is one of the factors, it alone must lead directly to unmodified results. Sometimes we may be able to see reasons for the opposite. When the Roman legions encompassed Jerusalem, and hundreds of thousands of those who had been, and still seemed to be, God's people prayed to Him for deliverance, we can yet see that, in accordance with His declared will, not their desire, but the desire of their heathen enemies must be granted. Or, to take the highest illustration: When Christ prayed, "If it be possible, let this cup pass from Me," the cup did not pass away, for such was not the Father's will; but the prayer was nevertheless heard, and "there appeared an angel unto Him from heaven strengthening Him." So also with His Apostle, who did not have the "thorn in the flesh" taken away in answer to his thrice repeated prayer, but did have "grace sufficient" for him under the affliction granted.

It has been asserted that all objects of desire may be divided into two classes, one of which is, and the other is not, the legitimate object of prayer. From the earliest times, such phenomena as the rising and setting of the sun, and the ebb and flow of the tides, were seen to move in such invariable sequence, that all thought of prayer in regard to them was abandoned. With further knowledge of nature, this class of objects has continually increased, and is increasing still; while the other class—so far, at least, as physical objects are concerned—must necessarily correspondingly diminish. The time is foretold when all physical phenomena will come in this way to be recognized as under the control of fixed laws, and the weather, health and sickness, and everything else of a physical kind, will be removed from the category of things to be prayed for, because men will come to understand that they are so governed by law that prayer can have no effect upon them. If, however, the points above made have been well taken, it follows that all such reasoning is founded on a mistake. Anything that we desire in the whole realm of the universe, physical or spiritual, is a legitimate object of prayer, provided only it be in accordance with the Divine will. Whenever that will

has been expressed, in the nature of things, there can be no true prayer against it; there can be no trusting, submissive expression of desire in opposition to the known will of Him to whom it is addressed. Hence it comes about that certain spiritual and certain physical objects are not legitimate subjects of prayer. To pray for the salvation of one who dies without faith, repentance, or holiness of life, would manifestly be insulting to the Almighty; to pray for the removal of an eclipse would be an impertinence. And this class of objects must be enlarged in physical matters, as we come to know more of the Divine purposes from the study of nature. The ground of this enlargement, however, is not in the conviction of the intrinsic impossibility of the change desired, but in the knowledge that such change is not in accordance with the Divine will. But while we continue ignorant of what those purposes may be, and have no sufficient ground to suppose that they are absolutely fixed, prayer, although it may be mistaken in its object, is yet legitimate in its purpose. We need not be deterred from it by the mere *possibility* of the Divine will being otherwise; for there is the same possibility also on the other side. But just in proportion as we understand this to be probable, the right-minded man will refrain from putting himself in opposition to God.

It is no valid objection to this, that prayers are thus made legitimate at one time, or under one set of conditions, which are otherwise illegitimate. It does not follow from this that the effect of prayer is only subjective, and without objective reality. Precisely the same thing occurs in regard to moral conduct. The principles of morality are invariable; and yet man's conduct is approved or disapproved, according to his action *relatively* to his knowledge of them. It is thus that we judge of the virtue of Socrates or of any heathen, and we are assured that the awards of the great judgment will be upon the same principle. Or, to take an illustration from Scripture: We have the surest warrant for saying that the union of a man with only one wife was from the first the Divine will; yet polygamy was not only tolerated "because of the hardness of men's hearts," but was practised, age after age, with an unreprieving conscience by the most eminent saints. And so also of a multitude of other things under the Old Dispensation sometimes inconsiderately objected to as if they were contrary to the New. These were "times of ignorance." The righteousness or wickedness of human conduct, and, consequently, the Divine action in relation thereto, was determined by man's ignorance. So also of prayer. In known opposition to the Divine will it cannot be true prayer, and, consequently,

it cannot be a factor in the government of the world; but it can be, and is so, in ignorance of that will. Physical events may, or may not, move on as if such prayers had not been offered. In some cases we may be able to see that the other factors are too many and too strong to allow of any visible modification of their effect; just as the ethereal vibrations producing light may be all absorbed by the surface coated with lamp-black. Nevertheless, the vibrations were really there, and if they no longer produce light, it is because they have been transformed into heat, or some other correlated "mode of motion." So the effect of prayer may often not be apparent in the form in which it was looked for, but it may be a real and objective effect nevertheless. Ordinarily, however, the factors which enter into the physical phenomena, with which we have to do, are too many, and their action and interaction too complicated to leave it in our power to say that this particular one is absent.

Apart, indeed, from all scientific reasoning, on high moral grounds, it might be urged that man should place himself in such a submissive attitude to the Ruler of all, that he should have no desire in these physical matters apart from that course of things which may be developed in the normal operation of Providence. But this relates to the entertaining of the desire at all, not to its expression. It supposes a more exalted spiritual state than man in this life ordinarily attains. If the desire itself may be permitted, its expression is legitimate.

These thoughts lead to the consideration of the proposed physical test of prayer, for physical objects, which was recently proposed to the Christian community with the sanction of a name very eminent in physical science. What has been already said shows the impracticability of such a test; for prayer is but one of a multitude of factors on which the issue of such events depends, and it would be simply impossible, by any arrangements within our power, to isolate its effects. For another reason, too, such a test is impossible. The prayer to be tested must obviously be the real desire of the heart, directed to the result by which it is to be tested; but in the case proposed, or in any similar one, the real object of the petitioners would unavoidably become the demonstration of the power of prayer, and not the recovery of the sick for whom the prayers are offered. The real would, therefore, no longer be the ostensible object, and thus, from the very nature of prayer, its power must be withered in the offering. If any such test is to be applied, it can only be historically, when the mind of the petitioner has been unaffected by the knowledge of the test. He that would prove the negative (and upon

him must rest the *onus probandi*), must show that no prayers for physical objects have ever been answered; to show that *some* have not been, would prove nothing for the reasons given below.

Other sufficient objections, also, might easily be suggested; but beyond all these, and independent of them, there is an insuperable difficulty in any such test. It lies in the intrinsic *incommensurability* of the things proposed to be compared. It would be folly to undertake to test a color by its loudness, or a sound by its brightness. Yet these things are by no means incommensurable in the degree that attaches to the test proposed. Both light and sound are measured by undulations, and these undulations are capable of numerical expression. The tensions produced in a transparent substance by the undulations of the one, affect the other. The media of the undulations may be different; one of them may be direct and the other transverse, and the rates of their propagation are so immensely apart, that they affect different organs of sensation, and it would be practically impossible to compare them together. Yet the difference is not one of their very nature. Such a difference, however, does really exist between prayer for any purpose and any physical test of its efficacy. Reverse the case, and let it be proposed to test the truth of the Copernican system by the moral effects of its reception on mankind! Here, of course, is a manifest and gross absurdity. Perhaps less manifest, but not less gross, is the absurdity of the proposed test.

Very plausibly, it may be said that since prayer is a means proposed for the attainment of a given result, it is truly scientific, to isolate a crucial case, to apply the means on a large scale, and for a sufficient length of time, and then to note the result. But the plausibility vanishes on serious examination. In the first place, as already said, it is impossible to isolate the force to be examined, and to arrange a result from which the operation of other forces should be eliminated. It is idle to attempt to test a force by results, in which its operation cannot be distinguished among the combined and complex results of a multitude of forces. Again, prayer is not to be considered a cause or a force, in the same sense in which steam is the moving power of the machine to which it is applied. If it were, the proposed test might have value. It is rather to be likened to the child's entreaties of its father, which may not obtain the particular thing sought, for reasons above the compass of the child's understanding. Man certainly cannot undertake to fathom the mind of the Almighty, nor can prayers (except by the grossest superstition or the most extreme irreverence) be

addressed to Him as commands limiting His freedom. But the proposition becomes simply preposterous when it is recollected that we know absolutely nothing of the *modus operandi* of prayer, and are utterly unable to trace its correlations. When Elijah, wearied with the seemingly vain contest against idolatry, sat down under the juniper tree in the wilderness, and prayed, "It is enough; now, O Lord, take away my life; for I am not better than my fathers," he asked for a physical object. His prayer was answered, not in the granting of that object, but in the wonderful theophany vouchsafed to him upon Mount Horeb. Such a correlation is beyond the scope of, and incommensurable with, any physical test. It would be as foolish to say, that unless the patient recovered for whom the elders of the Church had prayed, then prayer was of no avail, as to say that the heat of the sun or the fire was annihilated because it has become latent in the dissolving ice. In the latter case the heat may be still measured by its effects, because we know something of its correlations; in the former, where we do not know them, it would be folly to apply such a measure.

Nevertheless, we have some analogies which may somewhat help us in understanding the matter. For example, we have the government of the physical world going steadily on, notwithstanding the perpetual interference of man. Millions upon millions of men, during all the ages of the world's history, have been perpetually bending the course of nature to the accomplishment of their own purposes; the very physicist, in his laboratory, has been dealing at his will with elements, and with unnatural combinations of them, and from their forced analysis and synthesis wresting the knowledge of the laws of nature. Yet, to Omniscience, the conditions, motions, and relations of every atom have been known from eternity, and all things ordered in view of them. Similarly, to rise a step above simple physics, man has ever seemed to himself to be working out the events of history according to his own purposes; certainly the affairs of nations have often been ordered with little regard to the Divine pleasure, not seldom in open opposition to the Divine commands, whether known by natural or revealed religion. For the most part, men have been allowed, without any miraculous interference, to act out their own pleasure in these matters, governed often by the most selfish and unholy motives. Yet, if there be an Almighty Governor of the world at all, if there be a "God in history," these men unconsciously and unintentionally have been working out His purposes; and from the most outrageous evil and wrong He has still been ever educating good. His hand is not visible. Everything, but for prophecy,

but for the certainty that the finite cannot thwart the Infinite, might be referred to secondary causes, and to the automatic human will. Does the Almighty control all else in the universe, even the result of man's action, without disturbance of His own laws, and yet is he restrained from answering prayer?

But so far as any distinctly scientific appreciation of the value of prayer is concerned, we must fall back upon the fundamental proposition that the whole universe alike is under an absolute Divine government of perfect intelligence. From this it follows that every true spiritual act must be as necessarily followed by its effects as any physical act by its consequences. Much that is called prayer is, indeed, no true act of the spirit, and to such this reasoning will not apply. But all true prayer is a reality, is something done in the realm of spirit; something which, not having been before, now is, and therefore alters the relations and the course of the things among which it has come. Its action and its result can, from its nature, only come about through the Ruler of all, and He governs alike things spiritual and things material, and can bring out the effect of prayer as easily in the one as in the other.

To Him all things are alike present; or, if we prefer that expression, all things have been foreseen by Him, the end from the beginning. Every force which acts has been always known to Him in all, even its ultimate action; for he has ordained them all. Every factor that enters into the complicated problem of the universe has been, and is, under His cognizance, for He has constituted them all. There is no scientific reason to doubt that, among the rest, prayer has its force. On the contrary, all scientific analogy leads us to believe that prayer, as the earnest act of the spirit, must have its effect, and accomplish its destined end and work. That work may not appear when it is looked for; it may be transformed into its unknown correlations. It certainly cannot limit and determine the action of the Almighty; but, nevertheless, it is a reality; and as such, must have been considered from eternity as one of the factors in the ordering of the world. Therefore, as we are to labor to attain results, so also are we to "pray without ceasing." The teachings of faith, here, as elsewhere, are in perfect harmony with the teachings of nature.



THE "DIES IRAE."

IT is a remarkable fact that the Western Church is indebted to that period of its history generally known as "The Dark Ages," or to the centuries immediately succeeding them, before the dawn of its Reformation, for some of the sublimest strains of its sacred verse. It is the mediæval Church which has given to us "Jerusalem, the Golden," "In the midst of Life we are in Death," "Come, Holy Ghost," and other hymns of almost equal renown. But of all these sacred lyrics none can compare, in point of sublimity or touching pathos, with the *Dies Irae*. For centuries it has been the favorite alike of Roman and Protestant Christendom. The most renowned of modern poets, composers, and divines have bent in admiration at its shrine, and multitudes have essayed in vain to transfer its force and beauty to their own language. Among its avowed admirers must be reckoned such names as Bishop Jeremy Taylor, Dryden, Dr. Johnson, Haydn, Mozart, Göthe, Schlegel, Sir Walter Scott, Dean Milman, and a host of lesser luminaries.

Of its author and early history but little is known. It was written about the year of our Lord 1250, by a Franciscan friar, named Thomas da Celano (so called from the place of his birth, the Neapolitan village Celano), who was known in his day as the friend and biographer of the founder of his order, St. Francis d'Assisi. It did not long remain in obscurity. The Western Church soon gave it a place in its offices as the *Sequence for the Dead*, so called, because,

in the Roman Mass, it is sung between the Epistle and the Gospel, *following* immediately after the Gradual Hymn, when that is sung. In an English form it has also been adopted into the hymn books of the Church of England, and into our own new hymnal. Yet, no satisfactory translation of the majestic original has ever been given to the world; and the production of such a work is, perhaps, in the nature of things, an impossibility. For the Latin verse of the Franciscan monk, simple and easy as it appears at the first glance, has in it a secret force which baffles the ingenuity and skill of translators. We can only wish that some acknowledged prince of poets, some Shakespeare or Milton, had essayed the task. Perhaps the nearest of all versions to the spirit and power of the original (though it cannot be called a translation) is the well-known fragment which Sir Walter Scott has given us in "The Lay of the Last Minstrel:—"

"The Mass was sung and prayers were said, And solemn requiem for the dead; And bells toll'd out their mighty peal, For the departed spirit's weal; And ever in the office close The hymn of intercession rose; And far the echoing aisles prolong The awful burden of the song— DIES IRAE, DIES ILLA! SOLVET SÆCLUM IN FAVILLA; While the pealing organ rung; Were it meet with sacred strain To close my lay so light and vain, Thus the holy fathers sung:	'That day of wrath, that dreadful day! When heaven and earth shall pass away, What power shall be the sinner's stay? How shall he meet that dreadful day? When shrivelling like a parched scroll The flaming heavens together roll; When louder yet and yet more dread, Swells the high trump that wakes the dead! Oh! on that day, that wrathful day When man to judgment wakes from clay, Be thou the trembling sinner's stay, Though heaven and earth shall pass away!'"
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The music to the *Dies Irae* forms the principal part of Mozart's Requiem, and a singular history is attached to it. When the great German composer was nearing the end of his earthly course, and the decay of his bodily powers was very perceptible, he was waited upon by a stranger of fine and majestic presence, who begged him to compose for him a requiem, and promised him a handsome sum as his reward. Mozart was very reluctant to undertake the task; but his visitor was so urgent, that he at length consented. As he went on with his work, his interest in it seemed to keep pace with the decline of his physical strength, and, at length, the idea flashed upon his mind that he was composing *his own* requiem. Still he worked on as with the energy of despair, throwing into his composition the full strength of his great musical genius. At the appointed time the work was finished,—the unknown appeared and claimed his music,

and Mozart's earthly career was ended. Fortunately, a copy of the score had been preserved, and the world was enriched by the music of Mozart's Requiem. It is also related of the Earl of Roscommon (who has left us a fine iambic translation of this hymn), by Dr. Johnson, that "at the moment in which he expired, he uttered, with an energy of voice that expressed the most fervent devotion, two lines of his own version of *Dies Irae* :

' My God, my Father, and my Friend,
Do not forsake me in my end.' "

If all the instances in which the strains of this almost inspired hymn have interwoven themselves with the events of our lives could be recounted, a very interesting volume would, without doubt, be the result. One such case, in our own experience, may possibly be of interest to our readers. Every American resident in the city of Dresden, is familiar with its quaint old omnibuses, dark-colored, long and lumbering, with a smoking *coupé* in front, and long benches on the top outside. On one of these you can ride three miles out of the city to the little village of Plauen. Just beyond this, on the right, is a high bluff, surmounted by a ruined chateau, called the *Begenburg*, now used as a restaurant, from which there is a magnificent panoramic view of the Planensche Grund, with Dresden in the background. At the opening of the cherry-ground stands the wild old manor-house, for many years the living tomb of the mysterious Countess von Kielsmansegge. A little farther on, near a village called Potschappel, are the extensive coal mines of the Baron von Burgh. In the month of August, 1869, while we had charge of the American church at Dresden, there occurred there one of those mysterious events of Providence, which set at defiance all the laws and precautions of human skill. We had had an unusually cold and damp summer until near the end of July, when the thermometer suddenly rose, and remained for several days at an American summer temperature,—an event quite uncommon in Germany. It was supposed that these atmospheric changes filled the mines with explosive gas. Early Monday morning (August 2d), after the customary service of prayer, the miners descended to their perilous work, when a sudden flash cut them off from all earthly hopes and joys. The dead numbered near three hundred, leaving at least three times that number of desolate widows and orphans to deplore their untimely loss. The occurrence of so terrible a calamity, within six miles of Dresden, cast a thick pall of gloom over the usually gay city. Vigorous measures were at once adopted for the relief of the more pressing necessities of the survivors. The principal merchants

of the place constituted themselves Agents to receive such contributions as might be voluntarily tendered. It was the time of the annual fair on the Vogelwiese (when Dresden is crowded with strangers), and concerts and entertainments of every sort were devised for the benefit of the sufferers. The one which seemed the most appropriate to the occasion was a grand sacred concert given in the Frauenkirche, or Church of Our Lady. To this fine Lutheran edifice of the eighteenth century (whose bomb-proof dome successfully resisted the heaviest cannonading which Frederick the Great could bestow upon it), the masses of the Saxon capital wended their way on a cool, bright August afternoon. We had secured an eligible position in one of the galleries, directly opposite the orchestra, and, with the breathless crowds around, awaited anxiously the opening strains. We were not disappointed. The principal singers in the Royal Opera had tendered their services for the occasion, and were well supported by a large choir of excellent amateur vocalists, and a magnificent accompaniment of instrumental performers. After a prelude on the grand organ, from the compositions of Sebastian Bach, the Requiem of Mozart was commenced,—seldom given, except at the burial of kings and princes, but now offered for the benefit of the humble and unknown poor. It would be vain to attempt to describe, in words, the effect of the *Dies Irae* on that occasion. Many were moved to tears, and when the splendid basso commenced his solo,

“Tuba mirum spargens sonum
Per sepulchra regionum,”

and the clarion notes of a trumpet accompanied his voice, one could well imagine that the final doom was about to be pronounced! Toward the close of the hymn—

“Voca me cum benedictis!”

—a golden ray of light, from the declining sun, came shooting through the stained windows and fretted aisles of the grand old church, lighting up, with its gorgeous tints, the carved work of the massive pulpit. We thought sadly (as, perchance, many others then did) of those on whom that earthly sunlight had gone down in sudden and perpetual darkness, while we hoped and trusted that a better light might now be shining on them in a happier land. Passing strange was it to hear, in that Protestant Church, the sound of a requiem for the dead. But hardened indeed, in its prejudices, must have been the heart which could not then have joined in the prayer,—

“Requiem æternam dona eis, Domine;
Et lux perpetua luceat eis.”

The translations and versions of this hymn, which have been made in modern languages, are numbered by scores,—perhaps by hundreds. Lisco, of Berlin, has collected and published eighty-seven, nearly all in German. Dr. Abraham Coles, a physician of our own land, has accomplished the difficult achievement of making no less than *thirteen* versions of his own,—some of them possessing a great deal of merit. We fear, however, that the palm, in the matter of English versions, must be awarded to one on the other side of the Atlantic. After a close scrutiny, we must confess that the version of Dr. Irons (the one adopted in "Hymns Ancient and Modern," "The People's Hymnal," and our new hymnal) expresses most clearly the language and force of the original. The second best (which many rank as *the best*) has an historic interest attached to it; for it was the work of our own Christian soldier and statesman, Major-General John A. Dix, now Governor of the State of New York, while in command of Fortress Monroe, during the war with the South. As when, in the early days of the Christian Church, the Vandal legions encompassed his beloved city and diocese of Hippo, the holy Augustine found time and opportunity to compose his immortal "City of God," so, in the darkest days of a cruel war, the rhythms of Thomas da Celano found a fitting exponent in the person of one who was alike true to his country and faithful to his God.

"The established text of the hymn is known as that of Paris. It differs in but one line from that of Rome, which has for the third line of the first stanza,—

'Crucis expandens vexilla.'

There have been stanzas prefixed to the hymn, and others added; but, in its great strength, it has shaken off all such spurious additions. A marble slab in the Church of St. Francis, at Mantua, bore a copy of the hymn prefaced by five stanzas, which many scholars have thought, from the great age of the church, authentic. But the church is a century younger than the hymn, and these stanzas condemn themselves.

'Dies illa, dies irae
Quam conemur prævenire,
Obviamque Deo irae.'

The inversion of the Scriptural text, the poverty of the rhyme, and the weakness of the thought, are not faults of the *Dies Irae*.¹

¹ "The Seven Great Hymns of the Mediæval Church" (page 49), a very interesting little work, to which we are indebted for some of the statements contained in this monograph.

The great work of the Franciscan Thomas was evidently suggested to him by a passage in the Vulgate translation of the Old Testament, which passage he placed at the head of his hymn :

"DIES IRAE, DIES ILLA, dies tribulationis et angustiae, dies calamitatis et miseriae, dies tenebrarum et caliginis, dies nebulae et turbinis, dies tubae et clangoris super civitates munitas, et super angulos excelsos!"—SOPHONIA, i. 15, 16.

"THAT DAY, A DAY OF WRATH, a day of trouble and distress, a day of waste-ness and desolation, a day of darkness and gloominess, a day of clouds and thick darkness, a day of the trumpet and alarm against the fenced cities, and against the high towers!"—ZEPHANIAH, i. 15, 16.

We shall now give the hymn itself, accompanied by three of the best English versions, viz., the translation made by Dr. Irons, that of General Dix, and one by Dr. Coles :

DIES IRAE.

I.

"DIES IRAE, DIES ILLA!
Solvat sæculum in favillâ,
Teste David cum Sybillâ."

IRONS.

Day of wrath! O day of mourning!
See! once more the Cross returning—
Heaven and earth in ashes burning.

DIX.

Day of vengeance without morrow!
Earth shall end in flame and sorrow,
As from saint and seer we borrow.

COLES.

Day of wrath, that day of burning,
Seer and sibyl speak concerning,
All the world to ashes turning.

II.

"Quantus tremor est futurus,
Quando Judex est venturus,
Cuncta stricte discussurus."

I.

Oh! what fear man's bosom rendeth,
When from heaven the Judge descend—
On Whose sentence all dependeth! [eth,

D.

Ah! what terror is impending,
When the Judge is seen descending,
And each secret veil is rending.

C.

Oh! what fear shall it engender,
When the Judge shall come in splendor,
Strict to mark, and just to render.

III.

"Tuba mirum spargens sonum
Per sepulcra regionum,
Coget omnes ante thronum."

I.

Wondrous sound the trumpet flingeth,
Through earth's sepulchres it ringeth,
All before the throne it bringeth!

D.

To the throne, the trumpet sounding,
Through the sepulchres resounding,
Summons all with voice astounding.

C.

Trumpet scattering sounds of wonder,
Rending sepulchres asunder,
Shall resistless summons thunder.

IV.

"Mors stupebit, et natura,
Quum resurget creatura,
Judicanti responsura."

I.

Death is struck, and nature quaking—
All creation is awaking,
To its Judge an answer making.

D.

Death and nature, mazed, are quaking,
When, the grave's long slumber break—
Man to judgment is awaking. [ing,

C.

All aghast then death shall shiver,
And great nature's frame shall quiver,
When the graves their dead deliver.

V.

"Liber scriptus proferetur,
In quo totum continetur,
Unde mundus judicetur."

I.

Lo! the books exactly worded,
Wherein all hath been recorded!
Thence shall judgment be awarded.

D.

On the written volume's pages
Life is shown in all its stages—
Judgment-record of past ages!

C.

Book where actions are recorded;
All the ages have afforded
Shall be brought, and dooms awarded.

VI.

"Judex ergo cum sedebit,
Quidquid latet, apparebit;
Nil inultum remanebit."

I.

When the Judge His seat attaineth,
And each hidden deed arraigneth,
Nothing unavenged remaineth.

D.

Sits the Judge, the raised arraigning,
Darkest mysteries explaining,
Nothing unavenged remaining.

C.

When shall sit the Judge unerring,
He'll unfold all here occurring,
No just vengeance then deferring.

VII.

"Quid sum, miser! tunc dicturus,
Quem patronum rogaturus,
Quum vix justus sit securus?"

I.

What shall I, frail man, be pleading?
Who for me be interceding,
When the just are mercy needing?

D.

What shall I then say, unfriended,
By no advocate attended,
When the just are scarce defended?

C.

What shall I say, that time pending?
Ask what advocate's befriending,
When the just man needs defending?

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VIII.

"Rex tremendæ majestatis,
Qui salvandos salvas gratis,
Salva me, fons pietatis!"

I.

King of Majesty tremendous,
Who dost free salvation send us,
Fount of Pity! then befriend us.

D.

King of Majesty tremendous,
By Thy saving grace defend us,
Fount of Pity! safety send us.

C.

Dreadful King, all power possessing,
Saving freely those confessing,
Save Thou me, O Fount of Blessing!

IX.

"Recordare, JESU pie,
Quod sum causa tuæ viæ;
Ne me perdas illâ die!"

I.

Think, kind JESU, my salvation
Caused Thy wondrous Incarnation;
Leave me not to reprobation!

D.

Holy JESUS, meek, forbearing,
For my sins the death-crown wearing,
Save me, in that day, despairing.

C.

Think, O JESUS, for what reason [son,
Thou didst bear earth's spite and trea-
Nor me lose in that dread season.

X.

"Querens me, sedisti lassus,
Redemisti, crucem passus;
Tantus labor non sit cassus."

I.

Faint and weary, Thou hast sought me,
On the Cross of suffering bought me;
Shall such grace be vainly brought me?

D.

Worn and weary, Thou hast sought me;
By thy cross and passion bought me—
Spare the hope Thy labors brought me.

C.

Seeking me, Thy worn feet hasted,
On the cross Thy soul death tasted;
Let such travail not be wasted!

XI.

"Juste Judex ultionis,
Donum fac remissionis
Ante diem rationis."

I.

Righteous Judge of retribution,
Grant Thy gift of absolution,
Ere that reckoning-day's conclusion!

D.

Righteous Judge of retribution,
Give, oh! give me absolution
Ere the day of dissolution.

C.

Righteous judge of retribution,
Make me gift of absolution
Ere that day of execution.

XII.

"Ingemisco tanquam reus,
Culpâ rubet vultus meus;
Supplicanti parce, Deus!"

I.

Guilty, now, I pour my moaning,
All my shame with anguish owning;
Spare, O God, Thy suppliant groaning!

D.

As a guilty culprit groaning,
Flushed my face, my errors owning;
Hear, O God, my spirit's moaning!

C.

Culprit-like I plead, heart-broken,
On my cheek shame's crimson token;
Let the pardoning word be spoken!

XIII.

"Qui Mariam absolvisti,
Et latronem exaudisti,
Mihi quoque spem dedisti."

I.

Thou the sinful woman savedst,
Thou the dying thief forgavest,
And to me a hope vouchsafest.

D.

Thou to Mary gav'st remission,
Heard'st the dying thief's petition,
Bad'st me hope in my contrition.

C.

Thou who Mary gav'st remission,
Heard'st the dying thief's petition,
Cheer'st with hope my lost condition.

XIV.

"Preces meæ non sunt dignæ,
Sed Tu bonus fac benigne,
Ne perenni cremer igne!"

I.

Worthless are my prayers and sighing,
Yet, good Lord, in grace complying,
Rescue me from fires undying!

D.

In my prayers no grace discerning,
Yet on me thy favor turning,
Save my soul from endless burning.

C.

Though my prayers be void of merit,
What is needful, Thou confer it,
Lest I endless fire inherit!

XV.

"Inter oves locum præsta,
Et ab hædis me sequestra,
Statuens in parte dextrâ."

I.

With Thy favoured sheep, oh! place me!
Nor among the goats abase me,
But to Thy right hand upraise me.

D.

Give me, when thy sheep confiding
Thou art from the goats dividing,
On Thy right a place abiding!

C.

Be there, Lord, my place decided,
With Thy sheep, from goats divided,
Kindly to Thy right hand guided!

XVI.

"Confutatis maledictis,
Flammis acribus addictis,
Voca me cum benedictis!"

I.

While the wicked are confounded,
Doomed to flames of woe unbounded,
Call me, with Thy saints surrounded.

D.

When the wicked are confounded,
And by bitter flames surrounded,
Be my joyful pardon sounded!

C.

When th' accursed away are driven,
To eternal burnings given,
Call me with the blessed to heaven!

XVII.

"Oro supplex et acclinis,
Cor contritum quasi cinis,
Gere curam mei finis."

I.

Low I kneel, with heart submission—
See, like ashes, my contrition—
Help me, in my last condition.

D.

Prostrate, all my guilt discerning,
Heart as though to ashes turning;
Save, oh! save me from the burning!

C.

I beseech thee, prostrate lying,
Heart as ashes, contrite, sighing,
Care for me when I am dying!

XVIII.

"Lacrymosa dies illa!
Qua resurget ex favilla,
Judicandus homo reus;
Huic ergo parce, Deus!

I.

Ah, that day of tears and mourning!
From the dust of earth returning;
Man for judgment must prepare him;
Spare, O God, in mercy spare him.

D.

Day of weeping, when, from ashes,
Man shall rise "mid lightning flashes,
Guilty, trembling with contrition,
Save him, Father, from perdition.

C.

Day of tears and late repentance,
Man shall rise to hear his sentence;
Him, the child of guilt and error,
Spare, Lord, in that hour of terror!

The most forcible and vigorous English translation of the *Dies Irae* is one of the oldest,—the work of Richard Crashaw (A.D. 1696), the friend and contemporary of Cowley and Herbert. It is not in the metre of the original, and is far from being a literal version; but as a sacred lyric, it is worthy of the highest praise:

Hear'st thou, my soul, what serious Ah, then, poor soul! what wilt thou say?
Both the Psalm and Sibyl sings [things And to what patron choose to pray,
Of a sure Judge, from whose sharp ray When stars themselves shall stagger, and
The world in flames shall fly away? The most firm foot no more shall stand?

O that Fire! before whose face But Thou giv'st leave, dread Lord, that we
Heaven and earth shall find no place. Take shelter from Thyself in Thee;
O those Eyes! whose angry light And with the wings of Thine own dove
Must be the day of that dread night. Fly to Thy sceptre of soft love!

O that Trump! whose blast shall run Dear Lord, remember in that day
An even round with th' circling sun, Who was the cause thou cam'st this way;
And urge the murmuring graves to bring Thy sheep was stray'd, and Thou wouldst
Pale mankind forth to meet his King. Ev'n lost Thyself in seeking me! [be

Horror of Nature, Hell, and Death! Shall all that labor, all that cost
When a deep groan from beneath Of love, and ev'n that loss, be lost!
Shall cry, "We come, we come!" and all And this loved soul judged worth no less
The caves of night answer one call. Than all that way and weariness!

O that Book! whose leaves so bright Just Mercy, then, Thy reck'ning be
Will set the world in severe light. With my price, and not with me;
O that Judge! whose hand, whose eye 'Twas paid at first with too much pain
None can endure, yet none can fly. To be paid twice, or once in vain.

Mercy, my Judge, mercy I cry
With blushing cheek and bleeding eye;
The conscious colors of my sin
Are red without, and pale within.

Oh! let Thine own soft bowels pay
Thyself, and so discharge that day!
If sin can sigh, Love can forgive,
Oh! say the word, my soul shall live!

Those mercies which Thy Mary found,
Or who Thy cross confess'd and crown'd,
Hope tells my heart the same loves be
Still alive, and still for me.

Though both my prayers and tears com-
bine,
Both worthless are, for they are mine;

But Thou Thy bounteous Self still be,
And show Thou art by saving me.

Oh! when Thy last frown shall proclaim
The flocks of goats to folds of flame,
And all Thy lost sheep found shall be,
Let "Come ye blessed" then call me.

When the dread "ITE" shall divide
Those limbs of death from Thy left
side,

Let those life-speaking lips command
That I inherit Thy right hand!

Oh! hear a suppliant heart all crush'd,
And crumbled into contrite dust!
My hope, my fear—my Judge, my Friend!
Take charge of me, and of my end!

And thus through the circling ages shall this Great Hymn of Doom be sung by the Church of Christ, until her faith shall be turned into sight, and the awful glories of the Judgment Morn shall more than realize the scene which her sacred poets, in all ages, have striven to paint! We venture to add a *cento* of our own, culled from the preceding translations. If it possesses any merits, they are due to the labors of those who have gone before us in this sacred task.

DAY OF WRATH, THAT DAY OF BURNING! See the book exactly worded!
Heaven and earth to ashes turning, In it all is well recorded,
Seer and Sibyl speak concerning.¹ Thence our doom shall be awarded.

Ah! what terror is impending When the Judge His throne attaineth,
When the Judge is seen descending, And each hidden deed arraigneth,
Strictly to all deeds attending. Nothing unavenged remaineth.

Wondrous sound the trumpet's swelling What shall I, poor wretch, be pleading,
Rings through each sepulchral dwelling, By what patron interceding,
All before the throne compelling. When the just are mercy needing?

Death and nature, mazed, are quaking, King, dread majesty possessing,
While creation is awaking, Freely saving all confessing,
To her Judge an answer making. Save me, Fount of every blessing!

¹ If we accept the reading of the Metz Breviary, the first stanza would be,—

*Dies irae, dies illa!
Crucis expandens vexilla,
Solvat seculum in favillâ.*

Rendered by Coles:

*Day of wrath, that day amazing,
High the bannered cross upraising,
While the universe is blazing.*

Think, good JESU, my salvation
Caused Thy wondrous Incarnation ;
Leave me not to condemnation !

Worthless are my prayers and crying,
Save, good Lord, Thy grace supplying
Lest I burn with fire undying !

Weak and weary, Thou hast sought me, 'Mid the sheep a place provide me,
By Thy cross and suffering bought me : From the guilty goats divide me,
Not in vain such toll be brought me ! Safely to Thy right hand guide me.

Righteous Judge of retribution,
Grant the gift of absolution,
Ere the day of execution.

When the wicked are confounded,
Doomed to bitter flames unbounded,
Call me with the saints surrounded !

As a culprit stand I groaning,
Blushing, all my errors owning ;
Spare, O God, Thy suppliant moaning !

I entreat Thee, prostrate, sighing,
My sad heart like ashes lying,
Succor me when I am dying.

Thou, who Mary gav'st remission,
Heard'st the dying thief's petition,
Hope hast given in my contrition.

Oh ! that day of grief and weeping !
Man, no more in ashes sleeping,
Then for judgment must prepare him,
Spare, O God, in mercy spare him !

A PARAPHRASE.

See, it dawns, that day of burning,
Oft by saint and seer foretold ;
This fair earth to ashes turning,
Flaming heavens together rolled ;
While the glittering
Banners of the Cross unfold !

Then a book of fiery pages
Flashes on our startled eyes ; [gaze :]
All the sins of bygone ages
Shall a guilty world surprise ; [amaze :]
While for mercy
All in vain the sinner cries. [prays.]

Ah ! what terror is impending,
When the Judge of man descends,
Strictly to our deeds attending,
Every secret veil He rends ;
And the sinner
'Neath His rod of justice bends.

When the Judge, from heaven descending,
Mounts His crystal throne on high,
All His marshalled hosts attending,
Flaming legions of the sky ;
Nothing hidden
Shall escape His vengeful eye.

Hark ! the trumpet's wondrous swelling
Calls Death's captives from the ground ;
Every dark sepulchral dwelling
Echoes to its awful sound,
And the legions
Of the dead God's throne surround.

What shall I, frail man, be pleading ?
How from sin's sad doom be freed ?
To what patron interceding
Begging him my cause to plead,
When the righteous
God's free grace for safety need ?

Death, amazed with sudden terror,
Opens wide the mighty tomb ;
Nature, owning human error,
Hides her pallid face in gloom ;
Man, the creature,
Rises to receive his doom.

King of majesty and glory,
Who dost free salvation give,
Listen to Redemption's story,
Bid Thy erring children live !
Fount of Pity,
Save me, and my sins forgive !

Holy Jesu, with compassion
 Think upon Thine earthly way;
 How I caused Thy bitter Passion
 When in sin I went astray.
 Blessed Saviour,
 Leave me not in that dread day.

Though my prayers are void of merit,
 Thy blest love can never tire;
 Let my soul in Thee inherit
 All Thy ransomed saints desire;
 Save in mercy,
 Lest I burn with endless fire!

Weak and weary, Thou hast sought me, With Thy sheep a place provide me,
 Lost to God and dead to Thee; Pastured in eternal light;
 With Thy Blood and Passion bought me, From the guilty goats divide me,
 Hanging on th' accursed tree: Doomed to hell's eternal night;
 Let such labor On Thy right hand
 Not in vain be spent on me! Set me, clad in spotless white.

Righteous Judge of retribution,
 "Slow to smite and swift to spare,"
 Grant Thy gift of absolution,
 Hear a trembling sinner's prayer;
 Lest I perish
 In that day of dark despair.

When, with tears of bitter anguish,
 To their doom th' accurst descend,
 'Mid eternal flames to languish,
 In a death that knows no end;
 With Thy blessed
 Bid me to Thy joys ascend.

As a guilty culprit, groaning,
 Low I bend before Thy throne,
 Blushing, my transgressions owning—
 Sins for which Thou didst atone.
 Spare Thy suppliant—
 Lord, I cling to Thee alone!

Low in prayer I bow before Thee,
 Prostrate in the very dust,
 And with contrite heart implore Thee,
 Grant my portion with the just;
 In my death-pangs
 Let Thy mercy be my trust.

Thou, who Mary gav'st remission,
 When with tears she bathed Thy feet;
 Heard'st the dying thief's petition
 On the cross, Thy mercy-seat;
 Hope hast given
 That my pardon is complete.

On that day of tears and terror,
 Man, arising from his clay,
 Stands accused of sin and error,
 Guilty, trembling with dismay;
 Holy Jesu,
 Save him in that awful day! AMEN.



THE SPIRITUAL ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY.¹

II.—THE TRANSITION.

BEFORE proceeding further, it will be convenient to glance backward for a moment upon the path which has brought us to our present position. Our object, it will be remembered, is to bring into view what thinking Christians take to be the inward essence of their religion. It was said, at the outset, that owing to the one-sidedness of the intellectual development of the present age, many are losing sight of what is deepest and most essential in Christianity; and since that which is essential to anything is that which is distinctive of it, the consequence of the superficial view of Christianity, now prevalent, is its being regarded as merely one of the many religions which have arisen at different times among the different races of men, all of which are substantially alike in their general principles, and only differ in unimportant particulars. "Christianity must take its place in the history of the world among other religions, and must be regarded as a point in the harmonious religious development of the race." It can, then, no longer be regarded as the one and only

¹ ERRATA.—In the former paper in the preceding number of this REVIEW, p. 76, line 17, for "as originally *stated*," read, "as originally *created*;" p. 83, line 25, for "ideality, or external nature," read, "ideality, or *essential* nature;" p. 83, line 30, for "insists upon this *course*," read, "insists upon this *consequence*."

religion, the ultimate and absolute, the sole revelation of complete and universal truth. Now, no faithful Christian can tolerate an estimate of his religion, which, weighing the faith of a Saladin in a nearly equal balance with the faith of a St. Paul, leaves it only not quite indifferent, relatively, to absolute truth, whether he be a Christian or not. For a further consequence of the view in question is obviously this,—the denial that the Christian doctrines have come to men by a special Divine revelation. For, if all religions are alike, then all are Divine, or else none are Divine. But all cannot be Divine, because the widest generalization cannot obliterate the fact that the various creeds of mankind contain contrary and conflicting doctrines, and a Divine revelation cannot be supposed to contradict itself even in matters of detail. This, therefore, destroys the exclusive claim of any particular religion to base itself on a Divine revelation, and such a claim on the part of Christianity cannot be allowed, but, if the religion is to be accepted, must be withdrawn or explained away. Yet, for the Christian to surrender this, is to surrender all. If Christianity has sprung out of the “religious development of the race,” and is only a “point” in that development, how arrogant and how absurd is St. Paul’s language: “Though an angel from heaven preach unto you any other Gospel than that which we have preached, let him be accursed.” If “those things which are most surely believed among us” be cut from their Divine authorization, what is left of their certainty? What is to prevent positive belief from running out into doubtful opinion? What, but this, that the truths of Christianity come direct from the mouth of God is urged by the Apostle as our security, “that we be no more children, tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the sleight of men and cunning craftiness, whereby they lie in wait to deceive?” It may seem needless to argue such a point; but to these simple issues are we brought by the scarcely disguised infidelity which finds voice even among those who profess and call themselves Christians.

Now, as has been said, however destructive of essential Christianity the view we are considering may be, it is one which occasions no neglect of Christian morals; or, rather, such a view of Christianity leads to an exclusive consideration of its morality, because its morality is just what Christianity has in common with other religions. Morality is, in principle, the same thing the world over. However the social customs of different times and climes have affected the sphere of particular duties, duty, in its general conception, remains unchanged, because the moral nature of man is

always and everywhere the same. The teachings of Confucius, of Zeno, of Seneca, and, in their immediate aspect, of Christ, rest on the same simple eternal principles of right and wrong which must forever find an echo in the heart of man. What is distinctive, therefore, and that is what is essential, in Christianity, is to be found in another than the moral sphere; is to be found, as the title of these papers hints, in the sphere spirituality, in its system of spiritual truth, or body of spiritual facts. But, on reaching this position, we, nevertheless, first proceeded to an examination of Christian morals for the reason, afterward stated, that in morality the transition to spirituality takes place. The fact that Christianity brings into morality an element which, being in it, is yet strictly not of it, and how this vital principle, which we have named spiritual freedom, inspires morality with new life, and wakens within it a natural motion by which it passes out of the limits of its former determination up upon a higher plane, because it is brought to see a higher truth intimately and organically related to itself, and without which it is "dead, being alone,"—this was what the former paper attempted to show. It is hoped, therefore, that a view of the transition spoken of has been, to a certain degree, already obtained, especially from what was said at pages 75 and 76 of the preceding number of this REVIEW; it now remains to follow that transition somewhat more closely.

The movement by which morality goes over into spirituality proceeds in two distinct lines. The one is objective, the absolute movement of morality itself. This is theoretical, or that which the subject only *beholds*. The other is subjective, the corresponding movement which pertains to the activity of the moral agent; and this is practical, or that by which the subject himself advances.

1. The ultimate notion or first principle of morality is *law*,—the law of human conduct. This law has an inherent and righteous validity which makes it obligatory, makes obedience to it the *duty* of the will. We have seen the antinomy which results from positing, on the one side, this abstract imperative, and, on the other, the freedom of the will. We have now to see the insufficiency of the notion law considered in itself, or its inadequacy to being a true first principle. And this results from the simple fact that the idea of law is an abstract idea. It announces itself as a kind of fate. Right is right; there is no going back of that; there is no seeking a reason for it; it is grounded upon itself alone. And right is the law; of this, too, no explanation is to be given; it stands silent in the simplicity of its single self-announcement. There is, doubtless, a kind of Oriental grandeur in such a conception. It seats itself, in

the majesty of its power, upon the throne of our imagination, and compels our reverence and homage, remaining self-centred in its sublime serenity, wrapped in the solitude of its God-like calm. But, however all this impress the imagination, it has no charm or dazzle for the reason. The reason quietly persists in asking what law is in itself, and why it is law. It claims lawful sovereignty over men, but it says nothing of its own nature or origin, as grounds on which it rests that claim. It remains a pure abstraction. Now, an abstraction is the product of analysis. As the word imports, it is a severance from something. Relatively to the something, therefore, it is partial; and if the something be a complete, the abstraction must be an incomplete. Hence, any one who attempts to represent to himself a total actuality by means of an abstract conception, is using means incommensurate with his purpose. But the totality of the actual is just what is meant by truth; and, hence, in so far as an abstract idea is taken to be exhaustive and self-sufficient, it is untrue. The question, then, what is law in itself, or in its truth, will only find an answer when it is not assumed to be the whole truth, but is admitted to be only a part of it. In reality, or as the universe is constituted, law, being an abstraction, subsists in organic union with its complementary element, and as a *momentum* of the concrete unity which alone has perfect actuality, or self-existence. To find what law is, then, we must find first its opposite complementary abstract, and then the concrete unity of which both abstractions are *momenta*. We have already seen that its complement is potentiality, choice, volition, and that the concrete actuality is freedom, self-determination, personality, God. Absolute law is the mediation, the determination of the absolute volition. Law exists not of itself and by itself, but solely in its relation to that volition in the unity of the life of spirit. Not in any abstraction, but in this return into the concrete, is found the ultimate truth of the moral world. The first and last, the true *principium* of morality, is not law, but spirit. That term names an idea as concrete as truth itself; one which sublates its own antithesis, and negates its own negation; which, mediating its own identity by its own distinction, resolves both in its higher unity, and maintains itself self-comprised and self-complete. This idea in actuality is the "living God" of Christianity. Such is the self-movement of the abstract principle, law; in this movement alone it has its reality and its life; not in what is explicit, but in what is implicit; in its announcement lies its absolute truth; the ground of its being is the being of a Person; the revelation of its own complete truth is the

revelation of that Person, and this is its highest purpose and final cause.

This evanescence of the abstract, its necessary passing away into the concrete, is something familiar enough to the speculative insight, for that insight has discovered that the coalescence of opposite abstractions, and their inclusion in the unity of a concrete, is the eternal rhythmus of the universe. But it is something by no means clear to the ordinary understanding. For the understanding remains under the dominion of its own abstract categories; it never submits them to that criticism by the dialectic which transcends those partial and delusive "laws of thought," and embraces them within the unity of a concrete principle; and so it holds tenaciously to the substantiality of the abstract. Since, then, the intellectual progress of this age is mainly the progress of the abstract and abstraction-making understanding, it is something quite to be expected that the pursuit of natural science should issue in the apotheosis of natural law, and that the study of "comparative religion" should enthrone a similar fetich of abstraction in the moral law. The stage of thought alluded to may be characterized as a confusion of perception and inference,—of immediacy and mediation. Thus, with the material particulars which constitute the field of its observation, it mixes up a vague idea of law as a higher reality. It sets up law as the absolute.

But law is a mere abstract form that persists amid the fluctuation of phenomena. And thus while Positivism starts from premises unmistakably nominalistic, which base all knowledge upon sensuous experience, which assert particular things to be alone real, and general conceptions to be merely symbolic, it arrives at the opposite conclusion of an abstract idealism. And this, its result, is no less opposed to the principles of religion than the materialism of its disregarded premises. For religion can only be defended on the ground of the highest realism. Unless the Real of all realities is a Spirit, not an abstract generality, but a concrete universal, faith in a personal God can only be an anthropomorphic delusion.

Now, the tone of mind and the plane of culture which make the abstraction law the first principle of things natural, find their direct counterpart in those which make the same abstraction the first principle of things spiritual. As the abstract idealism of the day has returned in natural philosophy to the creed of the Pantheist, so in moral philosophy it has returned to the creed of the Stoic. These two creeds are quite consistent, and were frequently held together; and their joint result is to drive out the personal God at

once from His outward creation, the world of nature, and from His inward creation, the human soul. For, when morality is viewed not as the immediate phase of a total, but as self-sufficient, when the moral law is set up as the absolute, when moral principles are made to stand in the strength of their own validity, and independent of religion as such,—then what God has joined together is put asunder, then morality assumes, as it were by rebellion, a position antagonistic to religion, which, in disregarding it in effect destroys; even as Christ said, “He that gathereth not with Me scattereth abroad.” And this result is plainly to be read in the history of the later pagan world. During the period of the growth and development of the Roman people, their morality was one with their religion. The virtues were severally deified; the safety and sacredness of home were preserved by the dutiful care that tended an ever-burning fire in the temple of chastity; Rome herself was a goddess, and her founder a demi-god, and so even patriotism was a religion. This life of practical religion synchronized with the moral greatness of Roman character. But with the introduction of Greek influences, and the shaping of opinion by the standards of an effete civilization, began the decay of the ancestral faith and the denationalization of Rome. The religion, once that of warriors and statesmen, sank to a feeble superstition, whose faltering hold upon the masses was maintained only by their ignorant terror of the unseen. It had no longer any root in the popular conscience, and so there rolled up a fearful flood-tide of immorality and corruption, on which mankind seemed wildly drifting to a maelstrom of utter ruin. While thus the multitude clung to the wreck of the ancient faith, an educated and thoughtful few were seeking to sustain themselves on a raft of their own launching. For them religion was forever dead, but morality still lived; and so they sought refuge from the degradation of the time in the moral philosophy of the Porch. Thus the traditional unity of moral and religious life was broken beyond repair. The religion of the people, when most fervent, was powerless to exert any moral influence; the virtue of the Stoics, when most pure, sprang from no religious principle, professed no religious faith. What was good in Stoicism we have no wish to disparage, nor to underrate its importance as one among the preparations for Christianity; we merely point to the fact that, as a system of abstract morality, it stands in the strongest opposition to the fundamentals of the Christian religion. We have no space to set this out fully in a detailed analysis, but it will suffice to refer to three main heads of Stoic doctrine, theology, anthropology, and

ethics.¹ (1) Stoic theology was Pantheistic. In the natural and moral worlds its supreme principle was an abstract necessity; the simple *rerum natura*, blind and invisible, deaf and dumb to mankind. This, of course, cuts up all possibility of religion by the roots, and it carries with it also this moral consequence,—it renders impossible any sense of sin as *sinful*, and any true penitence. These emotions follow from the intuition of the personality of the moral absolute. To the Stoic wrong-doing was not an unfilial offence against a loving Father; it was nothing more than a contravention of the law of the soul,—a failure to realize the ideal of human nature; it was an error rather than a crime. For him right-doing and wrong-doing were things purely self-regarding. He could not have understood David's exclamation, "Against Thee only have I sinned, and done this evil in Thy sight." (2) There being no personal God, man could have no Heavenly Father. His nature was in no sense Divine; he was no sharer in the absolute, but distinctly excluded from it. Hence, there was for him no assurance of immortality; no life beyond the grave, nor any future retribution. Death, and the preparation for death, was much in the Stoic's thoughts; but it was death as extinction, not as the entrance into eternity. (3) The moral law being set up, *in its abstractness and immediacy*, as the law of man's being, the antithesis between it and the natural impulses appeared in all its sharpness. This the Stoic would resolve, not by a harmonizing mediation, but by fiercely trampling out the sensuous desires and motives. Stoic ethics declared its fundamental principle to be conformity to nature; but this, in its application, involved a denial of the plain fact that there is in man a lower as well as a higher nature. Bodily comforts, it taught, were needless; pain and privation were no evils; the desire of happiness was only in us to be overcome; never was an extremeness of asceticism professed. Thus boldly contradicting the common consciousness when it regarded the individual, the view taken by Stoicism of the mutual relations of men outraged yet more the genial instincts of humanity. Pity, love, sympathy,—all the most powerful social impulses of our nature were, in its eyes, weaknesses to be repressed. Passionlessness was the Stoic ideal. The genuine Stoic was stern, impassive, immovable, isolated, self-contained, selfish. Wrapped in the mantle of his self-esteem, he sat alone upon the height of his peculiar creed, and scarcely looked

¹ This has been well done by Dr. Lightfoot in his dissertation, "St. Paul and Seneca," published in his edition of the Epistle to the Philippians.

upon the world below. In the light, then, of these characteristics, all seeming coincidences between Stoic and Christian teaching, and they are not a few, are seen to be only apparent; the language is often similar, but the meaning is never the same; the notes struck often seem identical, but the trained ear detects a difference of key. One contrast in general tone may be noted as springing from a difference in origin. Stoicism was the offspring of religious despair. In the land of its birth, as in that of its adoption, it appeared as a last refuge for the utterly discouraged. It would have been impossible for one who could say, "Now abideth faith, hope, and charity." It was bred among men "having no hope, and without God in the world." On the other hand, Christianity arose in the fulfilment of a promise, and the coming of a long-looked-for blessing. The first followers of Jesus said to their friends, "We have found the Messias; we have found Him of whom Moses in the law and the prophets did write." And so the Gospel poured forth from Judæa a boundless enthusiasm of hope, exclaiming to its converts, "Rejoice in the Lord; rejoice alway; and again I say rejoice!"

2. We come now to the subjective transition to spirituality, or the movement of the moral subject's own advance. This may be considered as a third step logically consequent upon the two we have taken, although it is, in actuality, simultaneous with them. It will make the matter clearer if we recall those two steps in a single glance.

First, the dialectic of free-will in our first paper showed that the moral objectivity, law, while external to the moral subject, is included within the sphere of personality, that being precisely the concrete unity of subject and object. In other words, that which is opposed to abstract or formal freedom—what may be called the *wilfulness* of the will—is, equally with its opposite, a *momentum* of absolute will, or will in its whole truth. Law is the supreme determiner of will, but will is *è natura* self-determining; hence, law is will's *own* determinateness, the essential *content* corresponding to the will's essential *form*. Therefore, one who is obedient to the right is *obedient* from the point of view of his unessential nature only; he obeys as a "natural man," as one who has not attained complete self-consciousness. On the other hand, from the point of view of his essential nature, the right is seen to be constitutive of his spiritual being, and hence, what was obedience becomes perfect freedom. The opposition which obtained in the moral sphere between law and volition, is resolved in the unity of the spirit's free, self-conscious life. Thus, absorbing into his own inner nature that truth

which was foreshadowed to him as an ethical law, the self rises into a higher consciousness of personality.

Secondly, arrived at this spiritual status, the distinction which, at the moral status, was cancelled by identification, reappears on a higher plane. The objective, which has been brought within the circle of personality, again separates itself from the subjective in us, and holds itself not now *against* us, but *above* us. In the failure to realize our ideal freedom, we see the incommensurateness of our individuality to the principle of its own being. Our subjectivity has its being in our objectivity, but not conversely; the latter is inclusive of the former, but not identical with it. In the duality of its life the self is unequally balanced against itself; one side ever drags and falls short. The distinction of subject and object appears as a distinction between what is relative and particular and what is absolute and universal in the same personality. Human spirit is essentially an absolute; through this consciousness we enter into the spiritual life, but there we learn at once the negative converse of this, namely, that the absolute is not essentially human. Self-existence is indeed the whole truth of humanity, but A is not convertible into A, and humanity is not the whole truth of self-existence. Here, then, we look up beyond ourselves with the question, What is this absolute, which is in us, in itself? The answer to this question, which is the second step of the general movement under consideration, has been reached under the first head of this paper, where it was seen that the moral absolute, which is first announced as the abstraction law, and then recognized as the essentiality of human spirit, is, in its own being, absolute spirit, God.

The third and final step in the subjective transition is thus an easy one to take. To resume: (1) The subject identifies himself with the moral objective, and takes stand as independent spirit; but (2) at the same moment the object separates itself from him again to reappear in its complete actuality as God; yet (3) the identification before effected follows this new distinction, and once more, through his spiritual essence, the subject identifies himself with this Divine existence, and calls himself the child of God. His relative particularity as a spiritual being is grounded in and derived from the absolute universality of the Divine Being. He, too, is a spirit; his nature is homogeneous with the nature of the Divine; God is his Father in heaven. As the second step is the subject's intuition of the personal God, so the third step is his intuition of the essential relation between his own being and the being of that God. Here, then, we have reached the religious consciousness in which man's

own self-consciousness is completed, and he is carried from the moral sphere of the subject's separation from God to the spiritual sphere of his unity with Him. And thus it appears that morality, by an inner principle of progress, leads on to religion as to a higher plane of the subject's consciousness. So far from morality being the final cause of religion, it is religion that is the final cause of morality. So far from moral virtue being the whole outcome of religion, and the measure of its worth, it is precisely the converse of this that is true. Here clearness of statement becomes important. Let it be understood that no disparagement is done to morality by subordinating it to religion. There have been schemes of religion in which, from one or another partiality of view, moral requirement has been neglected, and such neglect is undoubtedly the condemnation of such a religion. So says St. James: "If any man among you seemeth to be religious and bridleth not his tongue, that man's religion is vain." But note that St. James says, "*seemeth* to be religious;" such a man, that is, is not really religious; the religion that neglects morality is not true religion. For religion only transcends morality in that it includes it. Morality in leading into religion is not destroyed, but fulfilled; it is not lost in religion; on the contrary, it finds therein its own completion. The only contrast between the two, if it can be called such, is the contrast between a part and its whole. It is only a maimed and false religiousness,—a religion merely of emotion and sentiment, of self-deception and delusion, which can really be placed in contrastive opposition to morality. For religion is in itself already morality before it is something more. The right is bound up in the religious from the first. Morality is of conduct; religion, too, is of conduct, but, more than that, it is of character. Morality is of the will; religion, too, is of the will, because it is of the whole being,—reason, affection, and volition, or heart and soul and mind.

When we turn, then, to the practical bearing of the transition from the moral to the religious consciousness, we find that the former is not annulled in that transition, but taken up into a higher insight and a fuller realization. What is the moral stand-point? We have seen that it is the antithesis between the self in its immediacy and the law of its action. In a speculative sense this antithesis is removed by the discovery that the law is the self's own true nature. It thus appears that the immediate self—the antithetic, the subjective, the selfish self is a lower and a false self, an evil self, a self tainted by original sin. Indeed, it will be found that quite generally this subjective selfness, this assertion of independence by the selfish

self is precisely what is meant by evil ; the setting up of our individuality, that which is finite in us, in opposition to our universality, that which is infinite in us, is the single principle of all that bears the name of sinful. But, as was said in the former paper (page 82 of the preceding number), this speculative insight brings no practical relief. What is needed, what the law demands, is a change of life ; is to get out of, away from, beyond the individual, the selfish, the natural, into the universal, the unselfish, the spiritual. What is to effect this ? Not the law, for it is powerless "in that it is weak through the flesh," and hence resulted the practical failure of stoicism. The stoic thought to change the inner man by precept. He would set before him the unworthiness of the lower and the dignity of the higher life ; he would urge the contrast, and commend the ethic standard to his mind. But while false principles may be confuted by negative argument, they can be extirpated only by positive truth. To teach unselfishness, as such, is merely to deny and combat selfishness ; it is not to advance any new practical principle. Such a principle was proclaimed, when, by Christ and His Apostles, a single word unknown to stoicism was uttered,—a word that names at once the fulfilment of the law and the motive power of the Christian life. As self is the active principle of evil in the soul, so the active principle of good is love. It is love that works the change of heart and life ; it is in love that man is born again, and enters into the kingdom of God. A reader of the New Testament hardly needs to be reminded in what wondrous language the life of love is spoken of throughout the book ; what infinite depth and fulness of meaning centres in that one idea ; what a vast range of truth lies coiled up within the compass of that single word. Yet, let us recall a few of these utterances from our Lord's last discourse with His disciples, recorded in the thirteenth and following chapters of St. John's Gospel, and from the Epistle general of the same Apostle, which, it has been said, is little else than a repetition and expansion of that discourse.

"As the Father hath loved Me, so have I loved you ; continue ye in My love. If ye keep My commandments, ye shall abide in My love, even as I have kept My Father's commandments and abide in His love. . . . He that loveth Me shall be loved of My Father, and I will love him. . . . and We will come unto him and make Our abode with him. At that day, ye shall know that I am in My Father, and ye in Me, and I in you. . . . These things have I spoken unto you that your joy might be full."

"Beloved, let us love one another ; for love is of God, and every
xcvii.—5

one that loveth is born of God and knoweth God. . . . Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin; for His seed remaineth in him, and he cannot sin because he is born of God. . . . God is love; and he that dwelleth in love, dwelleth in God, and God in him. Herein is our love made perfect, because as He is, so are we in this world. . . . No man hath seen God at any time. If we love one another, God dwelleth in us, and His love is perfected in us. . . . We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren. . . . By this we know, that we love the children of God, when we love God and keep His commandments. . . . And, truly, our fellowship is with the Father and with His Son Jesus Christ. And these things write we unto you that your joy may be full."

These passages, a few out of many, have been cited to show that love is taught by Christianity, not as a high precept of morality, but as a principle that wholly transforms and regenerates the moral nature, and carries it through morality out beyond into spirituality, or living unity with the spirit of God. It is true, love is a moral principle, or rather *the* principle of morality; but more than that, it is the transition from the moral condition of servants to the spiritual estate of sons. "A new commandment I give unto you, That ye love one another" (in respect to your loving one another); "*as I have loved you*, that ye also love one another." There was an old commandment of love which Christ had declared in answer to the lawyer's question, to be the great commandment of the law (Matthew, xxii. 35-40), but Christ gave a new commandment in the matter, raising the standard of the affection both in quality and degree to the very height of the Divine, and here, as elsewhere, leading the moral law into the spiritual life. Such is the purport of St. John's comment: "Brethren, I write no new commandment unto you, but an old commandment which ye had from the beginning. . . . Again, a new commandment I write unto you, which thing is true in Him and in you: because the darkness is past, and the true light now shineth." What is thus deepest and most distinctive in the Christian principle of love is missed by those who seem to think that that principle leaves morality, after all, where it found it, sufficient to itself, with its doctrine of obedience as still the highest that man may know. Those who say that love is the "very kernel of the Christian moral scheme,"¹ and yet seem to think that Christian morality is thereby only enriched by a peculiarly lofty doctrine, and

¹ "*Eccce Homo*," p. 179 (Am. ed.).

do not see that it is differenced *toto genere* from every other moral scheme, are but skimming the surface of Christian truth; they have not sounded its depths. Such a presentation of the "Ethics of Christianity" as is made, for instance, by Mr. Haweis in his "Thoughts for the Times," reminds one of the chapters on Hegel or Spinoza in certain histories of philosophy that might be named, and betrays underneath a like appearance of comprehensive grasp, a similar blindness to the inmost of his subject, and a similar inadequacy to his task.

Here we must pause for the present, and leave the conclusion of our subject to a following paper.



LOSSING'S LIFE OF GENERAL SCHUYLER.

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF PHILIP SCHUYLER. By Benson J. Lossing, LL.D.
New York: Sheldon & Co. Two vols. pp. 504 and 548.

THE history of the United States is largely indebted to the labors of Dr. Lossing. And the volumes before us are not the least important of his contributions. Indeed, for reasons which will appear in the sequel, whoever reads them will find himself making a very satisfactory acquaintance with two of the most stirring portions of our national story,—the colonial wars with France, and the war of the Revolution; and with just those portions of these wars around which the most romantic interest gathers, and on which results of the last importance depended.

The name of Schuyler was early and honorably associated with our annals. Major Peter Schuyler, the grand-uncle of General Philip Schuyler, and son of the Holland emigrant who brought the name to this country, was prominent and active in the province of New York from the time of the incorporation of the good city of Albany, in 1683, until his death.

Just at the time when he entered on public life, the question, which had long been looming in the future, whether France or England was to hold and mould the northern American continent, was taking shape for a final decision. From the time when European settlement began in North America, things had been drifting

toward this issue. Spanish, Swedish, Dutch colonization had each acquired some foothold, and each had failed to maintain it for permanence of power. And so, when the New Netherlands passed into an appanage of the British crown, and New Amsterdam became New York, and Fort Orange and Beverwick became Albany (thus dividing the ducal title of him who was afterward James II.), the two great powers of Europe stood face to face on the shores and amidst the forests of this land of ours. The actual crisis came in 1690. The abdication of James, and the accession of William and Mary, as they brought France and England into the shock of war in Europe, so they brought them into final collision, as colonial powers, in North America.

A period of seventy years was to be gone through before the question thus raised would be decided. Things hung in the balance from 1690, when the old French wars began, till 1760, when Canada, and, with Canada, French domination in North America, fell before the cross of St. George. Mighty issues for the world's future were involved in that long struggle. Nor can any man read aright the history of the United States unless he understands them. When understood, they give the lie to that piece of silly "spread-eagleism," which loves to say that this country sprang into existence as Minerva came, full armed, from the head of Jupiter.

It is a curious spectacle which presents itself to the mind of one who, looking at a map of North America, tries to think just what there would have been on it in 1690.

Beginning at a point not very far to the east of Boston, he sees a line of English settlements sweeping along the Atlantic seaboard, and stretching on, with many breaks and intervals in it, as far as to South Carolina. Here and there the settlements push inland along the banks of rivers, as on the Connecticut, to the frontier towns of Massachusetts; in New York, along the Hudson and the Mohawk, to Albany and Schenectady. Something of the same sort appears in Pennsylvania and Virginia. But, with these exceptions, the settled strip lies on the seaboard. It is, though it hardly looks like it, the seed-plot of a future nation.

Turning now to quite another region, on the peninsula of Nova Scotia he finds the peaceful French settlements of Acadia. In coming years, at the very eastern extremity of the peninsula, the ramparts and bastions of Louisburg will frown over the wild waters of the Atlantic. Running the eye along the mighty flood of the St. Lawrence, some of the older settlements are seen, and then the

rocks of Cape Diamond, crowned with the citadel of St. Louis. A few villages and settlements—very few—appear to the westward of Quebec; and then comes Montreal, the second of the two Canadian strongholds. Westward still, there is, here and there, a mission-station or a trading-post, and these will multiply as time goes on. By and by a plan will be developed of carrying a line of settlements up from the mouth of the Mississippi, to meet a westward line from Canada, and then of pushing all in, from the Gulf of Mexico to that of St. Lawrence, on the English colonies, till they are crushed and conquered. This rapid view reveals the extent and position of the colonial dependencies of "His most Christian Majesty" (with glimpses of their future), in 1690.

What of the rest of this broad land? It lay in its natural wildness, one vast expanse of leafy forest, dotted with lakes which sometimes spread to inland seas, threaded with watercourses, which were often mighty streams, holding in its untouched depths those wonderful resources for a nation's material life which near two centuries have hardly begun to develop. Here and there are Indian settlements or single wigwams, and separated camp-fires. All the rest slumbers in the silence of long centuries.

The different characters of French and English colonization determined, to a very considerable extent, their relations to these Indian tribes. On other things we need not dwell here, happily, for they are sad in the remembering, and they open a long story of shame and wrong. Permanent occupation, for the purposes and arts of civilized life, was not much in the immediate plans of the French. The fur trade, *la gloire*, to their credit be it said, the conversion of the pagans, and the annihilation of the power of England, were the great things in their thoughts. Perhaps, in the long future, there might develop other plans, that would bring them into different relations to the Indian tribes. But these things, as yet, were not, and, therefore, there was little cause for strife between the French colonist and his savage neighbor.

Far otherwise was it with the English colonists. They sought permanent occupation of the soil, and a national existence. And this, even had there been nothing else, must have put them at once into relations of enmity with those whom we call the aborigines. The land could not be cleared and reclaimed for purposes of agriculture, and yet continue the Indians' hunting ground. The streams could not be utilized to the needs of civilized life, and still be his fishing haunts. Every stroke of the axe, every cut of the saw, was as direct an attack on him and his life, as the boom of the

cannon or the crack of the rifle. And thus the relations of the English and the Indians became hostile from the first. It is wretched to think how that inevitable hostility has been worked out. God be thanked that better days have dawned!

As one glances over, then, those dusky hordes and tribes, the endless subdivisions of the Mobilian and Algonquin families that range the forests from the Atlantic to the Mississippi, and from the great lakes to the gulf, it is seen at once that, as a rule, they stand on the side of France. And there they will stand in the coming struggle.

There was one notable exception. In the centre of the present State of New York, along the banks of the Mohawk, across the wide midland plains, beside the charming lakes, lay the five—and, at last, the six—tribes or nations of the Iroquois. They were the bravest, the most advanced, the best of all the aborigines, not excepting even the Lenni-Lenapè. Their name and their war-cry carried dismay to the villages and lodges of the Indians of New England and of Canada. When they went upon the war-path, they swept like a tornado or a pestilence. In the chances of war these Iroquois were early thrown into hostility to the French. When Samuel Champlain came to Canada, in 1608, he found the Canadian Indians in their customary condition of war with the Iroquois. In the spring of 1609, he accompanied, with a body of soldiers, one of the Canadian war parties on an expedition against their foes. It was during this expedition, and either on Lake Champlain or Lake St. Sacrament, that the first musket was discharged on those northern waters, whose mountains were destined, in after years, to echo to many a rattling volley and many a cannonade.¹ That musket-shot involved more than could have been imagined by the wildest fancy. It set the Iroquois, for the time at least, in opposition to the French, and in a position exceptional to that of nearly all the other tribes and nations.

How important the stand they might take was to the colonists of either of the rival nations, a glance at their geographical situation shows. There they lay, islanded, as it were, in the vast Algonquin sea, just between the French and English colonies. To which ever they adhered, they would be a living wall of defence. To which ever they opposed themselves, they would be a fiery scourge. As

¹ Charlevoix, "*Histoire de Nouvelle France*," vol. i. p. 223, gives a very long account of this expedition. What others have written has been taken from it.

matter of fact, they did remain, on the whole, true to the English through the seventy years' struggle. It was hard work to hold them sometimes, when ministers in England were more than customarily idiotic, and carpet-generals in America more than usually incompetent; when French promises were especially alluring, and Jesuit influence was in the ascendant. Still, on the whole, they were held. Nor is the holding without credit to their own fidelity.

It is in connection with these tribes, and at the opening of the struggle with France, that the first historic Schuyler appears on the stage. His influence with the Mohawks, the leaders of the Iroquois confederacy, was almost unbounded. No man ever surpassed, or even reached him in it, unless it were Sir William Johnson, and it continued, transmitted from sire to son, "till that league was broken, and the nations had dwindled to a few hundreds, in the State of New York, at the close of the last century." "Brother Queder," as the savages called him, had their unbounded confidence. In 1710, he carried four of the Iroquois chiefs—they called them kings—to England, where they were presented at the court of Queen Anne. And this visit was commemorated—unless we are in error, by the pen of Addison—in the "Spectator."

The position and labors of Major Schuyler were considered so important by the French, that Charlevoix makes large mention of them, and characterizes him as *un fort honnête homme*.¹

As Peter Schuyler was thus actively concerned with the opening scenes of the seventy years' struggle with France, so the subject of Dr. Lossing's memoir, Philip Schuyler, rendered important service in its closing years; though more than half its years were gone when he was born, in 1733.

Whoever has read those attractive volumes of Mrs. Grant, of Laggan, "Memoirs of an American Lady," will understand the social and domestic influences under which, in his native city, young Schuyler's early years were passed. The picture is a charming one, as Mrs. Grant paints it, with, perhaps, a little of that Claude-Lorraine coloring which the radiance of intervening years is apt to throw upon the memories of early days, but still almost Arcadian in its simplicity. Dr. Lossing gives an excellent sketch "in little" from her larger pictures.

At the age of eighteen, we find young Schuyler "deep in the wilderness on the borders of the upper Mohawk," on one of those wild trading and hunting excursions in which all young Albanians

¹ "Histoire," etc., vol. iv. p. 40.

engaged. Capital training-schools those excursions were. They help to form habits of self-reliance, readiness of resource, patience, endurance, and self-restraint, while in their physical results they might have satisfied the most ardent devotee of athleticism.

Two years later the young adventurer was able to rescue from the grasp of speculators—who, even at that early day, began to prey upon the Indian tribes—large tracts of land belonging to the Oneidas. This gave him an influence with the eastern tribes that almost equalled that of his great uncle, and formed another link in the chain that bound these forest braves to the family of Schuyler. Some of them took the family appellation to themselves, and the latest survivor of the general's children remembered that even in the earlier years of the present century, "full-blooded Oneidas named Schuyler came to Utica to sell their beautifully-embroidered moccasins, and received the Holy Communion" with her at the altar of our single church in that whole region.

The last great war of the seventy years' contest, the seven years' war, though it did not begin in Europe till 1756, was fairly opened in America in 1755. There had been ominous mutterings, and even something more, on the southern frontiers for many months, but the action of the great drama did not really begin till the year just named. Schuyler had not then attained his majority. But men ripen young in stirring times. And his own excellent abilities, his family standing, and the very position of the city in which he dwelt, all united to bring him forward in the coming scenes of strife.

From the year 1690, the conquest of Canada from the French was the one thing uppermost in the minds of the English colonists. Till that was accomplished, nothing was done which secured the English domination in North America. That conquest was for seventy years, if we may so speak, a military axiom. Nor did the plans for the conquest undergo much change. When the heart of Canada was threatened, there was to be an expedition by sea, the final point of whose offensive operations was Quebec, and an inland expedition up the Hudson from Albany, and then through Lake Champlain, the destination of which was Montreal. There might be other expeditions auxiliary to these main ones, but the vital issues concentrated themselves in them. So it was in 1690, when Winthrop moved to the attack of Canada on the landward side, and finding, when he reached Champlain, that his Indian allies had failed him, that boats were lacking and provisions were insufficient, fell back on Albany; and when Sir William Phips sailed from Boston and anchored before Quebec, whence he returned with loss of ships

and men, "fortune and reputation." So it was again in 1759, when Wolfe climbed the heights of Abraham, and died victorious on their summit, leaving it to Townshend to plant the red cross of St. George on the citadel of Quebec; and when Jeffrey Amherst crossed Lake George and occupied the strongholds of Ticonderoga and Crown Point, which Abercrombie's rashness and cowardice had missed the year before.

All this made Albany an important *entrepôt* through all the war. And Philip Schuyler was not likely to content himself by remaining on the home guard when such issues were impending. Accordingly, we find him sharing in the first battle of the campaign against Crown Point, the battle of Lake George (September 7, 1755), the honors of which fell on Sir William Johnson, although its success was more due to General Lyman than to him. Nine days after that action he was married in Albany, and with a generous hospitality, which characterized him all through life, took measures "to alleviate the sufferings of the brave and unfortunate" Dieskau, who received his death-wound in the contest. How generous and delicate his conduct was, is proved by the French general's message, sent through his aide-de-camp: "If he shall have the happiness to be restored to health, he will himself be the proclaimer of all the good words which should be said of you, and which in justice he owes you, for the trouble and care that you have had for him." His prisoners cared for, after one week he left his youthful bride, and hastened back to the duties of the camp.

We cannot follow out the story of those eventful years. They were sad and shameful years up to the summer of 1757, when the silly Duke of Newcastle, whose administration was a very fools' paradise of incapacities and blunderers, gave way to William Pitt, and the glories of Louisburg and Quebec covered the earlier disgraces of the war.

Schuyler appears on the scene again in 1758, and we find him on the battle-ground of '55, at the head of Lake George, in company with the idol of the army, and "the Lycurgus of the camp," Lord Howe. No wonder that the warmest friendship bound two such men together in ties stronger than the ties of blood. What Wolfe was at Louisburg and Quebec, that Lord Howe might have been, had he been in command, at Ticonderoga and Crown Point. Nor was it the least of all the disasters of Abercrombie's unfortunate expedition that it cost the life of such a soldier,¹ *sans peur et sans*

¹ His remains were first placed in the family vault of the Schuylers, and were afterward buried under the chancel of St. Peter's, Albany.

reproche, with whom it was said, "the soul of the army seemed to expire." The country for which he gave his life still holds his ashes; and the love and honor in which that country held him, are attested by the monument erected to him, in Westminster Abbey, by the general court of Massachusetts Bay. Schuyler remained in active service till the war was ended.

And now, passing over many intervening years, the history of which we have no time to pause upon, we reach the war of the Revolution, and come at once to the great northern campaign of 1777. On that campaign depended, to a large extent, the fortunes and results of the entire struggle. Had the British plan succeeded, the cause of the colonies might have failed, the contest would certainly have been indefinitely prolonged. That it did not succeed was due, under God, to the wisdom and the magnanimity of General Schuyler.

The purpose was to extend the British line of occupation from the city of New York to Canada. This would be, on many accounts, a movement most important to British interests, but specially so because it would interpose an armed line of separation between the New England States and those to the west and south. A double base for supplies would also be obtained; and the policy, "divide and conquer," might be fully carried out. All this made the campaign of 1777 a crisis in the war of the Revolution.

At New York the conduct of affairs was in the hands of Sir William Howe, whose *vis inertiae* was something marvellous. In Canada, General Burgoyne had superseded General Carleton in the active prosecution of the war. When shut up with Gates in Boston, he had complained of "want of elbow-room." Of this he was likely to find an abundance in his coming campaign, to which he looked forward without one doubt as to his success.

The general plan of military operation on the part of the British generals, as finally settled on, was for Howe to press up the Hudson river; for Burgoyne to march, with the main body of the invading force, by the way of Lake Champlain and the upper Hudson, on Albany; and for St. Leger to advance by Oswego to the capture of Fort Schuyler, and then to sweep the valley of the Mohawk. If these schemes had been carried out, and a union of these expeditions effected at Albany, the plan of occupation, and of severing the Eastern from the other States, would have thoroughly succeeded.

We need not go over, interesting as they must always be, the details of the campaign. They ought to be known, we wish we

could hope they were, to every schoolboy. The gathering again of Indian allies to share in the military operations; the siege and capture of Ticonderoga; the story—tragical, whatever be the truth about it—of Jane M'Crea; Stark's gallant action at Bennington; Herkimer's equally gallant one, albeit with less brilliant success, at Oriskany; Arnold's dashing exploits at Saratoga and Stillwater; the death and funeral of General Frazer; the conjugal devotion and unflinching bravery of Lady Harriet Acland and the Baroness Riedesel, and the final surrender of the boastful Burgoyne,—all these unite to give a charm and romantic interest to the story of those days, fraught as they were with mighty issues, that the people of this land should not "willingly let die."

In December, 1776, Congress fled from Philadelphia to Baltimore. They then delegated to Washington "discretionary control of all military matters" for six months; making him, in fact, a military dictator. "To General Schuyler almost equal discretionary power had really, though not in express terms, been given in the management of the military affairs of the Northern Department."

And what were Schuyler's position and resources as compared with those of the invading forces, when the British general marched from Canada, and embarking on the last day of June, said, in words (which came true in a sense quite different from that in which they were uttered), "This army must not retreat?" Burgoyne led to the invasion between eight and nine thousand men, well equipped, and with a full train of artillery. Some twenty-five hundred continentals and nine hundred militia, lying in the works at Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, constituted Schuyler's effective force. And from even this small body he was importuned to send troops to defend Fort Schuyler and the valley of the Mohawk. Reinforcements were not likely to come in very rapidly. The New England jealousy—a very much stronger word would not be out of place—prevented volunteering from the quarter from which men ought to have rushed to the point of supreme peril. Washington could send but little aid, for nearly all his available force was needed to contest the British occupation of Philadelphia. So Schuyler was left to his own resources.

His policy—and the result justified it fully—was a very simple one. Its very simplicity was objectionable to many. Its apparent yielding of ground disturbed many more. Had the troops at Ticonderoga and Mount Independence been properly reinforced, the British advance might have been checked there. Had Schuyler made more fuss about his defensive plan, or vaped with the

plausible volubility of Gates, things might have taken on a different shape. As it was, he did the only thing that could, reasonably, have been undertaken. He fell back before the hostile forces, breaking up bridges, felling trees, and obstructing roads; thus impeding its advance, and getting it daily involved in ever-increasing difficulties, from desertions, sickness, impatience, and lack of supplies. Meantime, he kept his own troops comparatively fresh for work, gave some chance for increased supplies and reinforcement, and, above all, gained time. There was strength for the invaded, and weakness for the invaders, in every hour's delay before the shock of battle came. Thus Schuyler fell back to the island at the mouth of the Mohawk, and held his troops there. Meantime, there were great searchings of heart in Congress (for, in truth, a session of Congress was, even in those days, not without dangers to the country), and the New England intriguers, seconded by the selfish and unscrupulous Gates, were in the ascendant.

Having patiently waited for the depletion of the enemy's advance, and the gathering of strength to his own army, Schuyler was ready, toward the end of August, to move against Burgoyne, when, on the 19th of that month, General Gates arrived in camp, and assumed the chief command. He came just in time to seize the results for which Schuyler's patient wisdom had made ready. No man of ordinary ability and common-sense could help crushing Burgoyne, if he carried out the plans already laid. And yet, had not Arnold outrun the subaltern whom Gates sent to call him back, it is hardly to be doubted that the battle of Bemis Heights would have resulted in an American defeat, and that Burgoyne "could have marched into Albany at the autumnal equinox, a victor." Gates gathered the laurels; the real honors belonged to Schuyler.

Schuyler's noble nature comes out, in strong contrast to his rival's selfish meanness, in his dignified acceptance of his displacement by Congress, in his patriotic continuance in office, and in unwearied labors after the most stinging insult, in his magnanimous conduct to Gates after the surrender, in the generous hospitality with which he received the captive generals. "In that house," wrote Burgoyne, "I remained during my whole stay in Albany, with a table of more than twenty covers for me and my friends, and every other demonstration of hospitality." It was the same spirit, that of a Bayard or a Sidney, which, twenty-two years before, had brought tears to the eyes of the Baron Dieskau, as it did now to those of the British commander-in-chief, when he exclaimed, "Indeed this is doing too

much for a man who has ravaged their lands and burned their dwellings." God be thanked for such bright characters in history!


Dr. Lossing has told in full the story of the intrigue to ruin Schuyler. It was part and parcel of the plot against Washington; and of both, the animating spirit and the true originator was Horatio Gates. The New England cabal and the Conway cabal alike held him as the pivot on which they turned.

The part which the New England delegates played in the plot against Schuyler is most discreditable. One New England State, Connecticut, may remember, with just pride, how sturdy and incorruptible Jonathan Trumbull, who was too true and honest a man not to recognize real ability and worth, and not to honor it when he did recognize it, stood by the abused patriot all through. It is mortifying to find Mr. Bancroft writing here in the interests of historic untruth, and repeating stale invective, which has not now even the poor possibility of misunderstanding to excuse it. Dr. Lossing disposes of Mr. Bancroft's platitudes kindly but fully, corrects his extraordinary mistakes, supplies his disingenuous *lacunae*, and closes his strictures with these well-deserved words: "I do not hesitate to say that in the course of my reading I have never seen, in the same number of pages, so many positive errors as appear in Mr. Bancroft's brief review of the career of General Schuyler in the campaign of 1777, up to the time when he was superseded by General Gates."

Philip Schuyler stands out on the canvas of American history a character of rare attractiveness, and one which it would be well for the young men of our generation to become familiar with. The contact would by no means be barren of results. We trust Dr. Lossing's interesting volumes may serve this purpose. They can serve no better one.

One stricture on them we must make before we close. When their author shall examine, with as much care as he has done other portions of our annals, the attempts to introduce into this country a colonial episcopate, we are well assured that he will blot many a phrase and many a statement in his present volumes. If he will go through the details of the long-continued exertions, and the fruitless applications of American colonial Churchmen for the episcopate, he will find that they sought no State officers with civil powers and bishops' courts, with lordly revenues and pomp, but simply shepherds of the flock which was scattered abroad in these western wilds. And if, on the other hand, he will look over such publications as "*Minutes of the Convention of Delegates*" (printed in 1843, in an incautious moment of antiquarian zeal), he will see how per-

sistently, in the face of every avowal and every offer, the changes were rung on "appropriations of land and money," on "prelatic pomp and splendor," on "the tyranny of bishops' courts," and things of the like nature. Dr. Lossing's candor as a judge would, we are certain, after such examination, reverse some conclusions which he holds just now ; and his eminent fairness as an historian would lead him to declare such reversal to the large audience to which he speaks.



PRESBYTERIANISM AND EPISCOPACY IN SCOTLAND.

II.

WE have seen how the first preachers of Christianity in Scotland appeared there as ambassadors commissioned by the Catholic Christian Church, claiming to have received through it, from Christ, a special spiritual authority and power to convey in His name mysterious spiritual privileges, and to dispense mysterious spiritual grace. We have seen that this Church became a national establishment by the act of the civil rulers recognizing this authority as bestowed on it from above, and giving it free scope and abundant means for the exercise of its power over all the souls within the realm. We have seen how Rome was regarded as possessed, in a special and preëminent degree, of this mystical power and Divine commission, and how the Church, therefore, tended constantly to assume more and more a position of subordination and conformity to Rome. We have seen how this lofty spiritual attitude of the Church enabled it to do a Church's work with respect to every person, of whatever rank, in every portion of the land. Every one recognized the right of his bishop and his priest to speak to him, confessed that a peculiar power from Christ accompanied their acts and words, and felt that to disregard their warnings and reject their ministrations was to incur a sentence of condemnation from their

Lord. We have seen how this spiritual power held its own until it was encountered by a deeply-ingrained conviction that it was employed no longer for, but against, the truth and holiness which Christ had established it to maintain ; and how, when it had once lost, in this way, its hold as a spiritual power over the conscience, all the power of the State was unable to preserve its supremacy and efficiency as an establishment. We have seen, too, how the system inaugurated under the auspices of John Knox, as a substitute for the ancient hierarchy, though established by the law, and preaching a doctrine accepted by the people, proved unable to hold its own and do its work from the want of any conviction in the people that its ministers had a peculiar authority to speak and act for God, which each man needed to have exerted on his behalf. We have seen how Andrew Melville, by teaching that Presbyterianism was the genuine form of government established by the authority of Christ and His Apostles in the Church, and that, therefore, to depart from that form, and to separate from the Church where it existed, was a separation from Christ's kingdom, and a rebellion against His sovereignty, succeeded in arousing an intense devotion to that system of government, and to the ministers as governors, though without the former reverence and value for their spiritual function as authorized dispensers of Divine grace, apart from their personal gifts and effectiveness as preachers. We have seen how a peculiar combination of passions, prejudices, and interests contributed to give the champions of Presbyterian government success in their resistance to the endeavor of the sovereigns to impose, often by unworthy means and for unworthy ends, a system of Church government by bishops, who were to be rather convenient instruments and supple agents for the political purposes of the king, than free and spiritual pastors of the flock. We have seen how this fatally close alliance between Church and State involved the ruin of the monarchy and the subversion of the Church ; and how the religious system, which had acquired for itself the allegiance of the most fervent of the people, claimed, by right of conquest, as well as right Divine, the position of the legal national establishment in place of that which it overthrew. We have now to see how it acquitted itself in that position, and whether it proved itself capable of holding the position and doing the work of a national Church, in conveying the teaching and spirit of Christ Jesus by the agency of its ministers through the land.

We have said that Presbyterianism conquered for itself the position of a legal establishment ; and it began to exercise its power as a conqueror. The civil power under the kings had lent the arm of
xcvii.—6

the State to support the tottering Church; but the Presbyterian leaders seemed to regard the State as existing mainly for the Church, and bound to use its powers chiefly in the Church's service, and according to the Church's bidding. And from its peculiar theory as to the office and character of the Church, there was, theoretically, no limitation to its requirements. The essential and characteristic feature of a true ecclesiastical system consisted, according to their theory, not so much in its being a channel for the communication and diffusion of Divine grace through the secret and mysterious operation of the Holy Ghost, as in its possessing a power of government and discipline, whereby every soul could be brought under the yoke, and either made obedient to God's law, or else be punished for transgression. Each parish kirk session was held responsible for the good manners and morals and sound doctrine of all the people within its sphere, and every individual member of the Church was impressed with a conviction that it was his or her duty to help on this work by bringing every aberration to the knowledge of the pastor and ruling elders. Each presbytery was responsible for all the kirk sessions within its bounds; each synod for its presbyteries; the General Assembly for all the synods and every soul within the realm. The first act of the first thoroughly supreme Presbyterian General Assembly was one "for bringing in of the Synod-books yearly to the General Assembly, for the inspection of the proceedings as there recorded;" and one of the favorite covenanting historians gives a vivid description of their system and its working: "Every minister was to be tried five times a year, both for his personal and ministerial labors; every congregation was to be visited by the Presbytery, that they might see how the vine flourished, and how the pomegranate budded. And there was no case nor question in the meanest family in Scotland, but it might become the object of the deliberation of the General Assembly; for the Congregational session-book was tried by the Presbytery, the Presbytery's book by the Synod, and the Synod's book by the General Assembly. Likewise, as the bands of the Scottish Church were strong, so her beauty was bright; no error was so much as named; the people were not only sound in the faith, but innocently ignorant of unsound doctrine; no scandalous person could live, no scandal could be concealed in all Scotland, so strict a correspondence there was between ministers and congregations. The General Assembly seemed to be the priest with Urim and Thummim, and there were not one hundred persons in all Scotland to oppose their conclusions; all submitted, all learned, all prayed; most part were really godly, or, at least, counterfeited

themselves Jews. Thus was Scotland a heap set about with lilies, uniform, or a palace of silver, beautifully proportioned; and this seems to me to have been Scotland's high-noon. The only complaint of profane people was, that the government was so strict, they had not liberty enough to sin. I confess that I thought, at that time, the common sort of ministers strained too much at the sin which, in these days, was called *malignancy* (and I should not paint the moon faithfully if I marked not her spots); otherwise, I think, if Church officers could polish the saints upon earth as bright as they are in heaven, it were their excellency and the Church's happiness. *But this season lasted not long*"¹ (as it, of course, could not, human nature being what it is).

Such being the Presbyterian ideal of ecclesiastical perfection, it is manifest that zeal against *malignancy* (that is, confirmed opposition to Presbyterianism, and maintenance of Episcopacy), was not only consistent with it, but incumbent upon its upholders. Sound doctrine and correct morality were to be advanced by means of their *government*, and therefore they felt bound to bring its utmost force to bear upon those who not only in their opinion held and propagated error and corruption, but set themselves against the authority appointed to remove them. So, one of the first duties which the Presbyterian leaders took upon themselves, as a Church, and sought to impose upon the State, was to extirpate Episcopacy. They had abundance of material on which to work; for even after they had deposed, excommunicated, and persecuted the bishops, the leading divines, and the doctors of the universities, the parochial clergy throughout the land, with the exception of five counties, were not only episcopally ordained, but Episcopalians by conviction; while in the north, the people, almost to a man, stood by their ministers. In fact, the leaven of Episcopacy was so large, that the General Assembly of 1642 was very thinly attended by ministers, though strong in ruling elders of high place and power in the State, the Marquis of Argyre being at their head.

In order to be systematic in their assault on prelatists, they began with Roman Catholics, exacting that "every Presbytery should convene at their first meeting all known Papists in their bounds, and require them to put out of their company all friends and servants who are popish, within one month. Also, within that space to give their children, sons and daughters, who are above seven years of age, to be educated at their charges by such of their

¹ Kirkton's History.

Protestant friends as the Presbytery shall approve. . . . and to find caution [security] likewise of their abstinence from mass, and the company of all Jesuits and priests. . . . That the Council may be supplicate for an act, that in no regiment which goes out of the kingdom any Papists bear office, and that the colonel be required to find caution for this effect before he receive the Council's warrant for levying any soldiers; and, also, that he find caution for the maintaining of a minister, and keeping of a session in his regiment." They also sent a "pleasant letter" to the Long Parliament, in which they say: "They consider that not only prelates, formal professors, profane and worldly persons, and all that are popishly affected, are bad councillors and workers, and do abuse their power, and bend all their strength and policies against the work of God; but the God of this world also, with principalities and powers, the rulers of the darkness of this world, and spiritual wickedness in high places, are working with all their force and fraud in the same opposition. And who knoweth but the Lord hath now some controversy with England which will not be removed till, first and before all, the worship of His name, and the government of His house, be settled according to His own will? The commissioners of this kingdom, in the late treaty of peace, did represent in the name of this kingdom their serious thoughts and earnest desires for unity of religion, that in all His Majesty's dominions there might be one confession of faith, one directory of worship, one public catechism, and one form of kirk government. This they conceived to be acceptable to God Almighty, to be a special means of suppressing the names of heresies and sects, Puritans, Conformists, Separatists, Anabaptists, etc., which do rend asunder the bowels both of kirk and kingdom."

The Assembly also appointed a certain number of ministers and lay elders to sit in Edinburgh as Commissioners of the Kirk till the next Assembly, "to sit and cognance in the same manner as if the General Assembly were personally sitting." This was the origin of the famous "Commission of Assembly," said by Scottish jurists to be the most formidable court that ever existed in the country; far exceeding in its despotic exercise of power the old Court of High Commission, of which so much has been said. It was always composed of the fiercest and most ultra Covenanters, and took cognizance of every one who "haunted the company of any excommunicated person," or any one not a Covenanter, or any one having any relationship to or intimacy with *malignants*. Some presbyteries in Ayrshire wrote at once to the new commission that they had been as yet unable to put down an inveterate superstition and relic of

Episcopacy among the ministers, of kneeling in the pulpits, and concluding their prayers and the psalms with the doxology. The covenanting ministry resolved to make a "negative separation" from all who observed this custom; and, in a short time thereafter, the greatest sticklers for these forms got the better of their prejudices, or were driven from the kingdom.

Subscription to "The Solemn League and Covenant," as found now in the Westminster Confession, having been required of the people of both kingdoms, and refusal to subscribe being made a ground of persecution, the next General Assembly proceeded to pass an act requiring "the ministers of all the particular kirks within the kingdom to keep unity and uniformity in the substance and right ordering of all the parts of the public worship of God," according to the Westminster Directory of Worship. They suspended for the first offence, and deprived for the second, such ministers as should hold any communication with excommunicated persons, especially the bishops and other loyalists excommunicated in 1638. Another act, "anent an order for using civil execution against excommunicate persons," renewed an act of the Earl of Morton, which had been suspended by King James, to imprison all excommunicated persons, and to confiscate their whole property; and they ordered every presbytery to report the names of all whom they excommunicated, that the public prosecutor might immediately proceed against them. As Aberdeen was the stronghold of Episcopacy, and it had been made penal either to observe the festivals of the Church or to disregard the fasts appointed by the presbyteries, a solemn fast was appointed to be observed in that city on Easter-day, and the lay-elders were sent from house to house to see if any meat was cooking, and to remove it from the spits. Lest the commission should not be able to reach all the Episcopal ministers whom they meant to depose, three *riding committees* were organized; and, to make sure work, it was enacted, that if any of the clergy whom they deposed should obtain any part of their stipends which might be due, the committees were empowered to excommunicate them. To set the example, the Assembly itself proceeded to silence and depose the Rev. Andrew Ramsay and the Rev. William Colville, two of the remaining Episcopal clergy of Aberdeen, who, says Bishop Guthrie, in his memoirs, "for their eminency in learning, diligence in their calling, and strictness in their conversation, were ornaments to the Church of Scotland." To aid the officers of the Church in their work of extirpating Episcopacy, and bringing the whole kingdom into subordination to Presbyterian government, the Scottish Parlia-

ment, during the period when the Parliament of England was engaged in condemning and executing King Charles I., devoted themselves chiefly to the work of dividing the loyalists remaining in Scotland into four classes; the first to be excluded from all public offices for life, the second for ten years, the third for five, and the fourth until the next session of Parliament, thus clearing the judiciary and other government offices of all who had any taint of loyalty, supplying their places with creatures of the Marquis of Argyle. As the principal thing required of them was to be severe against Episcopacy and malignancy, their ignorance and corruption quickly infected the management of affairs; but, as these points were not of immediate moment to the supremacy of Presbyterianism, they passed without correction or rebuke.

But it was not enough for the Presbyterian rulers that the Parliament should pass laws for their support, and the civil authorities should execute them. It was part of their duty of government to see that the actions of men, in all departments of life, were in conformity with their standard of what was right, especially in all things that immediately affected the interests of the Kirk. They claimed the right to dictate to the government, in civil matters, what should and should not be done; to proclaim their opinions from the pulpit, and enforce them by ecclesiastical penalties. When, after the surrender of Charles I. to the English Parliament, the Scottish estates entered into an engagement to take up arms for his release, the Commission of the Kirk refused to acknowledge their authority, because some of the terms of the engagement were unsatisfactory to them, and the matter had not been previously submitted to the consideration of the Kirk. When the Committee of Estates, in response, desired: "1. That the General Assembly would be pleased to demonstrate, in writing, *from the Holy Scriptures*, the unlawfulness and sinfulness of the present engagement. 2. That the Assembly would be pleased to demonstrate, *from the Word of God*, that the Kirk has interest in the undertakings in war, and to declare what her interest is in determining thereof;" the Assembly passed an act and declaration against the Act of Parliament and Committee of Estates, and against all new oaths and bonds in the common cause, imposed without consent of the Church; and they warned, and, in the name of the Lord, charged "all the members of this Kirk to forbear the subscribing to the said act and declaration, much more the urging of the subscription thereof, as they would not incur the wrath of God and the censures of the Kirk." They likewise ordained "that presbyteries, synods, or the Commission

be careful to proceed against and censure the contraveners of this act."

When the execution of King Charles produced such an outburst of indignation among the people that the Scottish Parliament was forced to proclaim his son as King of Scotland, the Assembly only recognized him as king according to the Solemn League and Covenant, and required that "before he be admitted to the exercise of the royal power, he shall give satisfaction to the kingdom in those things that concern the security of religion, the unity between the kingdoms, and the good and peace of the kingdom of Scotland, according to the Covenant." They also censured the Parliament, because it "proclaimed this king with all public solemnity, without setting any time apart to seek the Lord for counsel and direction therein,"—that is, without appointing a fast-day, and going to hear the sentiments of the Presbyterian preachers. Moreover, when an army was raised, under Leslie, Earl of Severn, to encounter the army of the regicides, the Commission of the Kirk compelled the Committee of Estates to command all the malignants and engagers to leave the army, and to displace all officers suspected of over-loyalty; in consequence of which, four thousand loyal Churchmen defiled out of Leslie's quarters. And when, by a series of masterly manœuvres, the Scottish general had reduced Cromwell to a desperate condition, the ministers forced him to leave his strong position, and engage an army which never had been beaten in fair fight, declaring that it had been revealed to them from heaven that they should be victorious. And when Cromwell, saying, "The Lord hath delivered them into our hand," charged and scattered them like chaff, they still insisted that the defeat was due, not to their impertinent interference, but to the presence of some undiscovered Achan in the camp.

A little later, the Commission of the Kirk, driven by the disastrous condition of affairs to the exercise of a little policy, passed a resolution that, "In this case, of so great and evident necessity, we cannot be against the raising of all fencible persons in the land, and permitting them to fight against this enemy, excepting such as are excommunicated, forfeited, notoriously profane, or flagitious, or such as have been from the beginning, or continue still, and are at this time, obstinate and professed enemies and opposers of the covenant and cause of God. And for the capacity of acting, that the estates of Parliament ought to have, as we hope they will have, special care that in this so general a concurrence of all the people of the kingdom, none be put in such trust and power as may be prejudicial

to the cause of God ; and that such officers as are of known integrity and affection to the cause, and particularly such as have suffered in our former armies, may be taken special notice of." But this action at once produced an obstinate dissension among the Presbyterians ; one party, under the name of Resolutioners, upholding the action of the Commission ; another, styling themselves Remonstrators, or Protesters, denouncing it as a departure from the way of God. In fact, the whole course of Presbyterian administration at that time in Scotland indicates a firm adherence to their theory that Presbyterianism is a system of Church government which is responsible for the ordering of everything in State as well as Church, in private and in public life, according to the view of what is right, held by the members and authorities of the Church. It is tersely and distinctly stated in the famous Presbyterian work, "*The Hind Let Loose* : " "The Presbytery hath the power of making peace and war ; and the Parliament ought not to enter into any war without them, more than Joshua did without the consent of Eleazer. . . . The Presbytery alone knows, and it can only determine, what the cause of God is ; the king and Parliament are not to be complied with, but in subordination to the Covenant. The Presbytery can counteract the acts of the Estates of Parliament, and discharge the subjects from obeying such acts as are imposed without the consent of the Presbytery."

But this aspect of the Presbyterian pretensions, and this method of their application, was not the worst. It was when they came to deal with individuals, and enforce their government by crushing out all opposition, that their conduct assumes its darkest hue. The prisons were filled with those whom the ministers regarded as hostile to their authority, the foulest dungeons being especially chosen for the most distinguished and obstinate malignants. The most horrible place of confinement in Edinburgh received its name of Haddo's Hole from Sir John Gordon, of Haddo, shut up there with the warm approval of the city ministers, and executed for high treason on his refusal to subscribe the Covenant. A committee of the General Assembly, in 1645, presented a remonstrance to the Parliament, "anent executing of justice on delinquents and malignants," pressing the execution of the prisoners then in the Tolbooth. Dr. Wishart, afterward Bishop of Edinburgh, being detected in a correspondence with the loyalists, was plundered of all his property, and thrown into the Thieves' Hole, where he was almost killed by rats. Irving, of Drum, was confined, with his two sons, in the Tolbooth, where one of the sons died from cruel treatment, and the

other was so reduced, that he had to be carried to the castle on a "wand bed."

At Philiphaugh, Montrose's infantry made such an obstinate resistance, that the proposal of their adjutant to surrender on promise of quarter was accepted on their behalf. But the clergy, of whom a full presbytery were present with General Leslie's army, declared it to be an act of *sinful impiety* to spare them. They suggested to Leslie an evasion of his word, by pretending that it had been pledged only to the person to whom it had been expressly given; and the remainder were ordered to be slain. After the arms of the soldiers were weary with the slaughter, hundreds of the prisoners were taken to a high bridge, and cast headlong down from thence, while the preachers justified and urged on the massacre, by quoting texts about Agag and the Amalekites, and crying out, "Thine eye shall not pity, and thou shalt not spare." At the execution of Ogilvy, of Innerquharity, a youth of eighteen, David Dickson uttered an exclamation which passed into a by-word, "The wark goes bonnily on." When the Committee of Estates were inclined to spare some leading noblemen, Robert Blair opened the session of Parliament with a sermon on the text, "I will early destroy all the wicked of the land, that I may cut off all wicked-doers from the city of the Lord;" and at the instance of the covenanting ministers, urging it in the *name of the Kirk*, all the prisoners were ordered to execution. The scaffold of Montrose was kept standing for two months for the execution of the officers who had served under him, and such other malignants as could be found; and so active were the preachers in providing victims, that it was called "the ministers' altar;" and it was bitterly remarked that they delighted not in *unbloody sacrifices*. But the most horrible affair of all was, when Montrose, after marching into the promontory of Kentire, had disbanded his army by order of the king, and transported his active force to Ireland, leaving behind the countrymen who had been pressed into the service. David Leslie, bringing up his army in pursuit, the inhabitants submitted on the promise of life and liberty; but the "bloody preacher," John Nevay, seconded by the Marquis of Argyle, a lay elder of the Kirk, persuaded Leslie to disarm them, and put them to the sword, the minister and the lay elder walking ankle-deep in blood over the field, coolly surveying and approving of the slaughter. The hard old soldier, Leslie, was himself disgusted and horrified at the sight, and turning to the preacher, said, "Well, Mess John, have you not, for once, got your fill of blood?" A passing access of shame made them consent to

his sparing the eighteen persons, who were all that remained out of three hundred; but even these were taken to Inverary, where they would have perished of starvation in the dungeons, if Lochiel, then a minor, under the guardianship of Argyle, had not visited them, and furnished them with food.

The "Memoirs of Lochiel" present a vivid picture of this "most cruel tyranny that ever scourged and affected the sons of men," which may suffice to close this sketch. "The jails were crammed full of innocent people, the scaffold daily smoked with the blood of our best patriots; anarchy swayed with an uncontroverted authority, and avarice, cruelty, and revenge seemed to be ministers of state. The bones of the dead were dugged out of their graves, and their living friends were compelled to ransom them at exorbitant sums. Such as they were pleased to call *Malignants* were taxed and pillaged at discretion; and, if they chanced to prove the least refractory or deficient in payment, their persons or estates were seized. The Committee of the Kirk sat at the helm, and were supported by a small number of fanatics and others, who called themselves the Committee of the Estates, but were truly nothing else but the barbarous executioners of their wrath and vengeance. Every parish had a tyrant, who made the greatest lord in the district stoop to his authority. The kirk was the place where he kept his court; the pulpit his throne or tribunal, from whence he issued out his terrible decrees, and twelve or fourteen sour ignorant enthusiasts, under the title of *elders*, composed his council. If any, of what quality soever, had the assurance to disobey his edicts, the dreadful sentence of excommunication was immediately thundered out against him, his goods and chattels confiscated and seized, and himself looked upon as actually in the possession of the devil, and irretrievably doomed to eternal perdition. All that conversed with him were in no better esteem."

Such was the course taken by the Presbyterians to establish their government, and such the means by which it attained the supremacy and perfection of which Kirkton so fondly speaks. Of course, it is no wonder that it *endured not long*. The Presbytery, like the Romans, had "made a solitude, and called it peace." They had produced a temporary silence and submission, but they had planted a bitterness in the hearts of men that was certain to bear its fruit. The people began to feel that a religious system which, instead of devoting itself to the simple inculcation of spiritual truth, and instruction in practical holiness, made it its business to lay down the law on all affairs of life, and enforce submission to its crudest

opinions on the penalty of exclusion from salvation in the world to come, and loss of life, liberty, and property in the present world, was not a system under which it was endurable for men to live; and when Cromwell and his army of Independents came to put the Presbyterians down, he found not only submission, but a welcome. The Presbyterians, who, in General Assembly, had asserted that the establishment of so vast a toleration under the Independents in England "could not be the spirit of righteousness and holiness," found themselves forced to yield to Cromwell's decree that, while they should be free to preach and teach, they should no longer be permitted to inflict civil penalties as an accompaniment of their ecclesiastical censures. This caused a great commotion in the Kirk, the ministers exclaiming against toleration, as opening a door to all kinds of error and heresy; and they mourned over a broken covenant and a backsliding Kirk. The creatures of Argyle were removed, and English judges introduced to administer English law. Though this was at first not relished, yet the clearness and impartiality of their decisions, in contrast with what had been before endured, awakened warm approval; and Bishop Guthrie says: "Even the common people began now to think that no slavery could be equal to what they had already suffered from their preachers. The Parliament officers affected the character of being scourges of Presbytery. They preached and prayed in all the churches; and at last the English Commissioners themselves demanded a total abrogation of the Scotch municipal law *and the established religion.*"

In this disastrous state of affairs the dissension between the Resolutioners and the Remonstrators increased in bitterness, each laying the blame of the Church's fall on the others, and each, in turn, attempting to find favor with the English rulers, and complaining grievously of any leaning toward the other side. There was energetic vituperation in the Synod and in the General Assembly, Baillie, a leading Resolutioner, declaring "that to expect an union on the smallest submission of these men [the Remonstrators] it is in vain, though the little remainder of our Church and State should perish before our eyes." The ministers began to encounter evidences of hostile popular feeling, now that the fear of civil penalties was removed. The Synod of Perth cited several persons before them for slighting their admonitions; but, on the day of their appearance, the wives of the delinquents, to the number of about a hundred and twenty, besieged the church where the Synod sat, with clubs in their hands. The Synod sent out a deputation to appease them, and to threaten them with excommunication if they continued contuma-

cious; but, alas! Presbyterian excommunication seemed to have lost its terror with the loss of accompanying imprisonment and confiscation; for the women beat them, and dispersed the meeting. The ministers, adjourning to a village about four miles off, agreed that no more synods should be held in that place, and, shaking the dust off their feet, pronounced it "accursed,"—for which the people of Perth do not seem especially to have cared.

And, finally, upon the convening of the General Assembly at Edinburgh, in July, 1652, "Lieutenant-Colonel Cotterell beset the church with some rats of musketeers and a troop of horse; himself," according to the narrative of Mr. Baillie ("after our fast, wherein Mr. Dickson and Mr. Douglas had two gracious sermons), entered the Assembly-house, and immediately after Mr. Dickson, the moderator, offered his prayer, required audience, wherein he inquired if we did sit there by the authority of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of England, or of the commander-in-chief of the English forces, or of the English judges in Scotland? The moderator replied that we were an ecclesiastical synod, a spiritual court of Jesus Christ, which meddled not with anything civil [a considerable coming down]; that our authority was from God, and established by the laws of the land yet standing unrepealed; that, by the Solemn League and Covenant, the most of the English army stood obliged to defend our General Assembly. When some speeches of this kind had passed, the Lieutenant-Colonel told us his order was to dissolve us; whereupon, he commanded all of us to follow him, else he would drag us out of the room. . . . When he had led us a mile without the town, he then declared what further he had in commission, that we should not dare to meet any more above three in number; and that, against eight o'clock to-morrow, we should depart the town, under pain of being guilty of breaking the public peace. . . . Thus our General Assembly, the glory and strength of our Church on earth, is, by your soldiery, crushed and trodden under foot, without the least provocation from us, at this time, either in word or deed."

Cromwell never suffered the General Assemblies to meet again during his protectorate; and this may be said to have been the end of the Presbyterian Establishment, for it deprived the Kirk of its government, which was its essential and characteristic feature. The Resolutioners and Remonstrators formed two separate synods, Cromwell appointed the heads of the universities, the English judges and sequestrators, by commission of Parliament, under his orders, leaning strongly to the side of the Remonstrators, who seemed to strike hands with the Independents, and who thus acquired

the still more effective assistance of the army ; and Monk, who held command in Scotland, so utterly broke the spirit of the ministers, that they would have dissolved any of their conventions at the command of a corporal. At the same time, by maintaining exact discipline among his troops, preserving peace and order, and seeing general justice done, General Monk advanced the trade and prosperity of the country, and, with it, the contentment of the people, to an extent which deprived all ecclesiastical malcontents of power to promote disturbance. Presbyterianism had thus lost its hold upon the affections of the people, and its power to rouse them to active effort in its behalf. One of its most devoted champions, Robert Douglas, a leading minister of Edinburgh, wrote dolefully to Mr. Sharp, afterward the famous Archbishop of St. Andrew's : "There is now a generation risen up, which have never been acquainted with the work of reformation, nor with the just proceedings of this nation, and therefore would condemn them, the covenant, and all their honest and loyal actings according to the Covenant principles. You will not believe what a heart-hatred they bear to the Covenant, and how they fret that the Parliament [that is, the Long Parliament restored to power by Monk] should have revived it." And, again : "The generality of this new upstart generation have no love to presbyterial government, but are wearied of that yoke, feeding themselves with the fancy of Episcopacy, or moderate Episcopacy." Yet, as in the days of the Romish hierarchy, there were many who were alienated in feeling, yet restrained by conscience from refusing reverence to those whom they believed to be ordained by God, and endowed with mysterious authority and powers by Him ; so there were multitudes who hesitated to subvert the established system, from their conviction that the assertion of their ministers was true,—“Episcopacy and other forms are men's devices, but presbyterial government is a Divine ordinance.” There now, however, came into power one who had no such scruples, and who had the strongest reason to regard Presbyterianism with intense disgust. Charles II. had experienced the Presbyterian severity of temper and narrowness of mind, their disposition to make all things subjects of ministerial inquisition, their want of appreciation for that delicate reserve which, in refined society, makes a man's privacy, whether domestic or spiritual, sacred from impertinent intrusion, their intolerance of those amusements which incite society to mirth, and make social intercourse an occasion of cheerful relaxation, instead of a season for the exclusive consideration of spiritual concerns. He remembered their treatment of him

when he was in their hands, their insisting on his signing a declaration accusing his own father of blood-guiltiness, their ruthless expulsion from his household of all his dearest friends, their actually driving him to such extremity as to induce him to take flight from their custody; and, considering it all, he declared that Presbyterianism was not the religion of a gentleman, and felt that it was not the government for a king. So, from the moment of his restoration to the throne, he set about the reestablishment of Episcopacy throughout his dominions.

Episcopacy regards the ministry as the Divine instrument, not primarily of government so much as of grace. According to its theory, the minister is sent to do certain acts and make certain declarations, which, as performed by him, are ratified by God, and counted as effective and sure as if actually done by Jesus Christ. Of course, there is always the proviso to be supplied, that these acts are performed according to the conditions established by God, and to the persons for whom He has authorized them to be availing; but, recognizing this, there is still that high view of the office of the ministry which connects with the due performance of its functions a special grace and presence of the Holy Spirit, pledged to go with them, and not promised to be sent without them. This being so, it becomes of the first importance, before a man is sent forth avowedly to be the instrument of such grace, to utter words of absolution, and to do sacramental acts which have their value only as signifying something done by God, to be sure that he is actually one of those whom the Son of God has promised to be with, and to whom He has sent the gift of the Holy Spirit.

Those who maintain Episcopacy being profoundly convinced that the authority to commission ministers was given by Christ to a particular set of men, His Apostles, to the exclusion of all others, and was transmitted by them to the particular set of men, styled bishops, in the same exclusive way, they regard it as most essential to the well-being of the Church that all its ministers should be the covenanted ministers of grace, by being episcopally ordained. This, therefore, was the one great point pressed upon the parish ministers in Scotland. Their presbyteries and synods were left, and they were allowed to carry on the details of Church government after their chosen manner, subject to the natural and wholesome limitation of its sphere, resulting from the loss of supremacy and the prestige of power; no robe or ritual was imposed upon them; but they were required to accept collation to their cures at the hands of the bishops, which involved ordination by them. Many consciously

revolted from this, regarding themselves as already possessed of a valid ordination; and so, of the nine hundred parish ministers in Scotland, at least a hundred were obliged to leave their cures. The number was increased by suspensions and depositions for recusancy, contumacy, or implication in rebellious risings, until Wodrow is able to make out a list of four hundred ministers deprived in the course of the reign of Charles II. But though such a number of ministers were removed, the change to Episcopacy would have been productive of comparatively little trouble except in five of the western counties, had it not been for the position of the Church as a State establishment, and the use attempted to be made of it as such by the State authorities. There were large numbers of men and women in Scotland who had subscribed the solemn League and Covenant, and held themselves to be irrevocably bound by its provisions. They held it unlawful to acknowledge any one as king who had not taken and did not keep the Covenant; and considered it a sin to submit to any government, except such a one as they had covenanted to support. As all those who were thus disaffected toward the State were for similar reasons disaffected toward the Church, it occurred to the members of the Scottish Privy Council to make church-going a test of loyalty, and to punish refusal to attend the established worship as an act of incipient rebellion. Orders were sent to the clergy, requiring them to make lists of all such as neglected to attend public worship; and as many of the Covenanters as had scruples about attending the services held by their parish ministers felt their consciences free to listen to certain chosen ones whom they regarded as still faithful, troopers were often stationed to arrest and interrogate persons entering or leaving church, as to whether they were not wandering from their proper place of worship. To make this condition of things more tolerable to the loyal Presbyterians, however, such of the Presbyterian ministers as would accept certain reasonable and moderate conditions, binding them not to intrude upon or interfere with the regular parish ministers, were permitted to minister to persons of their persuasion; and in case there were no vacant churches and stipends ready to receive them, a maintenance of four hundred marks a year was specially appointed for them. About forty of the best of the Presbyterian preachers were offered this *indulgence*, as it was called, and it was willingly accepted by all; and all Presbyterians through Scotland who could have access to their ministrations, cheerfully availed themselves of it, until some of the more violent of the old protesters who had been banished and had fled to Holland, wrote against it, and denounced

it as a breach of covenanted faith and a bowing the knee to Baal. The stricter Covenanters thereupon resorted to the hill-sides, when the most enthusiastic preachers of the party gave their eloquence full scope; and as, in order to keep up their ministry the Presbyterian preachers, both silenced and indulged, held frequent secret meetings where they licensed such young men as they could persuade to enter on the work of preaching, there was soon no lack of such ignorant fanaticism as that which prompted a Mr. Blackadder to preach thus: "Ask any old dying woman if she has any evidence of salvation. She will tell you, 'I hope so; for I believe the Apostles' Creed, I am taken with the Lord's Prayer, and I know my duty to be the Ten Commandments; but I tell you, sirs, these are but old rotten wheelbarrows to carry the soul to hell!'" As rebellion was preached as vigorously as Calvinism at these conventicles—the name given to the field preachings by those who objected to them—the Privy Council took steps to put them down. Military garrisons of one company of foot and twelve horse were stationed in the houses of two noblemen and ten gentlemen in the western shires, where the conventicles were commonly held; heritors were obliged to become bound for their families, tenants, and cottagers, that they should not go to conventicles, or frequent the company of intercommuned, that is, outlawed persons, and any landowner receiving tenants or servants of any other proprietor, without a certificate from the latter, or from the parish minister that they had conformed to the law, was subject to fine at the discretion of the Council. But as the disturbance in the west continued, being directed especially against the clergy as most defenceless and exposed, until fifty-eight parishes in Glasgow and Galloway became vacant at one time from actual violence done to the incumbents by the Presbyterians; and as thousands of the peasantry would frequently assemble in arms, under pretext of an "Occasion," as they were accustomed to call the administration of the Lord's Supper, the Council ordered a number of men from the Highland clans to be led into the south-western counties, and kept there at free-quarters among the Presbyterians. But as these Highlanders paid as little reverence to friends as to foes, and as the Episcopal clergy, with their parishioners and the loyal supporters of the Government, had as much cause of complaint against them as the Covenanters, they were soon withdrawn, leaving an intense feeling of bitterness and sense of oppression behind them. Conventicles began again at once, and became more dangerous than ever; more troops were raised to suppress them, and a cess imposed for their support; and the soldiers were protected by the authori-

ties in a very brutal manner of making their inquisitions. As all these proceedings were carried on against practices professedly religious, and on the plea that they were opposed to the religion by law established, the hatred of the sufferers was directed against the Church, and especially the primate, who was unjustly regarded as the instigator of the severities. His life had already been once attempted by a fanatic named Mitchell, and a plan had been laid by a band of respectably connected women to mob him to death, though the execution of it failed; but at length, in May, 1679, a body of determined men, under Hackston of Rathillet, and Balfour of Burley, laid wait for him, as he was travelling in his carriage, and murdered him, with aggravated cruelty, before his daughter's eyes. Thereupon, the Western Whigs rose in rebellion, and, after defeating Claverhouse, in a skirmish at London Hill on the 1st of June, were themselves utterly routed on the 21st of the same month at Bothwell Bridge. An indemnity was offered by the Government to all engaged in this affair, on condition that they would bind themselves never to carry arms against the Government, attend conventicles, or offer violence to the Episcopal clergy; but it was taken advantage of by but very few. The depression consequent upon the defeat, however, diminished the enthusiasm for attending field preaching, and all the preachers, except Richard Cameron and Donald Cargill, seemed to have ceased to act. After the death of the first, and the capture of the other of these men, in 1680, conventicles altogether ceased to be held in the fields, and there was but very little preaching in private houses, until James Renwick renewed both in the autumn of 1683.

But though this form of opposition died away, and by means of a stringent test-oath men were brought to an outward conformity, and even to temporary attendance at the parish churches, yet the effect upon the feelings of the people was favorable neither to Church nor State. Both were regarded as oppressive to the conscience; and those who, for the sake of liberty and property, submitted to an outward conformity which they secretly regarded as a sin, laid their guilt at the door of the Church, and hated it more intensely than before.

In the meantime, the clergy, who were thus made tools of the civil authority, were also at times its victims. Such of them as were devoted to their spiritual work, and objected to have it hindered by the services which the orders of Council exacted of them, were fined and even imprisoned for their negligence, while the test-oath was so worded as to press upon their consciences as severely as

on those of the Covenanters. In fact, they almost unanimously declined to take it. More than a hundred suffered in consequence the deprivation of their livings, and then, only after the passage of an explanatory act, which was a practical retraction of the obnoxious clause, would the remaining bishops and clergy make the required subscription. This unfortunate test-oath, indeed, aimed originally at the Presbyterians, contributed very largely toward the disestablishment of the Episcopal Church; for it bound the subscribers so stringently to the maintenance of the monarchy, in the line of the then reigning house, that the clergy, after taking it, felt themselves precluded from transferring their allegiance.

While thus strictly treated by the civil rulers, the clergy had also to endure severe persecution by the people in those parts of the country where the Covenanters, or, as it was now called, Cameronians, were numerous, suffering robbery, personal assault, and even murder, at their hands. Yet, notwithstanding all, they were not unsuccessful in bringing the people within the pale of the Church, and, in many quarters, diminishing and even entirely removing all dissent. Had it not been for the bitterness occasioned by the proceedings of the Privy Council, their success would have been still more marked; and even as it was, at the death of Charles II. the Church was in a more prosperous and peaceable state than it had been since the Restoration. The Romanists were only as one to five hundred. The Presbyterians were divided into two sects which utterly hated each other,—the Indulged and the Cameronians. Indeed, in 1682, some of the fiercer Cameronians had formed a plot to assassinate in one night all the Indulged preachers in the county of Ayr. The Indulged were thus drawn more and more by their opposition to the Cameronians toward the Church, and for the most part conformed and attended its ministrations. The better informed Presbyterians acknowledged that they could conscientiously live in communion with the Episcopal Church, and were willingly reconciled to it. By degrees the Liturgy of the Church of England was introduced, permission for its use being granted in 1680 to such as desired; and pious hearts in Scotland began to hope for better times. But then began the attempts of James II. to secure the supremacy of Rome, and this awakened the Protestant spirit of the kingdom to the intensest vigor. The action of the Church was hampered by the bonds which the State had thrown around it; and the Presbyterians took advantage of the greater freedom granted them for the very purpose of dividing Protestantism, to combine together by themselves. Yet still, on the accession of William of

Orange, the Church, if it had been willing to acknowledge him as the lawful sovereign, might have maintained its established position. He wished for uniformity of religion throughout the realm, and made repeated advances to the bishops and their clergy. But these were Jacobites in politics, almost to a man, and were further restrained by the special test-oath that they had taken.

Thereupon, he declared for Presbyterianism, and ejected all the parish ministers who declined conformity. To their credit be it said, that scarcely a priest hesitated to give up his living rather than desert his Church, though he not only had to endure the loss of income, but also a persecution far more severe than any that had been endured by the Presbyterians at the Restoration. (The exact number who fell away was twenty out of a thousand.) In the Western counties, the clergy were *rabbled*, their wives and children cast out of their houses, often in the night, naked, at the most inclement season of the year. Penal laws were enacted and enforced with a strictness which it was impossible to evade. Any minister of the Episcopal Church in Scotland who officiated to more than four persons in addition to the members of his own family, was liable to imprisonment and fine; and if he prayed, as they almost all felt bound to do, for the banished king, he became subject to the penalties of treason. But the consideration of the condition of the Church after its disestablishment, and of the proceedings of the Presbyterian establishment that took its place, may well afford materials for another article. Enough has been said at present to show the disastrous influence upon the Church's efficiency as a spiritual body exercising spiritual functions, of its connection with, and bondage to, the State.



THE FIRST BISHOP OF VERMONT.

The Life of the late Right Reverend John Henry Hopkins, First Bishop of Vermont, and Seventh Presiding Bishop. By One of his Sons. 8vo. New York: F. J. Huntington & Co. 1878. Pp. 481.

THE life of a bishop—the career of a “presiding bishop”—is not necessarily worthy of detailed recital. Though “abundant in labors,” though a wise and faithful “overseer;” that he lived, toiled, and died; that he rests in peace, and that his record is on high, is enough for epitaph and biography, so far as earth is concerned, for such an one. But now and then there are efforts and successes marking the else uneventful years of an episcopate which claim both record and remembrance. Now and then there are lives so far-reaching in their out-goings of influence, and so closely connected with the advances of opinion or the settlement of important questions of thought and belief, that the story of the individual becomes the history of the movement, or the age itself.

Thus eventful, thus successful, thus marked and important, was the life of the first Bishop of Vermont. The record of this life is before us, prepared by one who found in his self-imposed task the gratification of filial as well as Churchly love. The spirit of the work can best be learned from the writer’s words: “To a Catholic mind, when desponding or disheartened under some little annoyance of the present moment, there is nothing more consoling than to

watch the gradual growth of the great Church revival, as unfolded in the various steps of a life like this of the first Bishop of Vermont. The proof that God's Holy Spirit is at work in our American branch of the Church; that He is causing the 'root out of a dry ground' to spring and bud and blossom, and to bring forth the ripe fruits of Catholic unity and beauty and brotherly love; that He overrules errors, and brings good out of evil, and accomplishes results, through men, which those men never dreamed of; the proof of all this is a cumulative proof, and grows stronger with each year of our past history, which is carefully examined.

"My general rule of condensation in preparing this sketch of my father's life, has been to make as graphic a picture of the man himself as was in my power, under the limitations which must ever control the pen of a son; and, as part of this, I have given some prominence to the characteristics of American society in the early part of the century, and to the peculiarly American commingling of nationalities,—English, Irish, French, and German being here brought together in one family. Next, the chief stress has been laid on those parts of his thought and action which bore directly on the great Catholic revival of our age, and the growth and hopes of the Future. And, lastly, I have paid the least attention to those things which belong to the fading and disappearing, the effete and dying Past. This is the rule of choice which I know would have been most agreeable to him.

"As a pledge of my fidelity to truth, I can only say that every word of this work has been written in the room in which my father breathed his last,—has been written at the desk where he wrought, and from the very inkstand out of which he wrote for years; and, as it were, with his presence in the very air about me all the while. And, were it in my power, I would gladly lay the manuscript before him in Paradise, that it should receive his corrections before it is seen by any other eye."

Thus undertaken, thus prepared, there is given us a most readable volume. Abundant materials were at the writer's command, and the narrative is skilfully interwoven with the very words of the many actors in the scene. Much is said that, in the view of those who care only for "smooth things," might have been left unsaid. Much appears on these pages which might have been left for the future historian or antiquary to unearth from the rubbish-heaps of old pamphlets and letters. But, be this as it may, there is not an uninteresting page in the work, and once begun, the reader cannot lay down the story till the whole is told. Even the old-time con-

troversies rivet attention, and the minuteness of detail, and the ingenious mosaic of contemporary words and phrases, give to these exhibitions of partisan spirit a painful reality, which, we trust, may go far to prevent their renewal.

Charming is the picture which the writer draws of the early life of his father. The varied experiences, the strange succession of differing influences, even in youth, gave him that many-sided mind which was a marked characteristic of all the after years of life. The hand of God was seen in closing up, one after another, the avenues to success in various walks of life, till—after the heart of the young man had been consecrated to Christ, and the devotion of the young convert had not failed to impress a conviction of its depth and reality on all about him—there came to him, with no uncertain sound, the call to Holy Orders. The narrative of the strange providences preceding this call to a new vocation; the circumstances of early struggles; the romantic marriage with one in every way fitted to be his other self; the opening successes at the bar, and the election to the rectorship of the only living parish of the Church in Western Pennsylvania, ere he had even decided to enter the ministry, much less ere the period of candidacy for Orders had begun, make up a portion of this unique biography, at once fascinating and instructive. It is the record of the workings of the Head of the Church in preparing for leadership, in the Sacramental Host of His elect, of a "chosen Apostle of the Truth."

Entering the ministry late in life, but eight years of busy labor intervened before the episcopate was his. These years of earnest effort, and no little success, were spent mostly in Pittsburgh, where he laid broad foundations, which, after many years, are still to be traced. Careful study in his new profession, the erection of a new and spacious church from plans prepared by himself, the preparation of the music of the sanctuary, the visitation of neighboring points for aggressive Church work, and the presentation of large classes for Confirmation, added to his distinguished success as a parish priest and a preacher, made him a man of note throughout the diocese, and directed toward him the eyes of many who were casting about to discover the fitting assistant and successor of the venerable Bishop White. The story of that remarkable struggle in which, as his biographer remarks, Mr. Hopkins "appears as the leading candidate of the Low Church party, while, in reality, it was his vote which elected the nominee of the High Church party," need not be repeated here. It is by no means a chapter in our annals of which we have any reason to be proud. And yet, if the recital of the

story of "the contested Episcopal election" of Pennsylvania should stamp with fitting reprobation the party spirit and the party tactics, which never appeared more unlovely than in this bitter struggle, these historic pages will have answered an important end. At least, the "golden words" of him who "had virtually received the vote of nearly every member of that fiercely divided Convention except his own, and yet was not elected bishop," in reply to those who would have had him, for the sake of a party triumph, strive to secure votes for himself, may be some compensation for the "malice, guile, hypocricies, envies, and evil speakings" of this sad time. The words are these:

"If, without any effort of mine, the Great Head of the Church should put it (the episcopate) upon me, I must look to Him for grace and strength to fulfil its arduous duties. But if I were to step one inch out of my parochial sphere in order to increase a favorable delegation, or to influence, in the smallest degree, the votes which are to decide the election, I should never feel satisfied that my appointment was so strictly Providential, as I must esteem it in order to be at peace in my own mind. This, with me, is a point of conscience, independently of all the minor motives of delicacy and propriety, which dictate my being as quiescent as possible where I am aware I may be myself concerned."

It was but natural that one whose missionary zeal had been so fully and so constantly shown throughout Western Pennsylvania should feel the importance of means for the increase of a well-learned ministry; and it was only after earnest efforts to secure the establishment of a School of the Prophets, in Pittsburgh, had failed, from the apathy of the Churchmen in the eastern part of the diocese, that the rector of Trinity, Pittsburgh, listened to a "call" to Boston. It was the prospect of seeing such a theological seminary at the East, as he had desired in his old home, which was the moving cause of this severance of the ties binding him to his first parish; and when the failure of this hope was apparent, and the choice of the Diocese of Vermont had fallen upon him, the question of his acceptance of the offered see was easily decided. A few weeks subsequent to the consecration found him in his field, and the life struggle began anew.

The effort for the successful establishment of diocesan Church schools has marked the episcopate of more than one of our more earnest bishops in the past. The evident need of institutions of learning, and the manifest impolicy of committing the training of the youth of the Church to those who were, if not hostile, at least

strangers to her distinctive teachings, has impelled one bishop after another to undertake the establishment of educational institutions of various grades under the Church's control. It is a pitiful commentary on the lack of Churchly zeal and far-sightedness on the part of the past generation, that the result of these earnest and self-sacrificing efforts was, in every case, disappointment, obloquy, and debt. It will be well for the men of wealth of our time to read the touching narrative of the Bishop of Vermont's struggle for diocesan schools, and the sad tale may yield late fruit, if it prevents similar shameful experiences in our own day and generation. The lack of support accorded to Hopkins, in Vermont; to Doane, in New Jersey; to Otey, in Tennessee; to Elliott, in Georgia; the niggardly support doled out to Washington College, in Connecticut; to Geneva College, in Western New York; to Kenyon, in Ohio; to Kemper, in Missouri, and other Church institutions in various portions of the land, resulting in the crippling of all and the ruin of some of these nurseries of the Church, have put back the Church's growth to a degree it is hardly possible to exaggerate. Well shall it be for us if we take warning from past failures, and strengthen the things which remain.

So far as Vermont was concerned, the immediate results were disastrous in the extreme. Disappointed in the cherished hopes for which he had dared, attempted, and endured so much; harassed with debts; helpless to relieve a want he could not fail to see, and almost losing hope of the future, it was a loving Providence that suffered the clouds to rift as the evening time drew near, and gave to the bishop's last years at least a partial realization of his early hopes, and the good promise of a lasting success.

But we may not anticipate. To the mingling of parochial, Episcopal, and educational labors, the toils of authorship were added. It seemed as though the bishop's powers were commensurate with every call that could be made upon them. He could "toil terribly;" and the manifold results of earnest, faithful labor, pursued under every discouragement, soon appeared beyond the narrow limits of his diocese, making the influence of the Bishop of Vermont felt throughout the American Church, and recognized abroad.

It was the fortune of Bishop Hopkins to live in troublous times. The virulence of party spirit, which had been so painfully apparent in the diocesan difficulties of Pennsylvania, and had not been unknown elsewhere, culminated in the bitter strife which raged with reference to the Oxford movement, and in the personal attacks

which grew out of the ill-temper and partisan excesses of that memorable struggle. As a student of the writings of the fathers, as an ardent defender of the usages of the primitive Church, as a keen and trenchant controversialist, the pen of Bishop Hopkins was early and busily employed. His writings were eagerly sought for and widely read. They elicited the warmest commendations from critics of varying shades of opinion, and often of exceptional authority. His earlier studies in the law gave him peculiar influence upon the canonical legislation of the time. His clear insight, his argumentative readiness, and his experience in the forms of legal procedure, made him not only an authority in the House of Bishops, but gave to his connection with the episcopal trials which occurred during his episcopate a most noticeable fairness, and a maturity of judgment not always inherent to the episcopate.

To the skilfully-prepared chapters of the biography would we refer for an interesting *résumé* of the history of that troubled period of our Church's progress, when the Bishops of New York and New Jersey were brought to trial for alleged criminal offences. The conviction of Bishop Onderdonk, and the vindication of Bishop Doane, are too well known to require more than a passing allusion from us. Of far greater moment, so far as our purpose is concerned, is the gradual change in the constitutional position of the episcopate, as unfolded by the biographer in chapters xii. xiii. xiv. The establishment of the principle that a bishop is amenable to his own order, instead of being amenable solely to his Convention, was largely, if not solely in the first instance, due to the Bishop of Vermont. The legislation of the Church on the matter of discipline received important modifications and amendments at his hands. His position on the committee of the House of Bishops on Canons, which he maintained for many years, gave him opportunities, which he was not slow to improve, for securing an uniform administration of ecclesiastical justice. In fact, he could never be idle where there were wrongs to be righted, or evils to be provided against.

It were impossible, within the limits which are ours, even to indicate the passages of surpassing interest, both from their intrinsic importance and the felicity of their presentation, which stud these pages, and make even the stories of issues long since fought and wellnigh forgotten, as attractive as the pages of a romance. The home life at Rock Point, where loving hands and well-directed labor made attractive a spot reclaimed from the wilderness, is charmingly detailed. The effort to put down Tractarianism, and

the share taken by Bishop Hopkins in the various measures which were tried to effect this end, are told with a raciness and skill which are characteristics of the writer's style. The literary life of the versatile bishop has its fitting chronicling. The story of the bishop's course during the civil war is most instructive, while, in the animated chapter on the reunion of the Church, the biographer gives us a most attractive summary of measures, the memory of which will linger lovingly in the mind. Notices of the golden wedding—a fitting feature for a wedded life of singular devotion and happiness—of the bishop's simple verse, and his judgment on certain points of canonical procedure, have their appropriate place, bringing us at length to those portions of the work which may possibly claim our most serious consideration. These chapters are those which refer to the bishop's theological opinions, to "Ritualism," and to the Lambeth Conference.

To judge of Bishop Hopkins's views of ritual, we need merely to cite his own words, as reported by his son, and to add to this expression of his opinion *after* the publication of his "little book" the explanatory paragraph on which the bishop would have his work received. We quote from the memoir (p. 379) the bishop's words, uttered when his book was receiving the critical notices of his brethren in the episcopate: ". . . I am satisfied that I have never done the Church a greater service than by that little book on 'The Law of Ritualism.' We have the old Catholic Creed; we have the Apostolic succession; we have valid Sacraments; we have an admirable Liturgy; we have all the grand substantial features of a true branch of the one Catholic and Apostolic Church. And yet the practical working of our system seems to have an almost inevitable tendency to run down into semi-stagnation,—a half-dead-and-alive sort of condition, and the most constant exertion is needed merely to keep ourselves above the level of deadness. Now, what is the reason of this? except that we have unwisely thrown overboard so many of those beautiful and impressive usages which are thoroughly authorized in Holy Scripture; which have always been freely used in the Catholic Church; which God himself made to be agreeable and interesting to human nature; and which were consecrated of old to His service by His express command. If, therefore, in addition to all we have already said, we could only regain a rich and gorgeous ceremonial, we should no longer have the old stagnation to contend with, but the Church would feel new life and vigor throughout her whole body, and to the very ends of her fingers and toes."

To this we add the following paragraph from the Introduction (pp. 4, 5) to "The Law of Ritualism:"

"I am quite aware that, although my line of argument will be entirely Scriptural, yet the same objection may be made to my conclusions which has been so zealously urged against the English Ritualists, namely, that they are in danger of drawing too near the Church of Rome. To this I can only reply, in advance, that our glorious Reformation was directed, not against the *ritualism* of Rome, so far as it retained the sanction of the Bible and the primitive Church, but against those false and corrupt *doctrines* by which she had so grossly innovated upon the pure creed of the Gospel. The main labors of my ministerial life have been devoted to our controversy with Rome, to the defence of our martyred reformers, and to the vindication of our own Scriptural, Apostolic, and really *Catholic* system. I have nothing to retract or to alter in all my former publications on that subject; nor is there a sentence in the present work which can justly be considered inconsistent with the position which I have hitherto maintained as the uncompromising antagonist of Popery. That there are some features of *Ritualism* in which the Church of Rome and the Oriental Churches are in closer accordance with the primitive practice than we are, may, indeed, be granted. But it will be seen in the following pages that it was otherwise at the time when our Reformation was established under Edward VI., and that these matters do not involve the slightest change in our Liturgy or Articles. Nor do I mean to be understood as *recommending* any alteration in our ordinary mode of worship. To this, neither my habits nor my advanced age would lead me to incline. But my personal tastes and my life-long associations furnish no sufficient warrant for a judgment which condemns any of my brethren, either here or elsewhere, who seek for a closer accordance with what they regard as a better standard, on the highest authority. On the ground of *law* I may be obliged to grant that their argument is entitled to confidence. Yet it does not follow from this that I should take any active part in their course, so long as I feel doubtful of its expediency."

And again he writes (p. 3):

"In the Church of God, which is Christ's kingdom upon earth, there must be not only the inward life, but the *outward manifestation*. My present subject concerns the latter only. There is no question about the *faith* in the blessed Redeemer, who died for our sins and rose again for our justification; no question that by this faith we must be saved through grace; no question that this precious

grace is not of ourselves, but is the free gift of God. All this involves the *inward life* of each individual believer, for which, of course, no outward form and order can be regarded as a substitute. Who would be so absurd as to imagine that the form and order of the body could supply the living energy of the soul? And it would be just as absurd to suppose that the outward form and order of the Church can avail, when the spiritual grace of a living faith in Christ is wanting."

It is evident from these passages that, however in other and comparatively minor matters the bishop's views may have modified with advancing years, or may have been influenced by the arguments of others, there was no condoning of false doctrine in his argument for a more ornate ritual. In fact, the action, or rather the non-action, of the General Convention of 1871, with reference to this very question, may be held to have endorsed the bishop's position. If so, it was not the first time he was far in the advance of his age and his brethren.

It was as a fitting close to a useful and honored life that he who had first suggested the assembling of such a council should be permitted, as the presiding bishop of the American Church, to participate in the scenes of the Conference of Bishops in communion with the Anglican Church at Lambeth, in 1867. The pages of this biography give us, for the first time, a monograph of that memorable meeting; and we cannot do a greater service to those who have not the volume we are noticing in hand, than by quoting at length portions of the chapter which is the record of the gathering:

"On Tuesday, September 24th, the Conference of seventy-eight bishops met at Lambeth, more quietly than any seventy-eight bishops had ever met before. They held their service in the chapel where Provoost and White and Madison had been consecrated. The sermon was preached by the Bishop of Illinois, and the Holy Eucharistic sacrifice was offered; but no one was permitted to be present but the bishops, and there was no note of music from beginning to end.

"On proceeding to business, it was found that the introductory resolution on the programme gave rise to discussions which consumed the whole day, and the debate was adjourned to the morrow. That introduction included two of the points objected to by Dr. Pusey,—the setting up Anglicanism as a model, and the recognizing of only four general councils. On this last subject my father moved that the four be changed to '*six*,' and supported his amendment in an earnest speech, in which he showed the immense import-

ance, in the controversies of the present day, of the action of the Fifth and Sixth General Councils; for the Fifth had condemned a number of errors, some of which were identical with some of those set forth by Colenso; while the Sixth was famous for having condemned Pope Honorius as a heretic. The omission of these two General Councils, therefore, would be, as he urged, a triumph both to Colensoists and Romanists, the two chief parties with whom the Church was at present compelled to fight the good fight of faith. The amendment was not carried in that precise form; but to the effect of his speech it was mainly due that the phrase was finally settled as 'the undisputed General Councils,' which is the same thing; the mover of this amendment being the [late] Bishop of Winchester.

"On Thursday the Colenso matter came up. When the colonial part of the programme was reached, the Metropolitan of New Zealand rose and moved the amendment finally agreed on by the colonial bishops in their meeting at Archdeacon Wordsworth's. It declared—

"That, in the judgment of the bishops now assembled, the whole Anglican communion is deeply injured by the present condition of the Church in Natal; and that a committee be now appointed at this general meeting [to consider the case, and inquire into all the proceedings which have been taken therein, and] to report on the best mode by which the Church may be delivered from the continuance of this scandal, and the true faith maintained. That such report be forwarded to his Grace the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury, with the request that he will be pleased to transmit the same to all the bishops of the Anglican communion, and to ask for their judgment thereupon.'"

"But, in the speech which he made on moving this, the courageous Bishop of New Zealand went beyond the text of his amendment, and declared that the whole question, 'Do we believe that the judgment of the Bishop of Capetown is valid or not?' ought to be met and settled by the Conference. He was seconded by the Bishop of Montreal.

"The Bishop of Vermont then rose and declared it impossible for him, on such a question, to content himself with voting for a resolution which did not utter a syllable of sympathy for the Bishop of Capetown any more than for the Bishop of Natal; and which, by proposing a committee to inquire afresh into the whole case, put it in the power of the friends of Colenso to claim that it was the acts of the Bishop of Capetown which were to be inquired into and reported on, rather than anything said or done by the Bishop of

Natal. He could not consent to leave it thus doubtful which party was really on trial. He therefore moved the following substitute for the resolution offered by the Bishop of New Zealand :

“ ‘WHEREAS, The bishops of the Holy Catholic Church, in communion with the Church of England, hold it to be their sacred and imperative duty to maintain the unerring truth of the Holy Scriptures, as the Divinely-inspired rule of Christian faith and practice, and to condemn as false and heretical all doctrine which is opposed to the same.

“ ‘And whereas, Doctor John William Colenso, some time Bishop of Natal, has taught and published many great and grievous errors, against the authority of the Holy Scriptures, and utterly subversive of the Catholic faith; which errors have been condemned by the Convocations of Canterbury and York, by the Synod of the Episcopal Church in Scotland, by the General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States, and by every principal synod of the Colonial Churches.

“ ‘And whereas, the said Doctor John William Colenso, after due and repeated admonitions, has been deposed and excommunicated by the Metropolitan of the Province of South Africa, with the unanimous consent of the Synod, for the said grievous and notorious errors, involving the most destructive heresy, and nevertheless refuses obstinately to submit himself to the united voice of the whole Anglican communion, and now contumaciously acts in defiance of the same, scattering and oppressing the flock of Christ, which he was appointed to gather and to feed with the saving truth of the everlasting Gospel.

“ ‘Therefore, *Resolved*, That the bishops of the Holy Catholic Church assembled from every quarter of the Anglican communion in this present Conference, do hereby declare their entire approval of the deposition and excommunication of the said Doctor John William Colenso, as valid, righteous, and just. And while they abstain from pronouncing any opinion concerning the judgment of the secular courts, they will hold themselves bound to regard the said Doctor John William Colenso as a heretic, cut off from the communion of the Church, until, by the grace of God, he shall renounce his grievous errors, and be openly reconciled by lawful authority, for which we devoutly pray.’ ”

“This substitute he supported in a speech of great earnestness and vigor, handling the subject with a boldness and pungency which made a decided impression upon the Conference. He was supported bravely by the Bishop of Salisbury, whose manly and outspoken defence of the right, on this occasion, my father often afterward spoke of with grateful admiration; but, if I am correctly informed, no other English bishop stood with him in this.

“All the opposition, however, came from the English bishops. The Bishop of St. David’s—their chief spokesman on this occasion—rose and objected to the discussion of the subject in any way whatever. He protested against entering into the question, on the

ground that to do so would be a breach of faith toward himself, and perhaps others; and he threw himself upon the president's 'honor and good faith.' The president was in so delicate and disagreeable a predicament, that he did not at once speak out. A long discussion ensued as to whether the whole case should be gone into or not, during which several bishops, especially those of New Zealand and Grahamstown, declared that they were not bound by the archbishop's programme, of which they knew nothing until they reached England; whereas, they had come from the ends of the earth expressly for the discussion of this question. The Bishop of New Zealand added that it would be most unfair if bishops, who had been accused of uncanonical proceedings, and claimed inquiry, were not heard; and dwelt strongly upon the Bishop of St. David's assertions upon the subject in his late *Charge*. During that discussion the Bishop of St. David's appealed *four times* to the president, and called upon him to close the debate, as its continuance would be a breach of a solemn engagement. At length the archbishop, thus compelled to speak, ruled that neither the Bishop of Vermont's substitute nor the Bishop of St. Andrew's amendment (which had been moved during the debate, and with which the Bishop of Capetown had expressed himself satisfied) could be submitted to the Conference; but that it was no breach of the previous understanding to discuss, amend, or adopt the Bishop of New Zealand's motion. The Bishop of Vermont, on this decision, rose and withdrew his substitute, making a closing speech, however, in which he alluded to the pressing and imperative importance of the question; spoke of his own advanced years, and of the short time within which he must stand before the Judge, the great Head of the Church, to render his account, and said that his sense of responsibility to the Master would not have permitted him, for any earthly consideration, to say one word less than he had said that day. But the responsibility, he added, was now in other hands, and there he left it.

"The Bishop of Capetown then rose, and stated that he had had no intimation, when invited to attend the Conference, that there would be any restriction put upon it as to the subjects to be discussed thereat; that, had he been informed that this case would not be gone into, he would not have come; that he had hoped to enjoy the opportunity of vindicating himself from the aspersions which had been cast upon him and his proceedings; and that there should have been some expression on the part of the members of the Conference, either that they did, or that they did not, accept the valid-

ity of the spiritual sentence upon Colenso. He then read a resolution which he had himself intended to submit to the Conference, and sat down, saying that he submitted to the ruling of the president.

"The Bishop of New Zealand's resolution was then adopted, omitting, at the suggestion of the president himself, the words enclosed above in brackets. The Bishop of Oxford (now of Winchester), a few moments after, privately asked my father to permit the use of his substitute as a *declaration*, to be signed by as many of the bishops as might desire to do so; but he declined, on the ground of delicacy, saying that, if any paper of that kind were to be signed, it ought not to be left to an American bishop to originate it. He, therefore, brought his substitute home with him, and, on reaching his room in the hotel, endorsed on the back of it these words: 'Resolution offered at the Council of Lambeth, but not acted on, because of the understanding between the Archbishop and the Bishop of St. David's that the subject of Dr. Colenso should not be introduced. London, September 26, 1867.'

"But the discussion had gone too deep into the hearts and consciences of the bishops to lie still under the archbishop's private understanding with some few individuals. On the last day of the session, Friday, the Bishop of St. Andrew's earnestly appealed to the Bishop of St. David's to waive his 'understanding' with the archbishop, in order to introduce for action a *declaration* drawn up by the Bishop of Oxford, touching the fact of the present *status* of Dr. Colenso. But the Bishop of St. David's refused to waive a pledge which had been given to others besides himself. The *declaration* referred to was then produced, notwithstanding, as a paper signed 'by the bishops assembled at Lambeth,' the words 'in conference' being omitted; and it was signed in the same room, and during the continuance of the session, by *fifty-six* of the bishops. Nor was this all; for the same morning papers which published the Synodical Letter of the Lambeth Conference, published also the fact that a faithful and orthodox priest had been appointed to be consecrated in place of the deposed and excommunicated Colenso. The committee on the Bishop of New Zealand's resolution, moreover, in their report to the adjourned meeting of the Conference in December, covered pretty much the whole ground of the 'substitute' that was ruled out in September, and it was received and published without a word of opposition.

"On two other points my father spoke in the September meeting of the Conference. One of the English bishops made a well-

meant, but not a very happy allusion to the American bishops, as not enjoying the advantages of a union between Church and State. This brought out from the Bishop of Vermont a rejoinder which, without attacking the position of the Church Establishment in England, so pointedly put the case on the other side, as to call forth the enthusiastic admiration of many of the American bishops, who afterward spoke of it.

"The other point was, as to the publication of the stenographic report of the proceedings, which had been resolved on at the preliminary meeting. But the Colenso episode had made a change. The good archbishop's blunder was a very uncomfortable blunder for him, and for many of the English bishops; and the colonial and American bishops were courteously unwilling to add to his annoyance by publicity. But the trouble was, how to avoid it. The first alteration of the original resolution was, that the publication should be made, with such omissions as the president should deem judicious. It was soon seen, however, that to make clear work of this, the report would be something like 'the play of Hamlet, with the part of Hamlet left out.' So, at the close, it was resolved that the stenographic report should be written out in full, and laid up in the archives at Lambeth, to be consulted only by bishops, and even by them not for publication. In vain did my father oppose this resolution. Two American bishops—but, so far as known, only two, the Bishops of Ohio and New York—opposed him; and the amiable archbishop was evidently so little desirous of full publication, that, with few affirmative votes, and still fewer in the negative, the resolution was carried. Before leaving England, my father made a pressing application to the archbishop for a transcript of the stenographic report, to be made at the expense of the American bishops, and for their use. He urged this on the very reasonable ground that 'our absent brethren have a right to know what we said and did as representing them.' But the reply was a polite and even kind refusal; the archbishop 'could not, consistently with the expressed will and judgment of the Conference, comply with the request.' He held out hopes, however, that something might be done about it at the adjourned meeting in December; and then, accordingly, a resolution was adopted:

"That his Grace be requested, if applied to by the House of Bishops in the Episcopal Church in the United States of America, to allow a copy of the records of the Conference to be made for them, and to be lodged in the hands of such officer as shall be designated by the House of Bishops to receive it, for reference by bishops only, but not for publication."

The importance of the subject, and the prospective interest which attaches to this initial meeting of bishops in communion with the Church of England, in view of the probable convening of another and a fuller synod of Anglican bishops, must be our excuse for quoting in full this record—the fullest in existence—of this memorable gathering. Besides, the interesting notice of the part taken in this Conference by the presiding bishop of our own Church on the side of Catholic truth and order, is one of which we have reason to be proud. Nor we alone. The following words, spoken by the Bishop of Quebec, at the burial of the Bishop of Vermont, attest the estimate in which his efforts at this Conference were regarded by those who witnessed them :

“In that great assembly of bishops, which was not long since convened at Lambeth, I saw him stand conspicuous,—a pillar of the Church. In that great assembly, where men so various in their gifts and acquirements, so various in their habits of mind and in their habits of life; where the ripe scholar, emerging from his library, and the missionary, hastening from his toil and his travel, met face to face; when, at the call of him who sits in Augustine's seat—that seat where was planted in congenial soil that graft of the true Vine, which had grown and grown till it has become a stately tree, extending the shelter of its shade to the ends of the earth—when, at the call of the Archbishop of Canterbury, from all quarters of the globe—from India and from Africa, from America and from Australia, from China and from Borneo, from the coasts of the Mediterranean and from the isles of the Pacific—seventy-six chief pastors in Christ's Church gathered themselves together, to celebrate and cement their union in the One Body, in and by the communion of the Holy Eucharist; in that assembly, so manifold in the differing gifts and diverging experience of its members; in that great assembly, when opened for counsel and debate, he bore himself as one in whom all might recognize a master in Israel, as one in whom you might gladly recognize a representative man, the first bishop of your Church. Replete with learning, ready of utterance, without fear and without favor, he contended earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints, and contributed in no slight measure to the prosperous issue of our deliberations.

“In how manful a manner he subsequently upheld the dignity of our insulted body; with how just a severity he administered rebuke, when rebuke was needed, is known to all.”

It was with reference to this and other manly efforts in defence of the faith, that the Bishop of Oxford happily said, at a public meeting, just after the Conference, that “they had not looked in the faces of their American brethren for nothing.” This fearlessness, when the right was to be maintained, was among the advantages resultant from the absence of any complication of the American Church with the State.

The end of an honored, because a useful, life was near. On the 9th of January, 1868, Bishop Hopkins fell asleep. Death found him in the harness,—sought him ere he had entered the “sere and yellow leaf” of life. But his end was peace, and devout men everywhere made lamentation for him. With touching beauty does his biographer note the feelings of a diocese and Church bereaved:

“And yet, in the midst of the grief there was, everywhere, the nobler feeling of solemn joy, that such an end had rounded and made perfect the story of such a life. To have fought his way through so many battles and storms; to have suffered so many disappointments and losses; to have endured so many losses; to have endured so many years of obloquy and reproach; and, at length, to behold the success of that diocesan school, which was the darling of his old age; to see the reunion of his beloved country, and the more perfect reunion of his still more beloved Church; to aid in the glowing revival of her truer and richer life and strength and beauty; to rejoice at the fulfilment of his own suggestions, and be present at the first free Council of the Anglican communion, in such wise as to feel within it the germ of that which *may* bring about at last the reunion of all Christendom; to win, there, the deserved honor of being regarded as a chief pillar of truth and courage among all his brethren; and then to return and gather in—though it were in the frost of midwinter—richer spiritual harvests, from his own hard tillage, than he had ever reaped before; what better time than this could an old man find to die, even if a loving God had given him his own choice out of all the unknown future?”

Such was the life, such the life's close, of the first Bishop of Vermont, the seventh presiding bishop of the American Church. Instructive, encouraging, and hopeful as is the story in itself, it has lost none of its attractiveness in the reverent, loving hands of him who has told the tale so well. Here and there, where there must needs have been the unveiling of an unlovely past, words and phrases may be found which could have been softened; might, perhaps, have been left out. And yet all these controversies of ours, even the bitter strifes of those servants of God who are bidden “not to strive,” must yet be made manifest. The age is one of investigation, and the historic past is scrutinized with eyes that will see the minutest details of every event, anticipating, as near as may be, the revelation of judgment. It might serve to moderate somewhat this *odium theologicum*, if we remembered that in cooler moments we were to review in print our bitter words and un-Christlike deeds; or if, after we were dead and gone, our memory should be dimmed by such an exhibition of ourselves as we really were in life. Other than these exceptional instances, where the biographer may have been carried away with his own personal interest in the disputes or

events he is recording, there are occasional attempts to bring out from private conversations and personal deductions, an accordance, on the part of the bishop, with an advanced school of Churchmanship, toward which the bishop was evidently tending, and in behalf of which, had he lived, he very likely might have been the able and honored advocate. With these efforts, a majority of the admirers of the first Bishop of Vermont can hardly sympathize, and, with them, it may be a question whether the zeal of the biographer may not have carried him too far in thus seeking to place his revered father on record in a light somewhat different than his own published works would reveal him. At the same time, it is an instructive study to note, as these pages enable us to do with such abundant fulness, the progress of a mind so gifted, and one, too, whose perceptions were so largely intuitive. In advance of the age, as he was so often during his long and varied career, it may well be conceded that, at the last, he was equally in advance, and that a few years later we can the better judge of his wisdom and consistency.

As a contribution to the history of our Church, this biography is of lasting value. It is largely a *mosaic* of authorities. No pains have been spared to gain access to every available source of information; and the record of a career covering the period of the Church's first expansion and adaptation to the necessities of its rapid growth and unlooked for experiences, could not but contribute to our clearer understanding of the story of our recent past. Nor this alone; the appendices, with their compilation, from original sources, of such interesting and striking papers as "Bishop Ravenscroft's Opposition to the Consecration of Bishop Meade," the protest against the political tone of the pastoral of 1862, and the Westminster Abbey correspondence of 1867, give an added value to a most valuable book.

There are many points to which we can only call the attention of the readers of this work, as lack of space forbids our referring to them at length. Among these points we would notice the interesting letters from Bishop Ives, just preceding his defection to Rome, and the Bishop of Vermont's views of the position of the Anglican Church as to confession and absolution, as given on pp. 277-280. The brief historical summary of attempts to prevent the consecration of bishops-elect (pp. 289-291), to which Bishop Ravenscroft's paper, referred to above, forms a fitting appendix, will be found worthy of remembrance. The "suggestions," with reference to a more efficient conduct of the General Conventions, contained on pp. 351, 352, are of no little value, and have already, in one or two instances, commended themselves to approval and adoption on the

part of that body. But by far the most important portions of the volume, when we take the future into account, are the two chapters on the Lambeth Conference, one of which we have, in part, reproduced, while the other, "Preparatory to Lambeth," we cannot but regard as equally important; noting, particularly, pp. 408, 409, 410, which contain some things never said before, and not likely to be said by any one who had not peculiar opportunities for a look behind the scenes. These pages, in particular, cannot be passed over without thought, especially in view of a possible second "Pan-Anglican" but a few years hence.

At the outset, we referred to the exceptional importance of the Life of the Bishop of Vermont. The biography makes good our assertion. It has been of that portion of it which was specially noteworthy to the Church at large, to the world without, that we have spoken—that this interesting biography is written. There was an inner life of godliness, an habit of prayer, a depth of faith, an earnestness of love, a purity of spirit, a zeal, self-sacrificing and constant, which made up the Christian character of one who shall ever find remembrance among the worthiest of our Church's worthies. In a long and faithful life, he was the means of turning many to righteousness. He shall shine "as the stars, forever and ever."



WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, THE PREREFORMER.

THE century succeeding the one in which Thomas of Aquin flourished, was marked by a name scarcely less notorious than his, and one, on many accounts, much worthier the attachment and veneration of Protestant Churchmen. Aquinas was, after all, an intense Italian. His Churchmanship was, as we may say, part of his politics. The Pope was the head of Italy, more than of any portion of the globe; and so the great Neapolitan looked upon him as part and parcel of his native country. If the Pope had lived in London, and been an Englishman, it may be fairly questioned whether he would not have paid him far less devotion. Then, perhaps, he would have carefully scrutinized those quotations, which were furnished him as genuine sentiments of the fathers, and which he blindly hurled at the theology of the Orientals, and, most especially, against their hierarchical pretensions.

But William of Ockham was, country-wise and politically, almost an antipode to the ecclesiastical champion of Italy. He was born at the village of Ockham, in the county of Surrey. So he was a *bona fide* Englishman, and his course, as a theologian and a philosopher, proved, demonstratively, that his mind was eminently of an English cast. Duns Scotus was, of course, a Scotchman, and was a veritable specimen, not of Scotch scepticism only, but of Scotch persistiveness and earnestness. Albert the Great was a German, and manifested all the fervor of imagination and prone-

ness to mysticism which characterize so many German scholars. Abelard was a Frenchman, and a high type of the vivacity and brilliancy of his countrymen, with their clearness and lack of depth. Aquinas was an Italian, and carried the calculating subtleties of his race to the uttermost.

But Ockham was, as moderns would say, a John Bull; and he had all the opinionatedness and resolution of an Englishman, with his sturdy and self-reliant independence. He possessed, too, the practical disposition of his countrymen. He wanted things to be judged of, not by outward appearance only, or by seeming showiness, but by an adaptation to actual circumstances, and to the familiar forms and customs of human life. Hence, Ockham's was clearly a mind out of which to make stuff that would brace and invigorate a reformer, and render him a pioneer, not so much among theories as among moving and sympathizing men.

He possessed a large share of what Englishmen prize as an every-day virtue,—common-sense; and was continually asking, not as Aquinas did, what things *were*, that is, in their essence or essential nature, but what they were worth or good for. In this way he tested theology, philosophy, the Church system, and the world's whole machinery, by a standard which fitted him, as we said, to become the forerunner of Protestantism, considered as a policy or a working force, and especially of it considered not as an affair for homage, but for humanity's best good. Romanism seems to look at the world as something whereby to better its own self. Protestantism, on the other hand, looks at it as something whose welfare has got to be promoted. Honor Romanism for itself, and you may be canonized. Honor Protestantism for itself, and none so poor as to do you reverence. No wonder the former encourages the worship of images and shrines, of saints and spiritual heroes. Idolatry is one of its inherent tendencies; one of its *concomitant* developments.

But now let us turn to a glancing review of Ockham's life, to see how it illustrates such sentiments.

He was born, we said, at Ockham, in the county of Surrey, and was induced by the Franciscans to commit himself to their tuition; they to provide for his education, and to usher him upon the world, to act, as they hoped, no mean part amid its growing agitations. Accordingly, they sent him to Oxford, to have an English *inprimatur* put upon him; and then to Paris, that the rough diamond might be polished, and set in burnished gold. In Paris, he heard Duns Scotus, who was then the most celebrated lecturer in Europe.

But, as we may suppose, from the character of his mind, as now delineated, Ockham did not listen as a tame and abject pupil. He listened, as altogether an independent and self-sustained one. He called no mortal man his master. He put no restraint upon inquisitiveness, but tested everything in his practical way, to ascertain and to appreciate its weight. And he kept his enthusiasm down, curbed it, to let it spring up for emergencies; showing that he had one great excellence of a military commander, and would answer for the leadership of a host.

Such a man could not but become a centre. He did become one, and soon had an army of adherents clinging to him as a rallying-point, and a point for forecast. "He began," says an intelligent authority, "a revolution."

And yet, after all, Ockham's mind was not perhaps the mind of a decided genius. It was not creative, but controlling and directing. He would take things made ready to his hand, and use them in a new fashion, and for new and better purposes; in this way proving himself a true philosopher, *i. e.*, not an imaginative one, but a practical one; not one for the world's admiration, but for the world's permanent benefit.

And he showed this, graphically, in relation to what was formerly called casuistry,—one of the four things which Mr. Selden pronounced indispensable for an ecclesiastic. He meant by casuistry, very much what we mean by metaphysics and logic. Metaphysics, and the logic employed in them, formed the primary subjects of Ockham's studious contemplation. And to help his researches, he did not despise the Byzantine logic because it was Byzantine. He saw, with his eminently practical eye, that this logic was right in considering words as mere substitutes or suppositions for thoughts, *i. e.*, in establishing a logical connection between a thought and its representative, without a pretence of such an inherent connection as the Realists claimed there should be and must be. He cared for words as arbitrary and pictorial things only; as having a fancied and not an actual value, as if they were the counters employed in games of skill. He saw that, practically, general terms answered the same purpose as counters, and were, in their way, and for their ends, just as serviceable as counters; and he cared not to plunge into those chaotic depths where the Realists were perpetually delving.

This disposition naturally gave him freedom to judge of scholastic theology (as a system built up upon realistic principles) with what has been called "philosophical scepticism." For ex-

ample: Such theology teaches that there is what is styled, in reference to the Eucharist, a *concomitancy*, or a communication of the properties of one element to the properties of the other, so that one might say, full confidently, the bread was in the wine, and the wine was in the bread. According to such a theory, it mattered not if but *one* element were imparted to a communicant; he was the virtual recipient of both.

"How do you know so much as this?" Ockham would stiffly say. "This is not the teaching of Scripture, but the addition of your philosophy to the text of Scripture, to make it mean what you want it to mean, and thus sustain a debatable practice of your Church."

It is, in fact, the same sort of conjuring with theology which Mr. Murray, of Boston, tells us the old Calvinists of New England indulged in. "They," he says, "concocted a system, *inferred* from the Gospel through the Epistles of St. Paul;" a theology which, as a system, might be quite complete, well dove-tailed, and thoroughly consistent, and yet be altogether a human manufacture.

Ockham's philosophical scepticism, when dealing with such manoeuvring and such architecture, was not only legitimate, but wholesome; and here he may be considered one of the forerunners, and, indeed, lively heralds, of the Reformation. Such scepticism tested scholastic theology admirably and most effectively; and if it had never gone further than the legitimate use to which he applied it, it might have been a felicity and a benediction. But, alas! it is a sort of Divine endowment to know when to stop and contemplate a work done, as the Almighty did, on the seventh day of the history of a regenerated world. Man has no day of pausing and rest, in his elaborations. He believes in incessant prying and progress; and from a scepticism which is philosophical, he goes on to a scepticism which is not philosophical, and therefore not lawful, and he ends in doubts and cavillings without scruple, without intermission, without end.

Luther was a great student of Ockham,—called him his master, and his dear master; and Luther stuck so fast by his Bible, that he acted within limits, and was comparatively safe. His followers—too many of them—treated the Bible as Ockham had treated scholastic and metaphysical theology; and they went tumbling off into the dreariest infidelity; like the headlong swine, who perished in an element they were not at home in. Yet, though we may say alas over such dismal consequences, ought we to blame too much a liberty, reasonable within bounds, but which degenerates into abuse when those bounds are overleaped?

One of Ockham's wondrous advances for his age was his scepticism about the supremacy of the Pope. In reference to this supremacy, the favorite theology of the day had glided into the same error which it fell into when broaching its theory about the *communicatio idiomatum*, an interchange of natures, properties, or attributes. Power is twofold in human society,—spiritual and temporal. It is inherently twofold if the kingdom of heaven be, as our Saviour studiously asserted, not of this world. And if so, there should be no rash intermixture of prerogatives in its different departments. The kingdom of heaven is, to a certain extent, an independency. The kingdoms of this world are, to a certain extent, independencies; and there should be no conflict between the two. Each must act sovereignly, within its legitimate sphere, and not attempt the control or the subjugation of the other. True, they may come into contact; but then a clash is not necessary or inevitable. If one transcends its vested rights or immunities, and the other can come in for relief or rescue, it may fairly be questioned whether it is not only the right but the duty of the other to grant such aid or relief as may be practicable. If, for instance, the State unjustly or by persecution condemn a man for civil or political offences, what should hinder the Church from granting absolution, or the administration of a sacrament, or the commitment of a dead body to a Christian grave? And, on the other hand, if the Church unjustly persecute and condemn a man, *e. g.*, excommunicate him, and cast him out as if a heathen or a publican, because he had offended the Church, yet not unlawfully, the State may interpose, and prohibit the Church's action. And this is no new idea, even for a Romish latitude, according to that profound antiquary and jurist, John Selden. Mr. Selden says explicitly, in his *Table Talk*, under the titles "Power and State," No. 7: "The Church is not only subject to the civil power with us that are Protestants; but also in Spain, if the Church does excommunicate a man for what it should not, the civil power will take him out of their hands." So that if Selden were now upon the stage, and were discussing, not the great subjects of *mare liberum* and *mare clausum* (the freedom or the bondage of the open sea), but such action as that lately adopted by the German Parliament, he must decide that Germany, with its modern Protestantism, has not done one whit the worse or one whit the more than ancient Romish Spain!

William of Ockham had marvellous penetration for the dark days he lived in. His philosophical scepticism led him to doubt whether there was an interpenetration or free interchange of powers

distributed through two wide kingdoms,—the spiritual and the temporal. He first doubted the close connection of the two. He then began to deny the positions of Romish theologians, which make one an inference from the other, a corollary or dependence of the other, so that the spiritual power embraces and swallows up the temporal; just as the sacred rod of Aaron gathered up and swallowed the magic wands of the savans of ancient Egypt. He could perceive no logic in the assertion that spiritual power naturally involves the temporal, and that he who wields the sceptre of the first, wields also the sceptre of the last. "No," said Ockham, "the Church is sovereign in *her* sphere, and the State sovereign in *its* sphere; the two must tolerate each other, and allow each other's peculiar and inseparable rights."

Standing on such a basis, he stoutly denied the supremacy of the Pope as a temporal sovereign. He was, he contended, a spiritual official, and a spiritual official only. And he battled upon such an idea, with a Saxon doggedness and pertinacity, to his life's last day.

Questionless, while he was acting such a preprotestant part, he was a tremendous sinner in the eye of a self-asserting Papacy. For Boniface VIII., Pope from 1294 to 1303, had carried the theory of Hildebrand, respecting Papal power, to its extremest arrogations. Hildebrand, indeed, and Innocent III. after him, had held that the Papal power was beyond control and beyond judgment; was unquestionably and perfectly supreme. They had ceased to take the old oaths of their predecessors, of conformity and obedience to the ecclesiastical canons. But they took care not to play the part of our late abolitionists respecting civil government. They had full faith in "the higher law," but put it in temporary abeyance. They would accord civil government ample sway, provided it should be exerted in due subordination to the See of Rome. In this way, Innocent readily granted John Lackland a royal crown. But Boniface outstripped them both. He went as far with *his* inferences, in *one* way, as German Protestants and New England Calvinists had gone, with *theirs*, in a way suited to their fancies. At the jubilee of 1300, he exhibited his assumed power, in its entire circuit, to pilgrims from every quarter. *As Pope*, he claimed to be Cæsar and emperor besides! That is, he announced himself as the plenipotentiary monarch of "the round world;" insisting, in the most public manner, that all power beneath the sun concentrated and resided *in* him, and *with* him, singly and alone!

France resisted, stoutly and vigorously, the enormous assumption,

the transcendent mistake, the Satanic error. Ockham stood by France with all his wisdom and his most energetic capabilities. He issued a Latin tract upon the ecclesiastical power committed to prelates of the Church and princes of the earth. And this tract has been pronounced a perfect magazine of ammunition, with which to fight Rome's intolerable and illimitable assumptions, and even now would answer a valuable purpose, if translated into English. We could then point to the past, and say that, in her palmy days, Rome's only really dangerous claims have been rebuked by her ablest sons, keenly, and with irrepressible energy.

France, though her monarch has been studiously denominated "the eldest son of the Church," shrunk not from a close contest with Boniface, and had no discomfiture to mourn over. Ockham was her champion, and accomplished as much by his pen as did royalty and parliament besides. He distinguished, most happily, and with logical acumen, between the powers exercised by Christ, in His state of humiliation, when "He took upon Him the form of a servant," and those exercised by Christ, as seated on a mediatorial throne, with "a name above every name." If the Church on earth were (as she was claimed to be) the vicegerent of Christ, she was such a representative of Him in His humiliation, and not in His exaltation; and so had no right to plume herself, but was bound to treat civil government *as He did*, when in His lower station, and not in His higher one. He argued this point with so much stress and vehemence, from such texts as this, "I came not to be ministered unto, but to minister," that he obtained from a distinguished abbot an almost peerless appellation for the times he lived in, "A man well learned in the Holy Scriptures!" Christ's payment of tribute, too, he contended, authorized, on grounds not to be gainsayed, the right of civil governments to tax the Church for civil purposes.

This was an overturn of Rome's temporal authority, from turret to foundation-stone. But Ockham was not content to rest quiet, even after the achievement of such a *quasi* miracle. He cut off all Roman claims to temporal supremacy, and then went straight forward to show that Roman claims to spiritual supremacy had also their bounds and limitations. A celebrated contest between his order, the Franciscan, and the order of men like Aquinas, the Dominican, provoked him to such an issue, and he followed it up and out with even martial ardor.

The Franciscans contended that Churchmen should be individually and universally poor, *i. e.*, *as* Churchmen. They insisted that our Saviour had no temporal possessions, and that His followers

were bound to unflinching imitation of His example. *Distinguo!* exclaimed the order of St. Dominic, with Jesuitical sharpness,—Churchmen may be and should be obedient to the law of poverty, as individuals, but not as communities and combinations acting for “the greater glory of God,” in a corporate capacity. So individuals must own no property; but an order might be rich *ad libitum*, to give the order full scope for high designs and broad performances.

The difficulty was radical; it admitted not of reconciliation. The Pope, accordingly, was appealed to; and, as might easily be conceived, he could not afford to forego the Dominican doctrine, there was (as we say, amid the simmering decisions of our days), there was so much money in it! The Pope cared not a groat for mendicants, as individuals; but the Church, and the Church’s best adjutants—the various orders—might be, not to say must be, as we said before, rich *ad libitum*. So the Franciscan doctrine was discountenanced, and frowned upon, and nullified.

This brought out Ockham as a critic of even the Pope’s home decisions (as they may be styled), his spiritual ones. His entire order held a general council, in which Ockham appeared as the Provincial of the order from England; showing his lofty eminence in the estimation of his countrymen. He abundantly justified the confidence reposed in him. He attacked the Pope’s spiritual supremacy, just as he had attacked his temporal supremacy; maintained that even this supremacy was partial and restrainable, and dealt upon Papal power the heaviest blows, perhaps, which it received during mediæval times.

He published a tract, called his *Defensorium*, which has been esteemed one of the best specimens of that class of writings to which it belongs, and, for the middle ages, an *Areopagitica* without a rival. He assailed the Pope and his court, and the elevated Roman clergy generally, with resistless logic and blistering sarcasm, in reference to their gross wealth, and the luxurious vices which swarmed around it. Rome’s hottest wrath was roused and levelled against a head which conceived and brought to birth such disastrous yet telling and popular conceptions. Ockham was cited to appear before the vindictive tribunals of his Church within a month from the issue of a mandatory summons.

He contrived to keep his enemies at bay for years; but, at last, was circumvented, pounced upon, hurried to Avignon, then the Papal residence, and buried, with some of his associates and fellow-combatants in this implacable strife, in an apparently hopeless dun-

geon. It was a dark and bitter day for the unfortunate Franciscans. Many of their choicest spirits had perished in the internecine controversy. They were denounced as traitors; and it was determined to crush the insubordination of the rebels by sacrificing their ring-leaders with ignominy and with agony. All that was dear in life to Ockham was in immediate and formidable peril, when relief arrived from an unexpected quarter.

The Franciscans, in their bitter struggles with the Pope, naturally looked around for a friend in power, who might be an effective champion; and they discovered one in the Emperor Lewis of Bavaria. Lewis had had a quarrel with his Holiness, not dissimilar to that in which France participated, and which Germany is now engaged in. It was the old standing quarrel between Church and State—a conflict of sovereignties—with a solid determination, on either side, to fight it out, as the colloquial phrase goes, “to the bat’s end.” Not such a quarrel, doubtless, as that between the head of the Church and an aggrieved and slighted order; yet a quarrel, and a fierce one, in which two separate parties, contending with the same opponent, could afford to join their forces, and act together. The Franciscans, therefore, entered into a league with Lewis, by which they were to fight the Pope unitedly, however the grievances of each party might have, with each party, a peculiar weight. Lewis espoused the cause of the imprisoned and imperilled Franciscans with the best appliances of secular power. He favored, and he procured their escape from prison to the sea-side. A boat was in waiting for them, which dashed away successfully from the Papal guards. This boat found its way to an armed galley, in the offing. That galley was the property of his Bavarian Majesty. It hurried out to sea on eager wings, and its precious freight soon found shelter, protection, and immunity within the battlements of Munich.

Here, Papal artillery could not reach, and Papal machination could not disturb them. It is true that Rome contrived to provoke the ire of the majority of their own order against them. A general chapter of the order was summoned at Perpignan; the monks were intimidated or cajoled into a furious decision against their fugitive brethren, and they were denounced and given over to Satan and perdition as schismatics, heretics, and even homicides. This was the uttermost of short-armed spite, and with it the contest was virtually closed and sealed. But Munich could speak, as well as Perpignan and its instigator, the Roman Curia. It responded in racy and rasping pamphlets, which damaged the Church of Rome,

far more than its tempestuous denunciations damaged the Franciscans.

Ockham and his colleagues lived on beneath a Bavarian firmament, unintimidated and serene. He lived on quietly to a natural death, and departed this life in the bosom of security and peace, in the year 1347. This was just about the middle of that century through most of which Wicklyffe, a Briton like himself, and one of his most eager students and admirers, made England ring with doctrines caught from Ockham; who, because he was a Briton like himself, was the most beloved of all his masters. He was so assiduously protected and cherished by the Emperor Lewis, that their familiarity assumed almost a jocular aspect. Ockham pronounced his pen a weapon, and was wont to say to his imperial patron, "Defend me with the weapons of your warfare, and I will defend you with the main weapon of mine. Your sword and my sword shall work blithely together." The compact was kept more faithfully than most treaties; and the issue was, that the tiny weapon oftener pierced the vitals of Romanism, and wrung out its angriest groans.

It was in Munich that Ockham finished up his life, and his greatest work, in vindicating what he believed to be solemn and all-important truth against the errors, the domination, and the persecutions of Romanism. He began his chivalric warfare mainly as a metaphysician. He foresaw that it was the aim and plan of the schoolmen, who took the Realistic side, to build up a theological system which would either originate a philosophy of its own, or absorb philosophy into itself. He foresaw that in this way theology would become not a science merely, but the queen and controller of all other sciences, till theology held all minds in its grip, and moulded them into vassals to its inapproachable will. This was what Aquinas projected in a theology which was to be a totality and a perfection. Theology was to hold everything else in its circumference, and subject to its arbitrament. Theology, too, was to be just what the Pope chose to have it; and so Rome, like Babylon in the Apocalypse, was to traffic not in ordinary merchandise alone, but in slaves and the souls of men.

Ockham confronted this well-planned but direful scheme with what has been styled his philosophical scepticism; though the word was not then used in its present suspicious signification, but meant nothing more than might now be meant by being doubtful or hesitating before inadequate proof; especially so before mere dogmatic assertion. He saw that philosophy was not to be swallowed up and absorbed into theology but at singular peril to each and to both; as

Lord Bacon perceived and maintained, at a later and perhaps not less trying day. So he brought his doubts to bear on theology, assuming the position and claims of a philosophy, and relegated her to her appropriate sphere. This sphere, in his estimation, is the realm of a kingdom not of this world; and the instrument by which she is to reach and retain the riches of such a kingdom, is *faith*,—faith, that is, not in reason, or in logic, or in human declarations and devices of any sort, but faith in the communications of God. Here Ockham became unquestionably the herald of a legitimate revolution; of such a revolution as was afterward called a reformation, or the introduction of new forms, shapes, and uses of things. Not the destruction of them, as some unhappily fancy, but the re-adaptation of them, the reapplication of them, the pertinent and genuine and individualizing appropriation of them. As such a character, Ockham may be looked upon as a fit model for such men as Wicklyffe among his own countrymen, and Melancthon among his continental neighbors; and particularly as such a model for the reformers of his native England, in the sixteenth century. And if it is a grand affair to so far divorce theology and philosophy that neither shall be the dictator or the servant of the other, then Ockham may be looked upon as one of the noblest benefactors of his native land, and, through her, of the world at large. Lord Bacon, in *his* sphere, deserves no higher encomium than Ockham in the one *he* aimed to fill.

But when Ockham had done what he could as a scholar in the realm of philosophy, then he endeavored to go onward—be progressive, as we say—and do what he could for theology, in her separate and distinct departments. He then took up the supposed connection between the Pope's temporal and spiritual sovereignty, and scrutinized it by the philosophical scepticism through which he doubted of the close connection, the mutual intertwining (the concomitance, to use a term of Romish dogmatics) of such things. He declared, and he proved, that the Pope's temporal and spiritual power were not blended or welded into one, but were as distinct as heaven and earth. His grand and pertinent conclusion was, that if one belonged to heaven, the other belonged to earth, and had no inherent ecclesiastical affinities.

And with the same scepticism, he penetrated into what may be called the recesses of the Pope's spiritual supremacy, considered as a subject separated and alone. He saw, forthwith, that this supremacy was not an indefinable unity, a unity whose parts could not be analyzed and conjured with. He did analyze and distinguish, till

he perceived that even the spiritual supremacy was made up of parts and constituent portions—had, as we may say, constitutional and organic laws—and that, if it exceeded its due prerogatives, it was a usurpation, and might be resisted, contended with, and set at naught as a fancy and not a fact. He saw that it did exceed its powers in its celebrated decisions between the order of Dominic and the order of Francis; and so he struggled manfully with it, even at the hazard of dungeons and the stake. Here, his escape was narrow, but his ultimate success assured; and he was a foeman whom Rome dreaded and anathematized to his last-drawn breath. Her partisans pretended, no doubt, that he recanted, and was absolved by her. This is easy enough to say, when few or none care to dispute the hollow assumption. If Ockham had really relented, and Rome could have laid a steady hand upon him, she would have treated a recantation in him as she did another in the person of Thomas Cranmer.

The final undertaking of Ockham's philosophical scepticism was in relation to a subject at the time one of the foremost for universal discussion and agitation,—the true theory of the Eucharist.

Genuine philosophical discernment is displayed as much in this way as in any other in detecting differences and separations in things which, to blunt eyes, seem close compounds. And a want of such discernment is also displayed as much in this way as in any other, by a confounding or blending of things which are essentially unlike. Now, it was an actual want of discernment, in that class of schoolmen whose minds ran blindly in (so to speak) an Aristotelian groove, that they could not possibly comprehend how a spiritual thing might be just as real as a physical thing, not to say more so, more intensely so. But such a possibility they could neither approach nor tolerate. Wherefore, to render Christ present in the Eucharist, there must for them be a physical change in it—a change of material substance—for which they invented their notorious and darkening word, Transubstantiation.¹

Ockham, however, could comprehend, and with ease, that a spiritual thing might be just as actual, just as positive, just as palpable (not, perhaps, to the senses) as if the grossest and densest sort of matter. And more—and here he went immensely, almost unspeakably, beyond his times—that a spiritual thing might occupy the

¹ We have encountered this same difficulty, even in modern scholars. Some will still have it that *spiritual* is the opposite of *real*. The opposite of *real* is *imaginary*. We once said to such a scholar, "God is a pure Spirit: is He not a reality?" "Oh," he exclaimed, "I never before thought of that."

same locality in space as a material thing, yet not at all disturb it. For example: he said the soul is in the body, and in the same place exactly in which the body is; and yet it does not crowd or displace the body in the least. A capital illustration; but he might have selected, for some queasy ones, a more glaring case, if he had referred to the burning bush. There, a *Divine* flame was in the bush, and over the bush, and around the bush, and all through the bush; and yet the bush, *as a bush*, was not in the least affected, physically. The very ground around it became holy, and was to be treated with most cautious reverence; while still the bush was all unchanged, though, so tradition has it, luxuriant with flowers, as delicate as they were beautiful.

Now, if such a presence—we might almost call it a plenipoten-tiary presence—did not affect the bush physically, but relatively and mysteriously, for moral and spiritual ends alone, what need is there for supposing that a similar presence should any more disturb the physical condition of the elements of the Eucharist? And, moreover, what can possibly be gained by the supposition, if it be admissible, and we strive to entertain it? It is Christ's potential presence which we want, and not the mode by which it operates. He declares, with His own unerring lips, that His "I," which means, of course, His totality—His body and His blood, His humanity and His Divinity—is present in the smallest congregation, gathered in a believing recognition of His gracious name; present in *their very midst*; a Divine centre for them all, for their minds and hearts, and their profoundest welfare.¹

We should be immensely entertained to see a Transubstantiationist undertake gravely to prove that the presence of Christ's "I"—His whole rounded-out personality—included less, and meant less, than "His body and His blood" upon the Eucharistic altar.

It seems manifest that all this was simplicity itself to Ockham; and he looked upon Transubstantiation as clearly and purely a philosophical mistake. It is such, to us, beyond the hope of contradiction. And Luther did no better, but perpetuated the same mistake, when he invented the term Consubstantiation; nor have others, who invented the term Impanation; which, and as many more, if offered, we no more want, than we do a metaphysical defini-

¹ And, doubtless, He is just as much so, if the Spirit be (as He himself said He would be) His abiding substitute or vicar, when He in person had ascended to the Father. What maxim is better established than this, *Qui facit per alium, facit per se*? The Spirit, *as Divine*, could take His place fully, without any abatement.

tion of the pronoun "I," after Christ has said explicitly that His "I"—His own actual and indisputable Self—would become a veridical central presence amid His faithful worshippers.

Yet it is easy to see how Ockham's discernment aided Wicklyffe and Luther, and much more Cranmer and Ridley, and thus influenced the Church of England to eschew, full studiously, all scholastic definitions of the Eucharistic elements, and to accept them as the Apostles did, at their first presentation, as if Christ's own hand offered and imparted Christ's own gifts. Christ as the Mediator (not of a Testament,—for what has a Mediator to do with a Testament, or a Testament with blood ?)¹, as the Mediator of "*The New Covenant*," does, by the impartance of such gifts to "those who receive them rightly," renew and reestablish the (to us) greatest compact in the universe,—an everlasting covenant betwixt God and the human soul. This is enough for the widest faith, the deepest devotion, and the loftiest hopes ; and he who wants to believe more and further, must go to theological systems for a satiety. The Scriptures of truth, of celestial truth, would not ask of him the pilgrimage.

¹ It seems surprising that while such a scholar as Dr. Lightfoot has earnestly contended that the word "Comforter" is wrong in the present translation of our English Bible, he should not have argued that "Testament" for "Covenant" is much more so. He does indeed say that "Testament" is proper in but a single passage,—in the ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews. And there, he says, "St. Paul glided into it, and did not introduce it formally." It is surprising, indeed, that we should give the Bible titles which it nowhere gives itself. The proper word is "Scripture," or "Scriptures;" and these seem to have been the words employed in all primitive times. For the Nicene Creed says, "according to the Scriptures;" exhibiting, incontestably, the usage of the early Church. The proper titles for the two volumes of our Bible would be, "The Scriptures of the Old Covenant," and "The Scriptures of the New Covenant." It is high time the revisers of our common version took up this matter. The word "Testament" is not found in the first volume of the Scriptures, except on the title-page; though the proper Hebrew word for it (if lawful) occurs about three hundred times! And while *διαθήκη* occurs in the second volume thirty-three times, in twenty instances it is "Covenant," and not "Testament." Why should thirteen instances override three hundred and twenty? In reference to the Eucharist, and our Consecrating Prayer in the Prayer Book, the proper word is, literally, of immense importance. A learned English critic says that "My blood of the New Testament" is a phrase without meaning. There is a close connection between a covenant and blood; but what a Testament has to do with blood, he knows not. Who does? Not Dr. Waterland; for he says, in his treatise on the Eucharist, that it is a (better *the*) covenanting rite.

As a philosopher, then, and as a theologian, the English mind of Ockham fixed its impress, and a deep one, upon the religious history of his country, and of all Protestant Europe. Still, it has not been the fashion to honor him, but rather to forget him, as one buried beneath the rubbish of Nominalism; as a mere quibbling scholastic, fit only to divide a hair betwixt its south and southwest side. Ockham was anything but such a devotee of distinctions without a difference. He believed in realities, and not in fancies. He distinguished, because his distinctions were genuine, and not imaginary. He was eminently practical. He was thoroughly benevolent. His ambition was that of a far-sighted philanthropist. He sought to benefit his contemporaries, and posterity besides, by giving them perceptible help, and stepping-stones for actual and consolatory progress. His name should be lifted out of the dust and darkness of by-gone ages, and put on the foreground of history, as a benefactor to his native land, and to the whole of that religious world which looks not to Italy as religion's centre, nor to the Vatican as the spot where that centre is enthroned.



BOOK NOTICES.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. By Charles Hodge, D.D., Professor in the Theological Seminary, Princeton, New Jersey. Vol. iii. Pp. 880. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1878.

Dr. Hodge has been a professor in the seminary at Princeton for more than half a century. Most of the time he has filled the chair of systematic theology in that institution. Of course, he is now venerable with age and academic honors, and is, moreover, highly and meritoriously esteemed for his general attainments and theological scholarship. The volume whose title is quoted is the last of a series which will give to the world the results of his life-long study and learning. And neither he nor his denomination will have any reason to be ashamed of it as one of the most valuable contributions to theological science which their side of Christendom has ever given to the world. True, it may not have the popularity of Dwight's Theology, since that was intended to be popular, rather than scientific. Dr. Hodge's work is for the theological scientist; and we presume an abbreviation will be made of it, to furnish a text-book for the lecture-room. It is cast in a more angular Calvinian mould than were Dr. Dwight's volumes; which, for their era, were wonderfully gentle and condescending. President Dwight was a wary ecclesiastical politician. He knew that he had the sons of many Churchmen under his charge; and so he complimented the "Episco-

pal Church," as "fast rising in the gradations of piety." A compliment which, for its day, Mr. Hume might have styled a minor miracle.

Dr. Hodge is a theologian simply, and yet even he is more amiable than some of his predecessors; has not always that grim and ungracious cast of countenance which betokens a delight in making religious truth about as ominous and uninviting as a thunder-cloud. In fact, we have known some of a departed generation who have suspected themselves of something like heresy when their sermons were not protested against for their gloominess and severity.

Dr. Hodge endeavors to smooth down some of the rougher wrinkles of Calvinism, and we are rejoiced at it. Calvinism, as Mr. Froude contends, has not been "totally depraved,"—has done good in its way, filled out its mission, and is now quietly taking a Rip Van Winkle nap. We do not wish to throw a pebble at it. *Requiescat in pace!*

Dr. Hodge succeeds, sometimes, admirably. But he is characteristically unfortunate when a Romanist, or a Churchman in ritualistic drapery, crosses his path. True, he can say of Rome, "Indeed, it is a matter of devout thankfulness to God, that underneath the numerous grievous and destructive errors of the Romish Church, the great truths of the Gospel are preserved" (p. 135). But, like too many Protestant theologians, he errs in using such a word as justification, as if Romanists employ it in precisely the same sense in which it is employed by their antagonists. They decidedly do not; and Bishop Hopkins, though a great controversialist against Rome, did (as his son and biographer tells us), *did* see this, and left that subject out of his book against the Romish Bishop Milner. It seems passing strange that it should so often be forgotten that Burnet (an evangelical for his day) said of the controversy about justification—if a Romanist means by remission of sin what others mean by justification, and by justification what they mean by sanctification—the war is one of words. But he did say *just that much* in his comments on the Eleventh Article of the Thirty-nine. The Romanist uses the term justification in a moral sense, and the Protestant in a forensic sense; and differences must be eternal if there is no mutual explanation.

And as it fares with justification, in the view of our eminent Protestant doctor, so does it with regeneration when the word is affiliated with baptism. Even such a divine as Waterland (our Dr. Hodge of the eighteenth century), when he talks of baptismal regeneration, is "full of confusion and contradictions," because he will not consider it "a subjective change in the state of the soul," but rather a change

in the spiritual state and relations of the person receiving it, which change, if properly availed of, will, in due time, produce an issue that may be called regeneration in a sense agreeable to the taste of theologians at Princeton. We wonder, as we read Dr. Hodge's strenuous assertions, if he would insist that regeneration in Matthew, xix. 28 (one of the two only instances in which the New Testament employs the word), did *not* mean a change of condition, *but* a change confined, subjectively, to the soul. Waterland could, and no doubt would, have signed, willingly, the declaration which so many of our bishops awhile since issued. With Dr. Hodge, also, that declaration, probably, was altogether passable. Did, then, Dr. Waterland and Dr. Hodge entertain, after all, the same views of the efficacy of baptism? Undoubtedly, the question might open a Princetonian eye somewhat widely. Why, then, will not Dr. Hodge allow Churchmen to define theological terms in their own way? Why should we be subjected to the whims of those who, as the dedication of the Bible to King James informs us, "give liking to nothing but what is framed by themselves, and hammered on their anvil?" We are not disposed to press Dr. Hodge with his theory of predestination, as involving the horrible idea of reprobation,—an idea flung in the face of St. Augustine by Julian, the Pelagian Bishop of Eclanum. By no means. A theologian ought not to be attainted because he uses words in his own way, if a liberal and charitable construction can be put upon his language.

When Dr. Hodge looks at baptism from a stand-point, confronted by a hardy denier and repudiator of the efficacy of sacraments, one might suppose, from his lofty tone, that he was an actual High-Churchman. When he looks at it from a stand-point, where he sees a Romanist or a Churchman "of the baser sort" hovering around the subject, he comes forth as if he spake under the broad brim of a Quaker. Thus, "the idea that a man's state before God depends on anything external—on birth, on membership in any visible organization, or on any outward rite or ceremony—is utterly abhorrent to the religion of the Bible" (p. 521). If a Quaker could ever be induced to say *Amen* out aloud, we think he would let it fly from his tongue in response to such a proposition as this.

Here, then, we see the same sort of confusion or contradiction which Dr. Hodge studiously complains of in the pages of Dr. Waterland. Looking at the same subject in reference to different classes of objectors to truth, our language concerning it will inevitably be tinged by the medium through which we make our observations. Truth itself does not always present the same aspect to the contem-

plator. It has its obverse side, and its reverse side, like a translucent picture, or a coin. The Gospel is a savor of death unto death, sometimes. Is it, therefore, essentially deadly? Our Saviour, under one aspect of His mission, came not to send peace, but a sword. Was He, therefore, a military conqueror? Dr. Hodge would explain such cases with supreme facility. Why, then, should he suppose that Dr. Waterland—quite as honest and able as himself—is but a bundle of contradictions, because he speaks of regeneration, now in reference to one of its bearings, and by and by in reference to another of them. Appreciating Waterland's aims and intentions, he ought not to have accounted such variations (and they are nothing more) as blemishes in logic, if not in moral honesty. We have found the same variations in Dr. Hodge himself, and have furnished illustrations. He has spoken with reference to persons of unlike conceptions and dispositions, and shifted his style accordingly. Doubtless, he would say, if faulted, that he followed his Master's example, and delivered the truth as people were able to bear it. And his plea would be a good one. Let him accord its efficacies unto others, and to the limit of that charity which "beareth all things."

Nevertheless, though we thus speak, we have no disposition, not the slightest, to be harsh with such an elaborate and indefatigable laborer in the cause of views which he believes to be the best views of truth ever entertained by mortal men. There is an immense magazine of information in his weighty tomes; and we doubt not that, to his own denomination, and to many others, they may long be a sort of theological dictionary.

MUSIC HALL SERMONS. By William H. Murray, Pastor of Park Street Church, Boston. Second series. Boston. I. 12mo. Pp. 207. J. R. Osgood & Company.

Mr. Murray shows that he has an understanding for the times, and especially for the times under a New England firmament, since his first topic is the proper method for meeting modern scepticism, and his last, an inquiry why the religion of New England has failed to convert the people. Moreover, he understands his own position in public estimation and in his own; for he could not say (as he does on p. 203), "I think it beyond dispute, that the pulpit of New England, to-day, is a weak pulpit," without fancying that he was authorized to depreciate the pulpits of his neighbors, in contradistinction from his own. We accept the inference, therefore, that Mr. Murray's preaching is just what it should be for a New England lati-

tude, and doing so, take in its full sweep such a statement as this: "You may go into any New England village, and you will find that the majority of the professional and business men are non-professors, and connected with none of the many local Churches of the place. And not only is this true touching the middle-aged, but it is equally, if not more true, in the case of the young men of the town" (p. 186).

This is a dismal portraiture of ecclesiastical affairs in the old homes of the Puritans; and we are nervously anxious to know to what he attributes the seeming failure of Christianity, under the leadership of men who accounted the Church of England worse than a failure, and who, therefore, came to these distant shores to show mankind what religion ought to be, and could be made to be, under pertinent auspices.

Yet, their high aspirations and mighty toil have gone for nothing, and New England is become, spiritually, what the Puritans found it physically,—a wilderness! We are profoundly curious to know some of the main causes to which Mr. Murray attributes such a disastrous and direful issue. One is the bigoted and terrifying examinations which candidates for the communion are constrained to undergo (p. 191). Another is the prevalence of cant, which "exists in New England to an alarming extent" (p. 191). A third is, "a theology *inferred* from the Gospel, through the Epistles of St. Paul," with "a terminology of definition, and vocabulary of expression, neither understood nor relished by the masses" (p. 193). And, lastly, pulpit imbecility, for which a quotation has been made already.

No doubt, all these causes are significant and prevailing ones. But they remind us, most forcibly, that the very Church the Puritans repudiated and abandoned, might have helped them mightily against just such causes of declension,—now the subject of most emphatic comment. Her examinations of candidates for confirmation are usually gentle enough; were gentle in times long gone, and continue to be such now, so as to provoke from a grim predestinarian unsparing reprobation. As to cant, we doubt if there is any communion of Christians in which this outflow of hypocrisy is less discoverable than in our own. As to *inferred* theology, why, it has been considered in *us* a weakness, and a grand deficiency, that we have shunned the thorny, flinty, and weary roads of Calvinism, to find out, and open if we could, one that may be called beckoning. While all we have got for our endeavors to employ "acceptable words"—as the Book of Ecclesiastes calls them—has been a judicial likening of the course we open to that broad and winding road which runs down the declivities of perdition.

As to pulpit weaknesses, we are not quite prepared to say, with Mr. Murray, "a minister, by cunningly-arranged exchanges, and use of old sermons, can lead an indolent life for years, and not be detected in a way to reform his habits, or dismiss him from the profession and service he has disgraced and trifled with" (p. 204). We had entertained the hope that *our* clergy were fully up to an honorable standard of conscientiousness; for complaints about clerical laziness have not abounded in our precincts, as they appear to have done in the ecclesiastical thoroughfares familiar to the pastor in Park street.

It may possibly be that Mr. Murray is as correct as he is graphic in his sketches of the decline, if not downfall, of Puritanism on the territory where it was once ascendant, if not supreme. We are certainly saddened to believe that his pictures may be severely true. And we cannot but more and more regret the "painful" reformation which the Puritans tried to engraft upon, and add unto, the reformation of the Church of England. If they had clung to the venerable forms of the old Prayer Book, and to its mild dogmatic theology, they might to-day have escaped the lamentations of Mr. Murray, in "the high places" of his domestic Israel. Then they might readily have supplied themselves with something kindly, attractive, and enduring, to draw out, fasten, cheer, and sustain their affections, and especially the affections of the young. Then they would have found religion, not a penance, but a privilege; and it would have shed sweet benedictions on their descendants. Then, as Churchmen, they would have exemplified a law of succession which dates back to the elder dispensation, and enters into and vitalizes all the successions of the new,—“Tell ye your children of it, and let your children tell their children, and their children another generation” (Joel, i. 3).

But, alas, Puritanism has quarrelled with successions in religion, as if they were redolent of the essence of actual Popery. It has made individuality so complete, and so intense, as to perpetrate Popery backward, if one may say so, by making every man a pope unto himself. And it has stripped off all garniture from sacred things; has so arrayed itself against "the beauty of holiness," as to render religion not nude only, but cold, jejune, and, to the sensitive, repelling. The great Sully chafed under its bareness, even when it went to lesser extremes among the Huguenots. When, as a French ambassador, he saw religion as it exhibited itself in the churches of London, he exclaimed, "Oh, if my countrymen could see such Protestantism as this, there would be thousands upon thousands more of Protestants in my native land!" But Puritanism was never made to

be loved affectionately. It always delighted in inspiring awe and terror. As some one has compared its edifice ecclesiastical, it may be as admirable a piece of architecture as the ice-palace of Russia, and, like that, filled with the breath of an Arctic zone.

And, besides, it seems to be swinging from its own ancient landmarks. It once believed not in reverent words only for praying, but in a reverent posture too. Now it sits down upon its haunches, and talks, literally *talks*, and very poorly too, to the High and Lofty One who inhabiteth eternity. Mr. Murray opens his mouth widely, and exclaims, "Such devotional stupidity and pious ignorance as are manifested by many professors of religion in our Churches, is enough to sharpen the edge of satire against it, and disgust the manly" (p. 191). This could never have been the case had the Liturgy been retained, and especially the Liturgy heightened in its impressiveness, by appropriate dresses and architecture, with music at once majestic, touching, and simple. People also want a service which they themselves can audibly and unitedly join in. They cannot endure the leaving everything to a minister, and run the risks of his lack in taste or devotion. They must have what it is our aim to supply them, to give their affections freedom and nurture,—“Common Prayer.”

PARIS PENDANT LES DEUX SIEGES. Par Louis Veuillot. Deuxième édition. Deux Volumes. Paris: Libraire de Victor Palmé. 1872.

These volumes are made up of extracts from the *Univers*, of which this renowned leader of the Ultramontanes has been the editor for forty years. They were written during the year (*l'année funeste*, he calls it) from August, 1870, to September, 1871, and are a commentary on the events of the two sieges of Paris by the Prussians and the army of Versailles. M. Veuillot is a man of extreme opinions, and of the most determined courage in the assertion and vindication of them. He goes with the Council of the Vatican to the very uttermost, and looks upon the decree of Papal infallibility as the one great bulwark against the unbelief and lawlessness of these evil days. He hates the infidelity of the Parisian press with unmitigated hatred, and meets it with scornful defiance; and it must be admitted that there is no one of his antagonists that equals him in the skill with which he handles his weapons. He is a master of the purest and most idiomatic French, and these volumes are full of examples of the best style of the journalist,—lucid, vivid, and trenchant. Nor can we help sympathizing with him in his strong attachment to his

Church and his country, in spite of all the corruptions which weigh them down ; and this sympathy is unalloyed in respect to his hatred of the abominable principles of socialists and communists. M. Veuillot is not afraid to speak as a Christian, and to point out the sins which have drawn down upon France the Divine judgments. We know of no journal in the land so bold to connect national calamities with national transgressions. It is refreshing to see so powerful and influential a writer not ashamed of his faith in God and His Son Jesus Christ ; but, standing up face to face with His enemies, to defend what he believes to be the truths and institutions of Christianity, sadly adulterated and perverted though they have come to be. We feel, in reading his impassioned words, that France, with all her infidelity and corruption of morals, is not without a witness against them ; and that the Church of Rome still holds within her bosom many sons to whom the name and honor of God are most dear. "Let her (France) be the fortress of Christ," he says, in his introduction ; "she will be impregnable ; let her be the light-house of the Gospel, and the soldier of the sacred war, she will shoot forth those shafts of life which will assure to her real dominion, without adding to herself an inch of soil." Such is the view of Catholic patriotism. God will fulfil it when He shall hear France address to Him the prayer of David : "*Non erubescant in me qui expectant te, Domine, Domine virtutum.*"

But if one admires the ardor of his hope that France is to rise again, and that the Church of France is once to more take the lead in the great spiritual warfare of the age, we are saddened to see so brave a warrior fighting with such indiscriminating valor. He will not abate one jot or tittle of the claims of the most arrogant Ultramontanism, but does battle for them all with genuine Quixotic devotion. He is right in his abhorrence of the anti-Christian liberalism of the day ; but he will not see that the usurpations of his Church, and the corruptions of Christianity, have done much to nurse it into strength. Nothing is more certain than that the Roman Catholic system cannot beat back the advancing tides of unbelief. It is itself responsible for much of the infidelity of France ; for Protestantism was all but swept away, and Rome had the field almost wholly to herself. M. Veuillot will not see this ; and while he is full of penitence for the sins of his country, he will acknowledge no sin or error in his Church.

Few years have ever been so crowded with great events and great calamities as that with which these volumes are occupied. "What a year," says M. Veuillot, "for France, for Europe, for the Church,

for the whole human race! . . . Humanity will remember the twenty-fifth year of Pius IX., begun by the proclamation of the infallibility of the vicar of Jesus Christ, which seemed to be the scandal of human reason, ended by the conflagration of Paris, which showed what human reason, left to itself, can do to procure the union of spirits and of hearts, and to secure the glory, the happiness, and the continuance of nations." Whoever wishes to see the events of such a year passed in review by the most accomplished of Roman Catholic journalists, will find in this book a great deal to instruct and to interest him.

THE HOLY BIBLE, according to the Authorized Version (A.D. 1611); with an Explanatory and Critical Commentary, and a Revision of the Translation by Bishops and other Clergy of the Anglican Church. Edited by F. C. Cook, M.A., Canon of Exeter. Vol. ii. Joshua—I. Kings. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1878.

The "Speaker's Commentary" is now too fairly launched to require, at our hands, any further explanation of its aim and object. To point out in detail the excellences of this new volume, or to note its defects, is too large a subject to treat in our short space. The work professes, on its title-page, to contain "a revision of the translation" of the Holy Scriptures, and, so far as we have had occasion to examine the emendations, we have found them accurate and truthful, while they often serve to clear up an existing ambiguity, *e. g.*, Ruth, ii. 14; Judges, iv. 10; II. Samuel, xiv. 14. In view of the question of Biblical revision which is now occupying the attention of so many minds, we are surprised to find how *few* passages there are which require any correction.

The explanatory notes are concise yet clear, sufficiently detailed without prolixity, scholarly yet popular, broad without being rationalistic, and present those points which are of importance to the general reader. The various "difficulties" are discussed in a candid spirit, and such solutions are offered as may serve to remove the scruples of an earnest believer, if not to satisfy the demands of a determined doubter. Thus, to instance but two cases, the Destruction of the Canaanites, and the Miracle of Joshua. In the "Introduction to the Book of Joshua," Mr. Espin handles, at some length the former subject in such a way as not only to answer English Deists and German Rationalists, but also to reconcile the action of the Israelites with the attributes of God, as illustrated in the *New Testament*. He considers the question in its relation to the Canaanites themselves, to the Israelites, and to the rest of mankind, while

he shows how the whole transaction is designed to be an image of the deep and awful truths which ever belong to all the moral government of God.

An "additional note" to cap. x. 12-15, is devoted to the discussion of the Miracle of Joshua, in which the ground is taken that these verses are a quotation from the poetical Book of Jasher, and are to be understood as signifying that the victory was completely secured before the day declined. The miracle is thus no longer an objective fact, but a subjective idea of the past!

Lord Arthur Hervey seems to agree with Dean Milman in the idea that "the Jews had almost a passion for large numbers," and so cuts down the 50,070 of I. Sam. vi. 19, to 70; the 30,000 of I. Sam. xiii. 5, to 300; the 40,000 of II. Sam. x. 18, to 4,000; while the 20,000 of II. Sam. xviii. 7, is declared to be "an impossible number." These reductions, which in some cases seem arbitrary, are hardly compensated for by augmenting the 700 of II. Sam. viii. 4, to 7,000.

There is much valuable information given in the various introductions, especially in those of Joshua and Kings. We regard the apportionment of the "Kings" to Canon Rawlinson as peculiarly happy, and await, with pleasant anticipations, his notes on II. Kings to Esther, which the English publishers promised to give us at Easter.

We wish this commentary could be in the hands of the general reader and student, so as "to put him in full possession of whatever information may be necessary to enable him to understand the Holy Scriptures." Such is its professed object; but we fear that in its present shape this purpose cannot be carried out. The "general reader" will not care to purchase ten or a dozen thick octavo volumes. Why need the text of King James's Version occupy so much space? For a book of *reference*, much smaller type would answer every purpose, and no one will probably use the twelve-volume work for his *devotional* reading. Why should not the text be compressed as well as the notes?

LIFE OF BISHOP PATTESON. London: Christian Knowledge Society. New York: Pott, Young & Co. Pp. 218.

One is fain to say, on laying down this fascinating little volume, Is this all we are to know of the life of that noble prelate and true martyr, John Coleridge Patteson? And then comes the answering question, Is not this enough?

The story is told with all that admirable simplicity, that discriminating insight, that delicacy of touch, that truly Christian, and as truly refined reticence, under which strong feeling is struggling, and through which it sometimes for a moment breaks, that are so characteristic of all the better religious biography of our mother Church and land. These are qualities which we often desiderate when fretting under the coarse and blotchy style, the extravagance of epithet, the indiscriminating and wholesale praise or censure, the thrusting forth of everything, even what is most sacred, into the common light, the absence of delicacy and reticence which so often mark dealings with the work of the living or the characters of the dead among ourselves. And yet, noteworthy and praiseworthy as the characteristics just mentioned are, they leave us with an almost unsatisfied feeling, and a half-formed wish that we might know more.

We have glimpses—little else—of the bright, conscientious, pains-taking boy, “ever ready for fun, but never for mischief;” never suffering play “to usurp the place of work,” “fixed and consistent” in his “moral and religious tone,” thoroughly amiable, never priggish, the captain of the Eton Eleven. When we pass to Oxford, we find him, as an undergraduate at Baliol, “not in sympathy with the spirit of his college,” “a reluctant and half-interested sojourner, ever looking back to the playing fields of Eton, or forward to the more congenial sphere of a country parish.” Later on, as Fellow of Merton, he came out in quite a new character, and, though without a shade of political liberalism, was active in the work of university reform. Then came, in 1853, the short life of the “country parson,” at Offington, amidst surroundings too bright to last, and then the life work was reached, and in 1856 the martyr missionary left his native land, never to visit it again. Let faith and love and self-sacrifice be never so strong, there must be a hard pull at the heart-strings when one has to say,

“*Nos patriae fines, et dulcia linquimus arva.*”

But he went without parade of feeling or many words.

Fifteen years of missionary life, five as a presbyter and ten as a bishop (for he was consecrated on St. Matthias's Day, 1861) were now before him, and then, unknown to him, the martyr's crown!

The things that strike one most in that fifteen years' life of self-denial, unremitting labor, and “perils by land and sea,” are its cheerful acceptance of hardness, its “patient continuance in well-doing,” and the entire freedom of him who lived it from anything like self-consciousness.

There was no labor too menial, no work too hard or humble for him to undertake; and he put the same rules about many things upon himself which he put upon "the smallest Melanesian boy." Bishop Selwyn wrote: "I wish you could see him in the midst of his thirty-eight scholars, at Kohimarama, with eighteen dialects buzzing round him, with a cheerful look and a cheerful word for every one, teaching A, B, C with as much gusto as if they were the X, Y, Z of some deep problem, or marshalling a field of cricketers as if he were still the captain of the Eleven at Eton; and when school and play are over, conducting his polyglot service in the mission chapel."

And so he went on in what many who fancy that the Church is to advance and prosper by a hard riding of hobbies, who cannot imagine any progress without a perpetual change of places, would call a very dull routine. But this sort of dull routine comes out in all great things in nature and in grace, and convulsionary movements rarely work much in the way of abiding result.

With it all, there was an utter absence of that self-consciousness which is so repulsive, especially when it works out in what some one has termed "a pious fuss." There was nothing of this in the missionary or the bishop; we are told (how one's heart warms at the words in these sensational days!) that Bishop Patteson "would not have liked to have had *fine things* said or written about his work. His life in the Melanesian archipelago, which is poetry and romance to us, was prose to him; but prose, nevertheless, which was written in the grand characters of simple duty." Noble words, and true as they are noble!

He was always in some, often in great, and once in special danger before the end came. And what an end! He was alone with his murderers and his God. Perhaps we shall never know of his last words or acts, or just how and where he fell. That lonely canoe, which drifted out toward the coral reef, had no tale to tell of what we long to hear; but it bore a lifeless form, on whose brow abode no trace of suffering, but rather a glimpse of the glory which shall be revealed. "Peace reigned supreme in that calm smile." The end had crowned the work!

We need hardly add that we trust this charming volume may have many readers. None can read it, and not be helped and bettered by it.



AMERICAN CHURCH REVIEW.

THE ALT-CATHOLIC MOVEMENT.

SPEAKING generally, it is the object of this movement to resist the recent encroachments of Popery upon intellectual, civil, and religious rights; to purge Latin Christianity of its corruptions, and ultimately to restore it in faith, in morals and polity, to the pattern embodied in the primitive and undivided Church. Our religious and secular press have published a great deal of information in regard to it; and yet, for some reason, our people do not seem to be much interested in it. This lack of interest arises, probably, from a partial knowledge of the facts. What information has reached the reading public has come in the letters of occasional correspondents, or in detached paragraphs compiled from foreign newspapers, giving mere snatches and glimpses of facts. It is not strange, therefore, that this movement should be regarded by some as a short-lived outburst of remonstrance and indignation from a few scattered malcontents, still dwelling within the enclosure of Romanism; and by others as a disorderly, incoherent attempt, on the part of a small school of German Catholics infected by the free spirit of the surrounding Protestantism, to protest against the despotism of that "insolent and aggressive faction" in the Roman Church which originated and forced through

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to the bitter end the decrees of the Vatican Council. Both notions fall short of the facts, and betray ignorance of the issues involved, and of the causes and aims of the movement. There has been no religious uprising since the Reformation of the sixteenth century so deeply grounded in principle, or so important in its consequences, or led by men of such gravity of character, depth of learning, and earnestness of purpose. There is no other movement in the domain of religion to-day, that history will pronounce more clear cut in its aim, or more positive in its tone. It is eminently the duty of every American Churchman to study it closely, and to ascertain how far it is likely to deserve his sympathy, or to excite his apprehensions. It is not yet, by any means, a finality; still tentative and transitional, no one can yet prescribe its metes and bounds, or predict its ultimate results. Many risks are yet to be encountered, and consequently much uncertainty attaches to its future development. The wise and temperate leadership which has thus far guided it may be forced to give way to one of violent and impetuous temper, which will bring with it all the hazards of a revolution, out of which modern rationalism and infidelity may gather a new army of disciples. But whatever its future, such is its character, and such its proportions now, that no intelligent member of the Church of Christ can afford to pass it by as one of the casual topics of the day.

In handling the subject, the writer will turn to account some opportunities for observation afforded him during a recent sojourn in Germany. The movement cannot be well understood without knowing the master spirits who are guiding it, and studying the temperament of the people who are to be most immediately affected by it.

The origin of this effort to reclaim the Church of Rome from her enormous assumptions of power, and from the corruptions of her dogmatic and practical systems, dates far back in the past, and recalls many well-meant but impotent struggles for the same end.

The feelings and convictions which have culminated in this movement were not the growth of a day, or of any one startling event. The promulgation of the dogma of papal infallibility simply brought them to a focus, and obliged earnest men to put their wills into their thoughts, action into their theories; and no longer to speak and print their protests, but to organize them into solemn and resolute insurrection against evils which menaced the foundations of the faith and civilization of Christendom.

It is not more true that Joseph II. of Austria, and his brother, Leopold of Tuscany, toward the close of the eighteenth century, and

Napoleon I. at the opening of the nineteenth, were, as regards their efforts to establish National Catholic Churches, and to carry out certain general reformatory measures adverse to the Papacy and to Jesuitism, forerunners of Frederick William of Germany, and Victor Emanuel of Italy, than that the Alt-Catholic leaders of to-day are the lineal successors in spirit and aim, if not in method, of Seiler and Wessenberg in the last, and of Möhler and Hirscher in the present century. In fact, ever since the Reformation, two rival tendencies have been working side by side in the Church of Rome,—the one striving to correct abuses, to restrain Papal authority, to vindicate the rightful independence of diocesan bishops upon the Romish See, to reform monasticism, to promote popular instruction by better schools, to adapt preaching and ritual to the changed condition of things, to introduce stricter morals, to recover the respect for ecclesiastical institutions forfeited by the neglect of former times, and to reconcile the order, the work, the genius, the theology of the true, historic kingdom of Christ, which, in its essentials, is unchangeable, with the drift and method of living, scientific, and critical thought, which never continue in one stay; the other endeavoring to accomplish results precisely opposite in every particular, to stifle the rise of liberal ideas and reformatory principles within the Church, to reduce the diocesan episcopate into helpless, absolute submission to the Bishop of Rome, to flank the priesthood in its work among the people by new supports, and, generally, by every conceivable scheme of propagandism, to multiply adherents to the Papacy, and even to recover a lost supremacy over the politics and diplomacy of Europe. The former tendency has made its voice heard at sundry times and in divers manners. The late Congress at Munich in 1871, and at Cologne in 1872, simply caught up and extended to new issues the protest of Ems, which, in 1786, emanated from no less illustrious parties than the German electors and the Archbishops of Mayence, Treves, Cologne, and Salzburg. Döllinger, Von Schulte, Huber, and Reinkens of to-day are but enlarged and distinct copies of the famous Scipio Ricci, Bishop of Pistoia and Prato, and his confreres of nearly one hundred years ago. To show how literally true this is, we need only refer to the Ecclesiastical Convention at Pistoia in the same year as the Conference at Ems, 1786, by which the constitutional principles or ancient liberties of the Gallican Church were boldly reaffirmed, and by which it was resolved to hold service in the language of the people, to distribute the Holy Scriptures, and to abolish all superfluous ceremonies. The latter tendency has been guided and fostered with a sleepless energy by the conservatives or

reactionists of the Romish Church. Men variously styled—according to the point of view from which they were regarded—Ultramontanists, because of their devotion to the Papacy; Infallibilists, because of their especial zeal for the new dogma; Jesuits, because, if not actually members of the Order of Ignatius Loyola, they have been inoculated with its craft, fired by its earnestness, and bound fast to the policy of a centralizing domination.

These antagonizing movements are still wrestling like twin giants for the mastery. The Vatican Council, with all its strange work, was the logical expression of the one. The Alt-Catholic assembly at Cologne was the latest formal utterance of the other. Which of these will prevail, and finally mould the religious life of Europe, is the foremost ecclesiastical question of our time. Men's estimate of the probabilities in this struggle will depend upon their sympathies. They will prophesy as they wish. None but those who are careless which way the world's life drifts can be indifferent to the issue. It must, as it advances or dies out, affect all human interests,—some directly, others remotely. Learning, culture, the whole intellectual spirit of the age, cannot stand aloof. Whatever is strictly characteristic of modern life is immediately involved. Not only religion, but civilization, is on trial; and if the policy of the Vatican is the true wisdom, clearly, we must look for new definitions of what mankind through the ages all along have agreed to pursue, as among the highest franchises and blessings of the race.

In treating the general subject of the Alt-Catholic movement, the following points will be considered in the order named: first, the extent of the movement; second, what it has accomplished; third, the grounds for faith in its ultimate success.

The press correspondence and comments have been quite full and minute on various details and aspects of the late Cologne Congress; but, so far as is known, they have presented no carefully-formed estimate of the numerical strength of the Alt-Catholics, nor any analysis of the classes of people thus far ranged under their standard. Not a little misapprehension, therefore, prevails among us as to the bulk and momentum of this religious uprising. Numerically, it is not large. In this country or in England, where the masses are in a half fluid state, separating and combining easily under the operation of any law of elective affinity that happens to be dominant, and where public opinion works with a suddenness often amounting to spontaneity, this Alt-Catholic uprising would be considered a very moderate, not to say trifling, affair. Let it be understood, then, that its strength to-day consists in the *quality*, not

the *quantity*, of its adherents; in the sorts and conditions and vocations of its converts, not in their numerical bulk; and, furthermore, that, so far as it lacks popular discipleship, or a firm hold on the popular heart, it must lack both the degree and the kind of power which a great enthusiasm always begets. There is much in the times, much in the present habit of German thought and life, much in the social, political, academic, and ecclesiastical spirit of the day, which forbids the appearance of another Luther, or of the qualities which he evoked from the heart of his nation. His fire, boldness, impetuosity, passionate impatience under errors and corruptions which overclouded and chafed into indignant fury the generation which he led, are now scarcely possible, and if possible, not desirable. The reformation now aimed at must be wrought out in conformity with present facts in the condition and life of Germany. If accomplished at all, it must be very gradually, and by the influence of reason and intelligence, together with the slow and difficult awakening of the religious consciousness of the people. Two things are to be done, preliminary to achieving any great and lasting result. First, the Roman Catholic masses must be brought to feel the sore need of a purer faith, a more vital religion, and then they must be duly instructed as to where alone these can be found. But this is the task of a generation, not a year. It must be pushed as an educational work—calmly, steadily, gradually—with all the alternations which usually occur between seed-time and harvest. Outbursts of popular rage, burning enthusiasm, violent assaults, the tumult and passion of a crusade,—all are out of place; and if it were possible to arouse them, they would damage, not help, the great ends in view. The Germans are regarded as a highly-educated people,—a people who read a great deal, and think still more upon all the serious problems of Church and State, as well as upon those within the domain of physical and metaphysical science. They are so to a certain extent, but not to the extent supposed among us. There is a class, but comparatively not very numerous, who bear out this description. Such are the land-owners, the merchants, the bankers, the officers of the Government and the army; the men who fill the liberal professions, who have been reared in the universities and the higher schools. Take out these, and the residuum justifies no very high opinion of its culture or general intelligence. The rank and file—the great million—there, far more than here, take little interest in matters that do not touch the coarser wants of life. Like the same classes in other parts of the Old World, their time is given to toil, amusement, and sleep.

They read little, and think less. The sources of mental activity and knowledge are open to them, but the hard, staple cares of animal subsistence allow neither the opportunity nor the inclination to use them. Germany abounds in great centres of learning, in vast libraries, in splendid museums; but these practically are for the few, not the many. The masses are educated up to a certain average, and they never get beyond it. As a whole, they are quiet, stolid, passive, with a sort of intelligence much lower and narrower than we are accustomed to in the same range of life. Changes in religion, government, society, whatever the changes may be, are begun and consummated in a sphere far above and beyond them. Now, this accounts for the fact that the people—the masses in Germany—have, as yet, been scarcely reached by the Alt-Catholic movement, and certainly have made no sign in regard to it. It is, as yet, in no respect a popular movement. In no district has it so moved the million as to carry them along with any signal demonstration of earnestness or power. By and by it will filter down through these underlying sands, and moisten them with the dew of its grace and life. But it has not done this yet. It has grown largely out of historical and theological discussions confined to the learned; largely out of political sympathies antagonistic to the Papal policy of supremacy over or interference with State affairs. But this is only another way of saying that it is a movement of the intellect rather than the heart of Germany, and, therefore, among the learned classes, and not among the masses. It is a law of history that uprisings which originate in the feelings, the passions, the heart of humanity, start uniformly from the million, while those which take the form of intellectual issues and differences, or have no immediate bearing on the impulses and emotions of the heart, begin at the top of the social pyramid, and work down toward the base. This law asserts itself in the present instance.

But if this movement, so far, has not drawn to itself the masses; if it is confined very largely to the middle and upper classes, to men in or from the universities, to learned professors and theologians and officers of the State, it has also failed to attract more than a meagre few of the Romish priesthood; and this for reasons easily anticipated. The power which holds a Romish priest in Europe where he is, is immensely more tangible and impressive than the power which attracts him toward any new position, either in the theory or the practice of religion. He has everything to fear, and little to hope for, from any change. He may be very wretched where he is; but he is taught to dread evils still more serious. Authority presses him, tradi-

tion holds him, constitutional weaknesses of character, engendered by his training, undermine all force of will and feeling of individuality. Threats terrify him, or promised rewards conciliate him. Ordinarily, he is not only *docile*, but *servile*; not only obedient to the nearest master, but slavish. The last heresy is to think for himself on any subject, and the bitterest curse awaits him for taking off the blinds from his eyes, so that he may see and feel as a man among men. None can imagine, who have not had the chance to see something of it, how enormous, how subtle, how secret and unscrupulous, are the means resorted to to keep every priest in line; and the same may be said of their flocks. Rome was never more active and resolute than she is now, in the effort to hold her own. And when she puts her marvellous machinery in motion for this end, a hundred lessons of history tells us how tremendous she is.

And then, on the other hand, this reform movement has, in its struggle for birth, been too weak to assure success, too vague to satisfy the inquirer who must see all parts of the movement reduced to logical symmetry, too loosely jointed to give promise of early and effective organization. It has also encountered a very serious hindrance from another source. It was declared, in the resolutions of Cologne, that pecuniary help would be welcomed from all who sympathized with the objects of the movement. Very recently it has been frankly avowed by the leaders that their chief difficulty is the want of money. It is confidently believed by those best informed, that if their subsistence could be guaranteed, a thousand priests would soon range themselves under the standard of reform. In heart they are with it; they secretly admire those who have accepted the heat and burden of the conflict, but they cannot bring themselves to feel that duty compels them to go out into what seems a wilderness of uncertainty, leaving behind bread and shelter and stipends. Nothing but an outburst of the martyr spirit can sweep away a hindrance of this sort. For these and like reasons, many minds favorably disposed toward the aims, and entirely convinced of the desirableness of this great effort for reform, have stood aloof, waiting to see what the future would bring forth. But whatever the causes, it is a fact that, up to this time, it is not known that, out of thousands of priests, more than fifty, and out of some twelve millions of reported adherents to Romanism, more than one hundred congregations, large and small, have joined the movement.

Now, after all that has been said and done, claimed and prophesied, this may seem a most beggarly array of statistics. But figures do not always do justice to forces. Tendencies are often immeasur-

ably stronger than the surface facts would indicate. As proof of the steadily-rising life of the movement, as well as of its advancing importance in the estimation of civil rulers and of the people generally, take the following items of intelligence, arranged according to their dates :

September 24, 1872.—Prof. Huber, in a public address, said : “Last year we doubted, when we were given a small church (in Munich), whether we could fill it, and it was crowded. Now we have a large church there. All the Allgau is in motion. In Straubing, Passau, Ratisbon, Nuremberg, Erlangen, Baireuth, congregations are formed. The movement is spreading into Switzerland and all the southeast of Austria. A rich literature has sprung up in favor of Old Catholicism, and it is spreading among the people. We have six newspapers acting as our organs.”

December 15, 1872.—Another authority says : “A fresh impetus has been given to the Old Catholic Reform Movement. The Central Committee of the Old Catholic *Verein* assembled, and, on the 1st of December, a general meeting of delegates and sympathizers was held at Olten, above one hundred and fifty delegates having met on the previous day to arrange the programme of proceedings. On the day itself, more than three thousand persons assembled in the parish church, where various resolutions were passed, as well concerning the internal organization of the movement, as its relations to the State. The Cantonal authorities were especially to be requested to secure to the Old Catholics the free exercise of their religious and educational rights, and they also petitioned for the removal of the Swiss Nuncio. But the grand feature of the meeting appears to have been the address of Reinkens, who had come from Breslau in compliance with their urgent invitation. He spoke, between the 1st and 11th of December, on five different occasions,—at Olten, Lucerne, Soleure, Berne, and Rheinfelden, being everywhere received with enthusiasm. He was assured, on taking leave, that ‘the cause of Church reform, in the Old Catholic sense, was now triumphant in Switzerland.’ Five other parishes had already followed the example of Starrkirch—one of them being Soleure, where the Romish bishop resides—and many more were expected shortly to join them.”

In Cologne, on the 29th of December last, a meeting of the committee having in charge the matter of the election of a bishop took place, and some preliminary arrangements were made. “The opinion was expressed that one bishop would not suffice, but that there would be needed one for North Germany, one for South Ger-

many, and one for Switzerland. The movement makes such progress, that, in the judgment of those present, the necessity for a firm organization daily becomes greater."

In February of this year, the Old Catholic worship was established at Bonn. About the same time, in Crefeld (Prussia), some one hundred and eighty families were enrolled as members of an Old Catholic congregation.

At the end of March, *Peré Hyacinthe* settled in Geneva, in response to the urgent call of three hundred Old Catholics of that city. He announced in his letter of acceptance that he was "resolved not to sacrifice the old faith either to Ultramontaniam on the one hand, or to infidelity on the other." The latest news from Geneva shows that his preaching has been very successful in adding to the number of his adherents.

But still more important is the following item, which reached us in April last:

At Constance there has been a vote of the people on the question of Infallibility. Out of 1,500 Catholics of full age, 657 voted against the Infallibility dogma, the numbers being divided pretty equally amongst the three parishes. The military are to vote on the matter later. Forthwith a deputation was sent to the Baden Government, to beg for at least the joint use of one church. This was granted immediately, and a ministerial decree issued to the town council, dated but two days after the vote, authorizing them to set apart the Augustinian Church for Old Catholic service, the hours to be settled amicably with the *pfarrrer*, or, if not, to be fixed by the council. This great triumph will give a good spur to the movement in Baden. Several towns are already mentioned as likely to follow the example of Constance, and the movement in the Grand Duchy will probably be most interesting. Baden is fettered by no concordats, and its support of the Old Catholics presents no political difficulty. What if this had been the case in Bavaria? Just at the present time there are in the Palatinate alohe twenty-one congregations or vereins of Reformers applying for ministerial action. But the Government is supine. The tables are now quite turned; while formerly Bavaria was the centre of all the reforming agitation, now north and south the war is raging, and Bavaria is quiet.

We proceed now to the second point to be considered: What the Alt-Catholics have accomplished. As might be expected, it is the feeling in some quarters, that because they have not done all that was anticipated, they have done nothing. Certainly, there are some things not yet achieved, and it would best range if there were not, along so far-reaching a line of assault and defence. It must be admitted, then, that this movement has not, up to this time, forced Rome to alter one jot or tittle of her avowed policy, or to abate any of her proud pretensions, or to modify any characteristic feature of

her theory or practice. Popery continues still unshaken in her hard and blind immobility. It must be admitted, too, that it has not yet very seriously affected the great water courses of German thought on religious questions. Nor has it thrown itself into battle array with the order and compactness of a disciplined army. It is still engaged on picket duty, and skirmishing on the edges and outposts of the coming battle-field. Nor has it yet received the consecrating baptism of the martyr's blood. The emergency which shall demand great sacrifices, and crowd reluctant and timid wills into an attitude of heroic courage and endurance, has not yet arisen. All these things, however, are only postponed. They will follow when the crisis shall demand them.

But in spite of these admissions, a vast deal has been done,—enough to establish the positive and progressive spirit of the movement. (1) It has created a new and, for purposes of popular instruction and general controversy, an ample theological literature on the issues with Rome; a literature which, by its erudition, unction, and logical acumen, has already won a high place in the records of modern thought.

(2) It has, by solemn resolutions and by protests clothed with all the gravity of profound learning and intense conviction, arraigned Popery once more before the tribunal of the world's judgment, to excuse or defend its enormous sins against Holy Scripture, reason, conscience, and civilization. To show how pungent and telling this arraignment is, we cite here a specimen speech of one of the most noted leaders:

In opposition to revelation, history, and civilization, the Pope has been declared infallible. Thus reigns Pius Nonus, *ecclesiæ onus*! Wherefore? That the whole Church may be Jesuitized, that the spirit of Loyola may inspire the Church, that Thomas Aquinas may be the ultimate authority on all dogmatic theology, and Alphonso Liguori on all moral theology. The foundation of the Thomist doctrine is, that science is the slave of theology, that reason and intelligence must bow to what is Thomistically-Jesuitically declared to be orthodox doctrine. Inquiry—theological and historical and scientific—is intolerable unless it be in bonds. The Jesuits have taken Thomas Aquinas as their standard, and no man may attempt to adopt any other philosophical line or reason in any other groove than the Thomist, or his book is on the index, and he is under censure. Yet the Thomist deductive system is incapable of being used to meet the logical requirements of the day. One must not do anything to meet philosophy on its own grounds. Mind, reason, intelligence, must be crushed into the Thomist mould, or be cast out as heretical and unclean. Everywhere in our universities, at Bonn, Breslau, Braunsberg, Munich, are only the broken ruins of theological science, shattered by Jesuit hands because it is not run into Thomist moulds.

And then again with regard to moral theology. The Jesuits have

adopted Alphonsus Liguori ; they have just had a triumph. Alphonsus Liguori, who took up theology in a huff at having lost a process, has been exalted to a level with SS. Augustine, Chrysostom, and Athanasius as a doctor ecclesiæ. And what, I ask, is the system which these Jesuits, with their Aquinas and Liguori, have introduced into the Church? It is the annihilation of all that is individual and God-like in man. A man is taught to subject and crush his will, his reason, his moral sense, his whole individuality, to make an oblation of all. Reason is not to be developed, but to be made into a holocaust; will is to be offered as a whole burnt-offering; the conscience is to be entirely surrendered, to be Liguorianized, so as not to know what is right from what is wrong. How is man to merit the kingdom of heaven? Not by putting out his talents to usury any more, but by wrapping them up in napkins, and placing them at the disposal of the General of the Order of Jesus. How is man to enter into heaven? Without a faculty of his own.

(3) Again, the Alt-Catholics have done good service in calling out and strengthening the determination of the rulers of the German empire to force Popery back within its proper boundaries, to confine it to the exercise of strictly spiritual functions, and—what is now the dream of a large part of the thoughtful minds of Germany—to lay the foundations of a national Church, to be sovereign within its own limits.

(4) They have, moreover, given a fresh impulse to reform movements in Austria, Italy, and Spain, and have established fraternal communication with Christian minds in other lands. Such are some of the more general and exterior results attained. But there are special ones of equal, if not greater, moment.

(5) With extreme men hanging upon their flanks, and visionaries thronging in their van, they have avoided splitting up into sects and schools, or running off into open schism. Though charged by some with half measures, with counsels of temporizing expediency, and by others with timidity and cowardice, they have held steadily in their course, advancing step by step as light was given them. "Half measures?" said the learned and eloquent Huber. "Granted; but what is this except to be on the road, and not yet at the goal? Such is the true definition of every influential movement. But our chief aim is no half measures. We want the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth."

(6) Again, they have taken the preliminary steps to secure Synodical organization under an Apostolic presidency, with bishops lawfully chosen and lawfully consecrated.

(7) And, what is most important of all, perhaps, they have agreed on the fundamental terms for the reunion of the non-separated bodies of Christendom. These terms were assented to by our

own representative, the learned and godly Bishop of Maryland, and by the two distinguished bishops in attendance from the Church of England, the Rt. Rev. Dr. Wordsworth, Bishop of Lincoln, and the Rt. Rev. Dr. Harold Browne, Bishop of Ely, by the Abbé Michaud, of Paris, and by the Archimandrite, professor of St. Petersburg, Johann Janyshew. The terms are few and simple, but involve the essence of the Catholic faith. They are as follows :

- (a) We believe that Jesus Christ is God and our Saviour.
- (b) We believe that Jesus Christ has founded a Church.
- (c) We accept *quod semper, quod ab omnibus, quod ubique creditum est*.

(d) As the Rule of Faith, we accept the Holy Scriptures, the Ancient Fathers, and the undisputed Œcumenical Councils.

This action will of itself signalize the great Cologne meeting as one of the most remarkable in recent history.

(8) But further, and what is a most difficult and unlooked-for result to achieve, these Old Catholics have shown themselves capable, amid much diversity of opinion, of coming to an agreement as to the abuses to be corrected, the corruptions to be swept away, and generally as to the nature and extent of the reforms to be demanded. And while agreed as to what ought to be done in this direction, they resolved, with singular wisdom and self-control, not to attempt these reforms, or to enforce them by discipline, until a regular Church system shall have been constituted. This done, and enforced celibacy, enforced auricular confession, worship in a language not understood by the people, the dogmas added to the faith by the self-will and judicial blindness of Rome, the servile dependence of diocesan bishops upon the Pope, and the whole system of appeal to the instincts of superstition,—all these will be abolished, and, for a portion greater or less of German Catholics, set aside forever.¹ Now, all

¹There are a few active spirits among us who are laboring to convince Churchmen of the expediency of reviving in the Church an institution bearing a very strong resemblance to the Romish confessional. Would that they could have heard the testimony on this subject, in the Cologne Congress, from no less an authority than the sober and moderate as well as eminent Von Schulte. He knew of what he spoke, and yet he did not hesitate to speak of the confessional as one of the leading causes of the moral corruption of Catholic society. With grave earnestness he declared in substance that children had thoughts put into their heads which would never have been there but for the priest's questions; that the peace of families was destroyed through the insinuations of confessors; that the health and integrity of the individual conscience were undermined by casuistic counsels and matter-of-course absolutions; and that morality in the Catholic parts of Germany was immensely

these viewed together are results so practical, so wide-sweeping, so full of promise, that no adversary can dwarf them, no enemy deny them.

But we pass on to the third and last point,—the indications of final success. We might, as the sufficient ground of our faith in the coming victory, fall back on the familiar maxim, "Truth is mighty, and shall prevail." But the past tells us of many bold attempts similar to the present, which have come to naught, or, at least, left behind no immediate result, except the scaffold, the stake, the wheel, the rack, and all the rest of the vulgar tools of persecution and repression. Truth, in the vicissitudes of its conflict with error, swings through vast cycles of time. Its blood may be soaked into the ground, and be, indeed, the seed of the Church; but the harvest is often a long way off from the planting. It may be so in this case; but certainly there are signs which tell us that the night of Popery is far spent, and the day-dawn of religion, pure and undefiled, is at hand. Events have happened in the last few years which have changed the whole outlook. Empires and kingdoms in Europe have changed front as regards this issue. God has made the wrath of man to praise Him. He has, in ways that excite our wonder, overruled the policies, the diplomacies, the agitations, and the wars of Europe, to the advantage of His truth, and the confusion of its enemies. It is plain to any close observer of the symptoms of German thought and aspiration, that there is much in what may be called the atmosphere—the common air of the Continent—favorable to the work undertaken by these reformers. Germany, on its religious side, is weary of the evils of Christian divisions, of schisms and sects, and of the strifes and jealousies that spring from them. She longs for the unity among believers in the Son of God, which she persuades herself she has introduced into the domain of science and literature,—unity of object, unity of spirit, unity in the great structural fundamentals, unity in a common rule of faith, which recognizes at once the voice of the Word, and the voice of the Church interpreting that Word. She reveres authority which respects reason, and loves liberty under law. But she knows from bitter experience that Ultramontane Popery, with the Jesuits for its mouth-piece, is an insurmountable obstacle to such unity, such authority, such liberty. She begins to realize, too, that these coveted treasures can never be found while travelling on the beaten highway of free-thinking scepticism. Germany turns, therefore, with increasing

below that among German Protestants, and that this was to be ascribed mainly to the practice of confession.

favor to this Alt-Catholic movement, which promises to bring together and reconcile interests which have been divided by the dark gulf of Romanism, or the equally dark gulf of Infidelity. She wants an Apostolic faith,—a religion that connects her with all the Christian past, a Church Catholic which shall be the pillar and ground of the truth; and, at the same time, she wants room for the progressive instincts of science, culture, and general civilization. This, at present, is the predominant feeling of educated Europe, and especially of Germany. This, in part, explains the strong sympathy of the empire with this movement, and its resolve to secure it protection and fair play. Besides, there now prevails throughout Germany a growing conviction that, as the hitherto dissevered elements of her nationality have been compacted and unified into one great empire, so the hitherto conflicting religious elements of the country ought to be consolidated into a Church of the nation, with bishops and clergy emancipated from the trammels of a foreign allegiance. The demand is, that the empire, in all its grand proportions, shall express itself ecclesiastically as well as politically. But the Papacy obstinately opposes this demand. It has entered upon systematic and adroit schemes of agitation to defeat it. Wherever the chances offer, it fomented discontent and strife among the people, to lead them off from the issue toward which the national instinct powerfully gravitates. In fact, the proud and insolent bearing of Rome toward the empire, its manifest purpose to baffle the now dominant aspirations of the German government, have rendered the future relations of the Church to the State the main question of Germany; and until this question is adjusted, the nation can never enjoy the repose and confidence it now so anxiously desires as the final token of its strength, and visible seal of its recent victories. Politically, then, this movement is strong. It has backing and support from the known policy of the government, as well as from the deepest instincts of the people. Both forces are moving in the same direction, and with conscious harmony of purpose. Sometimes the friendship of States has proved the friendship of death to attempts at religious reform. But it cannot well prove so now, and for the reasons which have been assigned for the existence of such friendship at all.

Another ground for hope is the fact of a growing tendency to reaction among the intellectual classes from the extreme claims of Popery, as interpreted by the late Vatican Council. Rome has set its mark too high. Its ambition has overleaped itself. It has laid, at last, a burden on the minds of men which cannot be carried long.

It has delivered a challenge to history and common-sense which must be answered. Multitudes of that communion are quiet under the strong pressure of the hour, who will silently desert its ranks as the conflict advances. Nothing can be more delusive than the belief which prevails in some quarters, that because the Roman Catholic prelates of Germany have succumbed to the Vatican, therefore, those who still acknowledge their jurisdiction have done likewise. And this brings us to notice another element of strength in this movement, and another keen and telling weapon that will be used with effect among the people. We refer to the now admitted vacillation, weakness, and slavish submission of the whole body of the German bishops, some during the Council at the Vatican, and some since. Teutonic honesty, consistency, manhood, conscience, feel themselves outraged to the last degree by the conduct of these men. No language of ours can convey to the reader an idea of the scorn, the ridicule, and the indignant, scorching satire poured upon them. Here are the words of Professor Reinkens in the late Congress. They will show how the battle rages, and the sort of controversial nitro-glycerine flung into the Roman camp :

Out of 1,037 voices, 533 were in favor of Papal infallibility. And this is now called unanimity. Before—we have the evidence in our hands—the bishops protested against the want of freedom allowed to the Council, and now they pretend that the Council was perfectly free! Before, they averred that in their dioceses Papal infallibility was a thing unknown by name even, as it was also unknown to Christian antiquity, and that—as Bishop Ketteler, of Mainz, declared—to make this a dogma was for the Church to commit suicide—a comedy for the amazement of posterity—yet now they aver that this dogma was always and everywhere believed. Before, they declared that, as witnesses to the truth, they could not, for their duty's and oaths' sake, vote for the infallibility of the Pope, and now, where is their oath, their duty? Before, they protested that the dogma would be ruin to souls, and now it is necessary to salvation!

Either they were not witnesses to the truth at Rome, or their present testimony is worthless. In Rome, they emphatically protested against the bulls of Boniface VIII. and Paul IV. ; in other words, against the Curialist idea of the relations borne to each other by the Church and the State, and declared it impossible to organize civil society upon it. Now they try to force it upon men, and are astonished when conflict arises. In Rome, they protested against this dogma, in order, by their protest, to clear themselves and the Church before mankind of the horrible responsibility for the crimes resulting from those bulls and that idea. Two months later they ate their words, and that protest remains as an eternal witness against them of the way in which they have trifled with God's truth. And why? They apologized afterward by saying that they could not before the face of the Pope express all they thought. What! shall they not have to stand before the face of One

greater than any Pope—God himself—and then will they have to give account for their treachery and their timorousness.

The influence of any great moral movement is brought to a point in the personal influence of the individuals who represent it. When men live as they think, and translate ideas into realities, they make an impression corresponding to the greatness of the ideas and the faithfulness and intensity with which they have been embodied in life and action. "When we look back into the past, or at what is going on around us now, we are often baffled when we attempt to analyze the vast play of forces. But when things have been changed, whatever else is intricate and confused, we can seldom miss the men who, by what they were and did, changed them. Indeed, it is almost startling to observe how it has often hung on the apparent accident of a stronger character or a weaker, one equal to the occasion or unequal to it, or some great unfaithfulness which lost the game, or some energetic conviction which won it, whether some vast change should be or not, some great enterprise should grow to maturity or die in the act of birth.

"How often, when everything has been in favor of a cause—reason, truth, human happiness—only dearth of character has ruined it; the ship, freighted with the dearest treasures, going upon the breakers because the wrong man was at the helm."¹

Now, perhaps, no movement ever derived greater strength from the character, position, and attainments of its leaders than this. They are, in most regards, more than a match for the ablest heads of Ultramontaniam.

Like all the best instruments employed by Providence, they have slowly ripened up to their work, and been largely edged and polished by the friction of the times in which they were to labor. Their learning, their eloquence, their honesty, their earnestness, and what, perhaps, is still better, their moderation and practical wisdom, have won the admiration of the on-looking millions of Europe. In all their writings and speeches, they exhibit an astonishing familiarity with the deepest soundings of the questions which they handle. History, logic, metaphysics, science, dogmatic theology, casuistry, all the windings and the pitfalls of controversy are at their tongues' end. They are scholars, thinkers, orators, and, at the same time, men of action, with an eye to business carefully prepared and methodically done. German assemblies have heard no such eloquence as that of these men since the Reformation. Amid the fire and tumult of the

¹ Discourses by the Rev. R. W. Church, Dean of St. Paul's, London.

most intense and passionate convictions they have argued their case with a judicial calmness and clearness ; exhausting the sources of all cognate knowledge, and all the available helps of logical reasoning. Whatever becomes of the movement, the movers will be landmarks of the century. Their words will burn and their actions will live on the pages of history. Taken together, these men present a marvellous combination of gifts and faculties for the work they have undertaken. There is Döllinger, the Nestor in age and wisdom, learned in history beyond any man of his time, revered for his great services in the past, and for his now exalted character, calm, unemotional, looking out on the scene of conflict with an anxious but serene gaze, conservative, comprehensive, profound, pale and wrinkled with thought, declining leadership, and yet his greatness inviting it. There is Huber, author in part of that famous book, "The Pope and the Council," a Munich scholar and theologian of energetic habits and deep convictions, earnest, clear-headed, strong-willed, gifted in speech, and of versatile acquirements. There, too, is Micheli, a man of singular gifts for moving great assemblies, a born orator, with towering form and noble head and flashing eye, his voice one of vast compass, pouring forth a diction pungent and impassioned, yet polished and measured, of childlike clearness and simplicity, and yet laden with citations from history and the imagery of a burning fancy. He holds the key to the common heart, and he uses it with an effect seldom surpassed. And, then, there is Reinkens, in some respects still more gifted, with a countenance of singular sweetness and benevolence, with a manner almost unmasculine in its softness and affability, and yet with a brain all alive with thought, and crowded with the stores of erudition, with a tongue from which the sentences drop like glowing sparks from the anvil ; sentences which the people carry away and repeat at their firesides, in their shops and places of amusement, and which go resounding through the schools and universities, thrilling the serious young life in those centres of learning.¹ Nor must we forget to name Friedrichs and Von Schulte,—the former the Quirinus of the Vatican correspondence, that was republished all over Germany ;² a man of cau-

¹ On the 3d of June last, Prof. Reinkens was chosen to be the first Alt-Catholic bishop. All who knew the man and the cause will agree that no wiser choice could have been made.

² Letters from Rome on the Council. By Quirinus. Reprinted from the Allgemeine Zeitung. Rivingtons ; Pott & Amery. 1870.

It is strange that this remarkable book has not been more widely read. It makes the Vatican Council an "open secret." In giving an accurate and

tious habit; but, when he moves, strong, bold, and incisive; a man whom the more thoughtful of all sides watch with the greatest interest, fully recognizing the vast influence that waits on his words and actions; the latter the most learned and accurate canonist of Europe; a man of even balance and rigid method, clear-headed and firm of purpose; a man, moreover, of affairs, who, beyond any one in his country, knows how to temper and mould great deliberative assemblies. Gathered around these commanding figures is a troop of lesser lights, each one of whom would have to be honorably mentioned in any sketch pretending to completeness.

Such is the extent, such are the results, such are the signs and pledges of success, such are the leaders of this movement for the regeneration and purification of Latin Christianity. Nothing, so far as man can judge, can arrest it. Its life is the life of forces which cannot die, except our modern life die with them. It must, therefore, go on. The foolish and the ignorant only will despise or scoff at it. Friends it will have; enemies it must have. With every blow it is being driven like a wedge into the solid cohorts of Popery. Already it has given Ultramontanism its quietus in Germany. In France, tendencies are at work, events are ripening, which will cure her of her fatal trust in its enchantments and divinations. Italy has already begun her exodus from its tyranny and darkness. Spain is slowly girding herself for a like task. As the signs of the times now read, one needs not the gift of prophecy to affirm that the disintegration of the Church of the Vatican is only an affair of time. "Driven into a corner, it must necessarily either sink deeper into the abyss of absurdity in maintaining Papal infallibility, or else return to the ancient Catholic doctrine, by correcting the errors into which it has fallen for ages, by blotting out from its creed all the anathemas which its ambition has dictated, and by resuming its ancient place among the orthodox sister Churches."¹

In ways that many among us do not seem to understand, those Old Catholics are fighting our battles, and we cannot be indifferent to their fortunes. The tidal-wave of the great controversy sweeps over us, and they who freely accept its dangers cannot be alien to our sympathies, or unremembered in our prayers and intercessions to Him who is Head over all things to His Church.

detailed knowledge of the men and the events connected with that Council, it is of more value than all other sources of information put together. Its style is easy and familiar, but full of pungency and power; and so skilfully are the characters and incidents worked up, that, without pretending to any plot or series of acts, it is clothed with the freshness and interest of a great drama.

¹ Abbé Michaud.



THE LAW OF DIVORCE, ETC.¹

PREFATORY REMARKS.

THE question as to the admission of divorced persons, or of such as have married divorced persons, to the Holy Communion, is delicate and embarrassing. It is so, principally because of the great difference between what is extensively considered to be the Divine law, and the regulations of civil powers, especially in numerous States of our own Union. In two cases within the writer's knowledge this question has perplexed the judgment and disquieted the conscience of intelligent ministers. We have presented in the following pages the results of our researches upon this interesting subject. It involves the institution and nature of marriage, the Scriptural grounds on which it may be dissolved, and the legislation of Churches and States. The materials we have gathered may aid others in forming more correct conclusions, or in giving to our own some authority.

¹The Law of Divorce, etc., in connection with repulsion from the Holy Communion. By the Hon. Murray Hoffman, of New York.

I.

THE MOSAIC LAW OF DIVORCE.

Our first inquiry is, What were the precepts of the Jewish law upon the subject?

Besides the denunciation of adultery in the Seventh Commandment, we have the following directions :

"The man that committeth adultery with another man's wife, even he that committeth adultery with his neighbor's wife, the adulterer and adulteress shall surely be put to death."¹

"If a man be found lying with a woman married to an husband, then they shall both of them die, both the man that lay with the woman, and the woman : so shalt thou put away evil from Israel."²

"If a damsel that is a virgin be betrothed unto an husband, and a man find her in the city, and lie with her ; then ye shall bring them both out unto the gate of that city, and ye shall stone them with stones that they die ; the damsel, because she cried not, being in the city ; and the man, because he hath humbled his neighbor's wife."³

"But if a man find a betrothed damsel in the field, and the man force her, and lie with her : then the man only that lay with her shall die."⁴

"If a man find a damsel that is a virgin which is not betrothed, and lay hold of her, and lie with her, and they be found ; then the man shall give unto the damsel's father fifty shekels of silver, and she shall be his wife ; because he hath humbled her, he may not put her away all his days."⁵

If the man who charged his wife with incontinence before his marriage failed in his accusation, he was to be amerced in a hundred shekels of silver, to be given to her father, "and she shall be his wife ; he may not put her away all his days."⁶

There was also the terrible ordeal of the waters of jealousy in cases where suspicion of the wife's guilt existed, but there was no witness against her, neither was she "taken with the manner." We judge from the passage in Ezekiel (xxiii. 45) that there was a body (the righteous men) who took cognizance of the crime of adultery, and pronounced the sentence.⁷

Again : "When a man hath taken a wife, and married her, and it come to pass that she find no favor in his eyes, because he hath found

¹ Leviticus, xx. 10. ² Deuteronomy, xxii. 22. ³ *Ibid.* 23, 24. ⁴ *Ibid.* 25, 26, 27. ⁵ *Ibid.* 28, 29. ⁶ Deuteronomy, v. 13, 19. ⁷ Numbers, v. 12-31.

some uncleanness in her : then let him write her a bill of divorcement, and give it in her hand, and send her out of the house. And when she is departed out of his house, she may go and be another man's wife."¹

"And if the latter husband hate her, and write her a bill of divorcement, and giveth it in her hand, and sendeth her out of his house ; or if the latter husband die, which took her to his wife ; her former husband, which sent her away, may not take her again to be his wife, after that she is defiled ; for that is abomination before the Lord."²

In the twenty-first chapter of Exodus (7-11) we have the case of the sale of a daughter to be a maid-servant, and the betrothal of her by the master. Then he is forbidden to sell her to one of a strange nation, but he must allow her to be redeemed (set free). Then, "If he take him another wife, her food, her raiment, and her duty of marriage shall he not diminish. And if he do not these three unto her, then shall she go out free without money."

This is considered as referring to a daughter, sold to become an inferior wife, or concubine.³

Some points of importance seem clearly deducible from these passages. Adultery was the crime of lying with the wife of another, by any man, married or single.

The adulterer and adulteress—the man and woman—were placed upon an exact equality. The penalty was death for each. In the case of one betrothed, and when the crime took place in the city, where a presumption of her consent arose, both parties were to be stoned to death. The betrothed was looked upon as a wife. If it took place in the field, the man alone was to be slain.

And in one special case, the woman could leave her husband (or betrothed) if he took another wife, unless he performed certain conditions.

The texts in the twenty-fourth chapter of Deuteronomy require full examination.

What is the meaning of the term, "some uncleanness," in the first verse ?

The author of the article in Smith's Dictionary observes that the Jewish doctors, at the time of our Saviour, differed widely upon this point. The school of Shammai limited it to a moral delinquency of the woman, including, of course, adultery ; while that of

¹ Deuteronomy, xxiv. 1, 2. ² *Ibid.* 3, 4. ³ Speaker's Commentary, *in loco*. See note on verse 11.

Hillel extended it to many other cases, such as going out with her head uncovered, or her clothes torn, that her person was not concealed. He thinks that Moses did not intend adultery, as that was punished with death.¹

Pool speaks of it as meaning "nakedness, shameful, or filthiness of a thing, a loathsome distemper of body or mind, not observed before marriage; or some light or unchaste carriage, not amounting to adultery, which was not punished by divorce, but by death."

Rosenmuller notices that "Moses has not defined what this *uncleanness* (*foedum quid*) is. It seems, however, to be something which makes the wife justly obnoxious to the husband, as obstinacy, disobedience, sharpness of tongue (*dicacitas*), or a defect of body before concealed. Christ, however, many ages after, restrained the rights of husbands in dismissing wives to *porneia*, which, for the future, should be the only legitimate cause of divorce."

The writer of the notes in the Speaker's Commentary refers to the different schools. He treats that of Shammai as allowing a divorce for immoral conduct, or grave physical defect. He concurs in the view that adultery was not intended.²

In Lange's Commentary it is observed that the phrase is uncleanness, matter of nakedness, something abominable in a female. That Rabbi Shammai and his school explained it as referring to adultery, while Hillel regarded it as comprising anything displeasing to the husband.

Again, in a note to the nineteenth chapter of St. Matthew, the writer says that the word fornication is an explanation of the Hebrew phrase translated *uncleanness*, and refers to his note upon the word before cited. Scott supposes it to have been some ceremonial uncleanness or disease, or a moral or physical defect of a real and grave character. He thinks that adultery was not intended.³

There are some passages of the Old Testament which may aid our inquiry. In the inquisition by the waters of jealousy,⁴ the priest charges the woman by an oath, and says, "If no man have lain with thee, and if thou hast not gone aside to *uncleanness* with another instead of thy husband, be thou free from this bitter water."⁵

If the original word is the same in each instance, this text tends to prove that adultery was included in the term.

On the other side, in the twenty-second chapter of Leviticus, we find that if a priest's daughter be married unto a stranger,⁶ she

¹ Doct. Lit. Divorce. ² Vol. i. p. 886. ³ Scott's Bible, Deuteronomy. ⁴ Verses 12, 13. ⁵ Numbers, v. 19. ⁶ One not of the family of Aaron.

might not eat of holy things. But if the priest's daughter be a widow, or divorced and have no child, and be returned to her father's house as in her youth,¹ she shall eat of her father's meat.

Can it be that a woman divorced for adultery was here intended? The term, "as in her youth," appears to suppose the daughter's purity. The admission to the holy meats proves it.

In the thirtieth chapter of Numbers, after prescribing that the vow of a woman, made in her father's house in her youth, must be with his consent, and if she had a husband, with his, it is declared, "But every vow of a widow, and of her that is divorced, shall stand against her."

And in Leviticus (xxi. 7), in relation to the priests, the sons of Aaron, is this command: "They shall not take a wife that is a whore or profane; neither shall they take a woman put away from her husband."

And as to the high-priest, it was ordered: "A widow or a divorced woman, or profane or a harlot,—these shall he not take."

So, in Ezekiel (xliv. 22), is the injunction to the priests: "Neither shall they take to their wives a widow, nor her that is put away."

In the third chapter of Jeremiah, backsliding Israel is charged with playing the harlot upon the mountains, and under every green tree; yet she is invoked to return to the Lord. "Her treacherous sister, Judah, saw that Israel had committed adultery, and been put away, and given a bill of divorce, yet she feared not, but played the harlot. Israel had justified herself more than treacherous Judah."

Then follows, "Return, then, backsliding Israel, and I will not cause mine anger to fall upon you. Turn, O backsliding children, saith the Lord, for I am married to you. Surely as a wife treacherously separateth herself from her husband, so have ye dealt treacherously with me, O house of Israel."

Thus the figurative language of harlotry, adultery, and divorce is used in connection with the idolatries of the people. The very words—bill of divorcement—are employed, and coupled with repentance and restoration. It is striking, also, that the passages in the third and fourth verses of Deuteronomy (chap. xxiv.), and in the first verse of the third chapter of Jeremiah, imply that the husband may take back his wife, if she remained unmarried.²

¹ See Leviticus, x. 14.

² See the note to the Speaker's Commentary, vol. i. 887; and see Lewis's Hebrew Antiq. iii. 288, 291.

And even under the Gospel, and upon a divorce for adultery, the Pastor of Hermas taught that the husband should take back a repentant wife once at least.¹

The passage from Isaiah² seems only to mean, Where is the proof that I have rejected you from my care and love, like that of a husband, by an act like the letter of divorcement?

From this review we judge, that far the best conclusion is, that the letter of divorcement warranted the expulsion for other causes than adultery; nay, originally and strictly excluded it. The decisive argument, in our judgment, is, the incredibility that a lawgiver who so denounced and punished adultery, could have sanctioned the adulterous wife marrying again. It may well be that, in time, the severity of the death-doom caused it to fall into disuse, and husbands would sometimes be averse to resort to it. Repudiation by such a letter may have been adopted; and a school would naturally arise to justify the practice, by a construction of the term "uncleanness" so as to comprise adultery. Mr. Lewis says Jewish husbands were not obliged to cause the wife to be put to death. But the view we take is a decisive answer to the idea that, under the law as given by Moses, a wife divorced for adultery could remarry. And this we shall afterward find to be of much importance.

The letter of divorcement was under seal, executed before two witnesses, required some legal forms, and could be carried to the Sanhedrin to be enrolled as a record of the dismissal. It declared that the wife should be free to marry again whom she chose. It ended: "This is a bill of rejection, letters of divorce, and schedule of expulsion, according to the law of Moses and Israel."³

This power of divorce, or rather of separation, so vested in Jewish husbands, checked polygamy; and as the repelled wife could marry again as well as the husband, the marriage relation was, in form, recognized. The regulations as to writing the letters, and the presence of a Levite generally required, gave time for reflection; and the formal act of the delivery of the bill of divorcement and expulsion from the house, tended to moderate the impulses of passion or caprice.

It is stated by Josephus that, by the ancient law, the wife had no power to put away her husband, but that, under the Asmonean dynasty, it was assumed.⁴ The language of St. Mark (x. 12) appears to prove that the practice existed when he wrote. Mr. Scott

¹ *Apud* Apost. Fathers, N. Y., 1810. ² Chapter l. 1. ³ Lewis's Hebrew Antiquities, vol. iii. p. 290. ⁴ *Antiq.* xv.

observes "that Salome, sister of Herod the Great, sent a letter of divorce to her husband, Artobarus, and her example was followed by Herodias and others. That our Lord intended to place man and woman on an equality in this grave matter."

II.

THE LAW OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

The principal passages of the New Testament upon the subject are as follows: St. Matthew, v. 31, 32; *Ibid.* xix. 3-10; St. Mark, x. 2-12; St. Luke, xvi. 18; I. Corinth. vii. 10-17, 27, 28, 39; Romans, vii. 2, 3. II. Corinth. vi. 14.

"It hath been said, Whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a writing of divorcement: but I say unto you, That whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery: and whosoever shall marry her that is divorced committeth adultery."—Matthew, v. 31, 32.

"The Pharisees also came unto Him, tempting Him, and saying unto Him, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause? And He answered and said unto them, Have ye not read that He which made them at the beginning made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife: and they twain shall be one flesh? Wherefore they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let no man put asunder.

"They say unto Him, Why did Moses then command to give a writing of divorcement, and to put her away? He saith unto them, Moses, because of the hardness of your hearts, suffered you to put away your wives: but from the beginning it was not so.

"And I say unto you, Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery: and whoso marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery.

"His disciples say unto Him, If the case of the man be so with his wife, it is not good to marry."—Matthew, xix. 3-10.

"And the Pharisees came to Him, and asked Him, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife? tempting Him. And He answered and said unto them, What did Moses command you? And they said, Moses suffered to write a bill of divorcement, and to put her away. And Jesus answered and said unto them, For the hardness of your heart he wrote you this precept. But from the beginning of the

creation God made them male and female. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and cleave to his wife; and they twain shall be one flesh: so then they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let no man put asunder.

"And in the house His disciples asked Him again of the same matter. And He saith unto them, Whosoever shall put away his wife, and marry another, committeth adultery against her. And if a woman shall put away her husband, and be married to another, she committeth adultery."—St. Mark, x. 2-12.

"Whosoever putteth away his wife, and marrieth another, committeth adultery: and whosoever marrieth her that is put away from her husband, committeth adultery."—St. Luke, xvi. 18.

"To avoid fornication, let every man have his own wife, and let every woman have her own husband."—I. Corinthians, vii. 2.

"And unto the married I command, yet not I, but the Lord, Let not the wife depart from her husband: but and if she depart, let her remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband: and let not the husband put away his wife.

"But to the rest speak I, not the Lord: If any brother have a wife that believeth not, and she be pleased to dwell with him, let him not put her away. And the woman which hath an husband that believeth not, and if he be pleased to dwell with her, let her not leave him. For the unbelieving husband is sanctified by the wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified by the husband: else were your children unclean; but now they are holy. But if the unbelieving depart, let him depart. A brother or a sister is not under bondage in such cases: but God hath called us to peace. For what knowest thou, O wife, whether thou shalt save thy husband? or how knowest thou, O man, whether thou shalt save thy wife?"—I. Corinthians, vii. 10-16.

"The woman which hath an husband is bound by the law to her husband so long as he liveth; but if the husband be dead, she is loosed from the law of her husband. So then if, while the husband liveth, she be married to another man, she shall be called an adulteress: but if her husband be dead, she is free from that law; so that she is no adulteress, though she be married to another man."—Romans, vii. 2, 3.

"Art thou bound unto a wife? seek not to be loosed. Art thou loosed from a wife? seek not a wife. But and if thou marry, thou hast not sinned; and if a virgin marry, she hath not sinned."—I. Corinthians, vii. 27, 28.

"The wife is bound by the law as long as her husband liveth;

but if her husband be dead, she is at liberty to be married to whom she will; only in the Lord."—*Ibid.* 39.

• "Be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers: for what fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness?" etc.—

II. Corinthians, vi. 14.

"A bishop then must be blameless, the husband of one wife."—

I. Timothy, iii. 2, and Titus, i. 26.

We shall class these passages thus:

1. Those relating to the institution of marriage.
2. The parties to a Scriptural marriage.
3. The dissolubility of a lawful marriage as stated by St. Matthew.

(a.) The omission by St. Mark of the exception.

(b.) Meaning of term fornication.

(c.) Ancient canons.

(d.) Judgments of the fathers.

4. Limited separations.

(a.) Passages in I. Corinthians, vii. 10, 11.

(b.) Marriage between believer and an unbeliever.

5. The Gospel precepts of universal obligation.

6. Rule of the Council of Trent untenable.

And we shall state under each head what we have gathered of canon, law, or exposition, upon the point.

§ 1. We have, in passages from St. Matthew and St. Mark, the explicit declaration of the Saviour, that, at the beginning, God created male and female, and commanded them to cleave to each other; that they were no more twain, but one flesh. He not only refers to this origin and nature of marriage, but repeats the declaration, and renews the precept. He adds that this union, being formed by God, could not be severed by man. These are the words and commands of God upon earth. They are accompanied with an explanation of the permitted relaxation of the original law, with an abolition of that lax rule, a restoration of the primitive unity, and an announcement that henceforth there should only be one ground for a dissolution of marriage. If the New Testament is to have any weight upon the subject, we must recognize the spiritual character of marriage as something beyond a civil contract; as a rite of religion, and for the ministers of religion to perform. This is the testimony also of the older and the later age.

Thus Ignatius writes: "It is fitting for those who purpose matrimony to accomplish their union with the sanction of the bishop, that their marriage may be in the Lord, and not in the flesh."

Tertullian says: "How can we find words to describe the happiness of that marriage in which the Church joins together, which the oblation confirms, the benediction seals, and the Father ratifies?" The Thirteenth Canon of the Council of Carthage directed that the bride and bridegroom should be presented to a priest, for benediction. St. Basil calls marriage "a yoke, which, by means of the benediction, unites in one those who were twain." And St. Ambrose says: "As marriage must be sanctified with the priest's sanction and blessing, how can that be called a marriage when there is no agreement of faith?"¹

It is true that the learned Selden urges that there is not sufficient proof of this being the general rule or settled custom among the early Christians; but the argument of Bingham, and his numerous authorities, satisfactorily answer him.

By a law of Charles the Great, in the eighth century, marriages were to be celebrated in no other way than with the sacerdotal blessing and prayers, to be followed by the reception of the Lord's Supper. A similar rule was established by Leo Sapiens, in the tenth century, for the Eastern Empire.²

King Edmund ordered, in the year 946, that the mass priest should be at the wedding, "who shall, according to right, celebrate their coming together with God's blessing, and all solemnity."³ And by a canon of Lafranc (1076), no man was to give his daughter or kinswoman in marriage without the priest's benediction; any other marriage shall be deemed fornication.⁴

Lord Chancellor Cottenham, in the Queen Mills,⁵ recognizes these canons as evidence of the laws of the Church and Kingdom of England.

By the statute, 2 and 3 Edward VI., cap. xxi.—"*To take away all laws against the marriage of priests*"—the act was declared not to extend to give liberty to any person to marry without asking in the church, or without the ceremony appointed by order in the Book of Common Prayer, Administration of the Sacraments, etc., the book of 1549.

Mr. Jacob has collected a large list of authorities, showing how thoroughly it was settled, in the old English law, that marriage without a priest was void. At one time it was held that the ceremony must be in a church or chapel, to be valid.⁶

¹ Bingham, vii. 64. Annotated Prayer Book, p. 261. ² Hook's Dict. Lit. Matrimony. Bingham, viii. ³ Johnson's Laws, etc., i. p. 370. ⁴ *Ibid.* 19. ⁵ 10 Clark & Tinely, 478. ⁶ See Bright's "Husband and Wife," App. vol. ii. p. 311.

The legal validity of a contract of marriage came to be a rule of the law, and a celebration in face of the Church could be enforced. Lord Hardwick's Act (as it is termed), 2 Geo. II. cap. 23, swept away all irregular marriages, and required the publication of banns, and solemnization in the parish church or chapel. We need not notice the relaxations of this law by succeeding statutes. By the present Act (3 and 4 Victoria), marriages of dissenters may be celebrated according to the rites, form, or ceremony which the parties choose to adopt.

The Church of Rome, carrying holy truths to erroneous extremes, has elevated marriage to a sacrament. The Use of Sarum treats it with reverence, as a sacred rite. The language of the Use of York is impressive: "Lo, brethren, we are come here before God and His angels, in the face and presence of our mother holy Church, to couple and knit these two bodies together, that they may be, from this time forth, but one body and two souls, in the faith and law of God and His Church."

The present form of the office in our own and the English Church, testify to its spiritual character. It is a holy state which the parties enter into. The vow is mutual to cherish and keep to each other, so long as they both shall live.

In the Presbyterian Directory we are told that "Christians ought to marry in the Lord. Therefore it is fit that marriages be solemnized by a lawful minister." There is a mutual pledge, similar to that in our own office. The minister pronounces them "man and wife, according to the ordinance of God," and declares, "Whom God hath joined together, let not man put asunder."

So, in the form of the Dutch Reformed Church, marriage is termed a holy state. The question is put to the man, if he acknowledges, before God and His holy Church, that he takes the woman as his lawful wife, never to forsake her, and to keep faith and truth to her in all things, according to the Holy Gospel." A similar question is put to the woman. The Gospel of St. Matthew, xix. 3, 9, is read, and then is added, "Believe these words of Christ, and be certain and assured that our Lord God hath joined you together in this holy state."

The religious sense of Bucer pervades these forms. "It is only in Christ the Lord, that Christians should be joined together in matrimony."¹

It is undeniable that, in all our civil relations, we must consider

¹ Hooker, v. xxxiii. 8.

a marriage valid which is formed according to the law of the State we are under. But for a Christian to marry without the solemnities of religion, is to condemn the origin and sacredness of the institution. And for Churchmen to celebrate it except in a church, when not impracticable, is a lamentable insensibility to duty, and a great irreverence.

We close this part of our subject in the words of Lord Stowell: "In most civilized countries, acting under a sense of sacred obligations, marriage has had the sanction of religion superadded. It then becomes a religious, as well as a natural and civil, contract; for it is a great mistake to suppose that, because it is the one, it may not likewise be the other. Heaven itself is made a party to the contract, and the consent of the individuals pledged to each other, is ratified and consecrated by a vow to God."

THE PARTIES TO A SCRIPTURAL MARRIAGE.

§ 2. The passage before cited from II. Cor. vi. 14, etc., is: "Be ye not unequally yoked with unbelievers, for what fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness?" etc.

(a.) It is conceded that this comprises an admonition against the marriage of a Christian with an unbeliever. Lange's Commentary contains a note showing a more extensive sense, forbidding habitual or close intercourse endangering faith.¹

The principle of this injunction is found in several canons, recognizing or based upon it.

The Fourteenth Canon of Chalcedon (A.D. 451) recited that, "in some provinces, it was allowed to readers and singers to marry, the Holy Synod has determined that it shall not be lawful for any of them to marry a woman of heterodox opinions. But those who have already had children from such a marriage, . . . they may not join them in marriage to an heretic or Jew or heathen, unless the person who is married to the orthodox person shall promise to come over to the faith. If any one transgress this decision, let him undergo canonical punishment.

The Thirty-first of Laodicea is: "It is not right to make marriages, or to give sons or daughters to every heretic; but rather to accept of them if they promise to become Christians."

The Twenty-first of the African Canons applies this rule to the children of clerics. The Council of Orleans (A.D. 532) prohibited

¹ Doddridge, iii. 660. Lange, *in loco*.

marriages between Jews and Christians. The Fourth Council of Toledo ordered that if any Jews were married to Christian women, they should be admonished by the bishop to become Christians; and if they refused, the parties should be separated.

By the Seventy-second Canon of the Council called Trullanum (A.D. 692), it was provided, "That it was not lawful for an orthodox man to marry a heretical woman, nor an orthodox woman a heretical man; that such marriage should be held invalid and dissolved, as a wicked union." Balsamon and Zonaras observe that the rule is thus settled in the Greek Church, and vindicate its propriety. Van Espen shows that although this had not been adopted as a rule of the Latin Church, yet priests were interdicted from marrying persons so differing in faith. "They should not make one body of those with whom there could not be one spirit."¹

Van Espen notices the fact that, in the present age, the rule was but slightly applicable. That, among the baptized, no variance of faith or doctrine broke the tie, expressly holding that Calvinistic or Lutheran views were not sufficient."²

This Canon of Trullo, as cited by Van Espen, proves that the marriages of infidels were not dissolved by the conversion of one of them; a regulation clearly supported by the passage in I. Corinthians, vii., as to a believer united with an unbeliever, hereafter examined;³ and by a Canon of Orleans (539), the marriages of the newly-converted previously contracted should not be broken.⁴

(b.) Another passage connected with this branch of the subject is that in I. Corinthians, vii. 39, where the bond of the wife to the husband while living is dwelt upon; but if he be dead, she may be married to another man, "*yet only in the Lord.*"

It is considered that this authorizes the second marriage of a woman, provided it be with a Christian. And what is allowed to her is *a fortiori* allowable to a widower.

Yet digamy, even in a layman, came soon to be condemned. Thus, by the Seventh Canon of Neo-Cæsarea (A.D. 315), a presbyter must not be the guest at the wedding of a person who is marrying a second time; for whereas the digamist needs to undergo penance, what a presbyter must he be who sanctions the marriage by his presence at the feast?"

The First Canon of Laodicea declares "that it is right, according to the Ecclesiastical Canon, that the Holy Communion should,

¹ Jus. Universum, vol. i. p. 591. ² Scholia in Canones Trullanos," vol. iii. p. 399. ³ Post § 4. ⁴ Guizot's "Hist. Civilization," vol. iii.

by indulgence, be given to those who have freely and lawfully joined in second marriages, but have not made a clandestine marriage; a short space having elapsed, which is to be spent by them in prayer and fasting."¹

And the argument by which a second marriage was disapproved of, was that no one married a second time could be admitted to Holy Orders; and it was unfitting and unscriptural, that any one should ask a minister to do for him what it was not lawful to do himself.

(c.) The texts which refer to this interdiction for one seeking Orders are those from I. Timothy and Titus, before cited: "A bishop must be the husband of one wife," etc.

By the Seventeenth of the Apostolical Canons, he who has been twice married after his baptism, or has had a concubine, cannot be a bishop, priest, or deacon, or any other of the sacerdotal list.²

By a Canon of Carthage, the bishop is subject to censure who, knowingly, ordains one as a cleric who has had for wife a widow or a divorced woman, or a second wife.

There was a difference of opinion whether the texts in question covered the case of two wives,—one before and one after baptism, or only of two after baptism. The Latin Church finally held that there was no distinction. The Greek Church took the Seventeenth Apostolical Canon for its rule. Two wives taken after baptism caused the disqualification.³

That these texts were only meant to forbid polygamy in one to be ordained seems wholly groundless. Polygamy was plainly against the spirit of Christ's teaching, and was condemned in the precept of the Apostle, that every man should have his own wife, and every woman her own husband.⁴ And a widow, to be made a deaconess, must have been the wife of one man.⁵

(d.) By the Eighteenth of the Apostolical Canons, he who has married a widow or a divorced woman, or a *servant-maid* or an actress, cannot be a bishop, priest, or deacon, or any other of the sacerdotal list.

Dr. Hammond has *maid-servant*, as above quoted.⁶ Dr. Chase, *servant*,⁷ and Dr. Fulton, *slave*.⁸ Van Espen's Latin is *ancillam*, which means female servant or slave. It is so used in a law of

¹ Fulton's "Index Canonum." ² Chase's Translation. ³ Van Espen, vol. iii. p. 504. ⁴ I. Corinthians, vii. 2. ⁵ I. Timothy, v. 9. See Lange's note on I. Timothy, iii. ⁶ Councils, p. 192. ⁷ Chase's Constitutions and Canons. ⁸ "Index Canonum."

Valentinian, forbidding a senator to marry *ancillam*, or *ancillæ filiā*, clearly meaning a slave, or the daughter of one. So, also, it is used in a law of Constantine.¹ One meaning given in Forcellini's Dictionary is *female slave*. Perhaps the canon was intended to go beyond the civil rule, and to comprise servants as well as slaves.

The commentators regarded this canon as founded on the probability of the woman being incontinent. Suspicion attached even to a widow who sought second nuptials. And then (as is well shown in the *scholium* upon the Eighth Canon of Neo-Cæsarea) the stigma of incontinence attached, even if slightly, to a man who consorted with one deemed incontinent.

By the Nineteenth Canon, he who has married two sisters, or a niece, could not be a minister. Taking this to mean, as it surely does, the sister of a deceased wife, we have a corroboration of the true result of the Levitical law, as to degrees. The taking a sister to wife, in the life of the other, was forbidden. This was a check upon polygamy. But the Church thought this unseemly, even after death, and made it a bar to Orders.

(e.) By the Second Canon of Neo-Cæsarea, "if a woman shall have married two brothers, let her be cast out until her death. Nevertheless, at the hour of death, she shall be received to penance, provided she declare that she will break the marriage if she recover. But if the woman or her husband die in such a marriage, the penance of the survivor shall be severe."²

This canon is interesting and suggestive. At the first reading, its sense seems to be that the marriage was not deemed null; but, by an act of the wife, was to be dissolved, as if lawfully made.

Haumond translates the Greek word into *dissolve*, which Dr. Fulton renders *break*. Van Espen has *hujus conjunctionis vincula dissolvat*.³ He states Balsamon as interpreting the canon, *quod si convaluerit, conjugium dissolvat, sive divortium faciat, et a sacrilegio usu matrimonii abstinebit*. Isidore uses *matrimonio soluto*. The sense of the Greek word given in the dictionaries is dissolution, separation.

Yet Van Espen uses this strong language: That the canon treats of the woman who has contracted incestuous nuptials with two brothers; what punishment should be imposed upon such a woman for the crime committed, or for such incest? "If she persist in such a sacrilegious marriage, she is to be cast out."⁴

¹ Bingham, vol. viii. p. 29.

² "Index Canonum."

³ Vol. iii. p. 114.

⁴ Scholium in Canon ii.

That such a marriage was incestuous and null from the beginning, may not be questioned. In our judgment, the old Jewish law forbade the marriage with a deceased brother's wife, and this was part of the unreversed Christian law. The Council of Aige, in 506, recognized this rule. The Council of Auxerre, in 578, declared the same. Constantine had proclaimed, as part of the civil law, that the children of such a marriage were illegitimate.¹ The Council of Aige provided, "that for all incestuous conjunctions we allow them no pardon, unless the offending parties cure the adultery by separation from each other."²

The rational sense of the canon, then, seems to be that the woman continuing to consort with the brother of a former husband must be excommunicated. Yet, on her apparently dying bed, she may be admitted to absolution on repentance, and on a promise of departing or separating from him. It is, then, abandoning a connection originally void, not taking steps to annul a marriage valid when made. The admission to penance is interpreted (we suppose correctly) by absolution. Van Espen has *fructum penitentiae*, and Labbeus, *viaticum accipiat*.

(f.) The law of the Church as to marriage, in connection with a religious profession, was regulated by canons.

The Council of Valence (A.D. 374) excommunicated virgins consecrated to God if they married.³ At a later period (A.D. 567), the Council of Lyons excommunicated a judge who should refuse to separate a monk from the wife he had taken after his profession.⁴

The Sixteenth Canon of Chalcedon (451) provided that a virgin who had dedicated herself to the Lord, and, in like manner, monks, are not permitted to contract matrimony. If they are found to have done this, let them be excommunicated. We have determined, however, that the bishop of the place has the power of dealing leniently with them.⁵

The full examination of this canon by Van Espen⁶ shows that Leo, who, by his legates, presided at this council, did not hold that the marriage was void; nor did St. Augustine. That the better opinion is, such a marriage was not declared null before the Seventh Canon of the Council held by Innocent III., in 1139. The Penitential of Archbishop Theodore, of England, is cited as proving that, in his time, the marriage was not dissolved.

¹ Bingham, vi. 418, n. ² *Ibid.* viii. 25. ³ Guizot's Hist. iii. p. 248. ⁴ *Ibid.* p. 271. ⁵ Hammond's Councils. Fulton's Index. ⁶ "Jus Universum," vol. i. 581.

It is not important to discuss the distinction between the vow *simplex*, and one attended with a kind of consecration.

Such was the ancient rule as to those who were married after a profession. As to those who married, and desired to profess, the earliest canon I have found is that of Agde (506), in France.¹ It forbids the conferring of the monastic order upon married men without the consent of their wives. In 753, the Council of Vermerie enacted that he who permitted his wife to take the veil could not marry again.²

The course of the law is thus stated by Van Espen. The distinction came to be settled between a marriage *legitimum*, *ratum*, and *consummatum*. The first was a marriage of the unbaptized, according to their own usages and laws; the second, a marriage according to the rites of the Church; the third, such a marriage consummated. If one of the parties to a legitimate marriage became a convert, the general laws of the Church forbade a separation, but the Pope could allow it, and the party could contract another marriage. Matrimony *ratum*, but not *consummatum*, was dissolved by a profession; but not so if unconsummated.

III.

DISSOLUBILITY OF MARRIAGE AS STATED BY ST. MATTHEW.

The declaration is made by the Saviour, that whosoever shall put away his wife, *save for the cause of fornication*, causeth her to commit adultery (by marrying another); and the man who puts away his wife, except for that cause, committeth adultery.

(a.) The clause italicized is omitted in the narrative of St. Mark, and in the brief statement of St. Luke. This cannot have the effect of annulling an exception found in a Gospel of unquestioned authenticity. The qualification is found both in the fifth and in the nineteenth chapters of St. Matthew. But the point is of great importance, and we have fully examined it in the sixth section of this chapter, upon the tenet of the Council of Trent.

We have, then, a Divine precept that there is one cause for putting away a wife and marrying another, and that cause is fornication. And here we may notice that, under the authority of St. Mark, x. 12, and by clear parity of reasoning, the same liberty and the same restriction apply to the wife as to the husband.

¹ Guizot, vol. iii. 205. ² *Ibid.* 284.

(b.) MEANING OF THE TERM FORNICATION.

The first material question is, What is the sense of the term fornication?—thus defining the only ground of a lawful divorce. Some other portions of Scripture may aid the inquiry.

We have before noticed the explanation of the term *some uncleanness*, in the passage from Deuteronomy, and the fact that a school of Jewish doctors held it to mean or comprise adultery; and that Lange, in his Commentary, considers the word here used to be an explanation or version of the Hebrew phrase.

In the fifth chapter of I. Corinthians, we have: "It is reported commonly that there is fornication among you, and such fornication as is not so much as named among the Gentiles, that one should have his father's wife." The ninth verse of the sixth chapter is: "Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers . . . shall inherit the kingdom of heaven." In the seventh chapter, second verse, is the passage: "Nevertheless, to avoid fornication, let every man have his own wife, and let every woman have her own husband." In the letter from the Council of Jerusalem, one injunction is, to abstain from fornication.

In all these passages, the Greek word used is the same (or a derivative) as that in St. Matthew,—*porneia*. The Greek dictionaries interpret the word generally as whoredom; and the Latin dictionary of Forcellini is to the same effect: "*Fornicatio est scorti consuetudo*."

The commentator Scott supposes the word to mean ante-nuptial incontinence, unknown at the marriage, as well as adultery in the ordinary sense. Doddridge is very explicit; he thus paraphrases the text: "Whosoever shall dismiss his wife, unless on account of whoredom, causeth her, by a second marriage, to commit adultery; and whosoever shall marry her that is thus unlawfully dismissed, committeth adultery, since the bond of the former marriage remains, in the sight of God, undissolved." He adds that the word must be understood of adultery.¹ We apprehend that Lange's view is the same.²

The Gospel of St. Matthew was, according to the general opinion, originally written in Hebrew, but the text is lost.³ The Greek translation soon superseded it. The Peshito Syriac was translated

¹ "Expositor," xxxix. ² Comm. *in loco*. ³ Davidson's Int. vol. i. p. 68.

from the Greek, and the version by Dr. Murdoch, of the Syriac, has the same word as Doddridge uses,—whoredom.¹

We conclude that the term comprises all unlawful carnal connection between a man and woman. Adultery is one of its forms. The term is used in one of the passages from Corinthians, where one of the parties was married. Adultery is sometimes treated as requiring both parties to be married; but by the law of Scotland, and the general civil laws, it exists if one of the parties is married, whether the other be so or not.

(c.) We proceed to notice some ancient canons, which show the judgment and rules of the Church upon the subject.

The fifth of the Apostolical Canons is: "Let not a bishop, priest, or deacon put away his wife on account of religion; but if he put her away, let him be excommunicated (*suspended*);² and if he persist, let him be deposed." Van Espen observes, citing Balsamon and Zonaras, that the Greek Church allowed a married man to be ordained to the Priesthood, and required that the parties should still consort; but marriage after ordination was forbidden. It became, however, a rule in the Latin Church, that a bishop, after consecration, must not only abstain from consorting with his wife, but must not live in the same house with her. This, says Van Espen, brings the sacrament itself into contempt, as if the marriage union could not consist with piety.³ It was separation, however, not divorce, that was enjoined.

The Eighth Canon of the Council of Neo-Cæsarea (314–316) provides: "If any one's wife has been clearly convicted of adultery, whilst he was a layman, a man so circumstanced cannot be admitted to the ministry. But if she have committed adultery after his ordination, he ought to put her away. If, however, he continue to live with her, he cannot retain the ministry committed to him."⁴

The comment upon this canon is, that while the Greek Church allows marriage to continue after ordination, it demanded the highest degree of conjugal chastity. Zonaras says: "By adultery a woman is polluted. Whoever has intercourse with one polluted, stains himself with the same contagion. Who would endure a polluted person in sacred things?"

¹Ed. N. Y. 1851.

²Chase's translation, and Fulton's Index. Van Espen, following Dyonysius, has only bishop or presbyter. All the Greeks have deacon, also.

³Scholium in Canones Neo. Cæsar.

⁴Hammond's Councils. The version in Fulton's Index does not vary in substance.

This reasoning appears to indicate that it was consorting with the wife after the offence was known, which caused the disqualification; and that, if the husband had repudiated her, he could be admitted. No law compelled a layman to dismiss his wife, even for adultery; and it might occur that to retain her without intercourse, and without public exposure, would be excusable. But the last clause compels a dismissal when the crime has been committed after ordination. It appears to us that the canon, so understood, is full of wisdom.

The Twentieth Canon of the Council of Ancyra (A.D. 315) is translated by Dr. Hammond: "If any man's wife commit adultery, or any man commit adultery, they are to be admitted to communion in seven years after passing through the several degrees of penance."¹

Van Espen remarks (there must have been a similar version when he wrote) that this sense has been objected to, as implying that the husband might be punished for the crime of the wife. He answers that the canon does not mean this according to its true and received construction. His own Latin version is: *Si cujus uxor adultera fuerit, aut si ipse adulterium commisserit, septem annorum penitentia oportet eam perfectionem consequi, secundum pristinos gradus.* And he explains it thus: If a man take to wife a woman divorced for adultery, or commit adultery himself, he is to undergo the penance.²

The Rev. Dr. Fulton, in his work just published,³ gives the Greek text, and translates it: "The adulterer and adulteress shall be restored to full communion after seven years passed in the degrees of penance."

I have been favored by the reverend writer with a critical examination of the Greek text, and Van Espen's Latin version. He says, in conclusion, that there is nothing in the Greek to warrant the translation *adultera fuerit*, viz., an adulteress at the time of the marriage. It was rather a version of Van Espen's construction of the canon, than a version of the canon itself. He has also referred to a comment by Hefele, "that the simplest explanation of the canon is, that the man or woman who has violated the marriage bond shall undergo the penance." This was, however, objected to by some, and Fleury and Routh think that the canon speaks of a woman who has been guilty, with the knowledge and consent of her

¹ Councils, p. 155. ² Scholia in Canones Ancyranos, xix. The 4th and 5th of the Greek are included in the 4th of the Latin text. ³ Index Canonum.

husband. He then would be punished for his connivance, just as if he had committed adultery himself. The exposition of Van Espen is noticed and disapproved. Dr. Fulton notices that Dr. Clark, in translating Hefele, gives this as the better translation, while it is only Hefele's understanding of the sense.

The twentieth of the Penitential Canons of Dunstan (A.D. 963) seems to have been framed upon this one: "If a married man defile the lawful wife of another, or a wife lie with another woman's lawful husband, let them fast seven years; three on bread and water, and four as the Shrift (*confessarius*) directs. And let them ever bewail their crime."¹

The one hundred and second (Greek 105) of the code called the African Canons, passed from A.D. 348-412,² is: "It is decreed that according to the Evangelical (*Gospel*) and Apostolic discipline, neither a man dismissed by his wife, nor a woman dismissed by her husband, shall marry another; but let them so remain, or let them be reconciled to each other (*sibimet*). But if they condemn this decree, let them be subjected to penance. For such a case the promulgation of an imperial law should be sought."³ Let them so remain plainly means "unmarried."

The comment of Van Espen is: "It was known to these fathers that among the Romans, divorces for various causes were permitted by the public law, and tolerated by Christian emperors. They knew that such laws could not dissolve the marriage bond, being contrary to the Gospel and Apostolic rule. If the parties did not remain so that they could be reconciled (*unmarried*), they were to be punished as for adultery. Yet, as they knew how slight was the power of the Church, though resting upon Gospel and Apostolic discipline and doctrine, against a custom favorable to human license and lust, and approved, or, at least, tolerated by the laws, they rightly added that an imperial edict should be sought."⁴ This means an edict to ratify and enforce the law of the Church.

Introduce into this canon, as we are fully warranted in doing, the Saviour's allowance of a dismissal for adultery, and we cannot find anywhere a more explicit, Scriptural, and sensible statement of the Christian rule.

The Eighty-seventh Canon of the Trullan Council is as follows: "The woman who forsakes her husband, and goes to another man, is an adulteress according to the Holy St. Basil, who, from the prophecy

¹ Johnson's Laws, etc., vol. i. p. 436. ² Van Espen's Scholia in Canones Africanos. ³ *Ibid.* ⁴ Van Espen, in Canones Trullanos.

of Jeremiah, has gathered that she shall not return to her husband, but that she shall remain utterly unclean ;” and again he says, “ that he who keeps an adulteress is senseless and impious. But he who forsakes his lawfully-wedded wife, and takes another, contrary to the Lord’s Commandment, lies under the crime of adultery.” It was decreed by the fathers “ that such persons shall be mourners for one year, for two years hearers, for three, prostrators, and for the seventh year, co-standers (with the faithful), and so be fitted for the oblation ; that is to say, if they repent with tears.”¹

This canon must also be understood, with the exception of a dismission for adultery. It then settles that abandonment for any cause but adultery, and a remarriage, is adultery. For such an offence, the extreme of ecclesiastical punishment should be inflicted.

The forty-eighth of the Apostolical Canons is: “ If any layman put away his wife and marry another, or one who has been divorced by another man, let him be *excommunicated*.”²

(g.) Among the ancient fathers we find Tertullian, Lactantius, Chrysostom, Basil, Ambrose, and Jerome, limiting the right of absolute divorce to the case of adultery. The language of St. Jerome is: “ The Lord commandeth that a wife should not be dismissed except for the cause of adultery ; and if dismissed, should remain unmarried. Whatever is commanded unto men, consequently follows as to women. The laws of Cæsar and the laws of Christ are different. Papianus teaches one thing, our Paul another. With the former the chains upon licentiousness are relaxed for men ; with us, what is not allowable to women is not allowable to men. *Sola fornicatio est quæ uxoris vincat affectum*.”³

And Aristenus Amersenus, a bishop, writing about the year 1101, observes: “ What God hath joined together, let not man put asunder. Hear this ye hucksters, who change your wives as ye do your clothes ; who build new bride-chambers as often and as easily as ye do shops at fairs ; who, for any light offence, presently write a bill of divorce ; who have many widows alive at once,—know of a certainty that marriage cannot be dissolved for any cause but only death or adultery.”⁴

(To be continued.)

¹ I am indebted to the Rev. Dr. Fulton for this version.

² Dr. Fulton has *suspended*.—Index, 97. Suspension in the case of a layman was the lesser excommunication. ³ Bingham, iii. 80, etc. ⁴ *Ibid.* 89.



REASON, AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

WHEN we seriously set ourselves to consider the statements of Holy Scripture respecting the being of God, a difficulty in the way of receiving them in their manifest sense is often felt and acknowledged to arise from the fact that we cannot *comprehend* the existence of God in a threefold personality. This difficulty (for such it really is, or it would not be so often urged) merits a calm and fair consideration, both to disarm opposition and to confirm faith.

That the mystery of the Trinity is *incomprehensible*, or *inconceivable*, none will deny; and this is admitted to be a difficulty. But of itself it cannot be considered an *objection*; for we must ask ourselves, How can the Infinite be conceivable by the finite, or the Eternal comprehensible by the temporal? It is reasonable that there should be a difficulty sufficient to stimulate faith to its highest activity when it rises to reach up to God; for the highest act of faith is faith in God, and its highest act demands its greatest energy. Like all other human faculties (if it be a faculty), it expands in power and rises in energy in proportion to the difficulties it overcomes. It requires no energetic exercise of faith to believe our friend's assurance of his good health, when we meet him on the street, because there is no difficulty to be surmounted; to receive the report of a new and unlooked-for phenomenon in science, for which we are not prepared at once to account fully, requires a

stronger effort ; yet we do not reject it if presented on creditable testimony. It remains a *belief*, though incomprehensible, until we have traced its connections, analyzed its conditions, and mastered its laws ; and then, indeed, it takes its place among the things we *know*. But its temporary incomprehensibility is not admitted as a valid argument against its truth. On the contrary, the difficulty of comprehending it is one of the strongest reasons for fixing the attention upon it, raising it in importance before the inquiring mind ; and this may be one reason why we are so constituted as to find the doctrine of God incomprehensible, that it may engage our thoughts the more. If by investigation we find that the report on which we believed could not have been true, we have added proof of its *impossibility* to the mere negative force of incomprehensibility, and reject it on the former ground, and not on the latter. But if the truth be one which, though fully attested, we are unable to analyze, and the laws and conditions of which we are unable to grasp ; if it be clearly and demonstrably above us and our faculties of positive knowledge, its incomprehensibility ought not to be admitted as an argument against our belief of it, even if the evidence were of a low order, nor against its certainty, if the evidence were otherwise unimpeachable. A truth so attested need find no bar to its reception by faith, in being without the sphere of other faculties of our nature, any more than we need find an objection to the truth of presentations to the eye in the fact that they are not observable by means of the ear. It does, indeed, require a more active and persistent exercise of faith to surmount the difficulty of confessed and irremovable incomprehensibility, and to accept a great truth without the aid of those other faculties which we are accustomed to call in to help us in making it our own ; but faith is equal to the task, and it is only in the presence of such demands upon it that it can display the highest, noblest, most energetic exercise of its powers, only because in the Nature and Being and Personality of the Godhead there is such an incomprehensibility, that faith is stimulated to approach His throne dilated to the utmost, to catch and retain the revelations of His glory.

It is, therefore, the sophism of putting the conclusion of one argument to the premise of another if we say, "This is incomprehensible, therefore it is untrue." To be proved untrue, it must be shown *impossible*,—that is, it must be shown to involve a contradiction to some known and necessary truth. We may say, "This is impossible, therefore it is untrue ;" but we cannot draw the same

conclusion from the premise, "This is incomprehensible." Those who exclude the mystery of the Trinity from the number of their beliefs, on the ground of their inability to comprehend or conceive the existence of the one God in a threefold Personality, are deceived by this sophism, whether they admit that it is taught in the Bible, and so reject also all Holy Scripture, or whether they interpret, explain away, and pare down the Word of God, so as to satisfy themselves that they receive the volume without acknowledging a doctrine it so plainly teaches. Of the various evasive interpretations invented by this latter class, to set aside the plain sense of the texts adduced by our theologians to prove the Church doctrine, it is not necessary to take notice, if we meet them all at once and at their source. Saith the judicious Hooker: "I hold it for a most infallible rule in expositions of sacred Scripture, that where a literal construction will stand, the farthest from the letter is commonly the worst." And if we show that there are no real objections against the literal construction, and expose the sophisms which mislead, we shall have no need to review the innumerable evasions to which they give rise; the honest inquirer will be able to accept the Word in its plain, unvarnished simplicity. If we dig up the root of unbelief, we shall have no need to labor at the branches.

What is meant by incomprehensibility or inconceivableness (for the two words are synonymous in this argument) is, perhaps, not clearly understood. In the natural world we comprehend that which we can represent to ourselves, either as a whole made up of its parts, or as the action of a cause developing its effects, or as a change fully accounted for by a knowledge of its cause; that is, we comprehend the things of the sensible world when we know them by their appearances and in their relations. But the spiritual world is super-sensible; we perceive nothing of it by means of our senses. It has no sensible appearance by which to be comprehended or conceived. The *comprehension* of its realities, therefore, is an act of the imagination uniting them with sensible symbols, and is distinct from the evidence of their existence. In order to fix the truths of the spiritual world for thought, we must *represent* them to ourselves by signs, symbols, figures, metaphors, drawn from the sensible world. It seems to be a law of thought, inseparable from our present twofold existence, as compounded of body and soul, that discursive, continued thought is only possible of things which contain a sensible element, either really in them, or by which they are *imagined*. We use the brain in thinking, and, in like manner, we use the presentations of the senses as objects of thought, or as meta-

phors, by which to fix (*i. e.*, make permanent before the mind) super-sensible objects of thought.

It is a part of the right exercise of the imagination thus to realize and embody spiritual truth in its proper forms, and those ideas for which it can find adequate representations are comprehensible or conceivable; while those for which no such representations exist are incomprehensible. Hence it follows that everything which transcends the analogy of our earthly experience is to us incomprehensible. But whether we are or are not able to find an appropriate figure, the reality of the spiritual existence is no way invalidated by the want of direct thought concerning it, under the limitations of our present life. We may be assured of it in various ways; but the condition of its comprehensibility is our power of representing it to ourselves by its proper symbol in the sensible world. When we can find no such symbol, however real we may be assured it is, we are compelled to confess it incomprehensible.

Now, this is what is really the case with us, when we confess that the mystery of the Trinity is to us incomprehensible. It would be strange, indeed, if there were in the creation anything that could adequately represent the Creator; and it is a demonstrable truth that any system of philosophy respecting the nature and being of God, which recommends itself on the ground that it is a system conceivable or comprehensible by the understanding, is false; and the peculiar excellence and almost certain demonstration of the doctrine of the Trinity is, that, being itself incomprehensible (in the sense in which we here use the word), it is the centre and point of convergence of all those comprehensible systems by which a Deity is indeed made representable in the imagination, but by which insuperable difficulties are opposed to that Deity's having any relation to the world. A theology without mystery is not, indeed, a mystery, but an abortion. God is, for reason, a principle from which to start in its discourse, not a result of reasoning, with whom to end,—a principle from whom beginning, we are to reason downward to our position and our duty; and as such, He is above reason, given to reason by faith, which is assured of His existence, and the mode of it, by revelation. God is incomprehensible by us in this life, because there is no adequate representation of the mystery of His being in the sensible world; were there such a one, God would no longer be incomprehensible. For this reason we cannot draw an analogy between God and any created thing; and yet, while we cannot comprehend Him, we can acknowledge Him, behold His works, believe His word, trust in Him, obey Him, adore Him.

And there is great reason for this non-existence of an adequate symbol of God in the creation (were it possible, which we do not know, that one should be created). For were there, among all the things in the world, something which would adequately represent, and so enable us to conceive the Trinity, it would be a constant temptation to idolatry. If there were, among created intelligences, some being of whom we could say, "This is three persons, and yet but one man"—or whatever other name we should devise for that being—and our minds were to be fixed upon him as the representation of Deity, we should be constantly in danger; thus continually mingling in thought the Creator and the creature, to transfer to the creature the worship due to the Creator, and in adoration of the type forget the original. The history of idolatry, fastening itself upon fancied representations, may teach us plainly enough that if there were a real representation of God—that is, if the being of God were comprehensible at all—there would be the greatest danger of this tendency,—a tendency only averted among enlightened Christian people by the refusal of God to give any representation of Himself, except through the incarnation of His Son. The incomprehensibility, which is the very difficulty we find in accepting the doctrine, is the only condition under which we can be faithful at all.

It remains, then, to consider whether the objection of impossibility can be urged against the truth of the doctrine of the Trinity. It is admitted that if we could substantiate the premise, it would be a valid argument, "This is impossible, therefore it is untrue, and not to be received."

That is impossible which involves a contradiction in itself, or which involves a contradiction to some known and established truth external to itself. It is an instinctive persuasion, springing from our very being, and, therefore, firm and unassailable, that no truth is destructive of any other truth; and that no faculty of our nature presents a view of truth contradictory to the view presented by any other faculty. It is universally accepted, therefore, as a fundamental law of thought, that two contradictory propositions cannot both be true.

That the mystery of the Trinity involves a contradiction in itself, it is utterly impossible to prove. We might as well assert that infinite space cannot have its three dimensions of length, breadth, and thickness, as that Infinite Spirit cannot exist in a threefold personality. It is true that we can observe the dimensions of infinite space in finite space or finite body, while we can find no example among finite personalities to shadow the mystery of Infinite person-

ality. The most we can conclude from the consideration of the doctrine in itself, is that reason alone has no authority to propose it as a comprehensible conception; not that it has authority to deny what is proposed as an incomprehensible truth, on grounds adequate to faith. All the arguments against its possibility, drawn from the analogy of finite things, or concluded by faculties the field of whose exercise is the finite, are based on the attributes of limitation, which are excluded in the very essence and definition of the infinite. Two (or three) finites cannot be one, because they mutually exclude each other; but were there two infinite beings, they must be mutually inclusive and coincident at every point; that is, they must be identical in essence, or else each, containing some attribute which was not in the other, would be an evidence of the other's limitation,—that is, finiteness, which is a contradiction. In all of infinite space there is not a point in the dimension of breadth which is not in the dimension of length, and also in that of thickness; the three are mutually inclusive, coincident, and yet length is not breadth nor thickness. So, we say, the Infinite Father, and the Infinite Son, and the Infinite Spirit, are three, and yet one; three persons, and yet one God. Finite things are temporal, that is, evanescent; so that when a finite thing passes over from one state to another, it ceases from the first as it begins the second; but the Infinite is eternal and unchangeable, and, therefore, if it pass over into another state (to speak after the mode of our conceptions), it must still and forever remain in the first state, and its passing over into the second must have been from eternity. Hence the Son is the Eternal Son of the Father, as the product of the Father's Infinite and eternal activity; and the Father's eternal gift of the Divine nature to the Son does not diminish or change aught of the eternal being of the Father. These illustrations of the argument in respect of the Infinite we do not give as comprehensible conceptions, but to show that what would establish contradictions in the finite and temporal, is expressly excluded by the very nature of the infinite and, eternal; and, since an inductive argument from the finite is the only possible one, in excluding it, all is excluded.

The principle of contradiction, therefore, cannot be established from any internal incoherency of the doctrine with itself. It can be applied only in one other way,—by finding a contradiction between it and some idea concerning God which right and universal reason is compelled to assert on the authority of its own necessary principles. Reason, it must be said, has a necessary idea,—either of the non-existence of a God, or of the existence of a God who is not

the Holy Trinity, which the doctrine of the Trinity contradicts ; in consequence of which it is entitled to reject that doctrine. For if the reason were a perfect blank, its mere negative want of the idea or conception would no more establish a contradiction against the apprehension of faith, than the absence of sight from the ear would be an argument of the impossibility of sight by the eye. The contradiction must be : Reason has one necessary idea, and faith a contradictory idea not so necessary ; and therefore faith must succumb to reason.

We proceed, therefore, to show that right reason is not contradictory to faith, but auxiliary to it ; that it does not by its own authority establish such a system of theology as would be required by its own laws ; that it furnishes the antidote to the evil of the attempt ; and that those who profess unbelief in the mystery of the Trinity, on the grounds of reason, do so without its authority. This task is the more grateful because thereby we argue not only for the revelations to faith, but for faith itself, from the necessary conviction of the unity of truth, and the proved inadequacy of reason alone to grasp it ; inferring thence the possibility, the probability, and the actual existence of more evidence than what reason can collect, and showing faith to be the “evidence of things not seen,” receiving, and in its plain, unbiassed sense, the revealed word of God.

Every possible theological system which reason can propose to itself as an object of inquiry, apart from revealed doctrine, is either a form of Polytheism, or of Unitarianism, or of Atheism ; and, therefore, if we can show that in none of these does it find the satisfaction of demonstrating a necessary and consistent doctrine, we redeem it from the misapprehension of being considered an opponent of faith, and restore it to its rightful service as a faithful handmaid of true religion.

Polytheism is the doctrine that there are “Gods many and Lords many.” Whatever diverse supposition it may have admitted in the minds of its votaries, touching the number and nature of the deities they worshipped, whether they were more or fewer, whether they were personifications of nature or spirits of heroes, we need not here consider ; the essence of the system, and its strength or weakness before reason, are contained in its definition and fundamental principle.

Unitarianism (as antagonistic to the doctrine of the Trinity, which is, in reality, the only true Unitarianism, as this argument will prove) admits of several modifications which it will be necessary separately to consider. Either (*a*) it considers God to be a single

person, distinct and separate from all other persons, and the Creator of all other beings,—in which case it may be called Unipersonal Unitarianism; or (*b*) it proposes the doctrine that God is diffused through the world as the ground of its phenomena, and the only really existing essence,—in which case it may be called Pantheistic Unitarianism; or (*c*) it assumes that the material world is an entity eternally coexistent with God, denying the creation,—in which case, applying the name God to its conception of the intelligent governor, and denying it to its conception of eternal matter, it may be called Dualistic Unitarianism. All possible Unitarian systems are contained in one or other of these three classes.

Atheism, like Polytheism, needs no subdivision in this argument; it is simply the doctrine that the world is ever existing, and had no creator or governor.

Hence we have five systems to consider: 1. Polytheism. 2. Unipersonal Unitarianism, which, for convenience, we shall call simply Unitarianism, this term being generally used to signify this doctrine. 3. Pantheistic Unitarianism, which, in accordance with general philosophical usage, we abbreviate into Pantheism. 4. Dualistic Unitarianism, or Dualism. 5. Atheism.

None of these systems presents itself to reason with that authority which entitles it to contradict the authority of Revelation, or the plain sense of Holy Scripture.

1. Polytheism does not. There is not, and there never has been attempted, a complete philosophical, or even mythological, system, which assumes as its basis the supposition that there are many Gods, coequal and coeternal. Our motive for philosophizing at all is the instinctive demand of reason for unity, which compels us to reject this idea. Reason itself is the attempt to reduce to unity of system all the phenomena of the world; and it calls in the idea of superintending, governing, creative intelligence, to account for that unity. Its argument with itself, in the last analysis, is that its instinctive desire is motive sufficient to believe in, and to seek for a God; and this very motive to philosophize, negatives the supposition of more supreme Gods than one. Reason fails, indeed, as we shall see, to obtain any satisfactory conception of the relation of the God it seeks to the matter it intends to account for, and even in establishing the sufficiency of its instinctive desire to be evidence to itself of His existence, because it fails to conceive any possible transition from the conception of the Many coexisting with the One, to the conception of the One existing in the past without the Many. But, on the other hand, it cannot accept the doctrine of many Gods,

because its idea of unity is an equal, and equally powerful, element of thought with its perception of the variety for which it desires to account. It cannot annihilate the variety which is its constant and universal experience in following its desire for unity; but it can as little annihilate its demand for an idea of unity because of its perception of variety. The two elements, variety and unity, are, both of them, necessary conditions of thought. Hence, when Polytheism presents itself as the last result, it is necessarily rejected, for it would be better to admit the multiplicity we behold in nature as all satisfying, without thinking at all, than to undertake the labor of thought under the desire for unity, and then to acquiesce in a variety of Gods, which affords no more satisfaction to the mind.

Will Unitarianism, then, meet the demands of Reason?

That which we have called Unipersonal Unitarianism is opposed to the doctrine of the Trinity as held by the Church Catholic, in the assertion that God is one in person as well as one in essence. It is distinguished from Pantheism by the doctrine that the Deity is a personal Being, distinct and separate from the world; it differs from Dualism by affirming that the world is God's creation. It denies that any person is God, but God the Father; it affirms that God the Father is a person, the Creator of the world. In its positive assertion it agrees with the Catholic doctrine; but by its negative assertion it denies that doctrine, and the natural interpretation of Holy Scripture.

That Unitarianism is opposed to the natural sense of the Holy Scriptures; that, if it be true, the Holy Scriptures require the utmost ingenuity of interpretation not to be rejected entirely; that, if it be true, they deal in the most licentious abuse of language, must be manifest to all unprejudiced readers. To preserve their authority, or to pretend to do so, by the non-natural interpretation put upon them, the necessity of dismissing the natural interpretation must be absolute; it must arise from an invincible persuasion of reason of the truth of Unitarianism, leading us to the dilemma,—either the Scriptures are false, or they teach Unitarianism. But this dilemma can be constructed only on the ground that the doctrine of Unitarianism, positive and negative, is a necessary, proved, and dominant truth, which reason cannot but hold. Before reason accepts this doctrine, however, she must be permitted to examine it. To use her name without her deliberate consent is an open and palpable fraud. She must find it actually to be that which it claims to be, before she can give it her allegiance. Without any other basis to stand upon than a forced and unnatural system of interpretation, which makes

Holy Scripture a mere play of words, Unitarianism is an object of suspicion to reason, and she must scrutinize it well before she stoops to the position of its servant and supporter. She must not take an interested assurance with too easy credulity ; but must ask herself, "Is this a truth of reason ? Am I bound to its negation ? Is not even that which is true in it an article of faith, rather than a conclusion of reason ? and should not I rather humbly bow down and worship before the truth of revelation, than usurp authority over its text, and cast out its meaning ?" Does reason accept Unitarianism ?

Our reason, we repeat, is the demand and search for unity amidst the variety and multiplicity of the world. The idea upon which it begins its inquiries is, that the variety and the multiplicity are controlled and, perhaps, originated by a cause producing the unity discoverable in the world. We have the perception of variety ; we have, also, the intuition of unity. The two notions are contemporaneous in the mind, but of independent origin ; we perceive variety and multiplicity by the senses ; we behold unity as an idea of the soul. The office of reason is to bring them together, to trace unity in variety, to establish the subordination of variety to unity, to unite the multiple and diverse things of the world into species, genera, classes, orders of beings, to account for differences, to discover resemblances, to penetrate the plan, and, if possible, to assign the cause of all which is. By its inquiries it seeks to verify its idea of a cause as yet unknown ; for it has no knowledge of God until it has instituted its inquiries, and obtained their results ; until then, its idea of the Supreme One is not verified ; it is sure only of the multiple and variable as external to itself. Hence its argument, and its only argument, whether illustrated from physical or from moral phenomena and adaptations, is the celebrated argument from design : design proves a designer ; the world shows marks of design ; therefore it has a designer, a governor, a God. By our investigations in the world, we behold a plan to exist ; the cause we assign for it is supreme and powerful intelligence.

So far, the progress is legitimate ; but at this point there is an alternative.

(a) If we can attain, by means of these inquiries, the ultimate idea and adequate knowledge of the God we seek, as a Being powerful to cause and intelligent to plan, with the other attributes of His nature and the mode of His being, it will only be by establishing the unity of truth in such a Being, by tracing all variety, through necessary connections, to original unity, without any inconsequential leaps. Moreover, we must not only trace every second cause to the first

cause, but we must demonstrate the causal connection between the first cause and the second to be such as establishes every affirmation of one's respecting the first cause, its nature, being, and mode of subsistence; for we can make no affirmation on the authority of reason which is not demonstrated by reason. In this case, the result of our investigation, if successful, would be the demonstration of the being and nature of God.

Or (b) failing to demonstrate the being of God in this way, but meeting the revelation of Him as one in essence and threefold in personality, our idea of unity, and our argument from design, though not strong enough to give unaided reason the knowledge of God, is not without force, but becomes a strong motive to believe, in the absence of direct knowledge, and urges us to trust to revelation to give us that knowledge of God to which we cannot attain by our own speculations.

In this latter case, however, we can have, previously to meeting with Revelation, no idea what doctrine the revealed Word must teach. We can have no previous conception of sufficient authority to contradict any doctrine which teaches the unity of God, however modified by combination with other ideas. The agreement of the doctrine of the Trinity with our idea of unity is a great advantage in helping us to believe the revelation of God's unity; but that idea would not negative the truth of His threefold personality. For the doctrine of the Trinity fully preserves the idea of unity, without attributing to revelation, as Unitarianism does, a fantastic and unnatural use of language. If the latter, then, be the true course of reason; if its idea of unity be rather the motive to believe, than the conclusion arrived at, Unitarianism fails in its demonstration as a truth of reason, and right reason is subordinate to revelation, not dominant over it. Unitarianism can only establish itself by accomplishing the former task, and tracing all truth to an unity of which the first cause is a God—conceived of, necessarily, under its idea, both positive and negative—that is, as one in essence and one in person. How disastrous, then, must it be to its cause, if it shall fail to establish the first link in its chain of argument, if it is unable to penetrate the mystery of the act of creation!

Nor can Unitarianism evade the task thus laid upon it, by the argument that *our* idea of unity is itself the intuition of the unity of God. This is not proved, and cannot be proved. It is rather the intuition of myself, one and indivisible as to my soul. One and the same amid the fluctuations and changes around me, I preserve, through all, my unity, my identity; my idea of unity, therefore, is

my intuition of myself, my self-consciousness. Having obtained the idea by self-intuition, I realize it by transferring it, impressing the unity of my thought upon the matter over which I have power. Man forms plans for himself before he philosophizes about the plans of others; he infers, from his limited plans, an universal plan; he studies philosophy, and discovers traces of that plan in mutual adaptations and fitnesses and general laws, and then he seeks to rise to the intelligence whose plan it is. This is the history of the development of reason. The world is variety; the soul is unity within it, for every man is the centre of his own world. The question to be solved is, "Is there unity beyond it?" That question is not solved, but only suggested by my intuition of the idea of unity, derived from my consciousness of myself as one and individual. What authority have I to seek for a more remote cause, the connection of which, with my idea, I cannot prove, when the origin and full explanation of my idea of unity lies within myself and my self-consciousness? The perception of myself is sufficient to account for the idea of unity in me; and its application to the world is but an example of that transfer of ideas to other subjects in which all intellectual progress consists. But the suggesting of an unity beyond the world is not the proof required of those who thus philosophize. That suggestion authorizes me to seek God; but it does not amount to an intuition of God, and never can be proved so to be. It only stimulates the inquiry, Can we trace the unity of plan up to its source, by penetrating through the world, so as to know the source, its being and character? Or must we wait in hope for future enlightenment, after this life is ended, and receive doctrine now by faith? The latter course Unitarianism rejects, asserting its ability to carry the former to a successful issue. On this ground it sets aside the sense of Scripture, and substitutes a sense of its own. Right reason, then, must demand of this form of Unitarianism a full account and demonstration of the creation of the world.

We are now considering that form of Unitarianism which admits and argues by the fact of creation. The assumption of the eternal coexistence of the variable and the one—the one intelligence governing the variable world without having created it—is Dualism. Unitarianism, pure and simple, demands more than this for reason to prove. It asserts not only that reason can prove the government of God, but His creation of the world, and assumes the creation as a demonstrated link in the chain of argument which leads up to an unipersonal God. It cannot look upon it as a mystery, but must unfold and make clear every successive step in its argument. For

to admit a mystery here, is to admit a flaw in its reasoning, a dark place which it must pass by, a break in the chain which binds the created effect to the creative cause. The Trinitarian may accept the creation as a mystery, and yet as a fact; the Unitarian cannot, for if he did, upon him would lie the inconsistency of accepting the creation as a mystery, and yet rejecting the Trinity because it is a mystery.

But to demonstrate the creation, or to give it any other claim on acceptance beside the revelation, in which it stands upon the same authority as the doctrine of the Trinity, is impossible. We have not faculties to enable us in reasoning backward from the present to the past, to pass from the present existence to the past non-existence of the world; nor, in reasoning forward from the supposition of the world's non-existence, to conceive or imagine, or realize in any way, the coming of matter or substance from non-existence into existence. We can neither conceive the annihilation of matter into nothing, nor its creation out of nothing. Hence we can neither reason backward, *a posteriori*, to the beginning, nor forward, *a priori*, from the beginning. We cannot grasp in thought, in any way, the process of creation out of nothing. Nor can it be said by the advocates of the system we are considering, that God created the universe out of Himself, thus evading the difficulty of creating something out of nothing, because this system asserts that God still remains separate from the creation, the same now which He has ever been, which He could not be if He had taken from Himself to make a world. By the hypothesis, He does not pass over into the world, either in whole or in part, but is entirely separate from it and above it.

The difficulty is, not that a creation is an impossible act, but that, with our faculties, it is an act of which we are not able to conceive the possibility, or to prove the actuality. We are given faculties which accept the world as an actual existence of the present, the external correlative of ourselves. We have no experience of ourselves except as in relation with the world, and, therefore, no thought of which a part does not belong to the world as that correlative. Hence we have no thought which can be a representation of the time when the world was not, or a representation of its coming into being.

For the notion of the One, as has been said, arises from our self-intuition; the notion or knowledge of the multiple and the variable, from our perception of the diverse things of the world by means of the senses. Hence they are independent notions; the one is not the other, nor derived from the other; they are given to us by the two

diverse faculties, sense and intuition. But they are also universally contemporaneous notions. With the notion of variety, we have, whenever self-conscious, the notion of unity; the perception of that which is without ourselves, developing simultaneously the consciousness of that which is within; and, conversely, the consciousness of that which is within depending for its development on the presentation of something from without. It is the limitation of a finite mind that it must depend upon external agents for opportunity to exercise its activity; that which could evolve from itself thoughts and acts independently of anything external, would be an infinite mind. Hence, under our present limitations, while the spiritual world is unseen, and our faculties of perceiving it are folded up, we cannot think at all, except by means of a prior perception of the senses. If there were no sensible perception, there would be no inward intuition. If nothing touched me, I should never be conscious of feeling; if I had nothing to see, I should never be conscious of my faculty of sight; in like manner, if my soul had been a monad floating in a void, I should never have been conscious of my own existence. So, if I had had no perception of the variable, I should have had no intuition of the One; but with the variable, the One came into consciousness in the intuition of my own unity.

Now, since these notions are *contemporaneous*, to attempt to annihilate one in thought (as we must, when we suppose the Creator existing before the creation) is to seek to annihilate one of the conditions of our thinking, and yet to continue thinking, which is a manifest impossibility. And since they are notions, *independent* in their origin, to attempt to evolve the one from the other is equally impossible, being the attempt to evolve the presentations of the senses out of the presentation of the intuition, or the senses themselves out of the intuition, which is as absurd as to try to deduce one sense from another, the eye, for instance, from the ear.

Hence, in consequence of the limitation of our faculties, as designed rather for action in the world than for speculations upon its origin, we are compelled to consider of universal application certain axioms and rules which are contradicted by the necessities of the case, whenever we attempt to apply them to the creation; and that, whatever be the hypothesis, whether that the world was created, or that there was no creation; whether it was an emanation from the Deity, or was self-existent. Hence, right reason has no doctrine upon the creation of the world, because it has no laws of thought to apply in the evolution of a doctrine on that question; it

has neither a theistic assertion, nor an atheistic, but receives its doctrine from faith and from revelation.

The subjective limitations of our faculties project themselves as shadows upon the truth of the creation in such ways as these.

While reasoning within the bounds of the universe, whether practically, to carry out our plans, or speculatively, to investigate the truths of natural science, we are compelled to assume as a fundamental axiom that substance is indestructible, permanent amid all the change of phenomena, without increase or diminution of its amount. This persuasion is inherent in us by the constitution of faculties expressly adapted to our position in the world, since, in order to act, we must have matter given us, for the subject of our action, which we can neither originate nor destroy, but only combine or separate. The axiom of the permanence of matter leads us *practically* to attempt neither origination nor destruction; but always first to collect our materials from the stores which God has provided. *Speculatively*, it leads us, when any new phenomenon appears, to investigate what has been the prior state, or what will be the future state, of the substance now manifesting itself in this way. For these purposes the axiom is necessary; yet, what is it but the old philosophical dogma, *E nihilo nihil fit*? If, however, in pursuing our argument from design, we attempt to reach by reason to a creation, we must reject for this particular case this axiom, which, by the constitution of our minds, we are compelled to think of universal application, and which is so, as long as we keep our reasoning faculties within their proper sphere. For, if there be a creation, that is, a change from *non-being* into *being*, substance has not been permanent in the same quantity during that change, it has come into being in contradiction to the axiom; and, therefore, if we assert that reason reaches to the creation, we reason, not only without the principle of reason, but in contradiction to it. This difficulty does not occur if we accept the creation by faith as a mystery of revelation, because then we admit that the subject transcends our faculties, and therefore it transcends, also, the application of axioms which are the expression of their limitations. But if, without revelation, we attempt to arrive at the certainty of a creation as a link in the chain of argument which is to establish a doctrine of God in opposition to the revelation of the Holy Trinity, we must reason according to the conditions of reason, and accept the contradictions into which it leads us, as proof of the futility of the attempt.

The shadow of our limitations throws an obscurity, also, over the truth respecting the Creator, so as to prevent our being able to con-

ceive His action as agent. It is another fundamental axiom of our reason, that everything must have a cause. This axiom arises, also, from the contemporaneousness of our impressions and intuitions, inducing in us the consciousness that when we act, we are acted upon; for even in the exercise of free will, the perception of opportunity, and the motive to do, which come to us from without, precede our determination and action, and are considered, if not physical, yet *moral* causes. Causes are of two kinds in respect of their necessity,—physical and moral. Physical causes are such as, operating under the right conditions, are universally and necessarily followed by their effects; they are the influences of the natural world. Moral causes are those which operate not necessarily as principles and motives in the world of willing and intelligent beings. These moral causes do not necessarily and irresistibly rule us, but they appear universally as the antecedents of our acts; and whatever act be performed by a free and intelligent being, reason, by its own laws, asks a motive as its antecedent or moral cause. The condition of the right exercise of our free will is that we act upon the right motives in what we do, and he who should exercise his free will by acting upon no motive at all, would deserve the name neither of a free nor an intelligent being. But when we carry this application of the axiom out of the sphere of the finite into that of the infinite, as we must do if we reason at all upon the infinite, we can find no motive upon which an intelligent infinite being can be supposed to have created the world. Our reasons and axioms fail; we cannot grasp the mental state (so to speak) of the Creator; we cannot imagine either how or why He should begin at any time a creation, having existed without one during the illimitable cycles of a past eternity. And yet we cannot get beyond the notion that motives, right motives, must influence an intelligent, free being, so as to act in a rational manner. Wherever we carry our reason, we carry its limitations; and they will not permit us to conceive any intelligent being, except under intuitions derived from the only intelligent being we know,—ourselves. Hence, from the want of comprehending a motive, the difficulty of uniting the temporal act of creation with the eternal existence of the Creator is insuperable to speculation, and can only be surmounted by humble faith.

The only escape from the difficulties into which we are led deeper at every step, is to accept the truth that the axiom by which we attempt to reason from the creation to the Creator, is limited to our use in this finite world; and that in passing from the finite to the infinite, reason seeks help from faith. For the axiom of causa-

tion, by which we are compelled to seek a motive, is the same by which we seek to rise from the world as an effect, to God as a cause. And if, as we have seen, it will not apply to furnish the motive, neither will it to give an account of the creation; and, therefore, our best and truest reason is to accept it as limited to the exercise of our faculties in this world. Motives and causes operate upon us because we are finite; and we cannot know from our finite experience of the infinite mind of God. The creation, therefore, is a mystery of revelation, and as such, reason receives it. But in doing so, it rejects this form of Unitarianism, which attempted to demonstrate the creation without revelation, that it might set up a notion of the Creator against that which revelation teaches.

Unitarianism may, nevertheless, seek a temporary shelter under the idea that the world is eternally coexistent with a God who is one in person; that He is the artist who moulds the plastic matter to his plans; and that reason is competent to infer the unity of person from the unity of plan observable in the world; that is, it may resolve itself into philosophical Dualism. But if Dualism were a true doctrine, the conclusions of Unitarianism would not follow; for the unity of plan might as well lead us to the Divine unity of essence, as to the Divine unity of person; and the Trinitarian doctrine would even then have this philosophical advantage,—that the variety of persons in the Godhead would be in closer relation with the variety of forms and phenomena in the world, than unipersonality. But as the Trinity is not a doctrine originally propounded by philosophy, but rests upon faith, it is not necessary to complicate it with philosophical considerations which are themselves destitute of any sufficient basis.

Our consideration of this species of Unitarianism need not detain us long, for two reasons: first, because it is not, so far as we are aware, *explicitly* held or advocated by any class of religionists at the present day; and, secondly, because much of what was preliminary to the previous argument applies and is presupposed here. Thus, even if we should admit, as a philosophical probability, that the world is eternal, the next step in the argument could not be taken by assuming the intuition of unity in our minds, as an intuition of God; for what has been already said respecting the original of that idea, that it is the intuition of the indivisible unity of essence of the human soul itself, is of force under all circumstances. Hence, to the Dualistic Unitarian, if such there be, is left only the argument from design.

But as we have only proved the inadequacy of that argument

to establish a creation, it may perhaps be thought able to establish a doctrine of reason with sufficient certainty, on the supposition that the world, or the substance of which it is composed, is independent and self-existent. A single argument, however, will show that this doctrine cannot satisfy the demands which right reason makes of a theory professing to be authoritative in the interpretation, or to the overthrow of Scripture. And in presenting this argument, we need not to enter into the complexities of Gnostic or Manichean crudities, or into any of the manifold forms of the doctrine advanced in past ages; since the want of basis for the fundamental propositions renders unnecessary the consideration of any of the schemes built upon it.

It must strike every one given to reflection that there lies an insuperable objection against the Dualistic hypothesis, in that it cannot account for the adaptation of the substance of the world to the works of the great Designer, if the Designer, and the substance in which He works, be both of them eternal, and independent of each other. How happens it that matter is so plastic to His hand, if He did not create it? How happens it to be such as to obey so perfectly His orderly and symmetrical arrangements? Or how happens it, if He had not the power to create, that He has precisely that power and that constitution of mind (we speak, of course, as reasoning under the forms of reason) which enabled Him to observe the capabilities and to produce the effects which have converted dead plastic matter into such an elaborate work of divine art as the Cosmos? If we have a rational doctrine at all upon the subject, it must contain the idea that the one was *adapted* to the other, which would infer that one was subsequent to the other, and arranged with respect to it; either that the Divine mind was so constituted as to work in matter, if matter itself be eternal, or else matter was adopted and arranged—in fact, created—for the operations of the Divine mind. Our axiom of causation enters here into our speculations. We find two existences, both asserted to be eternal and independent, and yet both adapted to each other; we cannot think this adaptation to be fortuitous; we cannot admit a chance production of either (for the hypothesis of eternity, as well as our reason, excludes chance); we cannot comprehend why matter should be subordinate to any influence or plan external to itself, except by supposing a causal connection between its existence and those influences or plans. Two existences, mutually adapted to each other, are given in the hypothesis; we seek, and by the laws of our reason we must seek, a cause for the adaptation, if the hypothesis be subject to reason; but

we cannot find the cause, if we admit them to be eternally independent.

In the supposition that matter is eternally coexistent with God, we are, in fact, but attempting to project the limitations of our being and our position into infinity. We and the world are coexistent, and our mutual adaptedness, each to the other, is easily accounted for, if, on the authority of that revelation, of which an inherent fact is the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, we believe both ourselves and the world to have been created by a higher power, each for the other. There is thus a sufficient cause for the correlation, in the design of the Almighty Creator, who made all things as parts of one whole. But when we project this idea of coexistence into infinity, by the supposition of the eternity of matter, there is nothing which can make it clear in any way how the mutual harmony subsists, of the Divine mind and the plastic matter in which He works so perfectly. Some connection of causality between the two we must have to satisfy the reason, if reason be competent to assert this doctrine. But that connection we found it above as impossible to establish, as here to do without; to what conclusion, then, are we led, but that the subject lies beyond our sphere? Seeing, then, that reason has confessed itself unable to solve the mystery of creation, and is so completely baffled by the supposition of non-creation, is it not better, while asserting its competency for thinking and laboring in the world as it is, to confess that it cannot go beyond it, and therefore to receive, on the well-assured faith of Holy Scripture, not only the revelation that there is a God who created the world, but also the revelation that that God is the Holy and Ever-blessed Trinity?

For, if Dualism will not meet the demands of reason, neither will the only remaining possible Unitarian hypothesis, *Pantheism*, the doctrine that all which really exists is God.

The existence of Pantheism as an historical philosophical system, is an argument against the sufficiency of either of the two foregoing hypotheses, of singular weight for our present purpose, from the fact that the Unitarianism of the United States is settling down upon it, and discarding as inadequate its earlier affirmations. For Pantheism is not an original or primitive philosophy; it is the attempt to escape from the difficulties of other suppositions, its arguments are the objections against other systems, and its only claim upon attention is its apparent escape from those objections and difficulties. It takes its rise in two ways: Either (1), taking as the starting-point the primitive belief in God, and attempting to

reason from God down to the world, the mind is led to this doctrine by the impossibility of accounting for the production of the world as a real existence, other than God, which is the genesis of Oriental Pantheism; or (2) it comes forth as the result of a long struggle of philosophy with the difficulties of all other suppositions, as a resting-place under fatigue and disappointment. Pantheism, therefore, is a clear testimony against Unitarianism and Dualism; not because it is itself a tenable hypothesis, but because it is the shelter to which the vainly-philosophizing mind has fled upon abandoning them. But, so far from Pantheism being able to supply the want of a consistent system, embracing all truth, it is even more liable to objection than the others as soon as we array arguments against it; it rests wholly upon negative arguments against other systems for its appearance of truth, and has no positive arguments to favor its own pretensions. We cannot refute it more clearly and forcibly than is done in the few following sentences of Prof. Mansel: "Pantheism presents itself as, to all appearance, the only logical conclusion, if we believe in the possibility of a philosophy of the Infinite. But Pantheism, if it avoids self-contradiction in the course of its reasonings, does so only by an act of suicide at the outset. It escapes from some of the minor incongruities of thought only by the annihilation of thought and thinker alike. It is saved from the necessity of demonstrating its own falsehood by abolishing the only conditions under which truth and falsehood can be distinguished from each other. The only conception which I can frame of substantive existence at all, as distinguished from the transient accidents which are merely modes of the being of something else, is derived from the immediate knowledge of my own personal unity, amidst the various affections which form the successive modes of my consciousness. The Pantheist tells me that this knowledge is a delusion; that I am no substance, but a mode of the absolute substance, even as my thoughts and passions are modes of me; and that, in order to attain to a true philosophy of being, I must begin by denying my own being. And for what purpose is this act of self-destruction needed? In order to preserve inviolate certain philosophical conclusions which I, the non-existent thinker, have drawn by virtue of my non-existent thought. But if my present existence, the great primary fact of all consciousness, is a delusion, what claim have the reasonings of the Pantheist himself to be considered as anything better than a part of the universal falsehood?"

We have thus examined Unitarianism under all its possible modifications, and demonstrated its insufficiency for the demands of

reason, if reason is to construct a system of theology. The labor was demanded because Unitarianism, with an amount of arrogance in inverse ratio to the littleness of its support, claims to be the religion of reason. The religion of reason truly is to seek the truth, admitting the limitations of our finite minds in the cordial acceptance of the revealed Word, according to its natural interpretation.

To establish this fully, we have but one more system,—a possible atheistic theory of the world. Can reason accept the doctrine that there is no God? Having found all other systems incapable of proof by reason, is Atheism the last resort of reason? Has it any positive grounds on which to recommend itself as a coherent, rational system, explaining all facts?

On the contrary, Atheism explains no fact. So far from being approved as the last resort of reason, it is only possible in reason's complete abeyance. If reason be the attempt to reduce all things to unity, or to find out their origin, their end, their use, what, even though it fail, is the irresistible desire to make the attempt, but its protest against atheism? its reaching up to the higher state of *faith* in the Word of God, not its satisfaction in the lower state of blank negation? Reason is the instinct of faith, not the authority for denial. For to admit atheism is to refuse to advance a step, to rest without any exercise of reason at all, to shut our eyes to all the problems pressing on us, and to suppose our refusal to contemplate them to be the same as their non-existence. Atheism is only possible without reason, without thought,—accepting the world as a congeries of facts, but resolutely declining to seek any explanation of them for fear reason will lead us to faith. For we cannot construct a system on the proposition that the world is self-existent, and never had a Creator. Reason cannot assent to such contradictions as that all things happen according to law, and yet there is no law-giver; that all things bear evidence of design, and yet there is no designer. We cannot comprehend an eternal world, nor frame a theory of eternal development! A constant succession of beginnings, and yet no beginning! Eternal motion, and no starting-point. A world full of causes, and no first cause! The infinite made up by adding the finite to the finite,—eternity made up of times and seasons, and days and years! No oneness anywhere, yet all things moving in harmony together! Life succeeding life,—fishes in the seas, animals on the land, and birds in the air; the rocks full of extinct species, and the earth teeming now with a life impossible under the conditions of the planet in bygone ages, and yet, when those old species died out, no Creator to give being to those who

live! All this design and order, this nice adaptation of means to ends, this clear record of successive creations, the moral nature of man demanding an origin, yet no great fountain of life, natural or spiritual! A world all order and beauty and harmony, instinct with intelligence and life, yet no intelligent designer and maker! Reason utterly rejects the consequence. Better all the follies of superstition, than the thought that there is no God!

To conclude this lengthy discussion. Since no possible system of theology elaborated by human imagination—neither Polytheism, nor Unitarianism, nor Atheism—comes to us with the authority of reason, we cannot reject the doctrine of the Holy Scripture respecting the Trinity of Persons in the Godhead for any reasons derived therefrom; nor, as we have seen further, from any ideas in the mind, nor from its inability to conceive, or comprehend, or imagine. But there is still a question left to the mind,—Whether to doubt all things, or to believe Revelation? Which is the legitimate state of the mind,—a state of doubt or a state of faith?


A philosophy has received its name from one who held that to doubt all existence is legitimate. Pyrrho advocated this doctrine; he had disciples who are called Pyrrhonists, and his doctrine was named Pyrrhonism. Not being able to reason to God as the Creator, nor to the world as uncreated, he conceived himself required to doubt both that God is, and that God is not; both that the world is, and that the world is not; both that we ourselves exist, and that we do not. Thus Pyrrhonism is not a theology, neither is it the denial of one. It differs from atheism in that it neither affirms or denies. If it have any affirmation or denial, it becomes one or other of the systems above exposed; but it doubts both existence and non-existence, and, to be consistent with itself, it must even doubt of its own doubts. It is nothing, and yet cannot say that it is nothing. But such a state of doubt is evidently opposed to all intelligence, and cannot be accepted as a result of the inquiries of reason. It is not legitimate to conclude that, because we cannot explain the connection between any two sets of facts, therefore we are allowed to doubt that those facts are. The only legitimate conclusion is that our unassisted faculties are not sufficient for the purpose; but this is manifestly consistent with the belief that the two sets of facts are really existent and really harmonious. Reason, therefore, in confessing her inability to account for all things, confesses her need of a *faith*, not her obligation to doubt.

If there were no bias either way; if the result of reasoning

were the assurance of the indifference, or the equal balance of reason between all systems, still, doubt would be no more legitimate than faith; faith would then be rational, being just as possible as doubt, even without any direct motives urging us to believe. But this is not at all the case. There exists no such equality, before reason, of faith and doubt. For every motive which existed as an impulse to the inquiry of reason, exists still as an impulse to a faith above reason; and, further, every fact which had not weight sufficient as an argument to turn the scale against opposing difficulties, in favor of Theism against Atheism, has full weight without counterpoise, as a motive to believe, on the proper evidence of Revelation. The difficulties are admitted; but they are remanded to their proper place, as arising from the limitations of our faculties, not inherent in the nature of things; difficulties unconquerable so long as we determine to accept no assistance to our reason, but out of the arena when we acknowledge the ray of truth sent down from above. The axiom of causality, though incapable of application to the rational proof of the creation, exists as a motive to believe in the Scripture revelation of a great First Cause; and the idea of unity, though insufficient of itself as an argument to demonstrate the Unity of the Creator, is forcible as a *motive* to believe the Unity in the Trinity which the Scripture proclaims.

And if the finite mind's idea of unity be thus a *motive to believe* the Unity of God, on the sufficient evidence of Revelation, is not the correlation and contemporaneousness of the idea of multiplicity equally inseparable from consciousness, a motive equally strong to believe the Revelation of the Three Persons,—triplicity not destroying unity, unity not swallowing up triplicity? True, we cannot comprehend the mode of this existence; but our argument has shown that, against any apparently comprehensible theology, lies the graver objection of inherent contradictions. Faith puts aside these difficulties, in the humble admission that the nature of God is beyond the reach of limited faculties, and contents itself with seeking in the Christian evidences sufficient assurance of the trustworthiness of Revelation. The Revelation attested by the witness of the Church, the Sacred Scripture, presents us, on giving it our adhesion, the reward of a doctrine which is the centre and equipoise of all unsatisfying opposing systems of philosophy or heresy,—the balance of Truth midway between contrary forms of error. This doctrine is not Unitarianism (so-called); it is not Polytheism; it is not Tritheism; it is not Sabellianism or Arianism,—it is the Catholic faith in the Holy Trinity. Reason finds itself unable to evolve the multiple

from the one, or the one from the multiple. The attempt is as old as the Parmenides of Plato; and its failure is confessed alike by the eloquent expounder of eclecticism, and his equally distinguished opponent. But that consciousness which will not furnish data for a reason-system of theology, furnishes both its elements, as motives to believe when unity and multiplicity are presented to it, in mysterious conjunction, in the Scripture doctrine of the Holy and Undivided Trinity.



PRESBYTERIANISM AND EPISCOPACY IN SCOTLAND.

III.

WE have seen the Church in Scotland relying upon the State, instead of on its own spiritual power, to maintain its authority over the consciences of men at the time of the Reformation. We have seen the Church dependent on the State to determine its particular form of ecclesiastical government, in opposition to the prejudices and conscientious convictions of the people before the great rebellion. We have seen the Church attempting to manage the affairs of State, as well as Church, according to its peculiar ideas of fitness, during that rebellion. We have seen the Church submitting itself to be the tool of the State as the price of its temporalities after the Restoration. We have seen its failure in every case from causes connected with these political entanglements. We have now to consider its history, first in actual hostility to the State, arising out of the same evil leaven of politics disturbing its spiritual peace; and then, after it had at length shaken itself free when almost in the gasp of death, gathering fresh life, and setting itself steadily to do its proper work. We shall then have an opportunity of comparing Episcopacy thus free with the modified Presbyterianism, now the established religion of the land, and of deciding as to the worth and efficiency of the two systems for doing the work of a National Church in reaching and harmonizing all classes of the community.

In the first place, it will be well to have a clear idea of the position of Episcopacy in Scotland at the time when it came into collision with the State at the accession of William and Mary.

Presbyterianism was established by law in 1689 as "that Church government in this kingdom *which is most agreeable to the inclinations of the people*;" but by this was meant only those people who were the active supporters of the new administration in the State. Bishop Sage asserts of this very time, "I can affirm, with a well-grounded assurance, that if by *the people* you mean the commonalty—the rude, illiterate, vulgar—the *third* man throughout the kingdom is not Presbyterian; and if by *the people* you mean those who are persons of better quality and education (whose sense, in my opinion, ought in all reason to go for the sense of the nation), I dare boldly aver, not the *thirteenth*." And a chaplain in one of King William's English regiments corroborates his assertion: "The Church party, both for number and quality, are predominant in this nation. The nobles and gentry are generally Episcopal, and so are the people, especially northward, where, to my own knowledge, they are so well affected that it would be no hard task to bring them to subscribe to the rites and worship of the English Church, as Buchanan says the ancient Scots did. My frequent reading of our service, and preaching in their churches to the auditories' satisfaction, the caresses of the gentry and respect of the ordinary people wherever I met them, infers so much, and plainly discovers that they neither abhorred me, nor my way of religion." The Presbyterian general, Mackay, who was defeated by Dundee at the Pass of Killiecrankie, gives what may be regarded as more unbiassed testimony: "Let men flatter themselves as they will, I tell you, who know Scotland, and where the strength and weakness of it doth lie, that if I were as much an enemy to the Presbyterian interest as I am a friend, I would engage to form in Scotland a more formidable party against it, even for their Majesties' government, than for it."

Yet this Church (so strong in the number of its adherents, and in the wealth and consideration of its supporters, that Viscount Tarbit, afterward Earl of Cromartie, balancing the two opposing religious bodies, declared, "The Presbyterians are more jealous and hotter, the other more numerous and powerful") was forced to see, at the very moment of the banishment of King James, great numbers of its clergy driven by mobs out of their parishes with accessory circumstances of extraordinary barbarity, and with scarcely a hand raised for their protection.

It might be imagined, and it has indeed been asserted, that the personal characters of these clergymen had something to do with the virulence of this persecution; but calm investigation justifies the language of Dr. Leslie, the English non-juror: "I have made inquiry, and am told by persons of known integrity and undoubted reputation, who lived upon the place, that the Episcopal clergy of Scotland, particularly in the west, where this *rabbling* was, were, at the time of the revolution, for piety, learning, and diligence in their vocation, the most eminent that country had seen since the reformation, or most Churches have enjoyed since the primitive times. And we have seen the proof of it here [London], by the conversation of several of them, who have been driven hither, as well as by the learned works of others, well accepted in this nation by scholars of the first form." This conclusion appears all the more probable when we remember that the saintly Leighton was, for many years, the prelate of the west.

Nor did the Church have in William a personal enemy such as Presbyterianism found in Charles II. William's latitudinarianism prevented him from feeling a preference for any particular form of doctrine and worship, but he was so desirous to have uniformity of religion throughout his dominions, that he actually sent the Bishop of London to the Bishop of Edinburgh with a message, that if the bishops would serve him to the purpose that he was served in England, he would take them in hand, support the Church and their order, and throw off the Presbyterians. But here the unfortunate mixture of politics with religion interfered. The bishops had all been chosen by Charles and James from among the most intensely devoted maintainers of the divine right, not merely of civil government in the exercise of its authority within the sphere appointed for it by God, but of a particular individual to the possession of that authority on the ground of hereditary descent; and, therefore, they held and taught it to be a sin to resist the power of that person, even though arbitrarily and unjustly exercised, and still more damnable to withdraw allegiance from him. So the Bishop of Edinburgh answered in their name, that they could neither make William their king, give their suffrages for his being king, nor acknowledge him when made king.

The Bishop of London therefore felt constrained to inform them that the king held himself excused for standing by the Presbyterians; which, as a political measure, he proceeded at once to do, leaving the Episcopal clergy to take the consequences of their avowed hostility to him.

So well were the sentiments of the clergy understood, and the necessary consequences anticipated by the Scottish Presbyterians, that even before this interview, on the very day when the news of William's success reached Scotland, a series of assaults began upon the parish ministers through the west, openly favored and secretly stimulated by the leaders of the Orange party. The Scottish standing army had been called into England by James to meet the invaders there, and there was nothing to hold the mob in check when their passions had been once aroused. To excite them, a rumor was started that some thousands of Irish Papists had been landed in Scotland to massacre the Protestants. A letter being sent on Friday, December 24th, from the Mayor of Glasgow to the town of Hamilton, announcing that ten thousand Irish Papists had already burnt Kirkcudbright, and were advancing into the interior, six thousand well-armed Presbyterians were assembled on Douglas Moor to resist them, by eleven o'clock on Christmas-day. After waiting there until three o'clock without further news of the expected invaders, this force was divided into detachments of two or three hundred in a body, and sent out to disarm all who were disaffected to their cause. This having been done, they were ripe for further mischief. At six o'clock, a party of Presbyterians, belonging to his own parish, beset the manse of the Rev. Gabriel Russell, minister of Govan, close to Glasgow. They beat his wife and daughter and himself so inhumanly as to endanger his life, and departed threatening still greater severity should he ever again presume to preach in the Church of Govan. At eleven o'clock the same night, another party entered the manse of Cathcart, in the absence of Mr. Finnie, the incumbent, thrust his wife, with five small children, out of doors in a "vehement frost," broke and destroyed all his furniture, and only after half an hour's entreaty permitted the poor lady to shelter her children in a stable among the straw.

Another party seized Mr. Simpson, of Galston, put on his dressing-gown as a substitute for his black gown, which they could not find, that they might have the pleasure of stripping it from his shoulders, broke the ice of a deep spot in the river Irvine, made him wade a long distance through it, and then, turning his face northward, bade him to depart never to return on peril of his life. At Calden, they found the black gown, but not the minister; so they carried it in procession, tore it in fragments, and fired a volley of shot over it. At Ballantrae they struck Mr. White, the incumbent, with a musket, wounded him in the breast with a sword, beat and abused his wife, and frightened her into a premature confinement.

Mr. Brown, of Kells, was taken out of his bed at four o'clock in the morning, and tied naked to a cart in the face of a snow-storm, where he would have perished, had not a poor woman, finding him there, first charitably thrown some clothes over him, and then untied him. At Renfrew, they beat the Rev. Francis Ross, and forced his wife, with her infant, forth into the snow on the third day after confinement. At Keir, in Nithsdale, after beating Mr. Guthrie, they turned his wife, with three sick children, out of doors, in consequence of which two of the children, who had the small-pox, died. It might be hoped that they bequeathed the contagion to their murderers, who concluded by making a bonfire of the furniture. At Daly, in Ayrshire, they abused Mr. Skinner so frightfully as to drive his daughter raving mad with terror, in which state she died within a few days. In Cumnock, Auchinleck, Mauchline, Rickarton, Tarbolton, and Baldernock, in Stirlingshire, similar scenes were enacted; and at Oilbridge, Mr. Crichton was banished, and his wife beaten and abused. She being in a delicate condition, in common, as it appears, with all the wives of all the Scottish clergy at that time in the west, her constitution never recovered from the treatment.

Throughout the seven presbyteries of Glasgow, Hamilton, Lanerk, Ayr, Irvine, Paisley, and Dumbarton, there was only one instance of resistance to the rioters, some parishioners of Calden, near Glasgow, having defended the manse and person of their clergyman, the Rev. Daniel Milne, from the assaults of the Presbyterians. Another Mr. Milne, who had for twenty-four years been a minister in Glasgow itself, was far less fortunate. On Thursday, January 17th, when he was going to the church to hold the customary mid-week service, a multitude of women seized him, stripped him of his gown and other garments, only after much entreaty allowing him to retain his small-clothes, and proceeded to administer discipline to him in a manner which must have carried the venerable man's memory back to his mother's knee. There is a painful incongruity between the ludicrousness of the idea, and the sad consequences of the brutal act, for the unhappy gentleman sank under the violence and the shame, and expired a few weeks afterward.

This combination of ridicule with outrage occurred again in Glasgow, when, after a month's cessation of all religious services, there was an attempt made, on the 17th of February, to revive them, the provost and town authorities going in formal procession from the Guildhall to the Cathedral on the occasion. When the congregation was dismissed, the crowd outside seized many of its members, and made them victims of that rough horse play in which a

mob delights. Lord Boyd had above a hundred snowballs thrown at him. Mrs. Anna Patterson, Mrs. Margaret Fleming, and several other gentlewomen, had their clothes torn off, and were themselves severely *pinched*,—they being probably matrons of a provoking degree of plumpness; many gentlemen lost their hats and wigs, and many ladies were hustled, slapped, and seriously discomposed; facts which are set forth in grave detail in a document written by James Gibson, magistrate, acting in the absence of the Lord Provost, and apparently without any sense of the humorous to suggest to him the advisability of suppressing such details in a paper designed to be affecting.

The Presbyterian women of that region seem, in more than one instance, to have regarded the small-clothes of the ministers as appropriate objects upon which to manifest their hostility to ecclesiastical attire, and to have had a depraved delight in reducing their pastors to that state of nature which Calvinistic divinity teaches to be so very far removed from a state of grace. Whether they regarded such proceedings as symbolical or not, a mob of fifty women treated Mr. James Little, at Traileflat, in Nithsdale, in the same manner in which their sisters of Glasgow had dealt with the Rev. Mr. Milne, leaving him only a fragment of the same indispensable article of wearing apparel, attired in which he attempted to address them in terms of solemn remonstrance; it is needless to say without effect, as Demosthenes himself could scarcely have been impressive in such costume. It was bitterly cold, and they kept him in this state for above two hours, all the time pinching him, and slapping him with their hands. They then took him to the church door, and ordered him to confess all his wickedness in preaching under a Popish king, and informing against those that did not keep the Kirk. Mr. Little, while meekly declining to confess his own sins, unadvisedly offered to preach to them, if they would have patience, a sermon on their own; but the suggestion of another sermon from him whom they were abusing for having already preached so many, moved them to pelt him resentfully with mud, and then leave him to find his way home as best he could, alone.

Having thus driven away all their ministers at home, the Presbyterians of the seven presbyteries proceeded to look abroad. They visited the other presbyteries of Galloway and Glasgow, increasing in numbers and violence as they advanced, and then in a body marched to Edinburgh. The gentlemen of the College of Justice, and many others, took up arms to withstand them; but a proclamation of King William appearing, which ordered all persons to lay

down their arms, at the same time directing that all violently-ejected ministers should be restored and continued in their charges without further violence, until a final settlement of Church affairs by law, they had neither the courage nor the will to appear in arms against the constituted authorities of the State.

The Presbyterians, however, avowing that they knew the sovereign's mind, and that he only pretended to protect the clergy, continued without interruption in their course; and the civil authorities soon showed that the *rabblers* were right in their assumption. In one place, a clergyman, who had conformed to the new order of things in politics, and who had, therefore, been the only one untouched in the Presbytery of Glasgow, being at length assaulted by outsiders, and defended by his parishioners, as in duty bound according to the law, one of the rioters was killed. A gentleman of the neighborhood hurrying off to Edinburgh to represent the matter in the proper light, was met by Lord Ross, the President of the Committee of Estates appointed by the Convention-parliament, with a grave regret that the rabble had been opposed, as such people cared not what they did, and it had been better to have yielded to their humor; he was sorry one of the minister's friends had been killed, but the matter had better be hushed up. "But, my Lord," said the gentleman, "it was none of ours, but one of the rabblers that was killed." "What do you say, sir?" said his lordship, briskly; "one of the rabblers that was killed! that may draw deeper than you are aware of!" The gentleman withdrew in dismay; and the day after the burial of the slain rioter, the rabble returned to the manse, and completed their work of outrage and destruction without any further molestation.

The reason why these acts of violence were thus permitted under such a firm administrator as William, was, that they were actually necessary to effect the desired change from Episcopacy to Presbyterianism. The only Presbyterian ministers, who had any clerical standing that could be recognized by the law, were such as survived of those who had been ejected at the Restoration in 1660. Of these there were only sixty; and under any form of synodical convocation that could be adopted, they would inevitably be outvoted ten to one by the clergy, Episcopal in principles. So it was expedient to allow of such an amount of terrorism as should reduce the Episcopal ministers to quiescence before the work of reorganization was attempted. But though the *rabblers* were very active and efficient, it would have had a very bad effect in England, and especially upon the King, if the whole work of displacing ministers had been avowedly resigned

into their hands ; so the Scottish Convention-parliament, assembled to declare the throne vacant and to elect William of Orange to fill the vacant place, provided an instrument adapted to attain the same end with more apparent decency. After nearly all the nobles and many of the gentry had left the body, protesting against certain forms of procedure which were repugnant to their political convictions, and there were left but few members who were not strong Whigs and stronger Presbyterians, a proclamation was published commanding all ministers of the Gospel within the kingdom to pray in public worship for William and Mary by name, as King and Queen of the realm. Though all the Presbyterian ministers declined to comply with this, in pursuance of their resolution to take no action until those sovereigns had declared themselves in favor of Presbyterianism, the authorities took no notice of their refusal ; a course not very just but very natural and judicious in view of the line of policy upon which the government had determined. But against the Episcopal clergy, who declined to read the proclamation on account of their Jacobite principles, the clause of the proclamation ordering them to be displaced was promptly and rigorously enforced ; and as it said nothing about restoring the ministers who had been expelled by violence, and, while prohibiting any further violence to any minister still in possession of his benefice who behaved himself becomingly under the new government, appointed no penalty for any violence that might be done, it really gave encouragement to the rabblers to proceed. The Presbyterians were, of course, active in laying information against the clergy before the Committee of Estates, appointed to carry on the government until William and Mary had formally accepted the throne, and thus in the next three weeks thirty clergy in the neighborhood of Edinburgh alone were deprived for non-conformity, before the new sovereigns had taken the power into their hands.

In the meantime, the rabbling went on as vigorously as before, being directed, as a rule, against the ministers who observed the proclamation ; the others being left to the care of the Committee of Estates. After the organization of the government, the Privy Council proceeded to further active measures, sending out emissaries through the kingdom, inviting persons of all ranks to bring libels against their ministers. This was attended with peculiar injustice ; for the Privy Council, being a judicatory not tied down to the ordinary rules of law, it was not hard to find some pretext, often unconnected with the charges made, on which to deprive the minister ; while the libels were, nevertheless, recorded on the

council-books, copies sent down to the presbyteries to be read, and other copies disseminated through England; the erroneous idea thus being propagated that the deprived clergy had, as a rule, been very lax in morals and very light of manners. A writer of the period declares that the following rules were adopted to regulate the proceedings:

1. No Episcopal minister should know his accuser, as otherwise a good many people might be discouraged from bringing accusations.

2. That it was sufficient to name the offence, without condescending upon time and place, when and where it was committed, for that might sometimes prove of great use to the panel.

3. A minister might be libelled upon common fame.

4. Witnesses should be put to answer *super inquirendis*; that is, What do you know of such a minister? Did you ever see him drunk, or hear him swear, etc.?

When the Apostle's rule, "Receive not an accusation against an elder but before two or three witnesses," was objected against them, the short answer was returned, "That some rules were good *in ecclesia constituta*, which must not be followed *in ecclesia constituenda*." There is, probably, some degree of caricature in this representation of the rules themselves, but not of the proceedings under them. Mr. Johnston, of Burntisland, was turned out for reading and recommending to his congregation "The Whole Duty of Man," because it approved of set fasts; Mr. Herriot, of Dalkeith, on an accusation known by all the town to be false, that he had danced about a bonfire; Mr. Peacock for not appearing at the bar of the Presbytery the very day on which his wife was buried; Mr. Crawford, of Ladykirk, in Ayrshire, cited for an alleged act of drunkenness fifteen years before, which he disproved, was deprived for having said that the Covenant was no better then a band of rebellion, the false charge being still retained upon the books; Mr. Cooper and Mr. Graham, of Dumfermline, were deprived because "they had admitted persons promiscuously to the sacrament, had profaned the Lord's Day by suffering people to bring in kale and fan barley for the pot on that day, and by suffering their children to play with others;" another clergyman for "having plucked a few peas on Sunday;" another because, "one day playing at bowls, he broke an innocent jest;" another for having used the Creed, the Doxology, and the Lord's Prayer; and yet another for having used Bishop Scougal's Catechism.

As there were still a very large number of clergy, none of whose

parishioners would bring any charges whatever against them, and it was found that the plan of sending Presbyterians to settle in their cures, and so become nominal parishioners, was attended with expense, and even considerable personal danger from the indignation of the genuine members of the parish, a circular was sent round to the sheriffs, magistrates, and others, inviting and pressing them to make the charges, and to cite the ministers to appear in Edinburgh, at a very few days' notice, to respond. If they failed, they were deprived. In this way, more than three hundred incumbents, chiefly south of the Tay, were removed, and it was at length considered safe to allow the sixty surviving Presbyterian ministers to meet and organize as the General Assembly of the Kirk. They were somewhat hampered, however, by the express desire of King William, that moderation should be observed toward the Episcopal incumbents, and by the request of the commissioner sent by him, that expressions in favor of toleration should be introduced into their prayers and sermons. One of the ministers manifested this in a very characteristic but irreverent way, when, after having made the desired remarks in his prayer, he concluded it by saying: "But, O Lord, *just to mak' free with ye, it would be better to mak' a clean hoose.*" The feeling against any toleration was, indeed, very strong, a bill of the Earl of Linlithgow, "for giving toleration to those of the Episcopal persuasion to worship God after their own manner, and particularly that whosoever were inclined to use the English Liturgy might do it with safety," being rejected at once on its introduction into Parliament. A test, called the Assurance, was, at the same time, adopted, declaring William and Mary to be King and Queen, not only *de facto*, but *de jure*, to be signed by all persons capable of electing or election to any office, civil, military, or ecclesiastical. Thus, all who were Jacobites, even in their private sentiments, aside from any overt acts of opposition to the Government, were excluded from all exercise of civil rights.

From the time of the organization of the General Assembly, and to evade the effect of a Royal Letter prohibiting the Assembly from taking any further action against incumbents of parishes until the return of King William from his continental campaign, the work of persecution was turned over to the local presbyteries, which, for that purpose, had to be combined together, as many of them, consisting of twenty or thirty parishes, had only two, or one, and sometimes even no Presbyterian ministers at all. For the same reason, a system of pluralism was introduced, one minister actually applying for five parishes with their stipends, and succeeding in receiving

three of them. Indeed, there was infinite difficulty found in supplying the vacancies at all. The Assembly had wished to procure an act declaring all parishes vacant, and giving the people their free choice to call whom they would ; but this was abandoned, as it was found that the majority of parishes would have recalled their Episcopal clergymen ; and despite the readiness of the presbyteries to settle as ministers even tailors, weavers, and tinkers, who professed a call to preach, more than half the empty churches remained unfilled. Then began that social degradation of the ministerial office which, to the present day, continues to deprive the Presbyterian ministry of Scotland of due influence with the higher classes, and of proper standing and dignity in the eyes of the lower. The Episcopal clergy were then, as they are still in England, mainly scions of the families of the nobility and gentry. As such, while able and willing to move freely among the poor and humble, they always were held in a personal esteem, which added greatly to their pastoral authority ; and, at the same time, they met the great people of the land on a footing of equality, which kept them free from truckling and servility. Now, it is often impossible for a minister of the Establishment to visit the homes of the most influential of his nominal parishioners without feeling awkward and out of place himself, and giving continual offence by solecisms of language and good-breeding ; while the rest of the parishioners are apt to be critical and censorious with respect to one whom they have known, it may be as a shepherd or fisher lad, playing barefoot about the town. This is a trouble that is painfully felt by the ministers of the Establishment themselves, and for which they have been able to find no remedy.

It would be tedious to go in detail through the difficulties experienced by the Presbyterian assemblies in removing the Episcopal clergy, especially from the region beyond the Tay. They were found so insurmountable, that at length the royal government passed an act, allowing the incumbents to retain their cures for life, only forbidding them to take part in the exercise of discipline through the presbyteries. Suffice it to say, that the clergy of the Episcopal Church would never have lost their places and their power had it not been for their own fault, in insisting upon taking an active part in all political conspiracies and rebellions on behalf of the banished House of Stuart. No sooner had the first vigor of persecution passed away, and those who were faithful to the principles of the disestablished Church permitted quietly to assemble in private houses, and even to build meeting-houses for their worship, than these were made nests

and nurseries of disaffection to the government. In nearly every one of them, not only were the names of the actual reigning sovereigns omitted from the public prayers, but the names of the Stuart claimants were introduced; and the attendants on the services were thus recognized by one another as avowed maintainers of the cause of the banished family, who had given pledges of their good faith by joining in an act of constructive treason. The assemblies for worship were made occasions for propagating reports, conveying rumors, and arranging plans for the furtherance of the Jacobite designs; there was not a Jacobite conspiracy in which the Episcopal clergy did not take a part, not a Jacobite rising whose time and place and circumstance had not been to some extent arranged within or around the walls of an Episcopal place of worship. As a consequence, after every Jacobite insurrection, the hand of the government fell heavily upon the Episcopal meeting-houses, and laws were passed, imposing civil disabilities upon all who attended public worship, where the names of the actual sovereigns were not duly introduced. Of course, this state of things quickly drove from the Church that large body of whom General Mackay speaks as attached to Episcopacy, indeed, but also attached to the revolution dynasty. Then those of the rising generation of the nobility and gentry who felt an ambition to distinguish themselves in diplomacy or politics, or whose spirit made them anxious to share the glories of the national military triumphs; that large number who were perfectly contented with things as they were, without troubling themselves as to the right or wrong of the proceedings that produced them; and that still larger number, whose principles are constantly modified by and subordinated to considerations of personal safety and pecuniary profit,—all began to fall off more and more from the Church which had consented to transform itself into a society of political intriguers and malcontents. As these were feelings which arose chiefly in the minds of the young and enterprising, the Church became more and more a community of elderly and narrow-minded men and women; and many young men, who had no other motive for deserting it, were kept away by a sense of foolish shame at being seen sitting surrounded by such a company of old men and maiden ladies as formed the main body of attendants at an Episcopal place of worship.

Those who deserted, unable to reconcile themselves to the coldness and barrenness of the Presbyterian worship, went nowhere at all; and irreligion and immorality were wide-spread among the aristocracy of Scotland through the eighteenth century. The Church,

however, rallied again and again after every rebellion and ensuing persecution, in spite of the relentless asperity with which the Presbyterians stimulated the powers of the civil government against her, and in spite of the persistent denial of toleration even to the last meeting of the Scottish Parliament before the union of the two kingdoms, when an act, proposed by the Earl of Strathmore, "for a toleration of all Protestants in the exercise of religious worship," was lost by a special remonstrance sent in against it by the Commission of the Presbyterian General Assembly. Nor was this denial of toleration as merely legislative and formal as it was at that time in England. In Glasgow, when the Episcopalians were celebrating the martyrdom of Charles I., their place of worship, in the house of Sir John Bell, was attacked by a mob with sticks and stones, though the clergyman was known to be well affected to the government; and again, on March 7th, it was assaulted, and the house greatly damaged, the Presbyterian magistrates looking on and informing the Lord Chancellor that they must decline to protect any place of Episcopal worship. As the Church party in Glasgow, both in wealth and members, were strong enough to protect themselves, the rabble of the adjoining county were brought in, especially a regiment of women under the command of a virago named Maggie Steen, who received her instructions directly from the Presbyterian ministers. She and her regiment had been actors in the indecent assaults upon the clergy in the original rabbling, and threatened now to serve all attendants at the Episcopal meeting-house worse than they had treated Mr. Milne. Under these circumstances, the service of the Church was from that time forward totally suppressed in Glasgow.

Soon after this, when the Jacobites attempted to take advantage of the discontent in Scotland, at the consummation of the union of the kingdoms in 1707, by a rising connected with a French invasion, one of the first steps of precaution taken by the Scottish Privy Council, was to suppress all the Episcopal places of worship in Edinburgh, unless the clergy took the oath of allegiance to Queen Anne. The Church was still so popular, that no less than seventeen clergymen were silenced, five of them being considered of sufficient importance to be committed to the Tolbooth until the danger was completely over. Notwithstanding this severity, however, and the ill effect the occasion for it produced upon the minds of the ruling powers in England, the Church began to revive. Some of the oppressive acts of Parliament were repealed, and any clergyman of the Church who would take the oath of allegiance to the queen, could exercise his

functions without further fear of banishment or prison. Several even of the regular parish churches were served by Episcopally ordained ministers who used the Liturgy; and besides what was done by private liberality, the University of Oxford found a demand for more than nineteen thousand Common Prayer Books, and other devotional and edifying works relating to it, which were sent into Scotland within the space of two years. But while many persons were probably attracted to the Church by the Liturgy now generally employed, and were driven from the Establishment to it by their objection to the system of patronage, at that time reintroduced by law, the Presbyterian Wodrow writes, that at Glasgow, where the Rev. Mr. Cockburn was essaying to raise the prostrate Church, many of the "old Episcopal way" refused to join him, because of the Liturgy; others stumbled because he took the oath abjuring the Pretender, and some began to weary of the charges they were at, though his stipend was only twenty-two pounds sterling.

The oath of allegiance and abjuration was, indeed, not merely obnoxious to a few laymen, but a stumbling-block insurmountable by the mass of the clergy. Lord Dunne, at a meeting of the bishop and clergy of Edinburgh, told them plainly that their best friends in England could do them no further service unless they took the oath; and that unless they prayed expressly for Queen Anne and the Hanoverian succession, they might expect all their meeting-houses to be permanently shut up; yet he could bring them to no resolution. The rebellion of Mar and Nithsdale, which followed the accession of George I., involved many of the clergy and their people; the government *desolated* all places where the Liturgy was used, and the nobles and gentry, who had contributed to their support, lost their estates by confiscation. Clergymen were imprisoned for officiating without letters of orders from a Protestant, that is, English or Irish, bishop, the Scotch episcopate being no longer recognized by law; and most of the remaining clergy of the Church were so closely pursued, as to be forced to fly the country. An Act of Parliament, passed in 1717, made it penal for an Episcopal clergyman, who had not taken the oath, to officiate before any number of persons above eight and the family in which he discharged his functions; and every dwelling-house, where nine persons besides the family were assembled, was declared a meeting-house within the terms of the act, and liable to be shut up for six months for its violation.

Yet, strange as it may appear, we find that six years after this act, Wodrow complains of a *terrible increase of meeting-houses* in the north, ten or twelve having been set up between the 1st of May

and the 19th of August; and in 1727 he speaks of "thirty or forty meeting-houses set up where they pray not for the king, since last assembly." The Presbyterians, in fact, were quarrelling among themselves about a work called the "*Marrow of Divinity*," which produced a serious schism in their body, and had little bitterness to spare from one another for the Church, whose members took advantage of the respite afforded them in consequence. But all the advantage gained was more than lost by the fatal alliance formed with Jacobitism. The bishops still looked on James as their rightful sovereign, and actually declined to assume any diocesan jurisdiction until the time when he should be able to issue legal appointments on recovering the crown; and they consequently acted merely as a college, with no practically efficient superintendence of the Church. More than this, they allowed the exiled prince to dictate to them through his agent, Lockhart of Carnwath, whom they should ordain to the episcopate, thus putting the Church in voluntary slavery to a Romanist and an alien. All the evil effects of the royal supremacy were thus intensified, each bishop striving to excel the other in servility in order to stand well with a would-be court, which could do the Church only harm, and could not really wish to do it good. The rebellion of 1745, therefore, as it was the most formidable in its character for a time, and the most crushing in the effect of its defeat upon the party which incited it, found the Church more fully involved politically than ever before, and far weaker spiritually to endure the discipline administered with unsparing hand by the "*Butcher Duke*" of Cumberland. By his orders, all the Episcopal chapels, many of them very handsome, were utterly demolished, all the rooms for meetings in Edinburgh had their doors padlocked for six months, and the law was increased in stringency so as to prohibit all Episcopal clergy in Scotland from officiating to any number of parishioners above four and the family. This stopped the ministrations of all clergymen but three, who took the oaths. Any layman frequenting unregistered meeting-houses, or those in which the king was not prayed for, was punished with fine and imprisonment; and letters of orders from Scottish bishops were declared to be, in the eyes of the law, null and void.

On account of the severity of these restrictive laws on all the clergy who continued in opposition to the government, and the persistence of the clergy generally, in their refusal to acknowledge the rightfulness of the powers that actually were, those who were attached to the services of the Church began to invite English and Irish clergymen, who had no scruples on this point, to come and

officiate for them. These ministers were not under the authority of the Scottish bishops, and, indeed, were rather disposed to maintain the Erastian theory of the government, that no man was a true bishop unless made so under the authority of the king. In this way there were formed in different towns many independent, or, as they were called, *English* congregations, which became as hostile to the Church as were the Presbyterian, and whose members complained of the Church ministers, whenever they ventured to overstep the limits of the law. In this way, several clergymen were brought into the hands of the authorities, who might otherwise have neglected to notice their proceedings.

Among others, Mr. Greig, of Stonehaven, who had attempted to evade the law by reading the service and preaching in one house, while the partition was removed between it and a room in the house adjoining, where a large congregation was assembled, was arrested and imprisoned on complaint of a sergeant of an English regiment, and, with some other clergy who had adopted a similar practice, was confined for six months in the Stonehaven Tolbooth. His congregation was then accustomed to assemble daily in the street below the window of their common cell, where, on week days, another of the imprisoned clergy, Mr. Troup, of Galashiels, entertained them after service with stirring Jacobite tunes *upon the bagpipes*. There was then a penalty for having children baptized out of the parish church; and the fishwives were often seen trudging with their babies in fish-creels on their backs, to have them secretly baptized in prison. What with the English Independent congregations and the Scottish Presbyterians, the Church was between the upper and the nether millstones; and to avoid all appearance of public worship, the people met in the lofts of ruined stables and outhouses, approached by movable ladders in charge of some vigilant and trustworthy friend. Under these circumstances, the clergy, who, in 1740, still amounted in number to three hundred, diminished, until, in 1790, there were only forty to be found; and the congregations dwindled in proportion; yet those who remained were far more faithful to their spiritual trust, than they had ever been before. The bishops had abandoned their college system and their connection with the Court of the Pretender soon after the failure of Charles Edward, and had divided the dioceses among the seven of them who remained. The Scottish Communion Office, to which our own owes so many beauties, had received its present form mainly through the efforts of Bishop Gadderar, of Aberdeen, one of the first opponents of the college system, and had one further beauty which we may regret not to have

adopted also. At the presentation of the alms upon the holy table, the priest pauses with the basin in his hand, and says :

"Blessed be Thou, O Lord God, for ever and ever : Thine, O Lord, is the greatness, and the glory, and the victory, and the majesty ; for all that is in heaven and in the earth is Thine : Thine is the kingdom, O Lord, and Thou art exalted as Head above all ; both riches and honor come of Thee, and of Thine own do we give unto Thee. Amen."¹

Besides the improvement in the Liturgy, there was also great attention paid by many of the clergy, at this critical period, to the work of catechising, so that the small remainder of the Church people were probably more thoroughly instructed than any set of Christians in the world. "When I first came to this parish," said the Rev. Dr. Gaskin, rector of Stoke Newington, in England, "I remarked a plain man, who was never absent from Church, who communicated regularly every month, and conducted himself with great appearance of devotion. He was a gardener, from Scotland. He was so perfectly acquainted with everything connected with our communion, so well instructed in every principle, and so rationally pious, as excited my extreme surprise, when he told me he came from Scotland, a Presbyterian country ; for of the Episcopal Church there I was almost entirely ignorant. I expressed my surprise, when he replied, with a strong expression of feeling, 'Ah, sir, I was well *catechised* in all that by Bishop Alexander, at Alloa.' " Bishop Walker also mentions how, on a certain occasion in America, when a whole congregation came into the church with their minister, the pastor was aided, in the most efficient manner, by a lay parishioner, who had been well catechised by Bishop John Skinner, of Aberdeen.

While the Church thus, under its bishops, who had arranged a regular system of synodical legislation and jurisdiction, was becoming a firmly-united and well-trained body of faithful and intelligent believers, the established system of Presbyterianism was showing some of its weak points. Disputes as to doctrine and discipline were pushed to the extreme of actual organic separation. It was enough for them that they retained the Presbyterian government, which they believed to be of Divine appointment ; for they had no such solemn warning against the sin of schism as is provided by the

¹ In Grace Church, Utica, these words, so important as giving prominence to the Offertory as an act of worship, are chanted by the choir before the presentation of the alms,—a practice which might be profitably imitated in other places.

office of the bishop, representing organic unity as part of the original Divinely-ordained constitution of the Church. Consequently, we find schism following almost immediately upon the establishment of Presbyterianism, the Cameronians organizing themselves as a distinct body, because the principles of the solemn league and covenant were not fully carried out in the constitution of the Establishment. Before the middle of the eighteenth century, there was a secession from these seceders, on the ground that it was a sin for a Church, as a Church, to recognize as sovereign any one who did not subscribe and govern according to the covenant; and thus was organized what is called the Reformed Presbytery. Out of the difficulties in connection with the laws of patronage arose another important schism, which is called that of the Associated Presbyterians, who claimed that, by submitting to the dictation of patrons, and the choice of ministers by persons possibly unsound themselves in doctrine, the Establishment imperilled the purity of religion. Then these Associated Presbyterians found a cause of division in the clause of the oath required of burgesses: "Here I protest before God and your lordships, that I profess and allow with my heart the true religion presently professed within this realm, and authorized by the laws thereof; one party claiming that no seceder ought to speak thus of the system from which they had seceded, on the ground of its being dangerous to true religion; the other, that they could take the oath as referring to the religion itself, and not to any maladministration;" whereupon they proceeded to form two bodies, each claiming to be the original Associated Synod, and each excommunicating the other. Among the Antiburghers there occurred a further division of the Old Lights and the New, with respect to the points of difference between which the Lord Chancellor of England, in an appeal case before the Privy Council, asserted that, as the opposing parties had endeavored in vain for years to make their tenets clear to the Scottish Judiciary, the English Council could not hope to arrive at an understanding of them; and we may, therefore, be excused for leaving the matter in the dark, especially as the Lights, both Old and New, have now long been extinguished. An objectionable presentation to the Parish of Inverkeithing occasioned another schism, accompanied by great scandal and much bitterness, and resulted in the formation of still another body, styling itself the Relief Synod, equally complete with the rest in all the points required for Presbyterian perfection.

These, and many other minor divisions, not only illustrate the failure of Presbyterianism to provide a system which will promote

unity even among those whose general belief is nearly uniform, but, in the manner of their occurrence, show that the very conception of what it is in the Church which ought to make its members cleave to it and cling together in it, had been practically lost. That idea is, that the *pastor* is the *feeder* of the flock in the truest and most spiritual sense, with a food received through him from the Great Shepherd of the Sheep. He offers prayers of and for the people, under God's Covenant that such prayers shall receive a special answer, because put up through that Divinely-chosen mouthpiece. He pronounces forgiveness for their sins, as one commissioned to speak on behalf of the King of Kings. He feeds them with the sacraments of grace, which have been placed in his hands by Christ, Himself the Sacrifice and the Bread of Life. Let a people believe in this, and they will value what the minister gives them, and feel it necessary to come to him and take it, even though personally they may find much to criticise in him, and be dissatisfied with him for. But in Calvinistic Presbyterianism this idea of a mystical grace, received especially and peculiarly through the minister of the Church, by those alone who come into the Church to receive it, is really lost. The elect are in direct communication with Christ in a way which makes these intermediate agencies of comparatively small account, and makes them feel that they are independent of any such particular and external channel of communication. The minister is really only the chief officer of discipline, and the teacher of doctrine to the people. The first office he shares with his lay elders, and is often subordinate to those among them who have greater force of character or other sources of influence over the congregation; and, in the second, if his doctrine or his fervor fall below the standard set up by the critical, they see no reason why they should not leave him for some one better, even though they leave the Church. All these schisms of which we have spoken really came from this,—that the people, and the presbyteries themselves, regarded minor differences in doctrine, which merely affected the worth of the pastor as a feeder of the intellects of the flock, as of more importance than all that he could have given them, had he been duly commissioned for his post in the more spiritual and strictly supernatural way. Therefore it was that the bond of unity was so easily broken, never to be restored except for reasons of sentiment or temporal convenience. The last great secession, that which originated the Free Kirk, when four hundred ministers left their cures together, and led one third of the people of Scotland with them into schism, could never have occurred had the true idea

of what the Church is, and what Christ gives to His members in and through His Body, been habitually present to the minds of the seceders. They would have cared but little how the ministers were presented to and supported in their office, so long as, when once there, theirs were the hands through which Christ Jesus was ready to give Himself as food, and His Holy Spirit as life, to those who came to Him for the nourishment and salvation of their souls.

In the meantime, the Church which held the true idea had passed its lowest stage of suffering and depression. The consecration of Samuel Seabury as Bishop of Connecticut, by the Scotch episcopate, turned the eyes of the English Church and people, almost for the first time, to the branch of their communion which still kept its life in northern soil. Then, soon after, the extinction of the Stuart line gave the non-jurors the opportunity, without departure from their traditional principles, to give their formal allegiance to the Hanoverian succession; though there were still some very wry faces made by the oldest and toughest Jacobites. "Well do I remember," says one of them, "the day on which the name of GEORGE was mentioned in the morning service for the first time; such blowing of noses, such significant hums, such half-suppressed sighs, such smothered groans and universal confusion can hardly be conceived! But the deed was done, and those who had participated could not retract." There was one well-known sturdy Jacobite, Alexander Hackett, who persisted in rising from his knees and blowing his nose in a significant and sonorous manner when the Collect for the King and Queen was read, until, when George IV. visited Edinburgh, he was carried away by the enthusiasm of the people, and by admiration for the well-proportioned limbs which that stout sovereign displayed beneath his tartans. He was heard to pronounce the king "a fine lad;" and the next Sunday remained upon his knees, and joined in the prayer with much devotion.

One man, indeed, attempted to make a schism, and declared that Bishop Rose, then in his dotage, had consecrated him as a bishop for the few remaining faithful; but the aged prelate protested that, though perhaps *his sister* had done so, he himself never had; and the endeavor proved abortive.

The English or Independent Chapels had now no excuse for their continued separation, especially as the Scotch clergy consented to accept the Thirty-nine Articles as their doctrinal standard; and so they rapidly amalgamated with the Church, there being now but very few remaining in their antagonistical position. In 1792, there

were nearly, or quite, twenty thousand communicants of the Church. The Gaelic Episcopal Society was soon after organized, to provide Bibles and Prayer Books, and educate ministers for the Highlands. In 1806, there were about sixty congregations and fifty clergy of the old Scotch Established Church remaining, and twenty-four English congregations which were fast uniting with them. As late as 1837, a congregation was discovered in the Isle of Skye that had never seen a clergyman, yet who had kept on faithfully reading the service for themselves; and the next year a church was erected, and a minister provided for them. In 1843, the drift toward the Church was so great, that it might have been swamped beneath a flood of intruding Calvinism, had it not been for a secession, led by an English Evangelical clergyman of the name of Drummond. These Drummondites have been found so useful in educating Presbyterians for and into the Church, that they have been actually beneficial instead of hurtful to it. In 1842, there were still less than a hundred churches, under six bishops. In 1855, the *Encyclopædia Britannica* reports seven bishops and a hundred and fifty clergy. At present there are more than two hundred clergy, with nearly three hundred places of worship, many of them beautiful buildings, and respectably endowed.

But this does not show all the influence that the Church exerts. Professor Milligan, of Aberdeen, sent out as a delegate from the Establishment to congratulate the Presbyterians of the United States on their reunion, stated in his address that there was an earnest desire for the restoration of ecclesiastical unity growing up in Scotland, stimulated by the efforts made by the present Bishop Wordsworth, of St. Andrews. "I am not sure," he says, "that the prospect of gathering together the powerful landlords, who are, for the most part, Episcopalians, into one flock with their dependents, together with the many lettered and cultivated men among the inhabitants of our towns, who have of late years been feeling the attraction of the Episcopal constitution and service, would not awake even a larger amount of enthusiasm in its favor than that of uniting Presbyterians alone." And again: "A great movement is steadily going on among Scotch Presbyterians, the leaders of which are of opinion that *the tendency of too many* to leave the Presbyterian for the Episcopal Church was not to be attributed to the mere influence of fashion, but to the fact that these persons frequently experienced a religious want which Presbyterianism was not really satisfying." Dr. Bisset, Principal Tulloch, and other writers, agree that the influence for good of the Presbyterian Estab-

lishment is greatly weakened, and it can no longer pride itself upon its superior efficiency as a system of religious government, and that "the Scottish Reform, hardened into a Calvinistic creed and a Presbyterian ritual, has utterly failed to penetrate the old historical families of the kingdom, and to mould the nation, people, barons, and nobles into a religious unity." It had, "as has been long too sadly apparent, no sympathetic expansiveness for moulding into religious unity classes widely separated in material rank and in intellectual and artistic culture." Contrast this confession of Principal Tulloch with the language of (the then) Dean Trench, that the English Church has continued "to shape and mould for good the whole character of this English people."

The movement toward the Church is greatly hampered by the promise exacted of each Presbyterian minister, at his ordination, "to submit to the Presbyterian government and discipline of this Church, and to concur with the same, and never to endeavor, *directly or indirectly, the prejudice or subversion thereof*;" but if the movement goes on, it will soon sweep over such a barrier; and then it may be that there may be seen in Scotland a national Church of a truer and nobler pattern than has yet been reached in England. For there is one good thing which the Establishment in Scotland has taught the government,—that while it can have the privilege of providing for the support of the Church, it must never found, upon that privilege, a claim to dictate or interfere in any of its spiritual or administrative concerns. The Presbyterian Establishment has never allowed itself to become the tool of the civil authorities, nor allowed itself to depend upon them for the maintenance of its spiritual power, nor been swayed by political considerations in the administration of its ecclesiastical affairs. If there is ever to be any relation between Church and State, it never could be established on safer and more honorable terms than those which at present exist in Scotland. And an experience in this country of a purely voluntary system, where the national Constitution professes to take no interest whatever in matters of religion and the maintenance of a pure system of religious faith, indicate that a great deal may be said on behalf of a system which places the seal of the national approbation on the ministers of Gospel light and truth. We are still trying the experiment whether religion can safely be so entirely disconnected from the national life, as it is rapidly becoming under the working of our popular government, without morals and manners deteriorating to a point which renders government and society so corrupt as to become unstable; and we cannot boast that

the problem has been solved to the satisfaction of ourselves or of the world. We may find something to be learned as to this matter by ourselves, if we ever see such a national Church as Scotland may hereafter give us, where the lawfully commissioned minister of Christ is sent forth with a support assured, and an authority acknowledged by the government of the land, yet coming not from a civil ruler, but from the Head of the Church, to a man responsible through the Church to Christ alone.

It has been the design of the writer, in these sketches of the Church of Scotland, to let the historical facts convey their own moral, with but little comment on them. The history was so new and fresh to him, that he felt himself conferring a greater favor on the reader of this review by compressing and communicating as many of them as possible, than by making out of a few of them a mere set of hooks on which to hang his own opinions. Yet he closes with regret that he has said so little of what might have been said on the text which has been provided for him. He can only hope that some wiser head and more skilful hand may take the materials he has gathered, and preach a sermon from them that will edify our Church on these Atlantic shores.

Extract from a Letter of a distinguished Clergyman of the Scottish Church.

“ . . . With regard to Presbyterianism, it has failed almost entirely in influencing the higher educated classes. The great bulk of the gentry belong to the Church; and a large proportion of the class just below this, such as doctors and lawyers, are unbelievers of various shades. Even the younger ministers are much tainted with German opinions, which, if carried out, would land them in unbelief. But they are kept in check by the *elders*, who form the real strength of the Presbyterian sects. They are mainly taken from the lower and lowest middle class, and are still bigoted. They have shown their strength lately in an unexpected way, by gaining control of the new Established School Boards. They are also *politically* strong Presbyterians, that is, Radicals. The different political tone of Scotland and England is very marked, and is quite due to Presbyterianism. Scotland now is almost entirely Radical, which was anything but the national character a century and a half ago; as you may see by the characters in Sir Walter Scott, such as Caleb Balderstone, Edie Ochiltree, and others. It is only during the present century that Presbyterianism has had full opportunity to

mould the national character. Before that, there were the feudal traditions, and the influence of the Church in many places. There has been a great deterioration of the national character within the last fifty years.

"The Church has certainly made considerable progress since the year 1840, but I cannot say that it has been wholly satisfactory, nor so great as it should have been. We have suffered, as well as profited, by the close overshadowing of the great Church of England. It has made our Church's administration very unnational, and thereby has deprived us of any help from feelings which ought to have been enlisted on the Church's side, but which have gone to strengthen Presbyterianism. I do not think that any blessing followed on the decision of 1863, to deprive our national Liturgy of authority, in order to gain admission to English livings. Still, progress has been made. The laity take more interest in Church work; there is more of a corporate and less of a congregational spirit; and I hope the laity will soon receive more privileges as to voting in synod, from which I augur good.

"The Drummondite schismatics have no footing in Scotland. Their influence for evil lies in their dividing the sympathies of the Church of England, and making the Low-Church party dislike us. They also supply an argument to the *expediency party* among ourselves, to give up somewhat more of the truth in order to persuade them to come back. But I do not think this will be done.

"You ask about the character of the town congregations. This is very different north and south of the Forth. In the north, they embrace a sample of all classes; but in Edinburgh and Glasgow they are principally confined to the gentry and to the very poor. Presbyterianism has quite failed in dealing with the lapsed masses. Indeed, the ministers neglect them altogether, leaving them to an inferior grade called city missionaries, and consisting of men who have not been able to get on in the ministry.

"One marked feature about recent Presbyterianism has been the great spread of translations of German theology. I suppose you know how barren Scotch Presbyterianism has been of theologians; and yet this cannot be due to any outward causes. The livings are good, and the work makes little demand upon their time; but it is generally remarked that they are not a learned body. I am afraid the Church also has fallen off in this way, since the great influx of English influence. Fifty years ago we had more writers than we have now, though our numbers were much smaller.

“I fear that a good deal of harm has been done by the primary charge of the Bishop of Brechin, sixteen years ago. In it he advocated the new doctrine put forward by Mr. R. Wilberforce, and thereby divided the High Church party into two portions, which have never acted together cordially since. . . .”



PHILOSOPHY OF THE EUCHARIST.

The Holy Communion; its Philosophy, Theology, and Practice. By John Bernard Dalgairns, Priest of the Oratory of St. Philip Neri. Third edition. New York: The Roman Catholic Publishing House.

JUDGING from some hints in the preface to the third edition, we infer that this work has become somewhat of a standard book on the great subject of which it treats. Its divisions are indicated in the title. We have never met with any work which so clearly and intelligibly exhibits the type of religious life and inward experience which dogmatic Roman Catholic teaching generates; and it is in this view that we propose to examine it. The author, we infer, is a pervert from the English Church, and there is an English manliness in his discussion which would hardly be met with in any one who had not enjoyed the benefits of an English university education.

Thus we have in this work this advantage,—that the author goes into the question philosophically, and more thoroughly than usual. He is not satisfied with merely repeating the commonplaces from Aquinas and Aristotle about substance and accidents, but deliberately, and in a scholarly way, attempts to show what there is in the modern forms of philosophical thought which bears upon the doctrine of the real presence as set forth by the decree of Innocent III., and maintained by Roman theologians ever since his day. In this we pro-

pose to follow him, with an inquiry into the justness of his conclusions, as compared with what may be regarded as the teaching of Anglican divines. We shall then consider the bearing of this doctrine upon the religious life to which it naturally tends.

I.

The dogma of transubstantiation having been decreed, it devolved upon St. Thomas Aquinas, the great doctor of the thirteenth century, to formulate a philosophy by which it could be sustained. The philosophy then recognized was that of Aristotle; and our author proceeds to give a *résumé* of it, as he supposes it to have been taught by one of the disciples of St. Thomas, lecturing at Oxford, and we quote accordingly:

"Matter was not considered to be an actual force, gifted with certain determinate properties by God. It was a mere dead, inactive element, with no quality at all of its own, but capable of becoming the subject of any qualities whatsoever on the infusion of certain occult entities, called in scholastic language, forms. It is difficult for us to conceive a system so utterly at variance with our modes of thought; but we must simply accept it as a fact, that such was the opinion, universally taught by our ancestors, in the schools of Paris, Oxford, and Salamanca, and all over the face of Europe. . . . They imagined that each successive change was caused by the infusion, from without, of the new quality which it assumed. Each quality they looked upon as a separate form, perfectly adventitious to the matter. Hardness, fluidity, color, sweetness, shape, gravity, even extension, were each a separate entity, which was, so to speak, imposed upon the matter, not natural to it. Of these forms, some were accidental, others substantial; but all were equally separable from, and foreign to, the matter to which they belonged. . . . All qualities were looked upon as grouped around the quiddity or substance of the object; and, consequently, separable from the reality, as well as the idea, at least by God's power, even if inseparable naturally."

Upon this basis of philosophy, the teacher (pp. 26, 27), a lecturer at Oxford, is supposed to discourse as follows:

"See now what Jesus does in the Blessed Sacrament. Never, for a moment, does He lose His absolute power over the creatures of His hand. The activities of all nature's varied forms are by His permission, nay, are rather the results of His presence; for when we say that He is present everywhere, we do not mean that He is

there as a spectator. He is there by essence, presence, and power ; and with Him to be present is to act and to give out virtue. . . . The substantial form which united with the matter, is erected into an individual substance, as well as each accidental form which gives color, substance, shape, taste, or any other quality, all those are but the result of the activity of Him who is ever at work, yet ever at rest. Why, then, can He not, with a word, take away the substantial form and matter of bread, and leave only the accidental forms, which He himself gave them? Why can He not, with one and the same word, substitute the substance, that is, the matter and substantial form, with all the accidents of the body of Jesus, for the bread, which was there, by a miraculous exertion of force, which we may well call by the name of transubstantiation " (p. 29).

But there is still another question :

"How is it that the body of Jesus can be in heaven and on many altars of the earth at once?"

The answer to this question resolves itself into the assertion that we do not know but God may take away from a body the property of extension, a limitation in respect to space. "Let God only reduce a body to the state of pure substance, and it ceases to be extended, without ceasing to be a body. This is what God has done to the body of Jesus in the Blessed Sacrament." "Such was the idea of the miracle of transubstantiation taught by the great saint of the middle ages. It is a beautiful relic of a time when men believed in God far otherwise than they do now." We may add, that it exhibits to us the effort of a devout teacher to explain, by a crude philosophy, one of the deepest of mysteries to the apprehension of the understanding ; and is no less an example of intellectual curiosity than of implicit faith. This is the philosophy which Innocent III., by his decree, erected into an article of faith, to be believed under peril of damnation.

The peripatetic philosophy has passed away, and been forgotten ; but the dogma still stands, and there is the same obligation upon every faithful member of the Roman Church to believe it. But the progress of modern thought does not allow that the dogma should be inculcated, without some attempt at a philosophy to explain it. The introduction of so much German and English culture, as has of late years been added to the Church of Rome, has created a necessity for bringing this cardinal dogma, this shibboleth of Roman Catholicism, into harmony with the forms of modern thought ; and this is the task to which Father Dalgairns has addressed himself.

II.

The problem is a double one. He has to apply the principles of modern philosophy to the asserted change in the elements of bread and wine, and also to the asserted non-extension of the body of Christ. He has to show in what modern terms this removal of the substance of the bread and wine, while the accidents remain, can be represented; and also to fit into modern forms of thought the other element of the problem.

He has fully committed himself, or rather his cause, to the success of his undertaking. He says:

“The great doctrine of transubstantiation, however, touches upon the deepest foundations of human thought. It proceeds upon ideas which must necessarily appear in all philosophies. If it could be proved that there was no such thing as substance, that substance is not separable from phenomena, that unextended matter is a contradiction in terms, *it would be a difficulty in the way of the dogma.*¹ I need not say that that blessed doctrine is a part of the Christian revelation; so that if all the philosophers on earth held that it was false, I should still believe it. Nevertheless, it has not come to that. The philosophy of the nineteenth century has not so far stultified itself as to have accepted as certain any principles which even interfere with the Blessed Sacrament. The philosophical ideas on which the doctrine proceeds are still perfectly intact. The existence of substance has never been disproved.² The notion of the possibility of the non-extension of matter has never been beaten out of the field. The course of modern philosophy has been precisely the other way. Let us, then, interrogate the history of philosophy, and estimate it not at any particular point, but by its drift and its results. I believe we shall find that the philosophy of St. Thomas has not been destroyed, but only completed where it was imperfect” (p. 35).

We cannot doubt the sincerity of our author's belief, however far he may seem to us to come short of accomplishing what he has undertaken. In his review of the history of philosophy, he begins with Des Cartes, whose system for the time being swept away, as he says, all traces of the old scholastic philosophy, and prepared the way for universal scepticism. Des Cartes was succeeded by Spinoza, and he by Locke, in England, whose system found favor in France, and prepared the way for the overthrow of the old state of things in Church and State. Des Cartes, by making all knowledge to rest

¹ The italics are ours.

² Has it been proved?

upon consciousness, destroyed the possibility of certainty in respect to everything that could not be ultimately referred to consciousness. This system threatened the doctrine of the Sacrament, because that doctrine required the recognition of the reality of substance, and Cartesianism could take no knowledge of substance. "Though the author of the new philosophy thought himself a sincere Catholic" (he was educated in a Jesuit college), "yet it found itself at once, without intending it, in opposition to the Blessed Sacrament. Hardly any one of its conclusions but contradicted either the dogma itself, or else some of the scholastic explanations of it. It is almost the only philosophical system in which the Blessed Sacrament is impossible."

Cartesianism effected a complete separation between the old and new forms of thought. The wonder is, that the dogma of transubstantiation survived.

Doubtless, it would also have disappeared but for the strenuous force of ecclesiastical authority. Cartesianism had its day; and in time the demand of the inquiring mind for a philosophical system was met by that of Leibnitz,—a Protestant, by the way, and not indebted to Roman Catholic teaching for his principles. From observing the failure of Cartesianism to afford any basis for the ideas of substance, material or spiritual, Leibnitz was led to a process the direct opposite of that assumed by Des Cartes. "Man, he would say, has an immediate knowledge of more than his own *ego*,—his own personality. God has given to the human mind a power of intuition, by which it is immediately cognizant, not only of its own being, and its various states, but of truths which are prior to experience. It requires an immediate knowledge of something more than our own mental states, or our own sensations, to obtain a view of any substance, material or spiritual" (p. 56).

"On this principle (that the human mind has other intuitions besides that of the existence of self), Leibnitz was able to construct a theory of substance, which he substituted for that which has been already described. Having established the existence of primary truths, and also vindicated to the mind the power of intuitions, he could now assume the reality of substance, which had been so sadly imperilled by the philosophy of experience" (p. 60).

Thus, one of the essential elements of the dogma of transubstantiation was saved by the genius of a Protestant! But the subject that transubstantiation has to deal with is a material one. There is not only substance, but accidents. There is not only the material of bread and wine to be handled, but also that of the body

and blood of Christ. The scholastic philosophy had departed, and what had come in its place rendered the dogma incomprehensible and impossible. It is in the system of Leibnitz, again, that our author finds a solution of the difficulty, in "his views of the ultimate composition of matter."

"The warning of the past was not lost upon Leibnitz; and instead of looking upon matter as a collection of atoms or molecules, he defined its ultimate elements to be simply unextended forces. We can, without any stretch of imagination, fancy him speaking thus: Take any material substance in God's beautiful world,—tree, flower, gem, or what you will. We know it is compounded; what are its ultimate elements? It is composed of extended atoms, says the Cartesian. But here, surely, is a contradiction in terms. If it is extended, it is divisible; how, then, can it be ultimate? How can it be an atom that is indivisible? Drop, then, the useless, unintelligible atoms. Make each body to be a collection of forces, without extensions, and all contradiction vanishes. With these alone you can construct the universe. Instead of the dull, dead molecules, acted upon by movement—that is, by a uniform mechanical power external to them—each body in the world is made up of an infinite number of active, energetic powers, producing all the endless changes of the universe, all its ceaseless alternations of generation and decay. Each one of these forces educes out of its own energy the whole of its future changes to the end of time, and containing them all within itself, without borrowing from any other. The phenomena of the world are the result of the united action of the whole" (pp. 62, 63).

Here we have, in place of the notions of substance and accidents, the ideas of forces and phenomena, and also a theory which allows of the non-extension of matter; that is, of the existence of matter not compressed into form, or occupying a definite and limited space. This theory of matter our author speaks of as "the deliberate homage of a German Protestant to the Blessed Sacrament;" and claims, as he attempts to show, how it "fits into the teaching of St. Thomas about this great doctrine." We should rather say, superseded it. Our author further makes a reference to a paper of Professor Faraday, published in 1844, on the nature of matter, which takes substantially the same ground; a ground which, we may add, had become familiar to the disciples and readers of Coleridge many years before.

And now let us see how our author uses these principles to give a philosophical validity to the dogma of transubstantiation.

"St. Thomas had grounded the doctrine on the idea that substance is not to be discovered by the senses, but is the object of the intellect alone. It is absurd to argue that our senses tell us that the object before us is bread, and that nothing can stand against the evidence of sense. St. Thomas had shown us that the senses tell us nothing whatsoever about the substance of bread, and that, therefore, they are not competent witnesses. Modern philosophy corroborates St. Thomas, by establishing that the idea of substance comes not from experience, but from intuition. St. Thomas had said that the accidents were separable from the substance, and, therefore, that God could leave the color and taste of bread after the reality was gone. In the language of science, the accidents are now called phenomena, or appearances; and it considers them to be, not the substance itself, but the effect of its active forces on our organs. Who will deny that God can cause these effects to continue, when the force itself is gone? It is a miracle; but who will dare to place it beyond His power?" (p. 66).

There is a sophistry and disingenuousness about this argument of which Father Dalgairns, we would hope, was unconscious, but which must, nevertheless, be exposed. In the first place, there seems to be an attempt to smuggle in the scholastic idea of substance, as if recognized by modern philosophy. Our present modes of thought know substance only in the concrete; and not as an entity distinct or distinguishable from the mass in which it inheres. The above quotation uses the word in the scholastic sense, to provide for a change in the substance of the bread and wine. What was formerly spoken of as substance, is now called force. "In the language of science, the accidents are now called phenomena, or appearances; and it considers them to be, not the substance itself, but the effect of its active forces on our organs." That is, in the language of science, there is a substance in the bread which puts forth active forces; and the phenomena are the effects of the active forces which the invisible substance of the bread puts forth. Surely, the author must know better than to attribute any such conception to modern science. Science knows substance only in the concrete. Here is a mass of bread, composed of flour and water, modified by heat. Here are three natural forces employed in its construction. As a mass, it has a force belonging to itself. This force is what stands for the scholastic "substance." Of this we do know something, not by intuition, but by its effects upon our senses. The only intelligible meaning to be attached to the dogma is, that this force is withdrawn, and another substituted. If the force is withdrawn,

surely its effects must cease; but this, again, is contrary to fact, for the bread does not cease to produce its natural effect upon the senses. There is a fallacy, or something more objectionable, in the following suggestion, that "the phenomena are 'only' the effect of its active forces on our organs." As if there were not real effects of the forces in the very existence of the phenomena. The wheat, the water, the bread composed of them by the use of heat, are phenomena apart from our senses. They are things which are *made to appear*, remaining whether the human organs are brought into contact with them or not. What meaning, then, is there in the question, "Who will deny that God can cause these effects to continue, when the force itself is gone?" Does this mean that the force which produced the bread has expended itself, and is thus gone, while the effects remain? This it plainly does not mean. It means that the natural and proper force which belongs to the mass of bread is withdrawn, so that it shall not produce the natural effects which bread may produce, and that another force is introduced. This is a thing which we will not deny to be within the power of Omnipotence—i. e., to change the inherent force, while appearances remain—but it is not within His power to effect contradictions. So long as the bread produces effects, not only on the organs of vision, which might well be averted, but also on the organs of taste and nutrition, which are proper to bread, how is it possible to believe that the proper force (substance) of bread is withdrawn? We can believe that something is superadded; but that will not answer the terms of the dogma. "It is a miracle," says our author. That is no miracle which cannot be discerned by the senses; for we depend upon the senses to prove the grand miracle of the Resurrection.

This is one side of the problem. The other relates to the non-extension of matter, with especial reference to the body of Christ. Here there is a continual interchange of the terms matter and body, as if they were identical.

"According to modern philosophy, so far is it from being certain that matter is identical with extension, that, on the contrary, its ultimate elements are by many held to be unextended, and bodies to be made up of unextended forces. In other words, it is no more a contradiction in terms, that a body should be in many places, than that a soul shall be whole and entire in each particle of the body."

If a man will use common terms, which have a fixed technical sense, in an arbitrary way, there is not much use in reasoning with him. We may use the term body in an abstract way, as expressing

the vital essence of any known subject; but when we speak of a body, we confine ourselves to something which has extension, and occupies space; and to attempt to argue from the non-extension of matter to the non-extension of a body, which, *ex vi termini*, is matter extended in space, is manifestly a contradiction and an absurdity. This assertion is made in support of the statement of Aquinas, that "the body of Jesus in the Blessed Sacrament is beyond the ordinary laws of space, so that it can be whole and entire on tens of thousands of altars at once." Such a statement seems to imply a material conception of the presence of Christ in the Sacrament, which is equally removed from a reality to the imagination, and a mystery to faith. The body of Christ is not an abstraction, not a mere unextended force. Christ, as a man, has an existence in an organized body, which has its abode in space. His body, therefore, including also His soul and divinity, is extended. We cannot conceive of Him as a man otherwise. Divinity we cannot conceive of as limited by extension; but our Lord is a man. Now, in heaven, at the right hand of the Father, He has (though glorified) the same body virtually with which he ascended from Mount Olivet. To assert, then, that God can impart to the body of the exalted Christ the property of non-extension, is to say that He can make a thing to be and not to be at the same time. A conception of the presence of Christ in the Eucharist, therefore, such as this, involves a contradiction. It does not belong to Omnipotence to cause a thing to be and not to be at the same time.

In effect, the author rests his cause, philosophically considered, upon the recognition of the scholastic idea of substance. "The terms in which the blessed doctrine is theologically expressed, have never been proved to be empty words, conveying only a semblance of meaning. They have never been expelled from human philosophy. As for the existence of substance, it is much under the mark to say that it has never been disproved. Its belief is guaranteed by physical science. The utmost which some few metaphysicians say is, that its existence cannot be proved, while the same men reassert it under the name of force; and all scientific men who believe in matter, believe also in substance, for matter is but the one permanent reality which is the cause of phenomena.

"Again, though no one believes in absolute accidents, yet no one who acknowledges an eternal reality disbelieves in phenomena as distinct from substance. There is nothing, therefore, inconceivable in the notion that these appearances remain by Divine power, after the substance is gone" (p. 80).

It would take more space than we can allow to show the sophistry of these statements. In implying that there is anything in modern philosophy that answers to the scholastic notion of substance and accidents, or that any one can conceive of a substance in bread apart from the chemical forces which made it what it is, the author is trifling with the intelligence of his readers, or imposing upon their credulity. There is not a word of truth in the statement fairly understood. No modern philosopher, as a philosopher, conceives of the existence of forces and phenomena apart from each other. No one would dream of giving utterance to such a theory, except under pressure of a necessity for defending the dogma of Innocent III., proclaimed in A.D. 1215.

And, in fine, all that is claimed as the result of the discussion is some proof of the bare *possibility* of the asserted change. In the next chapter, the author begins: "The Blessed Sacrament is possible. . . . If it be possible, it is." Even granting that the author's review of modern philosophy had left it credible that such a change as is involved in transubstantiation is possible, it would remain to be shown that this was the only mode in which the presence of Christ in the Sacrament could be rendered possible. The difference between Roman and Anglican theology, on this point, is not as to the fact, but as to the mode. It is practically admitted by the Roman theologians themselves, that the mode is not declared in the language of Scripture. The mode becomes an article of faith by virtue of the decree of Innocent III. We know when the notion which was finally formulated in that decree sprang up. We know that it was amid the worst and darkest period of her history that the Church of Western Europe has ever known, and we see that the theologians who set themselves to work to explain and defend it, moil as men who have little proclivity for their task, or who feel as if they were "laboring for the wind."

What, then, is a true and adequate representation of the presence of Christ in the Eucharist, which shall be free from these logical objections, and yet recognize it as a reality,—as a real, and not a rhetorical, presence?

We will go back to the scene in that upper room, when, the night before His Passion, He instituted this Sacrament. We have before us Jesus, who was born of the Virgin Mary, and, from a child, had grown up to manhood, and was now about offering Himself up to be crucified. He appears before us in a body,—*i. e.*, in an organized form, which was the product of the vital forces which constitute man. He was, however, *sui generis*; both because He

was the Word of God Incarnate, and was filled with the Holy Ghost in His plenitude. There are properties and powers in Him which do not belong to common humanity. We see Him take into His hands a piece of the Passover bread. He holds it up before His Apostles, breaks it, and says: This is My body that is broken for you. Likewise, also, with the cup: This is My blood which is shed for you. Now, knowing what we do of Him, it is quite admissible for faith to believe that, from His Sacred and Divine Person, went forth to that bread and that wine the power of the life which constituted His humanity, imparting to it an efficacy, a force, which, as bread, it had not; so that when He said, "This is My body," "This is My blood of the New Covenant," this bread and this cup, remaining materially as before, were exalted, not only to higher uses, but into a higher condition of existence. He had imparted to the bread such vital force as resided in His peculiarly constituted humanity. It is too plain that it was not His body in a material sense, for He was then palpably and unmistakably before His disciples in a fleshly form. Whatever may be supposed true of our Lord's body now, then, certainly, that body was not free from extension. But, taking His words in connection with His well-remembered discourse at Capernaum, we can see at once the relation between the two. It is His body in a sacramental sense. Not merely a representative, but a reality; given them to be eaten, that it might become their "spiritual food and sustenance." There is implied a real presence in the bread of the virtue of His body, meaning by virtue all that it has of vitality, energy, and efficacy. His body was what it was by virtue of the presence with it of His soul and His divinity. It was not the mere material flesh, but the living organism, with all its affections and activities, that He gave to inaugurate in His disciples the same species of life that was manifest in Himself.

If such a supernatural effect could flow from the action of our Lord when in mortal flesh, much more may we look for it now that the Son of Man has "gone up where He was before." By the resurrection from the dead, "the last Adam" became "a quickening spirit." His body, in its glorified condition, free from the weight and hindrances of mortal flesh, is not living only, but life-giving, and can send forth from itself a continual stream of vital energies. Even when on earth, virtue went out of Him from a mere touch of the hem of His garment. Much more can we conceive of such virtue proceeding from the risen and glorified Man, apparelled with the royalties of heaven. But in His ascended con-

dition, He works among men altogether by the Holy Ghost, whom He hath sent to be His substitute, and to abide with His Church forever. It is through and by the operation of the Holy Ghost that men are made partakers of "the power of His resurrection" in baptism; and it is by the Holy Ghost that the bread and the cup of the Eucharist are, by consecration, oblation, and invocation, made to become the body and blood of Christ, in the same sense that they were in the hands of the Lord himself; that is, they are endowed with a new spiritual force,—a force or an efficiency that emanates from His own humanity as it is now, regnant at the right hand of Majesty. This is the essential presence of Christ in the Eucharist; a power, a force, or an efficiency, superadded to the natural substances of bread and wine; so that in receiving these, the faithful communicant receives virtually, and therefore truly, the body and the blood of his Redeemer. It is not a relative, a metaphorical, or an imaginary presence, dependent simply upon the faith or hope or imagination of the receiver; but a real and an independent presence, resulting from the action of the Holy Ghost, through and by outward and visible signs, ordained by Christ's own lips, and offered by Christ's own grace.

To the sceptical or unbelieving mind, such a mode of the Divine presence is no more admissible than the other; but, certainly, there are not such palpable objections to it as are presented by the theory of transubstantiation. It is one thing to remove the natural forces from matter and substitute others, while all the phenomena remain, and quite another thing to superinduce upon a material substance new powers, while the original forces remain unchanged. The one conception involves contradictions, as we have seen, which render it impossible; the other is simply transcendental, and requires but a lively faith for its recognition and enjoyment. Such a conception forbids any speculations or theories as to the *mode* in which an unseen presence accompanies the Sacrament. It is a presence very real, and none the less real for being spiritual; but perfectly distinguishable from material forms and attributes. The "two parts" of the Sacrament are not confounded; the outward visible sign, and the inward spiritual grace, are both recognized and both accepted, yet they are both distinguished.

In the defence of transubstantiation, the strong expressions of the Greek fathers are often quoted to prove that such was their doctrine in the earlier centuries; but Bishop Cosin, in his treatise on transubstantiation, has amply shown that the strongest of these expressions did not imply anything more than such a presence as

has been brought out and depicted here. It is quite true that faith, looking upon the Sacrament, does not dwell upon the bread and wine; but, looking past them and beyond them, embraces only the spiritual realities that they represent. But then it is faith that contemplates them, and not the natural eye; while the Roman doctrine would maintain that what are spiritual realities, and therefore invisible, can be grasped by the corporeal senses.

The different and clashing conceptions of our Lord's presence in the Eucharist involve some important results in respect to two points; one respecting the way in which the Sacrament nourishes the soul, and the other respecting the practice of what is called "Eucharistic adoration." Our space allows us only to dwell upon the latter, as the more immediately urgent.

The Roman doctrine of a sacramental presence makes every Eucharist, every wafer, and every atom of a wafer, to be a complete Christ crucified. Nay, more, the bread *becomes Christ personally*. He is personally enclosed within what is called the host,—the *hostia*. Consequently, the consecrated wafer is entitled to receive adoration, as though Christ himself were present to the bodily eye, and could be touched by the hand.¹ The Sacrament is used for benediction, as though Christ himself, in person, passed through the crowd of worshippers, and scattered blessings from His hand. Worshippers gather in the Church, and kneel before the sacramental elements in silent, reverent awe, thus paying the homage of the body to what they are taught to regard as the present and tangible Son of God.

This results from the belief that the bread has ceased to be bread, and has become something which is a proper subject for religious adoration.

It is difficult to conceive how any one, who has any apprehensions of a spiritual existence, can be brought to regard a material symbol as identical with the spiritual reality which it symbolizes. It is a state of mind into which one requires to be educated; and, as it appears to the present writer, such an education cannot be attained without serious damage to one's spiritual character and constitution. We do not wish to use terms of reproach, but cannot withhold the remark that such a practice is even more depressing to the

¹ And yet we do not find in the Gospels that the Apostles offered habitually, to Christ's person, such homage as Ritualists would have us offer to a Sacrament.

mind in its highest relations, than the use of an image (an idol or a picture) which is used simply as an emblem. For Divine qualities are supposed by it to inhere in and cling to an inert, inanimate, material substance. The Ritualists, we infer, do not believe formally in transubstantiation; but by what we can gather from their writings, they must hold something like *impanation*, or the theory that the bread and the cup are permeated with the body and blood of the Lord, and therefore are to be adored as if His actual self.¹ They, equally with the Romanists, teach that the Sacrament has *become Christ*, and is to be worshipped like Himself in His Divine personality. Practically, on this point, the difference between the two doctrines is reduced to almost nothing. The effect upon the consciousness and the religious life must be very much the same.

In view of that presence of Christ in the Sacrament which has been advocated above, no such consequences are involved. The Sacrament does not become Christ personally. It is not affirmed or implied that the body and blood of Christ are mingled with, or made to pervade, the elements. The presence is perfectly distinct and distinguishable from the Sacrament. Christ is not, as it were, enclosed within it. That which is present is His body and His blood; or such a virtue of them as went forth from His person to heal a timid yet genuine believer. Where His body and blood are, or where their virtues are immanent, we may be well assured He is not Himself absent, or accessible only in figure or scheme or fancy. And still we are not compelled to locate Him upon the altar *in propria persona*. The presence to the eye in the "Sacrament of our Redemption," is a symbol or representative of such a personal presence; so that then and there one may have a consciousness of His presence not realized under other and lower circumstances. Doubtless, there may be a depth and fervor of devotion before an impressive celebration of the Eucharist, when the symbols of a Saviour's "precious bloodshedding" are before the eye of love and gratitude, which can hardly be equalled in the solitude of the closet, on ordinary and humbler occasions. But the soul's most earnest worship will not be addressed to the things seen, but to Him who is invisible, like the Father on high. Under the veil of these earthly elements we shall rather worship Him only in whom, as an Apostle says, though now we see Him not, yet believing, we can rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory.

So lofty and touching a subject refuses to be judged, measured,

¹ We have in mind the letters of Dr. De Koven to Dr. Craik.

and appreciated by the cold, hard syllogisms of a prying, unsympathetic metaphysician. To treat it in this way would be like applying logarithms to those glorious aspirations, breathed forth in the eighth Psalm, where David appears not as a mathematical, but a spiritual astronomer. The Eucharist is a mystery for the spirit, and for the spirit in its highest flights of devotion. It is not a problem of austere logic or of recondite philosophy. It is not to be looked at in what Bacon calls "a dry light." And yet it is the dryest of dry lights—the dry light of logic in its harshest form, and of philosophy in its most abstract mood—which have produced the chief and the worst of the influences attending the scholastic doctrine of it, till it has become to multitudes not "a form of godliness," but an enslaving superstition. Romanists stand aloof, and look at it as something severely and darkly formidable. They receive its elements—no; one half of them—once a year! We are not astonished. Scholastic wonders are justified by their hoodwinked children.

P. S.—Selden was accounted a Puritan, by many, because he was a member of the Westminster Assembly. He was perfectly familiar with controversies about the philosophical character of the elements of the Eucharist, and perfectly able, by his scholastic and judicial learning and discrimination, to appreciate them. It may gratify the curiosity of not a few, to know what the exact theory of such a man might be. Fortunately, he has left it for us, in his "Table-Talk," under the title, *Transubstantiation*. It is as follows: "The best way for a pious man, is to address himself to the Sacrament with that reverence and devotion as if Christ were really there present." This is enough for any grade of piety, however high; and if all would stand on Selden's platform, controversy might end evermore! As to transubstantiation, considered *scholastically*, no man has defined it better, or in shorter compass, than this great lawyer. He says it is rhetoric converted into logic. That is the exact truth, and the whole of it.



EVOLUTION: ITS PLACE IN PHILOSOPHY.

BEFORE Sir Isaac Newton had reasoned out why an apple falls from a tree, the universe was a riddle. When he discovered the law of gravitation, he released astronomy from its swaddling bands. Before his time, if any one had been asked why the apple fell, he would have said, because it was no longer supported in the tree. But Newton pushed the inquiry farther, and sought to know *why* the apple fell, when it was no longer supported in the tree. He saw that the failure of support was but the *occasion*, not the *cause*, of the apple's falling; the cause he sought in a law. The discovery of this law extorted from nature her long and zealously guarded secret. The key to the motions of the universe was found at last. All the wonderful discoveries that have been made since his day, by means of the telescope and spectroscope, have served only to add new confirmation to his illustrious guess; none of them have in the slightest degree impugned it.

If the great Newton had pursued the subject no farther than to reach the mere generalization that all unsupported bodies fall, and had thence proceeded to enunciate, as a law, the simple fact that they fall, he would have taught the world nothing that it did not know before; and would have been guilty of a mere trick in the legerdemain of words. But when, instead of calling the mere fact of falling a law, he showed that a force pervades all nature, of which falling is the result, and demonstrated the rule according to which this

force invariably acts, instead of uttering a platitude, he made known a discovery. The law of gravity, that all bodies attract each other inversely as the square of the distance, was all that made Newton's speculation more than a guess.

Is the attraction of gravitation an ultimate physical law? That is, is it a law itself, and not the result of another physical law? It is believed to be such, and as such mankind will continue to receive it, until a higher physical law shall be announced and demonstrated. In the meantime, since the discovery of the correlation and conservation of forces, it is, perhaps, not altogether certain that the attraction of gravitation is the only ultimate law with which we are acquainted. If it be true that all known forces are modes of motion, then it may possibly follow that motion itself can be traced back, for its origin, to attraction. The nebular hypothesis almost assumes as much. And it may be shown that even molecular attraction is the same law in its minute application; for by the application of heat molecular attraction can be so far overcome as to change any known substance into gas. The spectroscope teaches us that the most obdurate substances of which we have any knowledge exist in the form of vapor in the atmosphere of the sun, and of other central stars.

Now, if the doctrine of the correlation and conservation of force be true; and if it be true that the attraction of gravitation is the ultimate form of force, giving rise to motion, into which every other force may be transmuted, then it would follow that all the material force in the universe is the exact reciprocal of that attraction of gravitation exerted upon star-dust in the beginning. As a name for the law by which all this has come about from the beginning, the term evolution has been used. The fact of evolution, however, must be carefully separated from the many theories entertained of some of its subordinate workings. Over and above all these partial theories stands the great fact,—that if the doctrine of the correlation and conservation of forces be true, and the attraction of gravitation be acknowledged as the ultimate form of physical force, then there is some law that governs all mutations, and is the exact correlative of the attraction of gravitation. This law has been called, comprehensively, evolution. And the very pertinent question here to be asked, is, whether or not this term is a mere jugglery with words, and instead of being the name of a law, is only the name of a blank generalization. If a law, then it has definite conditions, like the inverse ratio of the law of gravity. If it has no such definite conditions, then it is a mere generalization. Such definite condition is found in

the law of the correlation and conservation of force ; and the question of the truth or falsity of evolution as a principle must be fought out on this ground. Nor do we conceive that spiritual force is implicated in the question, inasmuch as the premises in the outset include only physical force. Unless it can be shown that a spirit is subject to physical laws, it can never be shown to be the product of physical energy. There is nothing in the present state of science that renders the proof of this possible. Neither do we believe that it ever will be proved. It might not, indeed, be a violent presumption to suppose that, whilst the attraction of gravitation and evolution may be supreme laws in the domain of the physical universe, so, in like manner, there may be laws supreme in the spiritual universe, which we cannot understand in this present state of existence ; and that the two domains, the spiritual and the physical, may be but parts of a grand whole, results of higher forces and higher laws, which, perhaps, angels and archangels may not be able to fathom. By an ultimate physical law, therefore, we mean a law supreme in the physical domain, but which itself may be the result of other and higher laws, at the basis of loftier generalizations which it is impossible for us to comprehend. Such being the case, it is evident that it would be in the highest degree unphilosophical to endeavor to stretch a law belonging to one department of the universe over other departments that are governed by their own laws. We see, therefore, that the materialistic theories of evolution which have brought it into such great disrepute, are as illogical and unphilosophical as they are repulsive and alienating to every unsophisticated intellect.

Having now, at some length, shown what we understand evolution to mean ; and having, we trust, also shown that it has acquired a bad name only by reason of the marplots that have laid hold upon it and endeavored to compel it to do their bidding, but in whose hands it has proved recalcitrant, we shall advance to the chief purpose of this paper ; which is, to show that this idea has high value in philosophy ; that it renders signal service in a department of abstruse speculation, where very unsatisfactory results alone have hitherto been attained. This department, now a hardly-fought battle-ground, is a correct theory of causation, which, owing to the persistency of those by whom it has been debated, seems by all parties, tacitly, to be recognized as the true philosophical dividing line between theism and pantheism on the one side, and personal theism on the other. And it seems to us that this theory of evolution has, for the first time in the history of speculation, rendered a solution possible ; and that, too, a solution in the interests of truth and righteousness,

and utterly destructive of the entire scheme of unbelief, which it has been supposed to favor.

Sir William Hamilton says: "Of all questions in the history of philosophy, that concerning our judgment of cause and effect is, perhaps, the most celebrated; but, strange to say, there is not, so far as I am aware, to be found a comprehensive view of the various theories proposed in explanation; not to say, among these, any satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon itself."

Few, probably, will be disposed to question, on a matter of fact, the statement of a philosopher whose learning upon the subject, we may safely say, was never excelled; and, we might not be thought rash in adding, was never equalled. Both in his "*Metaphysics*," and in the smaller treatise, called his "*Philosophy*," Sir William gives what he thinks to be a satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon; but, as his explanation has not met with favor at the hands of other philosophers of repute, being but a matter of opinion on his part, we may not be thought presumptuous for rejecting it.

A contribution toward what we conceive to be the true solution, is contained in a book by that remarkable man, "Doctor" Newman. (See "*Grammar of Assent*," article "*Notional Assents*," chapter 4; on "*Presumption*," sections 5 and 6.) We quote from section 5: "It is to me a perplexity, that grave authors seem to enunciate, as an intuitive truth, that everything must have a cause. If this were so, the voice of nature would tell false; for why, in that case, stop short at One who is Himself without cause? The assent which we give to the proposition, as a first principle, that nothing happens without a cause, is derived, in the first instance, from what we know of ourselves; and we argue analogically from what is within us, to what is external to us. One of the first experiences of an infant is that of his willing and doing; and, as time goes on, one of the first temptations of the boy is to bring home to himself the fact of his sovereign arbitrary power, though it be at the price of waywardness, mischievousness, and disobedience. And when his parents, as antagonists of this wilfulness, begin to restrain him, and to bring his mind and conduct into shape, then he has a second series of experiences of cause and effect, and that upon a principle or rule. Thus, the notion of causation is one of the first lessons which he learns from experience, that experience limiting it to agents possessed of intelligence and will. It is the notion of power, combined with a purpose and end. Physical phenomena, as such, are without sense, and experience teaches us nothing about physical phenomena as causes. Accordingly, wherever the world is young, the move-

ments and changes of physical nature have been, and are, spontaneously ascribed by its inhabitants to the presence and will of hidden agents, who haunt every part of it—the woods, the mountains, and the streams, the air and the stars—for good or for evil; nor is there anything illogical in such a belief. It rests on the argument from analogy.

“As time goes on, and society is formed, and the idea of science is mastered, a different aspect of the physical universe presents itself to the mind. Since causation implies a sequence of acts in our own case, and our doing is always posterior, never contemporaneous with or prior to, our willing, therefore, when we witness invariable antecedents or consequents, we call the former the cause of the latter, though intelligence is absent from the analogy of external appearances. At length we go on to confuse causation with order. . . . Starting, then, from experience, I consider a cause to be an effective will; and, by the doctrine of causation, I mean the notion, or first principle, that all things come of effective will.”

It is a condition of human intelligence that something should be assumed at the outset. No reasoning is possible, except upon the basis of something that does not have to be proved. The whole science of geometry is built up on a few axioms which no one ever attempts to prove, but which all accept as self-evident truths. In like manner, the mind, in all its operations, continually assumes something as a basis on which to operate. *It instinctively ascribes a cause to everything which it recognizes as an effect.* The error in the theories of causation maintained by philosophers of the spiritual school—that is, those who recognize the will of God as the final cause of all things—has always seemed to us to be this: that they do not narrow the range of effects. They seem to assume that the mind regards all things as effects. Therefore, Dr. Newman pertinently says: “If this were so, the voice of nature would tell false; for why, in that case, stop short at One who is Himself without cause?” Seeing the absurdity of this, and conceiving that it lay against the *a priori* theory of causation, he rejects that theory, and endeavors to establish causation as a derivative idea. If he had narrowed the range of *effects*, he might still have held to a *a priori* views. But what does the mind regard as an effect? We answer, what it knows or believes to be produced by a cause. Nor is this to reason in a circle; it is but to say that there are some things that can be conceived of only relatively. The mind can no more conceive of an effect without a cause, than it can conceive of wrong without right, of upward without downward, or of falsehood with-

out truth. The question may now be asked, "What are the things which the mind knows or believes to be produced by a cause?" We answer, such things as it knows or believes to have a *derived existence*. Now, we are perfectly aware that it may be said that the mind regards all things as having derived existence. But this is a *petitio principii*. It assumes the very thing to be proved; for we are not talking of the logical question of "sufficient reason," but of the psychological law of causation. This law only demands that to every effect a cause shall be assigned; but what particular things may be effects, is a question that must be decided by reflection upon information, and be deduced therefrom as a judgment; save only such things as the mind has immediate consciousness of as effects.

Now, it is a notorious fact that until a child has begun to reflect, there are many things which it does not look upon as effects, but regards them as ultimate facts that need no explanation, and to which it does not occur to it to assign a cause. It is, indeed, probable that we can never know how limited is the range of recognized effects in the mind of a young child; whether or not it is conscious, at the first, of any other effects than those which follow its own willing, is, perhaps, impossible to determine. It seems, in truth, reasonable to suppose that, at first, it acts by instinct, and without any consciousness of either cause or effect as *ideas*; and that as soon as it begins to frame the mental conception of cause and effect, reflection has already set to work, and is in the very process of diminishing the number of ultimate facts, and increasing the number of recognized effects.

It is illogical in the highest degree, as it appears to us, to claim that the mind attributes a cause to everything; for, inasmuch as this is a pure psychological question, it would make the mind, by the very law of its own working, to destroy itself, inasmuch as it would dispense with reason and reflection; for why reason about cause and effect, if the mind, by the very law of its being, ascribes a cause to everything? If this were so, nobody would be found to dispute it, for nobody could dispute it. And yet it is a law of the mind to ascribe a cause to some things. These *some things* are recognized effects.

Now, it must be plain that whatever is conceived as having derived existence, must be regarded as an effect; for that which is underived, of course was not brought into being, and that which was not brought into being, cannot be an effect. Before reflection has busied itself about the universe, the mind does not regard the

universe as derived, and hence does not attribute to it causation; neither does it regard it as underived; it simply has no judgment in the matter; neither can it attribute causation to the universe until observation and reflection have done their work; *then*, if the mind decides that the universe has a derived existence, by the law of its own being it will infallibly attribute a cause.

Here is where, it seems to us, that discussion hinges. Those who deny a first cause, deny that the universe is derived, while those who impute a cause, with one consent declare it to be the handiwork of Almighty God. How, then, shall we prove that the universe is derived? The majority of civilized men cite the sacred Scriptures. The opponents of the derivative view refuse that testimony. What shall we do? Is there no way of overwhelming and confounding the gainsayers? If they will not believe the sacred Scriptures, in the faith of which the noblest of the human race have lived and died, is there anything that they will believe? Yes. Mr. Charles Darwin has been guessing, and they think his self-willed guessing better than philanthropic Holy Writ. Mr. Herbert Spencer, also, has been trying his fortune at the guessing trade, and has made a scientific use of his imagination. He says that the entire universe began in nothing but star-dust and gravity. Mr. Huxley talks about protoplasm, and derides the prophets of the Lord. And Mr. Tyndall has found out that nature has inexorable laws, and that, therefore, the hands of the God of Nature are so tied and tightened, He cannot help us when we pray. Up jumps a clan of satellites, who proclaim that Moses knew nothing of the cosmogony of the universe, but that Darwin, Spencer, Huxley, and Tyndall, are the men who *do* know it understandingly. Well, and what do these new prophets tell us? They tell us the very thing which Moses has told us all along; and this is, that the universe is derived. They put forth a theory of the origin of the universe, which, when divested of philosophical and religious error, seems to meet the confessed requirements of the case. Borrowing from Moses the idea that the universe has reached its present perfection by successive developments, and following the very order of development sketched by him, they have wrought out a scheme beautiful in conception and in progress, which they have honored with the classical name of evolution. In so doing, they have demonstrated that the universe is not only not an ultimate fact, but that it has both a *derived* and a *transitory* existence. In this last, they agree with the Apostles Peter and John, who also proclaim the fleeting nature of the present order of things, and foretell that there shall be a new

heavens and a new earth, when "the former things have passed away." What if, on some minor points of this majestic, but as yet unwrought scheme, they have, thus far, not attained sufficient light to enable them to accept all the statements of Scripture? Future investigation may correct errors, and teach them better; or, perchance, with further and higher knowledge, the Sacred Scriptures themselves may be seen to have a deeper and broader meaning than has hitherto been attributed to their mysterious declarations.

Another important feature of the doctrine of evolution is its immense sweep. All things in the universe that fluctuate or change, that grow old with time or are affected by causation, are within its compass. Thus, everything short of Almighty God himself, whatever law or cause, however vast and far-reaching, is brought within its domain; *so that all secondary causes, however far back they may reach into eternity, are shown to be only parts of the universe itself*, and, therefore, not antecedent or superior to it, so as, in any sense, to produce it, or cause it to exist. The philosophical value of this idea is beyond all estimation. It proves, if true, *as a demonstration of natural science*, what we have heretofore received as of faith alone. So that those who would not before believe Moses, must now, forsooth, believe him through Spencer and Darwin! If this doctrine be true, then has the missing link in the chain of causation been found! The vaulting ambition of unbelief will be seen to have overleaped itself, and the sons of strangers to have built up the walls of Zion!

The question now remains, whether or not the final cause of the universe, thus demonstrated to exist, is, or is not, an effective will. The affirmative of this proposition would seem to be contained, *ex vi termini*, in the phrase *final cause*; for a final *physical* cause would be a cause *within* the domain of the physical universe, or else it would not be physical. To say that the physical universe was brought into being, in the first instance, by a physical law, would be the same as to say that a part of the physical universe brought the whole of that universe into being; which, in turn, would be to say that a part is equivalent to the whole, because the producing cause is always competent to the effect produced. It is therefore, a contradiction in terms to affirm that a physical law could produce the physical universe. The only other cause known to us, besides a physical cause, is an effective will. If, therefore, it be necessary to assign a cause to the universe at all, which the theory of evolution demands—since evolution conceives of no period when the universe was not *in transitu*, and there be but two

causes known to us, a physical one and an effective will; and the physical cause be impossible of application—then must we, perforce, attribute the universe to an effective will, as a final cause.

There is, also, the argument from self-consciousness. So far as consciousness goes, we, at the first, regard ourselves as underived. It is only when we have reflected upon it, and gained a knowledge of the fact that all men are born into the world, and thus come into existence, that we begin to regard ourselves as effects. But this is a result at which we arrive by the exercise of reason. Consciousness teaches us nothing of this. It posits self-existence. There must be that which wills. Des Cartes might as well have written: "*Volo ergo sum*,"—"I will, therefore I am;" as to have written, "*Cogito, ergo sum*,"—"I think, therefore I am." Existence is posited in either case. The mind cannot go back of this; and if it do not tell us true, our nature is a lie, and (to us) there is nothing substantially true. If we cannot trust our minds regarding the question of our own existence, we cannot trust them about anything besides, and there is, forsooth, an end of all reliable speculation.

The testimony, therefore, of consciousness to causation, is in behalf of a will as a final cause. If we afterward learn that our own existence is derived, then that is a fact ascertained in other ways than by the testimony of consciousness; but this does not alter the fact that consciousness posits our own existence, and our own will as a final cause. Other faculties of our minds teach us that we ourselves are derived; but no faculty teaches us that our will is not self-moved and free. It is the only idea that we have of the *origination* of anything, or, in other words, of a *first cause*. We can conceive of derived or secondary causes that are not volitions; but of a *first cause*, the very structure of our minds renders any other conception impossible. If, therefore, there be a first cause which is not an efficient will, it is a cause the human mind, in the present sphere of its existence, can never believe to be.

The precise posture of the question, therefore, stands as follows, taking up its elements in reversed order:

1. The only conception that the mind has of a first, or final cause, is that of an efficient will.

2. But the mind does not assign a cause, outside the realm of consciousness, to anything, much less to a final cause, until, by observation and reflection, it perceives that thing to have a derived existence.

3. The only way that the universe can be proved to have a *cause*, is by proving that it has a derived existence.

4. The only way that a *final* cause can be proved, is by proving that all possible secondary causes are a part of the universe itself; that, in fact, one law pervades them all. Therefore, law being only the manner in which a force acts, and a force being only the nexus between cause and effect, and there being but one final force, there is, therefore, but one final cause.

5. Consciousness teaches us that a final cause must be an effective will; which is the point from which we started.

6. Evolution furnishes the proof, both of the derived existence of the universe, and of but one final physical force, viz., the nexus between the universe as an effect, and the ultimate will as a final cause.

But, if evolution be true, still other consequences follow. It renders the *historical method* in the study of subjects necessary; no very bad consequence, perhaps, but still a necessary one. Whatever results, therefore, follow from the historical method of investigation, the advocates of evolution cannot evade. Let us apply this method to the study of causation. There is an acknowledged difficulty in the way of the introspective method. The mind of man can never wholly put itself out of itself, and view its own operations from an external stand-point. Hence, its observations upon itself always have some taint of discredit attaching to them. A man may, with more success, observe others, than he can observe himself. A concomitant of the historical method in scientific investigation, is the study of savage tribes now existing; inasmuch as evolution theoretically affirms that all men were once savages. Whether or not they really were, is beside the point; only, if evolution be true, then they really were. Let us, therefore, subject to this scrutiny the proposition that the human mind attributes all effects to the ultimate agency of personal will.

Sir John Lubbock, in his "Origin of Civilization and Primitive Condition of Man," shows, from the study of existing savage races, that where their minds are sufficiently developed to think upon the subject at all—that is, to ascribe causation, and not to regard all things as simple ultimate facts—they invariably impute all effects to personal will. In his fourth chapter, he gives an effective testimony. He says:

"M. Arbrousset quotes the following touching remarks made to him by Sekesa, a very respectable Kaffir: 'Your tidings,' he said, 'are what I want; and I was seeking before I knew you, as you shall hear and judge for yourself. Twelve years ago, I went to feed my flocks. The weather was hazy. I sat down upon a rock, and

asked myself sorrowful questions; yes, sorrowful, because I was unable to answer them. Who has touched the stars with his hands? On what pillars do they rest? I asked myself. The waters are never weary; they know no other law than to flow, without ceasing, from morning till night, and from night till morning; but where do they stop, and who makes them flow thus? The clouds, also, come and go, and burst in water over the earth. Whence come they? Who sends them? The diviners certainly do not give us rain, for how could they do it? And why do I not see them with my own eyes, when they go up to heaven to fetch it? I cannot see the wind, but what is it? Who brings it, makes it blow and roar, and terrify us? Do I know how the corn sprouts? Yesterday, there was not a blade in my field; to-day, I returned to the field, and found some. Who can have given to the earth the wisdom and power to produce it? Then I buried my face in both my hands.'"

Although Sir John Lubbock claims that the case of this savage was exceptional—meaning, thereby, that many of them did not think upon the subject at all—yet he seems nowhere desirous to evade the conclusion, that when they do think, they ascribe all things to personal will. On the contrary; he brings a large amount of evidence to prove it. Confounding this law of the mind with religion, he says:

"The opinion that religion is general and universal has been entertained by many high authorities. Yet it is opposed to the evidence of numerous trustworthy observers. Sailors, traders, and philosophers, Roman Catholic priests and Protestant missionaries, in ancient and in modern times, in every part of the globe, have concurred in stating that there are races of men altogether devoid of religion. The case is the stronger, because, in several instances, the fact has greatly surprised him who records it, and has been entirely in opposition to his preconceived views. On the other hand, it must be confessed that, in some cases, travellers denied the existence of a religion, merely because the tenets were unlike ours. The question as to the general existence of religion among men is, indeed, to a great extent, a matter of definition. If the mere sensation of fear, and the recognition that there are probably other beings more powerful than man, are sufficient alone to constitute a religion, then we must, I think, admit that religion is general to the human race. But when a child dreads the darkness, and shrinks from a lightless room, we never regard that as an evidence of religion. Moreover, if this definition be adopted, we cannot longer regard religion as peculiar to

man. We must admit that the feeling of a dog or a horse toward its master is of the same character ; and the baying of a dog to the moon is as much an act of worship as some ceremonies which have been so described by travellers."

Most freely do we admit this, and are glad to have the opportunity of admitting it, and of placing the admission upon record. But mark what this admission involves. It involves the idea—if evolution be true—that the instinct, which, in man, a moral and spiritual being, becomes developed into what has been called the religious faculty, exists also in brutes. But they, not being moral and spiritual beings, in them it does not amount to the religious faculty, but remains only a faculty correspondent to the idea of external authority. It answers to that dominion which God gave to man over the beasts of the field, and over all living things, which, after the Fall, was changed into fear and dread. This dominion of man over the brutes is called, in the first chapter in Genesis, the image and likeness of God. If, therefore, the dominion of man over the brutes is answered by an instinct in the breast of brutes, and this dominion is the image and likeness of the dominion which God has over man, then we must expect to find in the breast of man an instinct answering to the dominion of God. This instinct is not conscience, nor the so-called moral faculty ; but is an instinct which all living things possess, testifying to the personal authority that is above them. For lack of a better name, we would call it the *Hegemonic Instinct* ; and the science treating of it we would call *Hegemonics* ; and the dominion itself we would call *Hegemony*.

But this is only by the way. We purpose, at another time, if opportunity be given us, to treat more at large, and specially of this. Our business, at present, is, with this instinct, only so far as it affects the intellectual faculties, and to show that it so affects them ; that in causation it invariably leads the mind to a personal will as the cause.

Much more testimony might be adduced in reference to savage tribes ; but all the evidence attainable being perfectly homogeneous, we do not think it necessary to adduce more.

If we turn to the history of the human race, but one kind of testimony can be found. In all ages, countries, races, and conditions of men, we find them invariably attributing all effects to unseen spiritual beings. The mythology of the world shows this. Jupiter thunders from Mount Olympus. Vulcan forges his bolts of lightning. Iris spans the skies with her gorgeous cloud-bow. Phœbus guides the chariot of the sun ; and Selene, during the night, sails in mild majesty along the arch of heaven. There is not a mythology

of any people but exhibits the same tendency. No wonder that materialists make war on the study of the Greek and Roman classics, for their fibre, warp and woof, is penetrated and interpenetrated with this psychological feature. Nor will any Christian civilization ever abandon the study of a literature which, two thousand years ago, brought to perfection the art of literary composition; and which, for all ages, wherever culture and refinement shall be known, must remain the admiration of mankind.

Trusting that no one will call in question the historic fact, sufficiently proven by the literature of various polytheistic mythologies, we shall proceed to classify the various stages of the development or evolution of this instinct or faculty or law of the mind, whatever it may be called.

I. The unconscious stage, characterized by absence of reflection.

(a) Early infancy.

(b) Low barbarism.

II. The conscious stage, characterized by reflection.

(a) The immediate polytheistic.

(b) The immediate monotheistic.

(c) The mediate monotheistic.

That which we have called the unconscious stage, we have so named, not because we believe reflection to be really absent, but because we cannot prove its presence. In this stage, the mind, without regarding anything as an effect, or attributing a cause to anything, possibly regards all things as ultimate facts, which require no explanation. There is great difficulty in conceiving any such stage possible among any persons except very young infants. Savages may indeed be so low as not to reflect upon the origin of the world, the heavens, or on the causes of day and night, wind and storm, summer and winter; but, nevertheless, they must reflect on something. But even in such supposed cases, the instinct asserts its existence, and makes the world itself a living being, and, consequently, all changes would be regarded as the result of its own volitions. In the "Origin of Civilization," an instance is recorded of some low savages, who feared to go under a certain cliff because once a man had been killed by the falling of a stone therefrom, which they attributed to the anger of the mountain. In the same book, reference is made to a tribe who seemed never to have reflected on the origin of things. Yet an answer to a question about the origin of the world clearly signified that the only idea of causation they had reached was of effective will, by saying, "None of us are aware of this; we have never heard anything about it, and, therefore, do not know *who has done it all.*"

If it be indeed true that any tribe of savages regards the world itself as a living being, having personality, then, indeed, there would be a demonstrated instance of pantheism arising without reflection, and not as the result of speculation. Yet two things are to be considered in that case. One is, that the existence of any such pantheism is only possible in the very lowest condition of the human mind; and the other is, that even this pantheism is a grade higher than that held by philosophers, inasmuch as it attributes personality and will to the pantheistic god; the mountain, *being angry*, hurled a stone from its overhanging cliff.

Advancing to the second stage, or historic period, in the development of this subject—that in which the *idea* of causation is formed in the mind—we see that it does not differ from the preceding unreflecting stage as to the fact that the mind acts upon the law of causation. The difference is this,—that it has reflected upon its own acts, and framed to itself the conception of causation; whilst, in the preceding stage, within the narrow range in which it attributed causation, it did it without framing to itself the idea or conception of causation.

The first step in the second stage was the immediate polytheistic period, wherein all the operations of nature were attributed to “hidden agents,” gods, goddesses, demons, etc. This covered all historic antiquity, wherever the true religion was not known. The only characteristic calling for additional notice being the fact that, here and there, mighty spirits arose, who refused to be bound by the galling fetters of this chain, and leaped at once to the conclusion that there was one God who originated all things, either immediately by His direct volition, or mediately through minor agencies.

The second step was the immediate monotheistic period, wherein the knowledge of the true God being spread abroad, everything was attributed to His immediate agency.

The final stage was that which yet commands the suffrages of mankind; the mediate monotheistic, wherein all things are attributed to the one God, however numerous or far-reaching the agencies which He employs. To this stage, that phase of evolution belongs which endeavors to rise to the highest and last generalization, and to hold in the grasp of one mighty idea, all things in heaven and earth, and under the earth. We may well doubt whether it may be vouchsafed to short-sighted mortals thus to ascend heaven’s heights, and penetrate the hidings of God’s power. However, we see not what harm can result from allowing that, *so far as man’s observation extends*, some theory of evolution may be provisionally held,

until such time as it may be demonstrated to be true, or may be shown to be fanciful or false; always, however, provided that the Almighty has as much liberty and sovereignty as man, and is not the bond-slave, but the Master and Guide, of His own agents. A strike against His authority is worthy only of a devil!

Yet, it is with this final mediate stage of causation that trouble begins, and the scientist leads us into temptation. So long as we distinguish carefully between secondary causes and the final cause, we are vigilant, fortified, and safe. But if carried captive by the spirit of lawless research which hovers round us, we refuse to believe that there is a limit to the possibilities of human achievement, we may, in the rampancy of self-conceit, stray away from all saving knowledge of the Most High, and quench our light and life in the outer darkness of materialism or pantheism or blank despair. And this is the way in which some bright, nay, radiant, minds become, what an Apostle calls, "wandering stars, unto whom is reserved the blackness of darkness forever."

We trust that it will appear that we have rightly presented the historical unfolding, or evolution, in the human mind, of the present idea of causation. According to this scheme, personal pantheism was the first and lowest, being a grade higher than the impersonal pantheism of philosophers which rejects all causation. Immediate polytheism was the next grade; immediate monotheism was the next, and mediate monotheism the last and highest.

During the mediate monotheistic period, the spirit of inquiry, searching into the laws that govern those agencies, established by the grand final cause, has, in its blinded zeal, forgotten the cause of all causes. The very fact, therefore, that materialism has arisen, may be cited as testimony against the views set forth in this paper. But when it is considered that materialism is only possible as the result of special culture, and that it maintains its existence only by continual assertion and constant warfare, we trust it will appear that it is a system which does violence to the human mind, and that its existence must be fitful, and shortened till it vanishes away.

The fact that asceticism once overspread Christendom, and even yet maintains, in some quarters, a vigorous hold, does not prove the absence of passions and lusts in the human breast. It, on the contrary, proves their presence and ascendancy; else such vigorous efforts would not be put forth, nor so much enthusiasm be expended, to surmount them. So, in like manner, the continual self-assertion of materialism, and the constant raising of false issues, by which it strives to perplex and to confuse, in like manner testify to the inborn

strength of the instinct upon which it now makes a sort of vindictive war.

We are persuaded that, whatever success in the disciplinary providence of God it may be permitted in the future to claim, will be, if indeed annoying, at least transient and unimpressive. It bears an apparent and catching resemblance to the great apostasy, foretold by the prophet Daniel, and may be, perhaps, an evolution from that *God of Forces*, which was to be a *new* God, that should be honored with gold and silver and precious stones. Materialism certainly defies the *forces* of nature; and the advocates of it are expending money and means without stint for the endowment of elaborate institutions of mere secular learning. Materialism has also taken under its wing that movement which regards not the primeval *desire of woman*. In the Book of Genesis we are told what this is: "Thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee." The fact that some women are so unsexed by fanaticism as to strangle this desire, and seek to be delivered from the legitimate rule of their husbands, and even to strive after the overthrow of legalized wedlock, thus destroying the family relation, no more proves that women by nature have no such desire, than the existence of materialism proves that the mind does not of necessity refer all ultimate causation to an effective will.

Unbelief, ever hostile to the true advancement of man, seizes upon every pretended discovery, and endeavors to utilize it for the overthrow of faith in a God, the living and the true. After the full experience that the Christian world has had in this kind of tactics, devout men should be slow to believe the assertion of a confident and puffed-up enemy, that such and such laws of nature contradict the Bible, and demonstrate the impossibility of a Divine revelation. That men of this description are found, however, only proves that faith works out in many a guilelessness of character, "that thinketh no evil," unless obliged to do so; and that the children of this world are, in their generation, wiser than the children of light. A fallen angel, we are told, can steal the livery of one unfallen; and so Holy Writ carefully warns us to try plausible and tonguey spirits, "whether they be of God." "By their fruits ye shall know them." Obedience to the Great Will, who presides at the centre of the universe, shows where a man genuinely belongs. Christ owned the man of such a tendency as equivalent to his mother and sister and brother, all blended into one. To a man of this description, his own blessed mother was but secondary. To that mother he was related by the flesh; to such a man, by his inmost soul.



SUPERFICIAL EDUCATION.

Report of Her Majesty's Commissioners appointed to inquire into the Revenues and Management of certain Colleges and Schools, and the Studies pursued and the Instruction given therein. With an Appendix, and Evidence. Presented, by command of Her Majesty, to both Houses of Parliament.

Greek in the Universities.—*Quarterly Review* for April, 1878.

THE above Report, with the Appendix and Evidence, contains the result of a painstaking examination, by a Royal Commission, into the condition of nine of the great English Public School Foundations. It affords a large amount of valuable and interesting information as to the working of the English school system. While the commissioners found much to approve, and while they do not altogether lose sight of that caution which teaches that sweeping changes are generally hostile to real progress, they, nevertheless, suggest considerable alterations. Some of these are of little interest to us, because the abuses which they seek to correct are peculiar to these institutions. Others are of general interest, and commend themselves entirely to our approbation; while there are still others which the experience of this country causes us to regard with distrust.

We are glad to see that the Royal Commissioners do not propose to touch the main features of the public school system. They argue strongly that the foundation of education must be literary, and

therefore classical. They do not wish English schoolboys to be less, but more, proficient in the knowledge of Latin and Greek. We regret, however, to perceive that, while not overlooking this point, they seek, at the same time, to attain another object which, we believe, is incompatible with it. They propose to make the studies of the modern languages, of the physical sciences, and, possibly, of music and drawing, obligatory parts of the public school course.

We do not intend, however, to discuss the report. As far as it is concerned, we have only to say that, while we do not doubt that the English school system is susceptible of great improvement, we distrust any attempt to effect that improvement by multiplying studies. And our object in the present article is simply to show that a too great multiplicity of studies has been, in this country, a serious injury to successful education. If we may employ the happy phrase of Elia to describe its evil consequences, we would say that the tendency of our school and college system is to make men "superficially omniscient."

Before proceeding to examine particularly our educational system, it is important to state definitely what it is. Those who control our institutions of learning, acknowledge that the chief object of education is to discipline the mind. They also claim, however, that it is important to give their pupils an acquaintance with all that information upon general subjects which is supposed to be indispensable to a well-educated man. They, therefore, lay the foundation of knowledge in all the sciences, saying that, after their pupils are thus introduced to the different branches of learning, they can, after their graduation, select which they please for further prosecution, and carry it on to proficiency; and that, meanwhile, they leave the college walls with disciplined minds, and a large amount of useful general information.

It will thus be seen that the great thing in education is admitted to be the training of the mental powers, and that the imparting of information, though of great importance, is a thing of secondary consideration. It is a peculiarity of those who defend the present system, that they often change their mode of defence. When it is asserted that the system does not discipline the mind, they fall back upon the assertion that it imparts necessary information. And when it is clearly shown that this information is not retained, or is not useful, they then fall back upon the theory that the main object of education is to discipline the mind.

Let us, therefore, examine the two positions separately.

In the first place, then, does our present system discipline the mind as it should? and, first of all, in what does mental discipline consist? An impression prevails very generally in schools and colleges, that the power of fixing the attention for a longer or shorter time upon the subject in hand, is the chief thing to be imparted by mental training.

But surely this is a very erroneous idea. Control over the intellectual powers, so as to turn them at will upon a given subject, and keep them fixed there, is, no doubt, a very important part of that which is afforded by mental discipline. But it is no more the whole of it, than the power of turning the eye to a given point is the whole of sight. The distinguishing of color, form, and substance enter into the latter, and many things enter into the former besides the ability to control the thoughts. A habit of patient and thorough investigation, of sound logical reasoning, of nice, but correct, discrimination and analysis, of careful observation and classification, the strengthening of the memory, the cultivation of the taste, and the chastening of the imagination,—all these, and others, must be classed among the objects to be attained by mental discipline. And the question is, whether our present educational system is well contrived to impart these advantages.

We answer, it does not give habits of thoroughness. In the ordinary time allotted to education, it is impossible to study more than the rudiments of all the sciences. A superficial view is, therefore, taken of every branch of knowledge. The student is insensibly led to think that this is enough; and thus the evil habit is formed of never going to the bottom of a subject, but being contented with a general and superficial view.

Again, it does not discipline the reasoning faculty. That is trained only by a thorough study. The general principles and first rudiments of a science must be not merely cursorily investigated, but thoroughly mastered, and then followed out to their remote conclusions. To do this in any branch of knowledge whatever, trains and disciplines the reasoning powers. To fail to do it, leaves the mind undisciplined.

Again, it does not encourage habits of observation. In order to do this, it is necessary that the most thorough mastery should be attained, not only of general principles, but of minute details, and the practical application of the former. Thus, in the study of the natural sciences, the very greatest familiarity with them must be attained before the habit can be formed of observing and classifying natural phenomena. The same holds true, in even a profounder

sense, in the studies of political economy, of civil and international law, and of mental science. And even in the study of the languages, but especially in that of comparative philology, it will be found that the same truth holds good.

These are weighty reasons for believing that the present system is based upon false principles. But perhaps this investigation may best be further conducted by a consideration of a maxim which is frequently adduced in its defence. It may be stated in these words : It is necessary that the mind should be symmetrically educated, and that its powers should be symmetrically developed. One faculty of the mind must not be trained at the expense of others. Students must not be brought up, informed on some subjects, and utterly ignorant of others. This statement embraces, it will be seen, two propositions,—one concerning an equal development of the different mental powers ; the other, concerning the necessity of some information on all branches of knowledge. The former really means that the memory must not be trained to the neglect of the reason, nor the imagination to the neglect of the judgment. The latter means that Latin must not be studied to the prejudice of chemistry, nor the lad so thoroughly drilled in natural philosophy as to remain ignorant of astronomy.

Now, leaving for the present all question of the truthfulness of these statements, we submit that they are two distinct lines of defence, and that one of them is relevant, while the other is not. Yet they are both combined in one sweeping assertion of the necessity of a symmetrical education, and the unhesitating assent which any one would yield to the first, is used to carry with it the much more dubious second proposition. Let us, therefore, examine each of them separately.

The first proposition is this,—the powers of the mind must all be symmetrically developed, not one to the neglect of others. This is most unquestionably true, as a general rule ; but it also unquestionably has no bearing whatever upon the question at issue, or the practice which it is called upon to defend. For the powers of the mind are such as perception, memory, reason, and imagination, and it would have to be shown that the study of the natural sciences develops one mental faculty, the study of ancient languages another, and the study of mental science another, before it would follow that these must all be equally studied, in order to an equal development of the various intellectual faculties. But, in reality, the very reverse is the case. The thorough study of some branches of knowledge trains and strengthens all the mental powers. The

thorough study of almost any branch of learning trains and strengthens most of them. A man may be utterly ignorant of several important sciences, and yet, by the complete study of some other, his mind may have been brought into a condition of admirable training, and he may be in a state to rapidly and easily acquire and digest information of all kinds. Such a man would not be a highly-cultivated man, perhaps, in the estimation of some, but his mind would be well and highly disciplined; he would, in other words, be well educated, and he would, at the same time, be a useful and practical man.

It is not true, therefore, that it is necessary to lead a college student through all the circle of the sciences in order to have him symmetrically educated, in the sense of having all his mental powers developed in due proportion, for this end could be achieved by the study of one or two sciences. The memory is trained by remembering first principles; the reason is trained by the perception of consequences which follow from them. The perception is trained by observing, and classifying what is observed under different heads. The imagination is encouraged to the most exalted flights by the opening of new and untrodden fields of conjecture. The power of precise statement is gained by the habit of observing nice shades of thought. All these, be it noted, follow from thorough study, but not from superficial study. The reason is not trained where the attention is so much directed to isolated facts. The perceptive powers are not trained where the student is as ignorant of the meaning of what he perceives, as he generally must be after a hasty and superficial study of rudiments. The imagination cannot soar, unless it has a firm foothold from which to begin its flight. Nor is the inestimable habit of precise thought and expression cultivated by a method of superficial study, which is fatal to precision of any kind.

The second of the two propositions is, that students should be equally informed on all branches of knowledge. But that is the very point upon which this article is intended to raise a question.

Before leaving this branch of the subject, let us notice another remark frequently made by those who defend the present system. They say that the study of anything disciplines the mind. We think that this position is entirely based on the tacit assumption that mental discipline consists merely in cultivating a power of fixing the attention; an assumption, the falsity of which we have already endeavored to show. For the mere superficial investigation of any subject that may be presented to the mind, without regard to its logical relations to other and kindred subjects, or even to a thorough

mastery of itself, is not likely to discipline any of the mental powers but that of attention, and, possibly, in an empirical way, the memory. If the remark quoted were altered so as to read, The study of everything disciplines the mind, it might then serve to justify our present educational system, provided any could be found willing to subscribe to it. If, on the other hand, it were amended so as to read, The thorough study of anything disciplines the mind, it would then be indisputably true; but it would fail to support a system in which the number of separate studies renders thoroughness in any one of them impossible.

To give a thorough, vigorous training to the mind, is, undoubtedly, the first and most important object of education; and our present system failing to do this, fails in the most vital point. The imparting of knowledge, however, is also of importance; and since much is claimed for the present system in this regard, let us now see whether this claim is well founded. We would be content to leave the answer to an examination of college graduates, returning after three years from their graduation. The mere fact that they had forgotten most of what they learned in college, would, possibly, not prove much; but other facts would be observed, which, we think, indisputably prove bad training, and cause us to suspect that what they do remember is of little use to them as knowledge. They would retain the husks and chaff, but the golden grain which these enveloped would have slipped through their minds. They would remember names and words, but would have forgotten principles. They would remember particular lessons or exercises, but would have forgotten subjects. They would remember that they had learned some principle or fact, and would have a vague notion what it was, but would not be able to state accurately either the one or the other. They would remember that A and B make a chemical compound, but they would not be quite sure whether it was pure water or corrosive sublimate. They would know that oxygen combines with hydrogen and nitrogen, and that one combination produces water and the other air, but they could not be positive which is which. They would remember some rule of the Latin Grammar, they could even give most of the words in which it was expressed; but for their life they could not say whether or not there is a negative in the sentence, or whether the case which is governed is the accusative or the ablative. If this is so to any great extent, as we believe it is, it is fatal to the pretension of the system to impart useful knowledge.

And even supposing a clear recollection to be retained of these disconnected facts, such knowledge is of little use. It is merely a knowledge of names, not of things or of subjects. It does little good to know a vast number of facts, unless their relations, and the principles which underlie them, the reasons for their existence, and the ultimate consequences which follow from them, are all clearly understood. And such knowledge it is impossible to acquire of all the different sciences in the brief span of human life, not to speak of the brief term of a college course.

When it is said, therefore, that it is necessary for a student, on graduation, to know something of all the different branches of learning, the answer is, that such necessity exists, if at all, merely for the purposes of display; for the kind of knowledge that can be imparted cannot be useful in any other respect.

It is not difficult to discover the reason of the insecure tenure of our school and college acquisitions. The power of memory depends greatly upon the association of ideas, and the connection of cause and effect. It is hard to remember a single isolated fact; but if you associate that fact with its cause or effect, or with a number of other facts having the same cause, or producing the same effect, the task of memory then becomes comparatively easy. Now, in taking a superficial view of any science, the memory has to deal too much with laws apart from their working, too much with principles apart from their application, to make the task of recollection easy. Moreover, when a hasty view is taken of so many subjects, it is impossible to dwell upon any of them a sufficient length of time, or with such constant repetition, as to produce a lasting impression.

What has been said on this point will, we think, show the fallacy of the appeal, which is so often made, to the practical usefulness of all this general information. It is so often said that, in our country, a different kind of education is required from that which is needed in other lands, and that our educated men always need a large amount of practical knowledge. According to this view, a practical education is one that concerns itself very much with material things; with natural science and the like. Beyond what is absolutely necessary for the transaction of one's daily business, that only is considered practical education which furnishes enough information to enable one to pass creditably in the world. It is considered well to know enough Latin to be able to understand common Latin quotations; enough Greek, to be able to give the names of the Greek letters; enough astronomy, to be able to recognize some of the constellations; enough chemistry, to be able to use and understand

some of the commonest terms; enough natural philosophy, to be able to talk of action and reaction, the principle of the screw, and hydraulic pressure. In other words, the received idea of a practical education includes a smattering of so many things, that it excludes a thorough knowledge of any. We think enough has been said to show that such an education is really very unpractical; that the knowledge would not be of any great use if it were firmly retained, and that it is really held in the loosest and most uncertain manner. A practical education is, rather, one which disciplines and invigorates the mental powers to such a degree as to make them quick in acquiring and arranging knowledge, tenacious in retaining it, and accustomed to correct habits of thinking.

A more valid defence is sometimes set up, in the remark that the present wide course of study gives an expansion and liberality of mind which could not otherwise be attained. If it were really true that this expansion of mind could only be acquired under the present system, that would then be a strong argument in its defence. This, however, we think, could not be shown. And, meanwhile, we are paying too dear for the fancy to sacrifice to it all thoroughness, and give ourselves up to a broad, dead level of superficiality.

It may seem, to some, hard thus to contract the sphere of a student's attention. But the complaint should rather be, that our capacities of acquiring knowledge are so feeble and limited, that, learning being so divine a thing, we cannot drink it in as freely as water, but must painfully apply drop after drop to our parched and thirsty lips; that we must grope so blindly in such Elysian fields. The old fable of Tantalus is realized in the position of a scholar. Unlimited fountains of clearest knowledge are welling up around him; and the feebleness of a merely mortal capacity prevents his drinking enough to more than increase his thirst.

Let us turn aside from the main subject, at this point, to notice another great fault of our educational system, which forms the most fatal combination with the one we are considering. We allude to the inordinate attention paid to the arts of speaking and writing. If superficial study were combined with less constant practice in composition, or if incessant speaking and writing were united with habits of patient investigation and thorough study, in either case the evil would not be so great. But when, to a system which does all it can to prevent thorough knowledge of anything, is united a practice which encourages the greatest fluency and confidence in speaking and writing about everything, and that, too, without care-

ful preparation, then the result is deplorable indeed. For to this unhappy combination, which pervades almost the whole educational system of the country, must be ascribed, not only most of the literary foibles at which we blush, but also some of the serious evils under which we groan. How often do we suffer from seeing men in positions of official responsibility, for which their whole previous life and education have unfitted them. And although their preferment to these positions is justly ascribed to merely political considerations, yet, if the whole nation were accustomed to thoroughness in every department of life, how much less likely would such cases be to occur, or even to be tolerated! How mortifying, too, was the spectacle, and how pernicious sometimes the consequences, of the unblushing effrontery with which, during our late civil war, men, women, and children, of all ages and conditions, expressed dogmatical opinions upon subjects of which they were totally ignorant; upon questions of finance that would have driven a Gladstone to despair; points of international law that would have perplexed a Vattel; and problems of military force and science that would have gone nigh to break the heart of a Napoleon or a Von Moltke. Nearly all the utterances of our periodical press upon subjects requiring serious thought, and especially the theological discussions of the last few years, afford still more striking illustrations of the immense evils produced by the fatal combination of superficiality of knowledge with facility of expression.

But to return to our subject. Not only does the present system of a vast multiplicity of studies fail to discipline the mind thoroughly, not only does it fail to impart such accurate and understood knowledge as will be of much practical use, it also, in an eminent degree, fails to awaken the interest of the student. And the reason is not hard to find. Thorough study is always interesting. Superficial study is always tedious. In fact, it might be almost stated as a maxim, that any man will become interested in any branch of learning, no matter how averse to it he may naturally be, provided he goes far enough to thoroughly understand it. For every science is like a pleasant field, set round with a thorny hedge of rudiments and technicalities. To penetrate or surmount this is a labor of difficulty and pain; but after it is once fairly overcome, there is then a wilderness of sweets with which to refresh ourselves. Alas, for the poor students, who are forced to all the toil and trouble of half penetrating, first one hedge, and then another, without being permitted to tarry long enough to get entirely through, much less


to pluck the fruit and flowers that bloom within the enclosures! Is it a wonder that, after the college course, so many are disgusted at the bare thought of scholarship and study, and give themselves up with a sigh to getting through life as well as they can without them?

The point which we have sought, in these remarks, to enforce, is the unavoidable necessity of concentration of effort, in order to thoroughness of attainment or mental discipline. The great evil deplored is the superficiality arising from a neglect of this principle. It may be difficult to determine whether the fault rests chiefly with our schools or with our colleges, for the evil springs from a false theory pervading the popular mind, and controlling our whole educational system.

It is not necessary, at this time, to discuss the practical measures to be adopted to remedy this evil. It is sufficient if the practice of frittering away the attention upon a dozen different subjects is recognized as based upon a wrong theory, and as being pernicious in its consequences. That point once admitted, the practical results will soon follow.

In schools it would be necessary to make a very great diminution in the number of studies pursued. Believing, as we do, that the basis of education should be literary and classical, to a far greater degree than it is at present, we yet hold even this important matter to be of secondary moment to the paramount necessity that *something* should be thoroughly taught.

In colleges, any change would have to be so made as to harmonize two apparently conflicting claims. In the first place, their university character must be retained. Facilities must be afforded for pursuing the same branches of learning as at present. But, in the second place, the sphere of study for each individual student must be greatly contracted. It certainly can be neither impossible nor very difficult to attain both of these ends, although the best modifications of our present plan may only be gradually discovered. But if the effort is honestly made in this direction, and if, in making it, we are wise enough to profit by the experience of other and older nations, we can hardly fail to make an improvement in our educational system which will be eventually felt, not only in all the walks of professional life, but in all grades of society, and even in all the functions of government.



GENIUS OF JUDAISM.

The Genius of Judaism. London: Edward Moxon, Dover street. I. 12mo. Pp. 266. 1838.

VERY many are familiar with the name of Disraeli in connection with his books of delightful learning; such as the "Curiosities and Amenities of Literature." But few, probably, are aware that he ever published a philosophical volume, intended to apologize for, and to vindicate, the faith in which he was educated. One reason is, that the volume is not anonymous only, but devoid of all preface,—coming nakedly forward before the public, to glean such tolerance or commendation as its intrinsic merits might warrant. It was published forty years ago, and ushered upon its fortunes as silently as if it had been a sort of ghost of history, that had slumbered like the primeval world under a canopy of darkness. It would seem, by its own description of its aim, to have been an attempt to recommend Judaism to the literate and scientific; at any rate, to rescue it from their habitual contempt. For its author places near its close, what he ought to have placed on its title-page as a motto, the following words: "I am not writing the history of the Jews, for antiquaries; but the Genius of Judaism, for philosophers" (p. 239).

This looks as if Mr. Disraeli's aim, in behalf of the fathers of his race, was altogether scholastic; at least, as if he desired to

induce the learned to admit Judaism's respectability. But when we consider the date, 1833, we can hardly help thinking that there was an underlying political aim which also prompted him. But a short time previously, England had consented to emancipatory laws, which opened Parliament and civil offices to the Roman Catholics. A sort of revolution in public opinion had taken place toward a once dreaded class of religionists. He waited till the waves of agitation had spent their force; and when the nation had subsided into a calm, he undertook the cause of a people more oppressed than those who had been set free. We see his timidity in coming out anonymously, and in leaving his volume to fight its own way, without apology or preface. But when, in the course of it, we find distinct and careful mention of the manner in which such men as Cromwell and Napoleon I. had demeaned themselves toward Judaism, it cannot fail to be suspected that politics had quite as much, or more, to do with its inauguration than mere scholarship.

It was a favorable juncture to bring up the auspicious facts that a great English politician, and a great French politician, had each shown himself, at least, not incurably hostile to Judaism. Right in the midst of the Puritans, with "the gilt pocket Bibles of the puritanical doctors" ready to leap out against him, as if something like what we call revolvers, Cromwell did not hesitate to give the Jews' case a patient, careful, and not ungracious consideration. Doubtless, the Cromwellian finances needed looking after, as well as the direct munitions of threatening war. And the astute Protector of the liberties of England, *alias* his own, well knew and appreciated the arts and mysteries of Jewish financiering. Mr. Disraeli says, understandingly, that Cromwell "took a statesman's view, and did a statesman's act." To pacify his clamorous divines, he listened to them. But "he declared there was nothing but confusion in their counsels; and, as had been his first intention, he allowed a limited number to settle in London, and to have synagogues" (p. 241).

Cromwell could always afford to be blind as a fanatic, but not as a ruler of a people becoming rapidly commercial. He had studied history, as well as submitted to long Puritan harangues. He remembered well what Mr. Disraeli gives us as the financial value of a Jew, in much older times. "The Hebrews became the reservoirs of the wealth of the strange lands where they were found" (p. 230). To whatever financial benefits the Jews might confer on England, Cromwell was determined to glean and grasp; and, with this view,

gave them such amazing toleration, that they not only built synagogues, but celebrated the Feast of Tabernacles, in booths, on the borders of the Thames. This brought down on them a rattling Puritanic hailstorm; and constrained them to retreat into comparative and silent insignificance.

But Napoleon's patronage of Judaism began, rather, from personal considerations. World-wide contemplator of the political horizon, hardly anything escaped him! He knew that his imperial pretensions were not the highest only, but the most hazardous, he ever had put forth. And so he looked around, on all sides, for anything wherewith to bolster them. He, as well as Cromwell, knew the value of the Jew financially; knew that no one could conduct financial operations with more secrecy, as well as high success, than he. It is a most curious fact, of which Mr. Disraeli gives us full assurance, that the Jews invented bills of exchange for the purpose of keeping gold and silver out of sight, and to stop their clinking! The very people, as a class, then, for a *novus homo* like Napoleon, an imperial adventurer, to make the most of. And especially when it came to his ears (as it did) that some of them, undoubtedly with selfish aims, had entertained the question whether he was not the foretold Messiah, and had decided the question in his favor. He seized such a hint with as much glee as if he had captured a fortress, whose fate might control a severe campaign. He summoned a general Sanhedrin at Paris. And he did his utmost to cajole his new-found friends into political and financial allies. But Judaism, in the hands of a military experimenter, proved too angular and stiff a subject. The almost conqueror of Europe could not mould and recast a religious clan. As Mr. Disraeli admirably expresses it, "Napoleon discovered that the jealous genius of Judaism resisted a social union with his nation at the voice of the Rabbin, and the imperial seducer could only calculate by the votes of his submissive Israelites" (p. 257).

But, surely, with the examples of Cromwell and of Napoleon before him, it were well worth while for a champion of a down-trodden race, whose blood was running through his own veins, to attempt an effort of a gentler and more unpretending kind; one, too, characteristic of its refined and scholarly author. So, in 1833, Mr. Disraeli put out a volume on the subject, with the impressive and taking title, "The Genius of Judaism." This, certainly, would attract; for it was novel, it was literary, it was philosophical, and it was not aggressive. What its success was, it is now too late to ascertain; but, probably, the effort of 1753—when the Jews

bought a bill of the British Parliament, which was too good to live, and which they had, soon after, to let die—was not to be a mere inanity a second time. Parliament could not go over again a farce so solemn and so cruel. Accordingly, we now find the Jew the political equal of the Romanist, and the well-known adviser and accommodator of civil governments. Nay, it is even said that, at one time, the Triple Crown would fain have made a bow pontifical to the house of Rothschild, for a consideration in the shape of filthy lucre. But what credit soever that crown may claim at the chancery of Heaven, could not in the least avail it over a banker's counter; and the Papal treasury had to "wander for lack of meat."

The volume of Mr. Disraeli is by no means a large one. It is a duodecimo of less than three hundred pages, and those pages handsomely leaded, and quite open ones; so that the book is pleasant to the outward eye, as well as attractive to the inward one. It has but fourteen chapters in it, and some of these short enough to be almost abrupt and meagre. Still, as the volume is now quite out of print, and, perhaps, entirely forgotten, it may be well enough to reproduce them, and here they are :

Chapter I.—With the Israelite everything is Ancient, and nothing is Obsolete.

Chapter II.—A more Intimate Knowledge of the Jewish Feelings and their History required.

Chapter III.—The Laws of the Jewish People constitute their Religion.

Chapter IV.—The Theocracy.

Chapter V.—The Decline of the Theocracy.

Chapter VI.—A Human Supersedes the Divine Code.

Chapter VII.—The First Great Cause of the Separation of the Hebrews. Their Written Law Received as of Divine Institution.

Chapter VIII.—The Second Great Cause of the Separation of the Hebrews from every other People is the Sabbatic Institution.

Chapter IX.—The Third Great Cause which Separated the Jewish People from their Neighbors, was the Multitude of their Rites, and their Ceremonial Law.

Chapter X.—The Fourth Great Cause which Separated the Hebrews from any Intercourse with the People with whom they Lived,—the Prohibition of Partaking of the Food of whoever was not an Israelite.

Chapter XI.—History of Jewish Conversions.

Chapter XII.—Of the Causes of the Universal Hatred of the Jewish People.

Chapter XIII.—The English Jews.

Chapter XIV.—Conclusion.

Under this programme, the first picture which Mr. Disraeli presents us, in his philosophical outlines of Judaism, is, obviously, its identity and continuity through its long-drawn and, at times, hope-

less history of thousands of years. And, assuredly, he could not have chosen a better subject for his foreground; for the supreme uncertainty of a protracted existence for any people, or any association, in such a world of downfalls and upheavals as ours, is a mathematical demonstration.

—"water-drops have worn the stones of Troy,
And blind oblivion swallowed cities up,
And mighty states, characterless, are grated
To dusty nothing."

—*Troilus and Cressida*, Act iii. Scene 2.

The acknowledged changefulness of anything pertaining to a nation, or a government, or a society, or an institution, makes one think of those palace-piles which he often sees rolling into incessantly new shapes in a heavily clouded sky. Take the grandest of old empires, like the Assyrian, the Babylonian, the Persian, or the Roman, and they seem like paintings hung up for admiration in the galleries of art. They have a pictorial existence, and no more. And the fact is just as prominent whether you consult ancient times or modern. Man's mightiest structures, as the poet says, "are grated to dusty nothing." Or, as a Hebrew once expressed the intense contrast,—

"Amalek was the first of the nations;
But his latter end shall be that he perish forever."

But here is a people which, like the Ganges, or our own Mississippi or Missouri, go through all sorts of obstructions or oppositions, yet always maintaining an onward flow, till they reach the farthest end for which they are pre-adapted. Now, Mr. Hume averred, full proudly, that that which is contrary to all experience is a downright impossibility; and supposed he had demolished miracles for evermore. Give him, for the nonce, his plea. If the Jewish people were stricken from the pages of human history, it might be pronounced a similar impossibility to discover, in that history, an example of perpetuity like theirs. And, if so, then such perpetuity is a miracle which even an infidel should respect, if not almost worship. "The close of the Jewish history," said Mr. Disraeli, "is imagined to be the destruction of their Holy City. But this people have survived their metropolis, their kingdom, and their code; and a terrible interval of more than fifteen centuries of merciless persecutions, of heroic struggles, of blasting calumnies, of martyrdoms, and of expulsions, constitute the modern history of the Hebrews"

(pp. 3, 4). A man who would not believe such an issue miraculous, would not be persuaded, though one of his departed acquaintances should actually rise from the dead, and remove the veil of the world unseen.

Such, then, is Mr. Disraeli's outline of the track and traces of Judaism, as it passes adown the vistas of human history; and he may well express profound regret, as he does, that its passage has not been drawn out in clearer lineaments. Most unfortunately for Judaism, it has not had authors within itself to fully and vividly depict its matchless vitality, as it descended, through baptisms of fire and blood, to some unknown home. The Jews have been neglectful of their own annals, and we see them not as they might have been seen—*within*; but as curious or unfriendly eyes have inspected them—from *without*. Well, therefore, may Mr. Disraeli somewhat mournfully say: "If it be permitted by human sagacity to discover the causes which have influenced the singular fate of the Jewish people, it must be sought by a more intimate knowledge of their feelings and their history than has fallen to the share of ridiculing Polytheists, of hostile Christians, and of doting Rabbins" (p. 15). If the Jews, after their dispersion, had had chroniclers like Josephus, we might have surveyed them to more advantage. As it is, we know scarcely more of their *internal* history than of the fate of the Ten Tribes carried captive to Babylon, and who seem to have melted away like some of our western rivers, whose floods, once full and sweeping, are finally lost amid the sands.

With this conspectus of the possibilities of Jewish history and its unwritten annals, we are next to consider a question ready upon the lips of any political philosopher or political economist,—How were the Jews educated for national unity and perpetuity? Where, amid barbarian surroundings, did their civilization come from? Intellectual culture, Mr. Buckle would say, is all that is wanted to perfect a people, and to keep them so.

Now, it was not scholastic education which elevated Judaism. It was legal education. Their laws were their religion, and their religion was their law. There was nothing merely secular in their economy. There was no such thing as expediency in it, or about it. It was all law, from beginning to end; or it was precept under a covenant, the stipulations of which carried implied or expressed promises through all their directions and obligations.

Oh, what a singular, what a most impressive spectacle, this, to a philosopher or statesman studying to unravel the secrets of national prosperity! Cicero, looking at the institutions of Solon or Lycur-

gus, and at the schools of Greece, exclaimed that it was better for mankind to be governed by law than by philosophy.¹ And the doctrine of the great civilian has been esteemed a strange one,—at least by opinionated and conceited scholars. But the experiment was a marvellously successful one among the descendants of Abraham,—“the sons of the Covenant,” as they delighted to style themselves. It was such a notorious success, too, that when Apion, the Egyptian philosopher, bitterly attacked Judaism, and Josephus responded, it was one of his boasts that the Jews were educated into, and up to, their own institutions, better than any known people. “Question my countrymen,” he said, “about the laws which constitute and compose their polity and religion. They will answer your queries as readily as if you asked them their personal names” (*Josephus against Apion*, B. ii. S. 19).

Where has there been a popular education comparable to this? And where organic law and subordinate law are thus understood and thus respected, is it wonderful that they should be profound and all enduring? that they should make a people one, and keep them one, under all usual human contingencies? But now if we were to pronounce Moses an unmistakable philosopher, what an upturning of eyes, and what supercilious staring, among the savans of modern times! Moses a philosopher? Why, he is, in some respects, an inquisitor, and, in others, a barbarian. Yet, when has mere human wit and wisdom, even if achieving its utmost, accomplished half as much as he? If there is anything constant, only to variations—“unstable as water,” to use a Jewish-born simile—it is systems of science, philosophy, and political economy. If such systems had created for themselves such a spectacle of identity and continuity as the genius of Judaism has done for the Jewish people, we should be anything but surprised to see them holding their crests aloft as infallible, and claiming for themselves all that has been claimed for the inspiration of Holy Scripture! Then we should be told, with the tallest sort of assumption, that the real Bible of humanity no longer belonged to the Church, but to schools of human learning. Then a university would be pronounced man’s best of temples, and inferior schools its “beautiful gates.” Nevertheless, science, philosophy, and political economy dwindle into tyros before the profound and, humanly speaking, the insoluble problem of an undying nation inaugurated by Moses. Well does a learned German exclaim, “The spirit of the Law was itself the

¹ De Oratore, i. § 44.

greatest prodigy!" The spirit which breathes through the laws of the Pentateuch, is a miracle for any age. For the age in which it sprang into existence, it seems an echo of that Voice which rang out through solid darkness and over an inky waste, "Let there be light, and there was light." Who will undertake to deny, when he sees Judaism covered with "wounds and bruises and putrefying sores," from head to foot—covered so for ages, and yet alive—that it has not a vitality destined for time's hardest fortunes and longest rounds?

With high conceptions of the vitality of Judaism, Mr. Disraeli not unnaturally gives us his *beau idéal* of the government under which, and by which, it started on its high and august career. This was the theocracy; which, doubtless, we are to expect him to look at, not with the eye of a religionist, but of a political philosopher, indirectly pleading for the tolerance and civil establishment of a people among whom were his ancestry. So we must not be captious if he contemplates this theocracy, not from an ecclesiastical point of view, like a commentator on Scripture, but from one befitting a far-sighted statesman. And we think that, with this distinction in sight, he has caught the right conception and aims of a government of which God was the virtual head, and in which every citizen partook, more or less, of the sacerdotal character,—was one of "a kingdom of priests" (Exod. xix. 6; I. Pet. ii. 9). He says distinctly, truly, and emphatically, with a most just appreciation of a nation's destinies, "Judaism could only exist in a constant triumph over idolatry" (p. 46).

And so we are specially to look, in its organic and statutory law, for provisions which would counteract the proneness of the people to yield to the allurements of idolatry. The more so because the idolatry surrounding the Israelites was not outwardly of that gross and hideous description "which, to be hated, needs but to be seen." "We must not imagine," says Mr. Disraeli, "that idolatry simply consisted of those 'dead things called gods of gold and silver,' or, 'some vile beast, laid over with vermillion, set fast in a wall.' Idolatry was a superstition which touched all the infirmities of the human heart. The darker passions were at work with the sensual seductions, and the splendid festival of the idolater often veiled terrific rites, or initiated into infamous mysteries. This was the idolatry of those 'strange gods,' which offered a ready aliment for the secret and wavering passions of the rebellious Israelites" (p. 43).

And to withdraw them from proclivities for such weaning and weakening temptations, the ceremonies of Judaism had to be more

complicated, more studied, and more gorgeous, too, than different times and altered circumstances might have demanded. We must judge of the tabernacle and its seemingly singular arrangements, particularly of its ornamentation and clouds of incense, not by an abstract standard, most especially not by a modern one; and we must always remember that, in its every provision, it was intended for a wide contrast and a steady antagonism. As such we must weigh it and appreciate it, and as such must we look at it when, under its shadow, a plea is sometimes entered in behalf of our own present tendencies to ritualism, and its nascent postures, dresses, and decorations. If we were surrounded by communities which, while betrayed into gross doctrinal errors, tried to glose over these errors with all sorts of outward plausibilities, then we might well enough get up and encourage some ostentatious counterpart. But we are not threatened by such provocations. The communities amid which we live much prefer the sober and chaste order of our Church to the tinsel array and mock-tragic shows of Romanism. And her true friends will be more anxious to illustrate her tolerant *temper*, her hearty *charity*, and her love of "*all godly quietness*," than to prove that she can safely load her ritual with outward and flashy ornament. The ornament of a meek and quiet spirit, which, in the sight of God, is *of great price*—actually meritorious, in the word's ancient sense—let such be her adorning, and her ultimate success is sure.

There is one feature in what a statesman would call the organic law of Judaism, that goes to show forcibly how changes in such law were provided for by a prescience which, had it not in it an element of Divinity, might be accounted far more than human. Successful changes in such law are among the grandest feats of legislation in modern times. But such a change was, notwithstanding, formally contemplated for Judaism, with a glimpse, doubtless, like that of Abraham, when his prophetic eye reached the far-off times of the Messiah. Mr. Disraeli is acute enough to perceive and to mark it. "In Egypt, Moses had indignantly witnessed the abuse of the regal power; and not less had the sage observed the petty despots of the neighboring nations of Israel. The inspired foresight of this awful legislator contemplated the future existence of a *constitutional monarch*" (p. 45—italics, Mr. Disraeli's).

Now, the Theocracy, with its internal provisions for changes and readaptation, would have fitted Judaism for a sort of governmental eternity. And the round world might, at length, have got to believe what many of the descendants of Abraham had got to

believe in the days of Jeremiah. The plaintive faith of his countrymen is distinctly alluded to by the sorrowing prophet. "The kings of the earth, and all the inhabitants of the world, would not have believed that the adversary and the enemy should have entered into the gates of Jerusalem" (Lament. iv. 12). Had the Theocracy, with its own provisions, been adhered to, this assurance would not have been, what it really was, a baseless conjecture. It would have been veritable history if the Jew had been loyal to the genius of his own institutions. Judaism, then, would have been the mistress of empires; "the kingdom, and dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom, under the whole heaven," would have been given to her as a dowry. Jerusalem might have become what Rome now claims to be,—the moral centre and point of radiation for an outlying world.

But, alas, her treasures of hope and possibility were entrusted to earthen vessels. Her gold, as her sad elegiacs represented it, became dim, her most fine gold changed, and her silver as dross. Her very law was almost annihilated by human substitutions for its unearthly ordinances, and the nation entered into its purgatory,—a purgatory at times quite amounting to a Gehenna. As Mr. Disraeli is forced frankly to say, "The institutes of Moses are not, in reality, the laws of the Jews. Two human codes have superseded the code delivered from heaven. The one originates in imposture,—that of their traditions. And the other is founded on tyranny,—that of their customs.

"Twelve folios of the Babylonish Talmud, or 'The Doctrinal,' form this portentous monument in the intellectual history of man. Built up with all the strength and the subtlety, but with all the abuse of the human understanding; founded on the infirmities of our nature; a system of superstitions has immersed the Hebrews in a mass of ritual ordinances, casuistical glosses, and arbitrary decisions, hardly equalled by their subsequent mimics of the Papistry" (pp. 77, 78).

So, then, the decadence of Judaism was owing to her own decadence from a standard which heaven had appointed for her guidance and preservation. The law was given to her people, not as a mere arbitrary or wilful enactment, but as a compound of matchless rationality. It was not given to them to render them slavish or doltish; to bury them in ignorance and servitude, like the laws of nations in days of Cimmerian darkness. Far from it. It was given to elevate their understandings, to dignify their characters, to enlarge their reputation in the views of others. Of this, Moses gives us full assurance when commending the institutions of which he was the guar-

dian to the best thoughts and best consideration of his countrymen. "Behold, I have taught you statutes and judgments, even as the Lord my God commanded me, that ye should do so in the land whither ye go to possess it. Keep therefore and do them; for this is your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the nations, which shall hear all these statutes, and say, Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people" (Deut. iv. 5, 6). "The Divine Code," says Mr. Disraeli, "was designed to make an inconsiderable people a great nation; and long it conducted the children of Israel during their political tutelage" (p. 123).

But, alas! the law, in its simplicity and purity, did not cover all the cases which it was desirable to overlay with its high sanction. So the Jewish mind elaborated a commentary, with which it could make the law broader and more adaptable. The work which was concocted was styled "The Doctrinal" (a phrase parallel to "The Ordinal" and "The Pontifical"), which embraces all the doctrinal commentary that Jewish scholars wished to have added to the enactments of Moses, thus extending their application to multitudes of cases not committed to actual record, but occurring (to use a modern word) in the way of development. Development, it will thus be seen, is somewhat older than the nomenclature of John Henry Newman.

This "Doctrinal" increased, that is, developed prodigiously, under skilful manipulation, till, at length, it grew full enough to swell into twelve tall folios! Its character was that of commentary, that is, superadditions in the way of inference or hypothesis; and the commentary was styled "The Mishna," which means *repetition*. It was the repetition of the great law of Divine origination, yet most unfortunately not a repetition of it under a Divine guidance, but under the *recta ratio* (so called) of mere human conjecture. It was, indeed, a Deuteronomy; but a Deuteronomy of man, and not of God.

And so the issue abundantly proved it. The repetition of the Law, as concocted by Jewish ingenuity (*alias* private judgment), required another repetition to render it intelligible and authoritative. If repetition be necessary for Divine statements, *a fortiori* is it necessary for human statements; and thus the *Mishna* gave birth to a *Gemara*, which means *completeness* or *perfection*. Nothing could be simpler or plainer, or more directly evident, than that man's Deuteronomy must teem with fallibilities and blunders of all sorts, and required a completing and perfecting treatise, in other words, a crowning regeneration.

Yet, under whose sponsorship does such a close of "The Doctrinal" appear to be attained to? Does an angel or a prophet give it utterance, in the name of Heaven? Ah, it is soon discovered that the Mishna is man's Mishna, and the Gemara man's Gemara; so that the genuine *terra firma* of certainty was as dim and misty, and as flickering as ever. And, naturally, there were soon found persons enough, and full enough, too, of high assurance, to declare as much, and cling to it. After books came doctors. After silent text came vocal commentary; and Judaism was soon afloat again, and drifting without compass, amid blasts and counterblasts of vain doctrine. And *her* doctors, like doctors in philosophy and doctors in the Church, were divided into antagonistic and belligerent classes. There were men called Sebureans, who appealed to reason, that is, their own private persuasions; and men called Gaons, who appealed to objective authority, that is, something above themselves. And between the two there was incessant and almost mortal strife. They, too, had perpetuity, like the codes they both fell back upon. We meet them in our Saviour's history, under the guise of Sadducees and Pharisee; and it is to such he makes the stern appeal, that, by their overlying traditions, they had sunk God's law into a nullity, rendered it a thing evacuated.

So with its Mishna and Gemara, and wrangling controvertists, Judaism put the charter of its existence and independence and practical success altogether out of sight. Its children had descended from a Divine to a human platform, and it was not so much retributive justice as natural destiny which carried a nation downward with the code which it dishonored. The lesser fall was the inevitable successor of a greater; as thorns and briers—tokens of earth's lesser fall—were the reflex issue of a greater fall, which damaged not outward things, but inward things; not shrubbery, but precious souls.

It is curious to observe how often man has tried to mend God's works by human superadditions. And it is one of the special curiosities of ecclesiastical history, that accretions have grown upon short and simple premises. The creed which was imposed by St. Philip, upon the courtier of Ethiopia, could be thrown into a single line. The Apostles' Creed, our oldest creed, though still our shortest, was once shorter still. The original Nicene Creed was very considerably shorter than our present one; until, in A.D. 431, the Church Catholic, assembled in her third Œcumenical Council, startled by the accretions which seemed to gather round symbols of the faith, took the solemn resolve that accretions must thenceforth cease. It made a prohibition, as explicit and irrepealable as lay in its power; at

least, so far as it might concern matters for Church use, and solemn liturgical repetition. The Œcumenical Councils of 451, 553, and 680 (all in addition to which *we* pay much deference), carefully respected this judicial ruling. The Creed—as such—was most reverently left untouched, and handed down in its fixed integrity. Decisions and actions, these, which, as multitudes will say, with lips compressed, demolish the Creed of Pius IV. and the additions of Pius IX.; but which, to our comprehension, quite as effectually demolish the Athanasian Confession, in a creed-way, and constrain the Church of England to accept it only as a dogmatic hymn, and put a Gloria Patri after it, as after a Psalm of David.

What an admonition should such issues be to us, to take old things in their simplicity and brevity, and not attempt to be wise above what is written, adjudicated, and settled. An admonition with which (singularly enough!) Moses ended the Law, and John, the last Apostle, ended his Revelation (Deut. iv. 2; Rev. xxii. 18, 19). And yet the tendency of men is never to be contented, but to follow progress and development, up and out, mindless of the catastrophes which too often attend them rereward. Progress and development were the stumbling-blocks over which Israel fell; and they will breed disasters in the Church Catholic, if taught as a necessity, and followed out as a law. May the fate of Israel, and the united voice of her great Lawgiver, and the latest Apostle, and half of our chiefest councils, preach consideration and forbearance less vainly than they have done!

With the spectacle before him, of a people ruined, as a government and a nation, by departing from their original constitution, and yet retaining their continuity, a philosophic statesman would ask unprompted, What potent causes have contributed to such a singular, such an unlikely issue? With a government overthrown, and national identity lost, a people ought to be extinguished and blotted out from history's rolls. So such an observer might argue and ask, as we have said, spontaneously, What causes were mighty enough, and comprehensive enough, to keep a people together after such frightful disintegration? The problem of the continuous existence of the Jews, *as a people*, even when exiles, is one which must tax all ordinary human calculation, profoundly and severely. And this is the problem to which Mr. Disraeli addresses himself, when he had shown how the Jews had put an end to their Theocracy, and virtually buried the Law of Moses under huge piles of promiscuous traditions.

The unique fact, of the continuity of Judaism, was a spectacle

for such an antiquary as John Selden to look at steadily. He did so look at it; and when cavillers among the Puritans spoke lightly of it, as not much of a mystery, he thus abashed them; as, fortunately, his "Table Talk," under the title *Jews*, gives us peculiar assurance. "Talk what you will," says he, to some evidently splenetic disputants, "Talk what you will of the *Jews*, that they are cursed, they thrive wherever they come; they are able to oblige the prince of their country, by lending him money; none of them beg; they keep together; and for their being hated, my life for yours, Christians hate one another as much."

Selden could generally silence a carper; especially when he borrowed the aquafortis of sarcasm. Disraeli has more amenity, and he attempts a calmer answer as to the queries of philosophical and political curiosity, in the seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth chapters of his book, devoting nearly one fourth of his whole labor to the momentous discussion. His answer as to the causes of the continuity of Judaism is, of course, fourfold. The first part, as we might expect, relates to the Law, which, though overshadowed and darkened, and almost nullified in its original character, by tradition and custom, still exists as a fact; still is honored with almost idolatrous devotion, in the parchment-rolls of the synagogue; still proves a centre for prejudice and pride, as some would say, or, as we prefer to say, for patriotism. Then come rites and ceremonies, of which many became obscure after the destruction of the temple, and a national dispersion; but two of which (which were, so to speak, family-rites) kept up in families, what was lost to a larger and more scattered community. These family-rites (circumcision and the passover) could go with the Jews into the longest and most dreary exile. They have so gone, and are as well known and as observantly kept now, as in the days of the great Lawgiver. It may be a wondrous thing to a politician, to see a people living and lasting by families, when torn, nationally, to pieces. But these fragments, as they might call them, are the fundamental elements of all larger associations. A family can grow into a confederation; a confederation may breed states, and states can be embodied into a wide empire. So long as seed remains, there is hope for the biggest plantations; and so long as Jewish families remain, Judaism can never be extinguished. It may resemble (to use the simile of St. Paul) a branch broken from its parent stem; but care and culture may graft this back again, for fresh and prolonged existence.

And while circumcision and the passover are family institutions, so the Sabbath, and peculiarities of food and eating, are quite as

much so; and these help on in the same direction, and render the family an identity and a perpetuity for unnumbered generations. It is, indeed, most curious to discover, by Mr. Disraeli's assistance, that Jewish peculiarities about food and eating brought to nothing the political manœuvre of Napoleon, when he inaugurated the great Sanhedrin of Paris. The Emperor would, of course, be extravagantly polite to the people whom he desired to employ for dragging along the creaking wheels of imperial power. He invited the late Abraham Goldschmidt to a state banquet, and prepared to talk most winningly of the amelioration of the Jewish people, and of their admission to political equality as citizens. But he could not, for a moment, throw "this honest Hebrew" off his guard. With plate of gold and unbounded luxuries about him, he would not eat but in Jewish peculiarity and segregation. He carried his own dish and its contents, before he would condescend to listen to promises, expostulations, and dreamy rhetoric. "Absorbed in the contemplation of the moral and political reform of the Jews, he was long silent; when, suddenly striking his forehead, he started this annihilating objection: 'But what can be done for their eating?' Simple words! but the words of truth; for, as it afterward appeared, the forbidden aliments proved the main cause of the breaking up of the whole Sanhedrin" (p. 163).

No wonder, if such trifling affairs as eating and drinking could defeat the astutest plans of such a schemer and toiler as Napoleon, that these, with other causes assigned by Mr. Disraeli, are sufficient to counteract all outward force in attempts to mix up Jews with Gentiles, and to render such attempts as fugitive and transient as the first Napoleonic dynasty. Philosophers and politicians consider themselves endowed with prophetic foresight. If they had had the construction of Judaism entrusted to their sagacity, and its future destinies committed to their direction, it had long since perished from the world. Its vitality was secured by the simplest of arrangements, selected by superhuman wisdom!¹

¹ The power of *positive institutions* in preserving the continuity of Judaism, ought to teach a wholesome lesson to those who think lightly of such things as sacraments and ecclesiastical successions. This is a mine for the intelligent to work in, which has not been disdained by such authors as Leslie and Bishop Butler. Arguments drawn from it will always have weight with the thoughtful, how little soever accounted of by the prejudiced and short-sighted. When men cheapen sacraments and Apostolical successions—in fine, an historic Church—they know not what they do. Christianity itself is but an Apostolic succession; and to the same sort of succession belong all its prominent

The continuity of Judaism, and especially the continuity of its people, was the main thing for Mr. Disraeli to account for, as a political and moral philosopher, and to present to the British public, in 1833, as a basis for its toleration, as an inextinguishable, yet harmless, peculiarity. He presumed he had done as much as might be, when he had demonstrated how easily Judaism could forego national ambition, if it might live unmolested in the bosom of families; existing, that is, no longer as a political peril, and thriving only as a social distinction.

He had accomplished his end, as, doubtless, it appeared to him, in a *direct* way. But he desired to fortify his position, in an *indirect* way, by bringing in what may be called negative arguments, forbidding any other conclusion than the one reached already. Wherefore, to represent Judaism as a fit subject for toleration, he went on to dwell upon the general fruitlessness of attempts to mix up Jews with Christian surroundings, by the process of conversion. Questionless, many good people look upon such conversions as quite possible and probable, and organize costly societies for their promotion. But Mr. Disraeli esteems them comparatively hopeless, so long as Christianity is not "at unity in itself." Mr. Selden cuttingly reminded the Puritans, when they anathematized their Jewish neighbors, that Puritanism's perpetually uprising sects hesitated as little to anathematize one another; and Mr. Disraeli plaintively asks, If the Hebrew intends to become a Christian, where is he to betake himself? "The greatest obstacle to the conversion of the unfortunate Israelite, when he may be disposed to embrace the Gospel, is the choice of his converter. Christianity becomes, for our neophyte, a world of waters, and nowhere shall this dove find a green branch to rest his weary wing; for, let the Hebrew choose where he will, he must be deemed impious, or be condemned by other Christians" (p. 212).

In sorrow must we confess it is too true that "our unhappy divisions" are still the great scandal of Christianity; that is, as exhibited in the conduct of its professors. Should "the Communion of Saints" we so often profess full faith in be ever restored, the miraculous victories of Christianity would, in all probability, return with it. Those now hovering in the distance would then flock to it

doctrines and institutions. The doctrine of the Trinity has its succession, as well as the orders of the ministry. Suppose one could not trace a belief in the Trinity to the days of the Apostles. We must then adopt the Unitarian theory, that it is a theological development.

as a congenial home, as sea-birds hurry to the shore when the storm begins to sigh.

Mr. Disraeli's final effort is to explain, so far as he may, the universal hatred visited on the Jews as a people. If such hatred were just, it would naturally be useless to indite a plea or indulge a hope for Jewish toleration. But he urges, as an apology against this hatred, four causes of no mean significance. One of the most prominent, no doubt, is the position of the Jews as "a peculiar people;" and not so only, but inevitably and unavoidably peculiar, from the character and demands of their own prescribed institutions. They have no free will about the predicaments which make them odious. Still, in sober justice, he admits that the Jews have not asked for lenity—as they well might, from the generous, on such grounds—but have rather given back hate for hate, scorn for scorn, and malice for oppression.¹ Such mournful and bitter reaction can only be prevented by a reversal of the former cruelties of Christians, and the inauguration of an era of tolerance and charity. Bestow them, therefore, upon the Jew, is his virtual plea. You will cease to execrate him when you begin to pity him and show him favor. In turn, he will admire and bless yourselves; for, as he affirms, with as much confidence as eagerness, "It is evident that the Jews, for every protecting government, become the most zealous patriots" (p. 250).

Mr. Disraeli's last appeal for his spiritual clients is, that the English Jews are among the choicest of their ancient race, descendants of Jews in Portugal and Spain, who, in turn, boast descent from the tribe-royal, and whose presence in England was a perpetual appeal to Protestant compassion, since they were "fugitives from the infernal fires of the *Autós da Fé*, and the living graves of the Inquisition" (p. 244).

To conclude. There is clearly a thread of excellent logic in Mr. Disraeli's portraiture of the genius of Judaism, asking at England's bar for tolerance and forbearance and considerate charity. He begins with its formative code of law, its political and religious and social constitution. He accounts for its national fall and its

¹ In extenuation of this, let us add the testimony of Mr. Selden to the liberality of their theology: "They held that themselves should have the chief place of happiness in the other world; but the Gentiles that were good men should, likewise, have their portion of bliss there too."—*Tab. Talk, Art. Salvation*. This is most decidedly kinder than Romanism, which will only allow a poor heretic to enter Paradise by the postern door of "invincible ignorance."

national dispersion. He explains the secrets of its continuity, even under such adverse and disheartening circumstances. He argues plausibly against the unhopefulness of its conversions. He touches English pride of race and manhood by showing that, in the Jewish blood of England, there is no gross debasement.

As to the taste and rhetoric which guide and aid him, no commendation is needful, in regard to such particulars, for the honored author of the "*Curiosities and Amenities of Literature*." There are few better adepts than he in the power and persuasiveness of uncorrupted English.

And well, therefore, may he close with such an appeal as this, to English good sense and purified humanity: "It would be an act of political justice that the name of Briton, which now must be attached to the Hebrew born in the dominions of Great Britain, should no longer be held in disregard; and it would be an act of political wisdom to remove all those civil disabilities and privations which hitherto have aggrieved and degraded so considerable a portion of our fellow-subjects" (p. 256). How far such arguments as Mr. Disraeli's prevailed with those in power, it is impossible to ascertain at this distant day. But we doubt not that his voice, with the better and more enlightened portion of his countrymen, was at once potential and effective. And the emancipated Jews of our times should render full tribute to a name which, in an hour of trial, sustained their cause with all its capabilities and with all its heart.



BOOK NOTICES.

MEMOIR OF COUNT DE MONTALEMBERT, Peer of France, Deputy for the Department of Doubs. A Chapter of recent French History. By Mrs. Oliphant. In two volumes. Edinburgh and London. 1872.

Montalembert is the most remarkable layman who, for a long time, has belonged to the Church of Rome. Belonged to her, we say, though not fitted for her, and, therefore, finally shorn away from her; yet all the while claiming to be hers, with intense, if not clamorous, eagerness! And so it is pleasant to find that, if French, he has obtained an English reviewer, in the last "London Quarterly." An appreciative, a considerate, and, too, a vivacious one, whom we are inclined to suspect of a consanguinity with his lively subject. For many a day, a Review, which used to be considered a little heavy, has not had a more enlivening or entertaining article.

The grand charm about Montalembert was, that, like Chateaubriand, he believed with his heart,—with all his heart. The poet Rogers discovered this, and said of him, as he went away from one of his breakfasts, "I envy that young man; not for his youth, nor for his fame, nor even for his handsome wife, but for his faith. He seems to believe in something, and *that* makes a man really happy." Aye, that was the grand secret of Montalembert's magnetism; he did, honestly and positively, believe in *something*. His creed was

the direct opposite of a writer in the "Westminster Review," finding fault with Premier Gladstone, who seems to wish to believe in *nothing*, and talks of the comforts of annihilation, because, forsooth, it is painless! A future that has *something* in it, has, to such people, naught in it but something dreadful. So utter destruction is their balmiest hope; they could not abide so much as poor Collins's "leap in the dark."

Montalembert had something definite to start with, and that, probably, saved him; for, curious as it may seem, De la Mennais was one of his early associates in a print once of notoriety for its liberalism,—the "Avenir." In that, these two, with Lacordaire, made attempts, as heroic as they were desperate, to liberalize and humanize Romanism. But they had to struggle with a system of iron sinews; under which, a Bellarmine said, no true devotee of it ever had a kind word for a heretic, and Le Maistre called Bacon a madman, and Locke a dullard. The effort, however, was honestly made; and it is even amusing to read the words in which the reviewer describes the chief hero of the quixotic adventure. "His life and character would be well worth studying if no higher or more useful moral could be drawn from them than that it is possible to reconcile a dogmatic, damuatory, exclusive system of belief, with generosity, liberality, Christian charity, patriotism, and philanthropy."

De la Mennais became an irrepressible liberal, and Montalembert, who believed in *something*, had to desert him, and seek a new departure. His mind had gone, so to speak, a doctrine-hunting; and now it took an æsthetic turn. It caught up æsthetics eagerly, and went off in a tangent after Christian art. Thought it had made a grand discovery, that there could be Christian art as well as Christian literature or Christian civilization!

This led to one of the great literary achievements of his life,—we mean outside of politics; for Montalembert was not only a writer, but an orator, and gathered plaudits in the halls of legislation. It was during one of his frequent tours for the inspection of mediæval monuments and buildings, that he discovered the resting-place of the remains of St. Elizabeth, in the Electorate of Hesse. They had slumbered in long oblivion; but her history had just enough of the forgotten and the romantic in it to fire Montalembert's fancy, and rouse his enthusiasm to make a subject of her. He did this with such wondrous felicity, that we doubt not, could the good Elizabeth have survived to read her own story, she would have gone off in a fit of ritualistic adoration, and worshipped her very self! She

could not have had a more enthusiastic painter, sculptor, and poet, to immortalize her memory.

And this was the dawn of something further off, and, in a literary point of view, much grander,—his work on “The Monks of the West.” Montalembert was, of all men, the fitting one to invest a monk with the most radiant and attractive of saintly halos. He could not look at a monk and see a spot of grease on his cowl, or the minutest specimen of vermin crawling on it. He saw a monk only through the spectacles of his wonder-working fancy, and at once saw him transfigured. Then his credulity was of the most obliging and omnivorous description. Miracles which might have provoked the doubts of quite ordinary people, never cost him a grimace or a smile. Every monkish miracle was as precious to him as the jewels which adorn the shrines of saints.

It may seem, to some, singular and contradictory that such a scholar as Montalembert, with perceptions of the keenest sort in some directions, should be so blind in respect to the foibles or fooleries of monkery. Why he was, at times, a glittering and potential orator, who made men like Thiers and Berruyer do him signal honor. But Montalembert in the French Senate, and Montalembert steeped and revelling in monkish lore, and sprinkling over it the diamond-dust of genius, are not two separate souls in a single body. Oh, no. He merely possessed the power of dividing himself according to the formulas of scholastic logic. He gave his *substance* to the forum, and his *accidents* to the legend. And his success was according to his sundered personality. It was substantial in the senate. Great men and profound men honored him there. It was accidental with the lighter portion of a community. They were caught by his scene-painting and poetic rhetoric; and, admiring him as they might a gaudy sunset, as soon, perhaps, forgot him.

Still, Montalembert has made his mark on the history of the times, and never more deeply, or attractively, or touchingly, than in the last days of a life falling gently to decay. His mind was sagacious and penetrating to the last. It saw, by the strong light of sober and saddening history, that his Church might claim *too much*. He divined the fatal step of the Council of the Vatican. He wrote his memorable letter, divulging his doubts and fears, but sixteen days before his death. That letter brought no response from Rome, but murmurs and mutterings of something worse. He was asked to recant, and struggled to do so with a faltering tongue.

Rome distrusted him, and well she might; for his heart sent no

blood into those lips which surrendered verbally. And, accordingly, he died virtually dishonored and under ban. For Rome can never forget a dissent from her loftiest claim, believe or admit what else we may; and so a man, in whom flourished the spirit of a votary and a martyr, died unblessed. And now, in closing, let us say that, if any one feels tempted to perversion by the æsthetics of Romanism—and they seem to have been the main secret of Montalembert's love for her—let him learn, from Montalembert's fate, that it is not admiration which Rome wants—it is not love which she wants—it is subjugation and slavery. Her tools she accepts and uses. All else is, to her, what the chaff is to the wheat, and she little cares if they are trodden under foot,—their very memories consigned to “dusty death.”

LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND. Delivered in Edinburgh, in 1872. By Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, D.D., Dean of Westminster. London: John Murray. 1872.

THREE LECTURES ON THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND. With especial reference to the Dean of Westminster's recent course on that subject. By Robert Rainy, D.D. Edinburgh: John MacLaren. 1872.

Dean Stanley evidently desires to be the Coryphæus of Broad Churchism, and, as such, to show how amiable his clique, party, or section—our readers may suit themselves about appellations—in the Church of England can be. Of course, he is bound to be an apostle for liberalism (we say not liberality, for that is an honest thing, and has an honest name), in all ways which are practicable, whether consistent or not.

It was strangely out of character for him, in the orthodox position of a high English dean, right under the walls of Lambeth Palace, and with the eyes of the ecclesiastical head of the Church of England looking down upon him, to refuse to admit a large conference of the Bishops of England and America to a place under his roof-tree, in the venerable Cathedral of Westminster. His reason, however, for doing so, was patent enough. He was afraid the conference might arraign his ecclesiastical *confrere*, Dr. Colenso. And it would have been most worrisky and malapropos for *him* to make his own parish church a dissecting-room for the heretical misdoings of the quondam Bishop of Natal. So he was constrained to refuse the Conference, point-blank. And then, afraid of the discharge of his own piece of ordnance, and perhaps conscience-smit-

ten under the grievous impropriety of his predicament, he attempted what the old fathers would have called an *apology*, in a letter to our late presiding Bishop Hopkins. He little appreciated his man, for he could not have fallen into worse hands. Bishop Hopkins knew how to give him the severest and most cutting of rebukes; for the bishop was perfectly able to deal with the most abrading ideas, in language of supreme parliamentary courtesy. The dean (we should have pitied him if he had not tried so poorly to flounder out of his awkward predicament) received a chastisement which rendered him the object of many a hearty laugh in England and America.

But the harshness of the adventure did not cure him. He then undertook to enact broadism in another direction; and, as he confidently fancied, in a more gainful way. He posted down into Scotland to deliver a series of lectures, in which he meant to tickle the sensitive ear-drums of Presbyterians, and obtain from them a plaudit which might heal wounds inflicted by the spear of an Ithuriel across the waters.

But, most unfortunately, he found Scotch Presbyterians as impracticable and keen as, and far rougher than, a prelate in this once colonial diocese of the bishop of his own metropolis. For we presume we need hardly tell *some*, that what is now the Atlantic portion of our United States, was once a part of the Diocese of London, and that Church lands in Vermont—the particular diocese of Bishop Hopkins—were given away by royal munificence to the Venerable Society for Propagating the Gospel in Foreign Parts. Still, the dean was so sure of his game, that he did not hesitate to insult the Episcopal Church of Scotland for the sake of the Presbyterians by whom it is surrounded. He took especial pains to show that the *name*, “Church of Scotland,” belongs fairly and only to the National Kirk, now established by law. This might be expected from a thorough Erastian, and endured with as much patience as Christian equanimity can rally. But to have him advance from such a position, and coolly recommend the Scottish Episcopal communion “to regard itself as a supplement to the needs of the National Church,” and to have that body patronize it as an “auxiliary,” to bring in “southern civilization,” this was certainly taxing the meekness of his more immediate brethren with as much of an “uttermost” as ordinary mathematics can figure out.

Perhaps those brethren were thinking so, and conjuring up a reply to such a mock recommendation. For, considered from *their* stand-point (and the dean knew it as well as he did the locality of Holyrood), his recommendation had not the excuse of ingenuity.

Impertinence, or a harder word, might have been expended on it. But the necessity was averted by the labor of a hand whose blows would be far more telling. The Presbyterians themselves, with their known national astuteness, penetrated the dean's poor scheme, and brought a champion against him from their own serried ranks. And they made a selection as happy for themselves as it was hapless for the Dean of Westminster.

They pitched upon Dr. Rainy, Professor of Church History in the "Free Church" of Edinburgh. His name is a new one to us, in these goings down of the sun; but as to a pun which it suggests at the dean's expense, we hope to be forgiven for seeing it. It could not well be missed by an open eye. It reminds one of the soaking storms which so often dash against the Scotch Highlands from the German Ocean and the broad Atlantic; and which seem not inclined to leave a dry thread in a coat, however sleek, brought up from Londonian "quarters."

Our readers must go to Dr. Rainy himself, if they want to see what some imagined would be only a Scotch mist converted into a regular Scotch deluge. We have neither time nor space to give them a full conception of the potency, the brusqueness, or the sharpness, with which the Dean of Westminster is summoned to a critic's reckoning. But we can give them a morsel or two, as an attestation of qualities. For example: The dean flings his Erastian advice broadcast. He not only recommends good honest Churchmen to become an appendix to Presbyterianism, but he then hints to Presbyterians themselves that they might thrive prodigiously if they, in turn, would become an appendix to a certain broad Church section, lying off south, and work cosely under the wings of a dignitary of the Church of England, in the main centre of England's Church and State. This would exalt Presbyterianism to a pinnacle of eminence; and, meanwhile, her new putative founder might become a pioneer, a hero, and a saint, all sweetly incorporated into one, with a name as redolent as summer's superbest nosegay!

Our Rainy friend, however, is by no means captivated by the ingratiating prospect. On the contrary, he flings it away, as if worse than a delusion,—as if a cheat no better than a Roman "holy coat;" and thus hurls at it the javelins of a martial indignation:

The short answer—but, of course, it would have to be politely expressed—the substantial answer is, "Go home again and get your own Church organized. If Episcopacy be the right way of it, keep it, and organize your Church with bishops. But put it in working order. If you cannot trust the clergy, take in the laity; if Episcopacy alone will not do, eke it out with Presbyte-

rianism; and if that will not do either, go on to Congregationalism, and help it out with that. Do this, and make a beginning, even in this nineteenth century. But if you will not, then do not come to us, who have been working our churches these three hundred years, to tell us, like the fox in the fable, that your own defects are a providential blessing, which have qualified you to be the model for all mankind."

The dean, with a perversity of taste as well as sense, undertook to work up the poet Burns into "completely a Scottish Churchman, in the largest sense." That is, he undertook to make a bid for Broad Churchism in Scotland, by erecting Robert Burns into one of its exponents, and hoping to smuggle him in under the ban of admiration for the national poet. Alas! Burns's moral sentimentalities made him about as good a member of a Calvinistic Kirk as the same sentimentalities made Horace a Christian. Who does not know that both indulge, occasionally, in moral maxims worthy a devout philosopher? But the acceptance of such things for genuine religion, rouses Dr. Rainy into the strain of a Demosthenes:

Of all perverse destinies with which earth could perplex his (Burns's) fame, did it ever visit his imagination that crowds of rhetorical men would go about in never-ending floods of eloquence, to prove his life a great moral victory and triumph? Did he ever foresee that every after-dinner orator, who wished to show what a flexible thing advanced Christianity can be, would harp upon the passages that saddened his own thoughtful hours, as proofs of what may comport with high moral and Christian excellency? Shame upon them that are so destitute of love for Burns, that have so little sympathy with the pathos of his view of his own life, as not to understand they are to let that alone? Let them celebrate his genius, if it needs to be celebrated. Let them celebrate his honest manhood—a great deal too straightforward, I will be bold to say, to tolerate the despicable sophistry that is spent on his career—let them dwell on the undying glow he shed into Scottish minds and hearts, and homes and lives and history; and for the rest, let it alone. Nobody is going to meddle with it, if themselves will let it alone. But if they will not, on themselves be the shame.

A curse upon the clown and knave,
Who will not let his ashes rest!

The dean betrays the usual inconsistencies of his school. They have no strong convictions, no deep, abiding and guiding principles; and, sometimes adopting whims or fancies in their stead, cut right athwart the course of those who are governed by something steadier and more bracing, with a wild fatality. Dr. Stanley, the devotee of nothingarian broadism, has, of course, no *taste* for Scotch Calvinistic martyrs, and, therefore, could not spare a slant at them. They were martyrs fairly enough, and so he could not deny them the conse-

crated name. But, alas! they were martyrs by mistake; and their deaths,—oh, they were thoroughly sincere, but, also, so absurd! Victims not for a great cause, but a sorry idea!

Can it be wondered at that Dr. Rainy should fume and storm a little over such ruthless slaughter? But let us hear him:

Well, now, I will take leave to ask a question. I am not going, I think, to say anything unfair. I hate the system of insinuating a calumny one dare not openly express. The dean has as full right to receive full credit at our hands, for perfect sincerity and integrity, as any one of us at the hand of another. And, therefore, I say beforehand, that whatever sacrifice the dean's conscience might require of him, in the maintenance of candor and honor, I am not to doubt he would make freely; God's grace helping him, which is needed by us all. But what I cannot but ask, is this: What is that *thing*, which is that *doctrinal truth*, in behalf of which the dean's conscience, according to his present lights, would lead him to think that people ought to undergo martyrdom, and might do so without absurdity? Where would he draw the line, and make a stand? I declare, most seriously, I do not know. I have not the least idea. . . . Ah, but martyrdom in a good cause is the life-blood of the Church and of the world. It is that which stems the current of an unbelieving epicureanism, and of a scoffing scepticism, and rings into the hearts of men the conviction that the faith cannot die, cannot be killed, cannot be conquered, lives on in the strength of an unseen Lord, and has its coming victory sure.

Such has been Dean Stanley's recompense for a hollow attempt, not to propitiate Presbyterians, for whom he has no more real liking than he had reverence for their martyrs, but to build up his own reputation by a praise he did not deserve; and which he went about to obtain in a way that might have answered among politicians, but which is not yet accounted orthodox among divines who believe in creeds and in principles, and the definite morality they sanction, not to say require. It ought to teach him a lesson he has not yet learned from the repetitions of the Ninth Commandment in his Liturgy. And when he turns from that to the Gospels, he should not make another big adventure without studying the allegorical counsel, derived from the failure of a calculator who sat not down beforehand to count his costs.

THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER. Edition of Charles Van Benthuyssen & Sons. Albany, N. Y. 1878.

This book has been thoroughly revised, and we believe it to be as accurate an edition as any that is circulating. In one respect, we think it more accurate than our new standard. We allude to the *Amens* which follow the thanksgivings in the Baptismal Offices,

and which are introduced by the exhortation, "Let us faithfully and devoutly give thanks unto Him, and say."

The question (a practical one) which had often been raised about these thanksgivings was, whether they should be said by the minister *alone*, or by the people in conjunction with him. The committee which sent up a proposed standard to the General Convention, in 1844, printed one of the amens to these thanksgivings in the Roman character, and the other in italics. It is a common liturgical rule that, when the amen is in Roman, the indication is, that it is to be said by both minister and people; and, generally, too, what precedes, as in the confessions, the creeds, and the Lord's Prayer. The committee wished the General Convention to decide between the amens, and make a settlement of the matter. The House of Bishops took especial interest in it, and ruled that *both* the amens should be in the Roman character, as an indication that the thanksgivings should *both* be said by the officiator and his congregation. Everybody acquiesced at once; the Roman amen alone was introduced into the standard, and stood unquestioned a quarter of a century! The ruling was a very simple and perspicuous one; holding that "and say" was to be taken literally, and that both parties were to *say* with the lips, and not one with the lips, and the other only with the heart. This ruling has been reversed by the Committee of 1871; but why, or on what grounds, does not appear. An express and carefully considered ruling by our highest authority—unchanged, unquestioned for a quarter of a century—ought not lightly to be set aside.

So, in the Apostles' Creed, we think Van Benthuyzen's edition more correct than the new standard. It puts a comma, instead of a semicolon, after "The Holy Catholic Church." The former standard went upon the proper liturgical principle of distinguishing the Twelve Articles of the Creed by punctuation. These Articles are alluded to in the Baptismal Offices, and are familiarly known in text-books to students of theology. It was intended, therefore, to distinguish these Articles by the semicolon, the colon, and the period, while *parts of the same Article* were to be distinguished only by a comma. It was thought that such a matter might be explained, even in a Sunday-school, and aid in catechetical lectures.

Now, "The Holy Catholic Church, the Communion of Saints," formed *one* Article,—the *ninth* of the twelve. So but a comma was placed between its clauses. The comma was denounced as doctrinal; it was the innocent cause of sharp comments in newspapers, and of long speeches in General Conventions. But the poor comma

was simply *liturgical*, and, if it could have reflected, would have been astounded to find itself a pivot for momentous bearings upon doctrine. Doubtless, the Article describes the Church under two obvious attributes, viz., as a body which, while catholic enough to spread the world over, should never forget that it is a body, not for separation of parts, not for schisms, but for unity, for intercommunion. It has but one Head, but one Lord, and so there should be oneness through the whole, however widely extended. That is, it should be, how wide soever its domain, but a single communion!¹

But the comma was complained of as intensely doctrinal, though it was simply and solely a liturgical effort to help a rector with catechumens! And still, if put away, as it is, why is its fellow semicolon *still* put away after "He descended into Hell?" "He descended into Hell The third day He rose from the dead," is but one Article; and so the old semicolon after Hell was dropped, and a comma inserted in its place. If one semicolon must be extinguished, the other should be also. Our present standard is inconsistent with itself!

No one who has never revised the Prayer Book for the press, has any conception of the difficulty of punctuating it upon proper liturgical principles, and of making it "at unity with itself." A standard edition should be first published in a proposed form, as was the standard of 1844. That form should remain open for free criticism, between two General Conventions, and then adopted after a thorough sifting of its merits.

A HARMONY OF THE FOUR GOSPELS IN GREEK, according to the text of Tischendorf; with a Collation of the Textus Receptus, and the texts of Griesbach, Lachman, and Tregelles. By Frederic Gardiner, D.D., Professor in the Berkeley Divinity School. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.

We are agreeably surprised to find that a work prepared amid the atmosphere of our Connecticut School of Theology has been republished in Scotland, by such a house as that of Messrs. T. & T. Clark. The work is criticised briefly by the "British Quarterly;" and as that smacks pretty strongly of Presbyterianism and Congre-

¹ The history of the Creed itself shows this. The clause, "The Communion of Saints," was not in the earlier copies of the Creed, but was, probably, introduced in the times of the Donatist schism. So it relates to this world, and not the text; and is simply a Church protest against schismatical divisions.

gationalism, we did not anticipate praise for an Episcopal publication. But we believe the "Review" *tries* to be fair; albeit, it works from a stand-point not more to our fancy than the one from which we work would be to theirs. *Sum cuique*; we give the Scotch reviewers all the commendation we can, and thank them for such language as this concerning an emanation from one of the oldest of England's colonies: "This volume will be very useful to certain classes of students. The title-page quoted above, lengthy as it is, hardly conveys all the information that a cursory inspection of the volume will easily supply. One valuable feature of the work is a careful tabular collation of the harmonies of Robinson, Greswell, Stroud, and Tischendorf, with an index which enables the student at once to find any portion of the four Gospels in the author's diatessaron."

We can remember the day when the word "lengthy" was accounted a sheer and bald Americanism. If it is, our Scotch neighbors seem to have adopted it without wincing. But this by the way. After commending an American author, it was natural to recoil and abate a little, and so the reviewers say, "The parable of the *minae* is thought to be so closely identified with that of the talents, that the latter is torn from Matthew, xxv., and placed in juxtaposition with Luke, xix. 11-28. Whatever general harmony of illustration is observable here, it appears to us to be a grievous wrong to the sublime contrasts in Matthew, xxv., to tear that discourse to pieces." However, the seeming harshness of this criticism is palliated by a concluding sentence. "Though we differ largely as to details, we thank Dr. Gardiner for a book which provides so much valuable material for study."

LUYSTER'S CATALOGUE OF IMPORTED BOOKS, No. 76. 188 Fulton street, N. Y., upstairs.

They who have never visited No. 138 Fulton street, should do so as soon as convenient, provided, only, they take care not to meet with such a fate as a reverend friend of ours once did. He emptied his pocket before he knew it, had not enough left to buy a dinner, and to pay his railroad fare had incontinently to borrow! We have picked up the following slip from a secular paper, which we think does Mr. Luyster no more than justice. We have dealt with him for years, and can adopt every word of it:

The best books are not always new books. The finest works in the literature of all the European nations are old, and the finest editions are often the

old ones. The popular demand now is for cheap books, and most of the new publications are cheaply got up; but many book-buyers are probably not aware that there is a place in the city of New York where the best English editions of ancient and modern books can be had at prices less than are often paid for trash. Mr. A. L. Luyster is an importer of English and foreign books, who has a vast collection of volumes lining the walls of several large rooms in the upper part of the spacious building, 138 Fulton street. He has agents in Europe, who forward fresh invoices by nearly every steamer, and he issues a catalogue every month or two. These catalogues are excellent descriptive and priced lists of the books, and persons who are fond of bibliography, or sometimes indulge in the purchase of rare old and fine new books, should send their addresses to Mr. Luyster, and solicit an occasional catalogue, from which selections can be made, almost as well as though one went to the trouble and expense of a journey to New York. All books sold from his catalogues are warranted perfect, unless otherwise expressly stated; and any books not agreeing with the description may be returned, within ten days, at the option of the purchaser. This is perfectly fair, and leaves no room for dissatisfaction. Mr. Luyster's last two catalogues are now before us; and we find priced and described in them copies of the best editions of a number of standard English authors, a great variety of Shakesperiana, the first and the second edition of the Bishops' Bible (A. D. 1568 and 1572), Cranmer's Bible (1566), a complete set of Pickering's edition of the famous Bridgewater Treatises, the complete works of Hogarth from the original plates, *Musee Francaise*, *Visconti's Iconographie Grecque et Romaine*, a full set of the London Art Journal, and many other rare and valuable works on art. We also notice in one of these catalogues a number of curious treatises on freemasonry. When any of our readers, who delight in books, go to New York, they should spend an hour or two in looking at Mr. Luyster's shelves.

We will add, that, from one of the catalogues referred to, we were able to obtain Sir James Ware's rare folio on Irish history and antiquities. It is a volume we have long sought after in vain. It has a fine head of Sir James as a frontispiece, and was printed at Dublin in 1705. It evidently belonged to a genuine lover of antiques, for it is carefully rebacked, and its torn leaves repaired with as much tact and solicitude as an economical housekeeper would expend in darning the well-worn stockings of mercurial school-boys.

One feature of Irish antiquities, carefully preserved, struck our eyes instantly. The crosses on the coins were *Greek* crosses, and not *Roman* crosses. This use of the *Greek* cross shows that Ireland's early affinities were with the East, and not with Italy. Just so it was in England; in St. Cuthbert's coffin, for example, and in the Church of St. Peiran, when disinterred from the sands.



AMERICAN CHURCH REVIEW.

THE LAW OF DIVORCE, ETC.

(Continued from the July number.)

AN important question has arisen, viz., whether these precepts of the Saviour were declared for His Church and followers throughout all time, or were limited to the Jewish nation—legislating for that people only—and correcting the regulations of Moses, or the erroneous interpretation of them by a class of Jews.

Sir James McIntosh observes that this must have been the opinion of Cranmer and his associates (three bishops, twelve ecclesiastics, and several learned laymen), who framed the *Reformatio Legum*. They proposed to allow an absolute divorce for adultery, cruelty, or desertion, and that the innocent party might remarry.¹

Another view may have been taken by them which some have advocated, viz., that what was meant to be forbidden, was the arbitrary power of the husband to put away his wife for any other cause than adultery; but to allow him in that case to exercise his former power by bill of divorcement. Hence the subject of a divorce through judicial process was not affected by any Divine law,

¹ History of England, ii. p. 274. Burns' Ecc. Law, ii. p. 503.

but was left within the province of Church and State to act upon, in their respective spheres. And the occasion and manner of announcing the law in the passages from St. Mark and St. Luke, above cited, somewhat favor this view. Thus in the tenth chapter of St. Mark, the Pharisees ask if it was lawful for a man to put away his wife. The Saviour inquired, "What did Moses command?" The answer was, "He suffered to write a bill of divorcement and put her away." Jesus replied, "That was on account of their hardness of heart, but in the beginning it was not so." Thus far, this absolute authority of the husband, and the mode of its exercise, seems to be all that was had in view; and the argument is plausible, that this was interdicted except in the one specified case, and that no more was intended. And there would be then nothing inconsistent in Church or State allowing the power in other cases upon judicial examination and judgment, and subjecting even the one case to restrictions. There are some proofs that in early ages the divorce for adultery was not necessarily accompanied with judicial formalities. Van Espen mentions a decree *De Divortiiis*, forbidding a dismissal without an application to the Episcopal tribunals;¹ and in the statements of early Fathers, we find the term dismissal sometimes used, without any connection with judicial proceedings.²

But the order of the narrative in the nineteenth chapter of St. Matthew, as well as the precepts therein, are, we apprehend, decisive against this view. The question is asked, "Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause?" The answer was by a reference to the creation of male and female at the beginning; then the declaration, that he who made them pronounced that a man and his wife were no more twain, but one flesh; then this entire union is reannounced by Jesus, and then there is the conclusion and command, What God had joined together, let not man put asunder. The question is put, Why then did Moses sanction a writing of divorcement? The answer is the same as in St. Mark; but from the beginning it was not so. Then we have the result in the shape of a law: "Whosoever, therefore, shall put away his wife, except," etc.; and the comment of the disciples follows.

We cannot scrutinize these passages in their order too closely. How must the Pharisees have understood them? It may be stated thus. We inquired as to the lawfulness of divorcing a wife for *any*

¹ Jus Universum, tome i. p. 609.

² See the passages *post*—Judgments of Fathers.

cause. You declare that God, in instituting marriage at the beginning, created such a unity between husband and wife, that they became one; and that such a union formed by God may not be annulled by man. But if such was the Divine law, why did Moses authorize the letter of divorcement? He tells them it was because of evils flowing from prevailing wickedness that Moses was allowed to relax the law. But I now restore it to its full force, with one exception. For fornication, that union may be broken; otherwise, whoever puts away his wife and marries again is an adulterer, and he who marries her thus put away, commits adultery.

It seems to us that such must have been the line of thought and understanding of the Pharisees. They may have disbelieved the authority of Jesus to declare or restore the law; they could not doubt that He meant to assert such power. And the disciples assuredly so understood their Master's sayings.

Thus we have, in language distinct and authoritative, the declaration that marriage was of Divine institution, and created such an identification as admitted of no severance, except with Divine sanction. We have God upon earth repeating and reaffirming this. We have Him accounting for a permitted modification of that law, and restoring and proclaiming it afresh, making one sole exception to its otherwise universal obligation. For fornication a divorce may be had; but for nothing else. We have questioners and disciples so comprehending His language. It is impossible to imagine that all these weighty and solemn declarations of the Saviour were solely intended for the Jewish people, and even as to them only to correct the errors of a school of doctors. They are, by origin and nature, applicable to all believers in all times; and they present a rule wholly supreme, irreversible, incapable of modification by any power of man, in every Christian relation, and for every spiritual purpose. The old Homily sums up the matter well: "Christ our Saviour, coming to restore the law of His Heavenly Father unto the right sense, understanding, and meaning—among other things, reformed this abuse of the law of God. For whereas, the Jews used, of a long sufferance by custom, to put away their wives for every cause at their pleasure, Christ correcting that evil custom, did teach, that if any man put away his wife, and marrieth another, for any cause except only for adultery (which was death by the law), he was an adulterer, and forced, also, his wife so divorced to commit adultery, if she were joined to any other man; and the man also so joined with her, to commit adultery."

TENET OF THE COUNCIL OF TRENT UNTENABLE.

Before the Council of Trent, very many of the ablest writers of the Church of Rome held that adultery justified an absolute divorce.¹ That Council finally settled that it only sanctioned a separation from bed and board. The Council did not anathematize those who held that marriage was dissoluble for adultery, but, with a fine casuistry, only those who held that the Council erred in declaring it indissoluble.

The text of the decision is given in the note.²

The deputies from Venice had urged the practice of the Greek Church, and obtained some modification of the canon which had been proposed.

The grounds of this decision, among others, are the omission of the exception by St. Mark and St. Luke,—the want of any qualification in the precept of St. Paul in Romans, vii., and in I. Corinthians, vii. 39.

We have before adverted to the omission in the other Gospels, but the subject requires a more full examination.

Different opinions have existed as to the narration of the Sermon on the Mount, given by St. Matthew and St. Luke. Lange, after examining them, considers that that of St. Matthew states what was declared by Jesus to the disciples on the mountain, and that of Luke, what was addressed to the multitude when He came down.³ We notice much that is the same or similar in both, and much omitted in one and found in the other.

But whether this was the case, or there were two entirely different occasions on which the sermon was uttered, the point is simply that the Lord omitted at one time some of the precepts given at the other. If there was any contradiction of precepts express, or necessarily inferable, the case would be embarrassing; but there is none, and the command and exception in the fifth chapter of St.

¹ Van Espen in *Canones Ancyros*, or Canon xiv.

² *Si quis dixerit ecclesiam errare cum docuit ut decet, juxta evangelicam et apostolicam doctrinam, propter adulterium alterius conjugum matrimonii vinculum non posse dissolvi; et utrumque vel etiam innocentem qui causam adulterio non dedit, non posse, altero conjuge vivente, aliud matrimonium contrahere, mæcharique eum qui, dimissa adultera, aliam duxerit, et eam quæ dimisso adultero, alii nupserit, anathema sit* (Van Espen, *Jus Universum*, tome iii. p. 607). ³ Lange on Luke, ch. vi.

Matthew is explicit, and unaffected by any omission in other scripture of part of the same discourse.

As to the passage in St. Luke (xvi. 18), the commentators notice its singular want of connection with what precedes or follows it, and the interjectional character of the verse. The duration of the Law and the Prophets until John is stated in verse 16; and then in verse 17, that it is easier for heaven and earth to pass away, than for one tittle of the law to fail. The nineteenth verse is the beginning of the parable of Lazarus.

We submit that the Saviour is here declaring the immutability of that portion of Divine commands which was common to Law, Prophets, and the new kingdom of God.¹ He gives one example and illustration of this enduring law. For such a purpose it was needless to state the qualification and exception. When declaring a command and rule of action, he covered the whole subject; when adducing an example of another general law, he omits a part of that example.

We have, then, to compare the narrative in the nineteenth chapter of St. Matthew with that in the tenth chapter of St. Mark. Here the time and occasion were the same. There is in St. Matthew the explicit assertion that the Saviour declared the exception. There is no mention of such exception by St. Mark.

Considering the point as a mere question of evidence, apart from the idea of inspiration in any, the lowest form, the true view seems to be this. St. Matthew was present, and a personal competent witness. It is generally conceded that his was the first gospel written. Dr. Davidson thinks it was written as early as A.D. 43. There is no ground for supposing that St. Mark was present. Even if we adopt the tradition that he was one of the Seventy, or was the young man who followed our Lord on the night of His betrayal, or both, there is no evidence of his presence.

There is a general acquiescence in the opinion that he wrote his gospel at Rome, and either from the dictation of St. Peter, or from the recollection of St. Peter's teachings and statements.² He did not then write from his own knowledge and hearing. Either, then, St. Peter, in his narrative, omitted the exception, or St. Mark omitted to record it.

¹ We apprehend that it is a great error to restrict the moral law (as it is termed) left in force under the Gospel, to the Ten Commandments.

² See Davidson's elaborate argument; Lange upon Matthew and Mark; Townsend's New Testament, and Westcott's Canon.

Upon such a state of facts, no man of ordinary judgment could refuse credit to the positive statement of a witness, a hearer of the declaration, and in no way discredited.

Again, the Jewish law, which so abhorred adultery as to punish it with death, was not abrogated at the advent, though probably much disused.¹ Suppose there had been no exception stated by St. Matthew,—how would the case have stood? A law not expressly annulled, denounced the crime as so heinous as to incur death. It would be reasonable, consistent, and logical to imply a modification of the general precept as to putting away a wife by permitting it in case of adultery. If punishable by death, it may be by divorce. So the exception might reasonably be intended, and there be no necessity for its insertion; and so the positive declaration in one passage is but an expression of the intendment of the other; or the intendment in the other confirms, rather than impairs, the positiveness of the first.

As to the passage in Romans, we notice that St. Paul is enforcing the power of the law over a man during his life, and illustrates his declaration by reference to the obligation of a woman to her husband. He is not presenting or defining a rule. If he were, we should be bound to understand him in connection with, and subjection to, what the Saviour had declared. And if inconsistency was too glaring to be capable of any reconciliation, his assertions must be rejected as spurious or erroneous.

And these remarks apply also to the passage in the seventh chapter of Corinthians.

In our judgment, then, it stands a fixed, distinct, and absolute Gospel truth, that marriage may be dissolved for adultery, so as wholly to release the innocent party from its bond; and may not be broken with such a result, for any other cause whatever.

IV.

RULES OF NATIONAL CHURCHES.

We shall next inquire as to the tenets of National Churches in regard to divorce.

(1.) We have before shown that, until the Council of Trent, the

¹ Mr. Lewis, Hebrew Antiq. iii., observes that the Jewish law did not oblige a husband to proceed to inflict the penalty, nor probably did the executors of the law do so, except when the woman was publicly caught in the act.

question was not settled in the Romish Church, and many of their learned canonists held that adultery was ground for a full divorce. That Council disposed of the question, deciding that adultery only justified a separation from bed and board.

The Papal Canon Law allows such a separation, also, for cruelty, desertion, impotence, and entering into a religious profession.¹

(2.) The Greek Church holds that adultery fully severs the bond. But it appears that she treats the laws of Justinian and Justin as binding upon her. The law of divorce, as contained in the Novels, is recognized. By that law, numerous causes besides adultery are grounds for a dissolution. In some cases penalties are imposed for exercising the power.²

Balsamon, in his Commentary on the Fifth Apostolical Canon, recognizes the rule of the civil law as the rule of the Church. This is singular in a Church of such high discipline. We shall hereafter notice the imperial laws more particularly.

Mr. Bishop quotes, also, Walterus, the Canonist and Professor at Bonne, as stating that the ordinances of Justinian and Justin, although in contradiction of Scripture, had been gradually adopted by the Greek Church. Repudiation by mutual consent was finally held to be void. He adds, that it was only for adultery of the wife that the divorce was allowed, not for that of the husband. The Puritans of Massachusetts at one time took the same distinction.³

At the time of the Apostolical Canon before cited, it was the rule of the Greek Church that bishops, priests, and deacons might be ordained, although married, and should continue to live with their wives afterward. On the mere ground of ordination and religious vows, they could not separate. But under the Twelfth Canon of the Council of Trullo (692), a bishop, after his consecration, could not consort with his wife, or even live beneath the same roof with her. This law did not extend to presbyters or deacons.⁴ Yet it became the discipline of the Latin Church to extend it to these also, whereby, says Van Espen, a dishonor was done to the Sacrament itself, as if the union could not consist with piety.⁵

(3.) We are to observe that in such cases the marriage was not dissolved, but separation only enjoined.

In England, there was a Canon of Eggbright (A.D. 740), providing that if a woman departed from her husband with a contempt for

¹ Ayliff's Parergon. ² Bishop on Marriages, § 372. ³ Kent's Comment. vol. ii. 103, n. ⁴ Van Espen, Scholia in Canones, Apost. Canon vi. Balsamon and Zonaras concur. ⁵ See Canones Trullanos.

him, refusing to return and be reconciled, he might take another wife, after five or seven years, with the consent of the bishop.¹ By the Tenth of Theodore's Canons, no one was to relinquish his own wife but for fornication, as the Gospel teaches. If any man divorce his wife, he was not to be coupled to another.² Yet the Penitential of Theodore expressly allowed the innocent party to marry again. The canon has therefore been regarded as a recommendation, rather than a law.³

The law of the Church of England and of the State prior to Foljamb's case, in the forty-fourth year of Elizabeth (1602), authorized the absolute dissolution of a marriage for adultery. This was held in Barr's case before the Delegates in 1548; and it was also held that the innocent party could marry again.⁴ But in Foljamb's case, the law was otherwise settled. A husband, after getting a divorce in an ecclesiastical court, on account of his wife's infidelity, married again, and the second marriage was adjudged to be void, because adultery was only a ground for separation *a mensa et thoro*. Archbishop Whitgift, with the advice of many divines, supported this view, and led to the decision.⁵

President Woolsey states⁶ that Professor Craik, in an appendix to the Romance of the Peerage, has examined what papers can be found relating to the case. From these it appears that there was a question of title to land raised. I should judge it was trespass. At any rate, the title of Foljamb depended upon the right of his second wife. He had got a divorce in the Ecclesiastical Court for the adultery of his first wife. If the second woman was not his lawful wife, he could not avail himself of her title. Thus the question of the force of the divorce would properly be an issue in the case.

The Star Chamber, grievous as were the offences which led to its dissolution, was a court created in the time of Henry VII., of extensive jurisdiction. It was composed of the King and Council in *Camera*. The Lord Chancellor, Lord Treasurer, and Lord Privy Seal were members; calling to their aid a bishop, with the two Chief Justices. The decisions of this court would be and were deemed of force. It was Whitgift, Archbishop of Canterbury, that was a member, not Bancroft. And the reporters and legal authors quoting it subsequently, prove that it was recognized as a judgment.⁷

¹ Johnson's Ecc. Canons, Part 1. ² *Ibid.*, p. 14. ³ *Ibid.* ⁴ McQueen's Husband and Wife, 208. ⁵ 3d Salheld's Rep. 138. Also in Noys's Reports. ⁶ Essay, etc., Appendix, p. 291. ⁷ Cunningham's Dict. Tit. Courts. Comyn's Digest, iii. 812.

About a century afterward, the practice arose of applying to Parliament for a full divorce upon the adultery of the wife. In a few instances the wife was permitted to apply. The practice began with the case of the Marquis of Northampton, who had obtained a divorce *a mensa et thoro* in the Ecclesiastical Court. He then married again. The Protestant canonists answered questions put to them by saying that the bond of wedlock being broken by the fact of infidelity, the second marriage was lawful. The Parliament of 1551 ratified it.¹

At first the proceeding was only allowed after trial and sentence in the Ecclesiastical Court. But the Duke of Norfolk's case, in 1700, was one of a direct application to Parliament. An argument of Bishop Cozzens (Cosine) was produced and delivered in Ross's case, in the year 1669. He contended that adultery worked an entire dissolution, by the Divine law, the old English law, and by the judgment of the Reformed Church. The Greek Church and the Constitutions of Christian Emperors permitted it. He concluded: "It has been said, that if this bill pass, it will pass against the Church of England. I know not why they should be called the Church of England that join with the Council of Trent, and plead so much to uphold it, rather than others who join with all the Reformed Churches, and plead against the Canon of the Church of Rome, which hath laid an anathema upon us if we do not agree with them."

It is a mistake, however, to treat these Parliamentary divorces as mere acts of legislative power. In *Shaw vs. Gould*² it was shown that the proceedings were of a judicial character, upon evidence taken, and sentence duly pronounced.

We have it, then, fully settled that the former English law of Church and State recognized the dissolubility of marriage for adultery, whatever difficulties were interposed in obtaining a judgment. And we have not a trace of its being allowed for any other cause. The present law under a statute of 20, 21 Victoria, is hereafter stated.

(4.) We next notice the action of our own Church connected with the matter.

In the year 1808, the General Convention resolved: "It is the sense of this Church, that it is inconsistent with the law of God, and the ministers of this Church shall not unite in matrimony any person

¹ Burns' Ecc. Law, vol. ii. p. 503, n.

² House of Lords Scotch Appeal Cases, 1865.

who is divorced, unless it be on account of the other party having been guilty of adultery." This resolution indicated the judgment of the Church, but did not form a law. It was before and then considered that a minister was not bound to perform the marriage ceremony against his conscience, although authorized by the civil law to do so.

In 1868, the following canon was adopted: "No minister of the Church shall solemnize matrimony in any case where there is a divorced wife or husband of either party still living; but this canon shall not apply to the innocent party in a divorce for the cause of adultery, or to parties once divorced seeking to be united again." The clause of the resolution of 1808, as to the inconsistency with the law of God, is omitted in this canon.

The last clause of the canon will apply to the case of a divorce for adultery, where that is the only ground known to the law of the State, and also to the cases where it is permitted for other causes. In strictness, it would seem that, as the Church should hold that divorce is not warranted except for the one cause, the tie remains, and a remarriage is at least needless. And if marriage was a Sacrament, as the Romanists teach, the argument from the analogous case of the non-iteration of baptism would be of force. But as it is a rite, though a holy one, the Church, we deem, has acted wisely in this provision.

The question, whether the Church should not have forbidden the marriage of the guilty party, even after the death of the other, is hereafter noticed.

In the year 1817, Bishop White, as chairman of a committee, reported that the Table of Kindred and Affinity established in the Church of England was received in this Church; but as to the provision respecting a man's marrying his brother's wife, or a woman marrying her husband's brother, or her sister's husband, although the Church disapproved of such marriages, yet it should not be a cause for repelling from the Holy Communion, but that it should not be lawful for any clergyman to celebrate such a marriage.

No definite action was taken upon this report.

(5.) The marriage ordinances of Zurich, 1525, allowed divorce for adultery, malicious desertion, plotting against the life of a consort, and for such other causes as the judge should deem proper.¹

By the Ordinances Ecclesiastiques of Geneva, 1541, it was allowed for malicious desertion; but it is declared, If a man, being

¹ *Apud* Woolsey, Essay, etc.

debauched, abandon his wife without her being culpable therefor, at the end of a year, under certain restrictions and cautions, she may be admitted to marry.

Nothing can be more explicit than the statement of the law by the Church in Nordlingen: "In the matter of divorce we follow our Lord Jesus Christ (Matthew, xix.), not permitting true divorce except for the cause of fornication, nor without the production of witnesses, and before a magistrate. . . . But in other things we follow the Apostle Paul (I. Corin. vii.), and allow persons who seek a divorce to be separated by authority of the magistrate, but on condition that they remain unmarried, according to the precept of Christ" (Matthew, xix.). With this the sacred Liturgy of the Church of the Foreigners, at Frankfort, concurs.

On the other side, as President Woolsey says, the great majority of the ordinances add malicious desertion as a ground of divorce. One of them thus expresses the rule: "By no means shall any divorce be allowed or procured, except in two cases, which Christ and Paul have allowed in the Gospel. As, namely, in the first place, when one of the parties has been proved guilty and convicted of adultery, and the innocent party will not become reconciled,—in such case, at length the sentence of divorce shall be pronounced according to Christ's words (Matthew, xix.). . . . In the second place, in cases of malicious desertion, running away and abandonment, of which St. Paul speaks" (I. Corinthians, vii.).

V.

We shall next notice the opinions and judgments of eminent men and writers of later days upon the subject.

We have before noticed the fact that Cranmer and his associates in the *Reformatio Legum* expressly allowed a full divorce in cases of desertion, cruelty, and mutual hatred, as well as for adultery; and the innocent party might marry again. Bishop Cosine, in the argument in Ross's case, before mentioned, contended that wilful and continued desertion was a sufficient ground.

Archdeacon Taylor, in his "Elements of the Civil Law" (p. 351), states one version of the passage in St. Matthew to be, that it includes not only adultery, but such facts as had the nature (*rationem*) of adultery,—as were like it, in defeating the ends of the institution. He considers, also, that the Apostle, in the seventh chapter of Corinthians, sanctions a divorce for malicious desertion. Grotius thinks

that acts of stubborn rebellion against the husband justify a dissolution. Martin Bucer supposes that the question of the Pharisees, and the answer of the Saviour, referred only to the case of a wife adhering to her husband, and generally fulfilling her duties. In such a case she could only be divorced for adultery; but for other misconduct, accompanied with abandonment, she could be divorced.¹ His reasoning applies equally to the husband. Milton asserts a right in a husband to dismiss his wife nearly as absolute as that exercised under the Mosaic law. He would allow it in all cases in which the object of the union is frustrated, for causes making the wife obnoxious to the husband.² His favorite dogma of the superiority of man over woman, which led him to inquire why "that novelty on earth, that fair defect of nature," was ever created, aided in inducing his extreme views.

It is stated that Erasmus entertained views not very different from those of Milton.³

It is to be noticed that in all, or nearly all, of these citations it is conceded, expressly or necessarily, that adultery is included in the term fornication, whatever else it may be deemed to comprise. Yet there are some writers who deny that it is included. They rely chiefly on the ground that this was punished by death.

We have sought to show from the prevalence of the School of Shammai, and otherwise, even under the Mosaic command as to *uncleanness*, the death-doom and the divorce came in practice to co-exist. This was in relaxation and modification of the original law, which never could have meant that an adulteress could remarry. But the punishment fell into disuse, though the law remained. A husband might be averse to the infliction of the punishment; the divorce was the alternative; and the Saviour, in solemnly recognizing this as a penalty, may be reasonably deemed to have superseded the stoning to death of the harsher law. It must not be forgotten how mercy was to prevail over judgment in the New Dispensation.

Mr. Lewis notices that the husband was not bound to subject the wife to the Waters of Jealousy, nor to death, unless, perhaps, she was caught in the act.

Again, an argument for this virtual repeal may be found in the treatment of the woman caught in adultery. The Pharisees forbore to inflict the punishment, or to go through the forms which it seems attended it; but the disuse of the law had not abrogated it.

¹ See Bishop on Marriage, and Shelford's Law of Divorce. ² Prose Works, p. 105. ³ Doddridge's Expos. vol. ii. p. 1632.

They bring her to Jesus as one having, or claiming to have, authority in the matter. They refer to the law that such should be stoned to death; but what sayest thou? The answer, if taken literally, would preclude the possibility of any one executing the sentence; but it may be treated as only requiring that he who began the execution should be of a pure and righteous judgment. They departed, no man condemning her; and Jesus said, "Neither do I condemn thee. Go, and sin no more." The phrase *condemn* thee means, we presume, the adjudging the penalty of death upon her for her crime. The law then was superseded, or broken, or remitted in that special case. The conclusion that it was superseded seems the most reasonable.

In our own country, the late Mr. Evans (and no one is entitled to deeper respect) strongly contends for the literal construction of the passages in the Gospels, and the restriction of divorce to the one specified case of adultery. His views as to the guilty party marrying again are hereafter stated.

President Dwight, of Yale College, in a sermon preached before the Legislature of Connecticut in 1816, insisted that there could not be a lawful dissolution of marriage except for the adultery of one of the parties. After noticing and condemning the facility of divorce in that State under the general law, and by special acts in particular cases, he says: "Happily, a strenuous opposition is beginning to this anti-scriptural law, which it may be hoped will terminate in its revocation."¹ Mr. Bishop observes that this hope has never been realized; and that notwithstanding the great license of divorce, there is no State in the Union in which domestic felicity and matrimonial virtue more abound.²

The writer of an able article in the American Quarterly Church Review, for July, 1868,³ enters largely into this subject, particularly in reference to the laws, and the astonishing number of divorces in the New England States. He concludes that the Divine law allows of nothing to obliterate the sanctity of the marriage contract, except adultery. Upon a divorce for this cause, and for this cause only, could either party form a marriage during the lifetime of the other. Yet he says: "This carries us on to an act of discipline in case the parties are communicants, or propose to be such, so long as both live, to warn from the Holy Communion that person who hath been divorced for any other cause than adultery, and shall marry

¹ American Church Monthly, May, 1857. ² Marriage and Divorce, § 275, n.
³ Divorce in New England.

again during the life of the other. And so long, at least, as both the parties are living, to warn off also that person who, knowingly, shall marry either of them."

But in a note, the writer feels compelled to say: "The obligation of this rule seems to be perfectly plain in cases where the act condemned is done knowingly, and in defiance of the pastor's previous counsel and protest. Otherwise, we give weight to the counsels of the Bishop of Illinois, in his late Convocation Address. That learned prelate says: 'There is a question of discipline connected with a second marriage after a dissolution of the first, by process of law, but on inadequate grounds, which has disturbed some congregations, and at different periods been presented to me for resolution,—Are parties thus married permanently disqualified during connection for the Holy Communion? Admitting all that can be said, and justly, of the offence involved in such a marriage during the life of the other party to the divorce, yet inasmuch as it is fully valid in all social relations, has been entered into without consciousness or intention of wrong-doing, and the state is beyond all legitimate remedy, I have been compelled to determine that the living in such a state was not a subject for Church censure equivalent to a permanent excommunication. If the party was a communicant before the new marriage, he should not be repelled, and if applying afterward, should not be repressed. This decision may not be admitted by a logical deduction, or in a severer age of the Church's discipline; but it would be the judgment I should form, and the advice I have given, in view of the conflicting obligations, the legal and social rights, the interests of innocent offspring, and the higher expediency involved in the case.'

"A decision, however, so qualified, will not constrain a clergyman whose conscience dissents, and who prefers to face the evils, and disregard the expediency, in view of what he considers inflexible right, and the condemnation of a state which he brands as adultery."

We understand the eminent prelate to mean by a divorce *on inadequate grounds*, a divorce for another cause than adultery,—some one of the other grounds found in State legislation; and his advice, guarded as it is with deference to the judgment of a minister, covers even the case of a communicant of the Church, bound, we should think, to know the law of the Gospel, who marries after such a divorce. This must make us pause.

And while the innocent party in all these cases would not be repelled, the offending party might be so; but for the offence, if of a

grave character, not, we apprehend, for the new marriage, according to this opinion.

The judgment of President Woolsey appears in various parts of his able and instructive essay. It seems clear that upon the great point of adultery being the only ground of divorce from a lawfully-contracted marriage, he takes the Saviour's rule in its letter and exclusiveness.

VI.

Our next inquiry is as to the enactments of the civil authority in nations and states.

In the most ancient of the Roman laws, marriage began with a religious ceremony, the *conferratio* before a priest. An ox was sacrificed, and a cake of wheaten bread divided between the man and the woman, as an emblem of the *consortium vite*, or life in common.¹

Hume states that the more ancient laws of Rome which prohibited divorces, are extremely praised by Dyonysius Halicarnassus; that the harmony was wonderful which this inseparable union of interests produced between married persons, while each considered the inevitable necessity by which they were linked together.²

Lord McKenzie says that, in early times, divorces were little used, although it is difficult to accept the traditional story told by Aulus Gellius, of Calvisius Ruga being the first who divorced his wife, about five hundred and twenty years from the building of Rome.³

But, at the close of the Republic, the profligacy of manners led to divorces to a frightful extent. The first emperors sought to check the evil by various penalties, but left the power of divorcing uncontrolled.

The law of Constantine enabled a man to repudiate his wife, if she were an adulteress, a sorceress, or a bawd; but the woman

¹ McKenzie's "Roman Law," p. 98.

² "Essay on Polygamy and Divorce," vol. i. p. 204. Lord Stowell's celebrated passage is but an amplification of Hume: "If it were understood that married couples might, upon mutual dislike, be legally separated, many persons who now pass through the world with mutual comfort, with attention to their common offspring, and the moral order of society, might have been, at this moment, living in a state of unkindness, of estrangement from their offspring, and of licentious and unreserved immorality. . . . Necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes."

³ McKenzie's "Roman Law," 118.

could only repudiate her husband if he was a murderer, a sorcerer, or a robber of graves. She could not do so for adultery.¹ This inequality of right was greatly condemned by Lactantius, Gregory Nazianzen, St. Jerome, and others.²

Passing over the law of Honorius, and that of Theodosius (A.D. 439), which brought back the license of Paganism, we notice the Edict of Theodosius II., A.D. 449. A woman was entitled to a divorce when her husband was an adulterer, murderer, sorcerer, or traitor; for attempts upon her life, beating her with stripes, against the dignity of a free woman, or was a robber of churches or on the highway. In such cases, she was entitled to sue for a divorce. The husband could have one for the same causes, and also if the wife feasted with strangers without his knowledge or will, or lodged out all night without good cause or his consent, or frequented the circus or theatres against his prohibition. If the woman proved her case, she could marry again after the lapse of a year; if the husband established his, he could marry at once.

And yet a divorce for other than these specified causes was valid. There was a penalty, upon the woman causing it, of a forfeiture of dowry and of spousal gifts, with a prohibition against marrying for five years. If she did marry within that time, she was reputed infamous, and the marriage declared void.

The Code of Justinian confirmed the law as established by Theodosius, and added a few other causes; among them, the imbecility of the man.³

The law of France, before the Revolution, treated marriage as indissoluble. In the language of Pothier, "God Himself having formed the bond of matrimony, no human power can dissolve it." The law of 1792⁴ allowed divorces in the following cases: (1) Adultery by the wife; and by the husband, if he kept a concubine in the common dwelling. (2) Outrageous conduct or ill-usage on the part of either. (3) Condemnation to an infamous punishment. (4) By mutual consent in certain cases, but under very stringent restrictions. In 1816, after the restoration of the Bourbons, this law was repealed.

Absolute divorces were abolished, but separations by judicial process were sanctioned. In 1830 and 1848, attempts were made to restore the law of 1792, and of the Civil Code, but without success.⁵

¹ "Code Theod." lib. iii. tit. 16. De Repudiis. ² Bingham, viii. 87.
³ Bingham, vol. viii. 89, *et seq.* ⁴ Adopted in the Code Civile. ⁵ McKenzie's
 "Roman Law," p. 121.

The law of Sweden, and, generally, of the kingdoms of northern Europe, authorizes a divorce for adultery, and, in some of them, for other causes. They are to be found in Burge's learned "Commentary," vol. i. p. 640, etc.

The ancient law of Scotland recognized adultery as a sufficient cause for divorce. By an Act of 1513, it was provided that, in case of the husband or wife deserting from the conjugal society without any reasonable cause, established by the decree of a competent court, and remaining with malicious obstinacy for the space of five years, the offending party was first to be prosecuted for adherence, and, after proceeding to a sentence of excommunication, a divorce might be granted.¹ Something of a similar nature now, or, at least, lately, prevailed. There was a decree of adherence, an application to the Presbytery, which declined to interfere, and a protest, which was deemed equivalent to an excommunication.²

By the Dutch law, a divorce can be had for adultery, and for the wilful abandonment by one party of the other, for a long time, without cause, and without any intention of returning.³

In Prussia, under the Frederician Code, the causes were adultery, a notorious and intentional desertion, the endangering life or health, and incompatibility of temper; and also for a difference in religious faith. If the intention to desert was doubtful, an absence of two years must be proved.

We have before stated the law of the English Church and State, and showed that it recognized the dissolubility of marriage for adultery, and for that only. But by a Statute of 20, 21 Victoria, which went into effect in January, 1858, a regular court for matrimonial and other causes was constituted, and an absolute divorce was allowed as follows: To the husband, for the adultery of the wife; and to the wife, for that of the husband, provided it was incestuous or bigamous, or accompanied with gross cruelty or other aggravated circumstances, or if coupled with desertion for two years and upward, without reasonable cause.

Either party is at liberty to marry again after the decree has become final, the same as if the union had been dissolved by death.

A judicial separation or divorce *a mensa et thoro*, may also be had for the mere adultery of the husband, or desertion without cause for two years and upward. The law permits the guilty party to marry the paramour.

¹ Ferguson's "Consist. Law," p. 174. ² "Bell's Principles," p. 1585. ³ Van Leuwin, Roman Dutch, p. 85. Ahrenfelt v. Ahrenfelt, Hoffman's Chan. Rep.

We proceed to notice the regulations of different States of the Union.

In Massachusetts, a divorce may be granted for adultery, desertion, imprisonment (when the sentence may, under some circumstances, be annulled), and for joining a religious sect which condemns matrimony. The innocent party may marry again. And the offending party, when the crime is not adultery, may get liberty to marry on application to the court. A limited divorce or separation may be had for various causes.

In Vermont, divorce is absolute for adultery, cruelty, wilful desertion, habitual intemperance, and neglect to support the wife, if of sufficient ability. There is no limited divorce provided for. Remarriages, in all cases, allowed.

The grounds in Connecticut are adultery, wilful abandonment, an absence of seven years, the party not being heard of, habitual intemperance, intolerable cruelty, and fraudulent conduct. By a law of 1869, there was added sentence to imprisonment for life for bestiality, or any crime in violation of conjugal duty, and for such misconduct as permanently destroys the happiness of the petitioner, and defeats the purposes of the marriage relation.

Upon a divorce for any one of such causes, either party may marry again, the guilty one with the paramour or any other; and the parties may be reunited. Limited separations are not known to the law.

By the statute of Rhode Island, a divorce may be had for adultery, impotence, extreme cruelty, wilful desertion for five years, or less, in the discretion of the court, confirmed drunkenness, refusal to provide necessaries, and other gross misbehavior and wickedness in either party, repugnant to and in violation of the marriage covenant. A new marriage is allowed.

The law of Maine (1857) sanctions divorce for adultery and other specified causes, and "whenever the judge, in the exercise of a sound discretion, deems it reasonable and proper, conducive to domestic harmony, and consistent with the peace and morality of society." But the parties must have been married in the State, or cohabited there after marriage. A subsequent marriage is lawful.

In New Hampshire, the causes for which divorce may be granted are adultery, cruelty, absence for three years without being heard from, and joining a sect holding marriage to be unholy.

A limited separation may be had for the same causes as a di-

vorce, if the parties desire it, and the court think fit, and also for other causes in the discretion of the court. A subsequent marriage is allowed.

The law of Pennsylvania permits a dissolution for adultery, desertion for two years, and on some other grounds.

By a statute of Virginia, a divorce is obtained for adultery, incontinence at the time of the contract, imprisonment in the penitentiary, conviction of an infamous offence before marriage, and wilful abandonment for five years. A separation from bed and board is allowed for cruelty, apprehension of bodily hurt, abandonment or desertion, it is presumed, for less than five years. In case of a divorce for adultery, the court may order the guilty party not to marry again; but this prohibition may be revoked.

The rule in Western Virginia is nearly the same.

In Tennessee, the union may be annulled for adultery, impotence, malicious desertion for two years, conviction of an infamous crime, sentence to the penitentiary, attempting the life of the other, refusal to remove into the State with the husband, joined with absenting herself for two years, and pregnancy at the time of the marriage. And either an absolute divorce or a limited separation may be decreed for cruelty, indignities to the person of the wife, abandonment, or turning her out of doors. If the divorce is absolute, either party may marry again, except that the guilty party may not marry the paramour during the life of the other party.

In Wisconsin, the divorce is for adultery, impotency, imprisonment for three years, wilful desertion for one year, cruelty, and habitual drunkenness. A separation may be had for desertion, cruelty, drunkenness, and a refusal to supply the wife with the necessaries of life. Upon an absolute divorce, either party may remarry.

The law of Florida does not recognize a limited separation at all; but a dissolution is permitted for adultery, impotence, extreme cruelty, indulgence in violent temper, habitual intemperance, and obstinate desertion for a year.

So, in Indiana, cruelty, impotence, a former marriage, abandonment, condemnation for felony, and inhuman treatment, are specified as grounds for a divorce; "and in any other case in which the court shall deem it reasonable and proper."¹

¹ The law of Indiana, according to newspaper reports, was much improved in 1873.

A law of North Carolina, of 1827, enacted that a divorce might be granted either *a vinculo* or *a mensa et thoro*, whenever the court shall be satisfied that justice requires it. In 1855, it was enacted that divorce could be granted in certain specified cases; and if any other just cause for divorce exists, it may be granted *a vinculo* or *a mensa*, at the court's discretion.

The law of the State of New York presents a marked contrast to that of most of the States we have quoted. Under the Dutch government, a court composed of the Governor and Counsellors had jurisdiction of cases of divorce. In 1674, one Abigail Messenger petitioned for a divorce on the ground of her husband's adultery and absconding, and for liberty to marry again. An order for his appearance was made.¹

It appears that in some of the colonies, statutes had been passed for dissolving marriage. In 1773, by order of Council, the governors were forbidden to assent to any such acts, and the royal disallowance of such acts was declared.² It is to be remembered that colonial statutes became laws, unless disapproved of by the king in council within a certain time.

For some time after the organization as a State, divorces could only be had by special acts of the Legislature.³

In 1787, an act was passed directing a mode of trial, and allowing of divorces in cases of adultery.⁴ It recited that the existing laws were very defective, and applications had in consequence been made to the Legislature for their interposition. This was condemned as made upon partial representations, without a just and constitutional trial of the facts.

The act provided for trial of the issue by a jury if there was a denial; and if there was no defence, yet proofs were to be taken before a Master in Chancery. The Chancellor shall, upon due proof, pronounce the marriage to be dissolved, and both parties freed from the obligations thereof. Then by the third section it was enacted, that it shall not be lawful for the party convicted of adultery to remarry any person whatsoever, and every such marriage shall be null and void; but the other party may make another marriage, as if the party convicted was dead.

In the Revision of 1813, the provision was, as it has since been, that the complainant might marry again, as if the other was dead;

¹ Holland Documents, vol. ii. p. 708. ² Documents, vol. viii. p. 403.

³ Kent's Comm. vol. ii. p. 97. ⁴ Greenleaf's Ed. i. 428.

but the one convicted of adultery could not until the death of the other party.

The Constitution of 1846 prohibited the Legislature from passing special acts of divorce. The provisions of the existing law (Revised Statutes, 1830) are these:

"A divorce can be decreed, and marriage dissolved, whenever adultery has been committed by husband or wife." Certain provisions are then made as to inhabitancy, place of solemnization of the marriage, or the place of the commission of the offence, which it is needless to detail.

And the relief may be refused in the cases of connivance, condonation, the adultery of the plaintiff, or lapse of five years from discovery, although the offence of the defendant be established.

There are other sections relating to the legitimacy of children, their maintenance, property, dower, etc. We presume to say, after much experience, judicial and professional, that those provisions are not surpassed for wisdom or precision by those of any other code.

"Whenever a marriage shall be dissolved pursuant to the provisions of this article, the complainant may marry again during the lifetime of the defendant; but no defendant convicted of adultery shall marry again, until the death of the complainant."

By provisions in the "Article of Marriage," no second marriage shall be contracted by any person during the lifetime of the former husband or wife, unless the former marriage has been annulled or dissolved for some cause other than adultery of such person;¹ or unless such former husband or wife shall have been finally sentenced to imprisonment for life.

The statute also of Bigamy² provides that any person having a husband or wife living, who shall marry any other person, whether married or single, shall be adjudged guilty of bigamy, and punished by imprisonment in the State prison for a term not exceeding five years.³

The exceptions, however, are:

Where the husband or wife has been absent for five years without being known to be living; or the remaining absent without the United States for five years together; or where the marriage has been dissolved by a competent court, for some cause other than the adultery of the party marrying again; when a marriage has been

¹ As for lunacy, impotency, fraud or force. ² R. S. p. 687, § 8.
³ R. S. p. 689, § 9.

annulled because of a contract when under legal age; and in the case of imprisonment for life of the former husband or wife.¹

If any person whose husband or wife shall have absented himself or herself for five successive years, without being known to be living, shall marry during the life of the absent party, the marriage shall only be void from the time that its nullity shall be pronounced by a court of competent authority.

It has been decided that under the eighth section above cited, a man divorced for his own adultery, and again marrying, was not within the statute, and subject to its penalty. The former relation no longer existed. The divorced innocent woman was not his wife, and he, therefore, could not be her husband. There was no former wife living.

But the court explicitly held that under the Marriage and Divorce Act, the second marriage was void, involving the illegitimacy of children, and being prohibited by the forty-seventh section of that act, was punishable as a misdemeanor.²

The statute also authorizes "separations, or limited divorces, forever or for a limited time," on the complaint of a married woman, for the following causes :

- (1.) The cruel and inhuman treatment by the husband of his wife.
- (2.) Such conduct on the part of the husband toward his wife, as may render it unsafe and improper for her to cohabit with him.
- (3.) The abandonment of the wife by the husband, and his refusal or neglect to provide for her.

The conditions as to inhabitance, etc., upon which the power of the court may be invoked, need not be stated.

When a decree for a separation forever, or for a limited period, shall have been pronounced, it may be revoked at any time thereafter, by the same court by which it was pronounced, under such regulations and restrictions as the court may impose, upon the joint application of the parties, and upon their producing satisfactory evidence of their reconciliation.

By a statute of 1824 (ch. 205), the remedies given to married women, by the act as to separations then in force¹ (similar to the present regulations), were extended to husbands; and in *Perry vs. Perry* (2 Paige's Rep. 506), it was held that this provision continued in force after the adoption of the Revised Statutes of 1830; and in

¹ 2 R. S. p. 189, § 5.

² *The People vs. Henry*, 5 Barbour's Rep. 117.

McNamara vs. McNamara (9 Abbott's Rep. 18), Justice Hylton considered this to be the present law.

But while the law of New York allows a divorce for adultery only in cases arising within her limits, her tribunals are compelled, under certain conditions, to treat as valid and give effect to sentences of divorce in other States, granted for other causes.

Thus, in *Kinnier vs. Kinnier* (45 N. Y. Rep. 535 Court of Appeals), there had been a marriage in Massachusetts, a removal of both parties to Illinois, and a divorce obtained there after the wife's answer, and by collusion, and for another cause than adultery. Then the present plaintiff married the divorced woman in New York, and afterward brought this action to have such marriage annulled, on the ground that the marriage in Illinois was void in New York.

It was held that the judgment was binding upon the parties, and that the former marriage was not in force at the time of the second. The court of Illinois had obtained jurisdiction by the appearance of the parties. Every State had a right to determine in what cases a divorce might be granted of parties within its jurisdiction. The rule stated in *Shumway vs. Stillman* (6 Wendell's Rep. 447), was reaffirmed. Under the Act of Congress, the judgments of courts of general jurisdiction in one State are conclusive in those of other States, with two exceptions or qualifications; one, when it appears from the record that the defendant was not served with process, and did not appear in person or by attorney; and the other, that if it appear on the record that the party did appear by attorney, the authority of the attorney may be disproved.

"It was indeed an unquestioned rule, that any judgment could be impeached for fraud; but what was a sufficient fraud, and who might allege it, were serious questions. In the present case, whatever was the fraud, both parties were guilty of it, and neither could set it up to invalidate the judgment."

This decision must, perhaps, be taken as overruling the case of *Jackson vs. Jackson* (1 John's Rep. 424), where the husband and wife were inhabitants of New York, and were there married. The wife went into Vermont, and sued there for a divorce on the ground of cruel treatment. The husband appeared, and defended the action. A sentence of divorce was pronounced, and a sum decreed for alimony. The wife returned to New York, and sued for the amount adjudged. The court refused to enforce the judgment. It had been obtained in *fraudem legis* of the State of New York. See *Holmes vs. Holmes*, 4 Lansing, 388.

But we are carefully to notice that a divorce obtained in another State, and even for adultery, is of no force in New York, when the defendant was not served with process, and the notice was only by publication in a newspaper of such other State, unless the party voluntarily appeared.¹

The defendant in the case had been and was at the time of the proceeding a resident of New York. The court say: "The tribunal of the other State had no right to assume jurisdiction over a marriage contract, more than over any other subject, without the service of process, or an appearance of the party."

It has also been decided that a man divorced in another State for some cause other than adultery, cannot be sued in this State for breach of a promise to marry.

And in *Holmes vs. Holmes* (4 Lansing's Rep. 383), the rule was again declared that a divorce in another State for cruelty and desertion occurring in our State before the plaintiff had obtained a residence in such State, and the parties were domiciled here, and the defendant never resided in such State, was void. And that service of process of the court of such State made in this State was void. And see *Vischer vs. Vischer*, 12 Barbour, 640.

VII.

THE LAW OF NEW YORK MOST CONFORMABLE TO THE GOSPEL.

Our review of the enactments of the civil power in various lands has led to the conclusion that the law of New York more fully conforms to the Divine rule than that of any other portion of Christendom. It is marked and explicit in three important points. With each of these, the regulations of some other states or nations agree; but in no one, as we believe, is there an entire concurrence in what is enacted and what is omitted. These points are:

- (1.) That marriage may be dissolved for the adultery of either party, but for that cause only.
- (2.) That the innocent party, upon a divorce for adultery, may marry another; but that the guilty party may not do so during the life of the other.
- (3.) That limited separations may be allowed for other causes than adultery. That the State may prescribe the causes for such

¹ *Hoffman vs. Hoffman*, 46 N. Y. 308 Appeals.

separations, as tending to good order and peace of its citizens; and that the causes allowed by the law of New York are just, expedient, and consistent with Scripture.

(1.) *First.* As to the first point, the researches of the writer, embodied in the preceding pages, have led him to the clear conviction that the Saviour authorized an absolute divorce for the cause of fornication, and prohibited it for any other. That this is a law for all time, and for all professing themselves Christians. The best expositions of the learned prove that the literal sense is the true one—remission on one ground, and necessary exclusion of any other. Every other passage in the New Testament is consistent with the precepts declared in St. Matthew. The testimony of the early Fathers, who had the benefit of a traditionary explanation reaching to Apostolic days, sanctions this view. The canons of councils bear tribute to its truth. The voice of the English Church, unbroken and the same, except for a period of her subjugation to Rome, supports it; and the slight action of our own Church adopts it. If this conviction is fully stamped upon the mind, the path of duty and of action will, in the great mass of cases, be cleared from the mists of doubt, and our feet will be saved from stumbling.

(2.) The law of New York prohibits the guilty party from marrying again during the lifetime of the other, but allows the innocent party to do so.

By a necessary inference, it permits the marriage of the guilty one after the death of the other, and does not prohibit it with the paramour.

By the law of 1787, it was made unlawful for the party convicted of adultery to marry again any person whatever; and such remarriage was declared null and void. The innocent party could marry, as if the other were dead. In 1813, the law was altered as it now stands, forbidding such new marriage during the life of the guiltless party.

(a.) When our Lord pronounced the husband who dismissed his wife, except for adultery, and married again, an adulterer, He sanctioned, by a just inference, such new marriage, if the divorce of the wife was for adultery. The denunciation of guilt in the other cases, involves innocence in that one.

And if the converse case of the wife be not exactly within the letter, it is within the spirit, and could rightly be enacted by Church or State. But we apprehend that the text in St. Mark affords Scriptural authority for it, and St. Jerome has rightly declared the entire equality of right.

Yet there are traces of this not being fully recognized and taught.

In the vision of Hermas (Command. iv.), after the statement that a man who knows of his wife's adultery, and continues to live with her, is guilty of adultery, we have: "And I said unto him, What, therefore, is to be done if the woman continue in her sin? He answered, Let her husband put her away, and let him continue by himself. But if he shall put away his wife, and marry another, he also doth commit adultery." And if the woman repent, and be willing to return, he should receive her, but only not often.¹

St. Austin was opposed to such a marriage, even of the innocent party. Yet he says: "A man who puts away his wife for adultery, and marries another, is not to be ranked with those who put away their wives without cause, and marry again. For the question is obscurely resolved in Scripture, whether he who marries again after putting away his wife is an adulterer."

The Council of Arles, in reference to the case, declares: *Placuit, ut in quantum potest (possit) consilium eis detur, ne viventibus uxoribus suis (licet adulteris), alias accipiant.*

The writer under the name of Ambrose says: "That a man was allowed to marry a second wife after he had put away the first for fornication; but the Apostle did not allow the same privilege to a woman!"²

Van Espen quotes this statement of Ambrose, and also the comment of Gratian upon it, seeking to explain it consistently with the dogma that adultery does not annul the bond. He treats Gratian's reasoning as unsatisfactory; but he adds that it had been extensively held that the passage was not genuine.³

In the Penitential of Theodore (about 693) it is declared: "If the wife of any one commit fornication, it is lawful to dismiss her, and accept another; that is, if a man dismiss his wife on account of fornication, if she was his first wife, it is lawful for him to take another. And she, if she wills to repent of her sins, may, after two years, take another man. It is not lawful for the woman to dismiss the man, although he be a fornicator."⁴

Epiphanius observes that, as Scripture allows a man to marry a second wife after the death of the first, so, if a separation is made on account of fornication or adultery, or any such cause, it doth not

¹ "Apostolical Fathers." Ed. N. Y. 1810, p. 308. ² Bingham, vol. vi.

³ Comm. on Gratian's Works, tome iii. p. 639. ⁴ Johnson's Laws, etc., vol. i. p. 94, n.

condemn the man that marries a second wife, or the woman that marries a second husband, nor deny them the privilege of Church communion.

Most of these authorities are taken from Bingham. He adds some others, especially that of the Councils of Elliberis and of Milevis, to the effect that penance was imposed for the remarriage. Bishop Cosine, in Ross's case, states that the Council of Elliberis permitted the marriage.

It was customary, with the decrees of divorce granted by Parliament, to insert a provision giving liberty to the innocent party to remarry.¹

In his argument in Ross's case,² Bishop Cosine contends that, as the marriage of the guilty wife was forbidden in St. Matthew, *e contrario*, that of the innocent husband was allowed by just inference. He quotes the Councils of Elliberis and Aurelianus as allowing it, and that of Lateran as sanctioning it after a year. He says that the whole Greek Church permits it to this day.

Mr. Burge quotes a long list of canonists who hold that the innocent party may marry again, but not the guilty one. He thinks the rule unwise, except in forbidding marriage with a paramour.³

(b.) The law of New York forbids the guilty party in a case of adultery to marry again during the life of the other.

It allows such marriage after the death of such party, and, as there is no exception, allows it with the paramour.

The Canon Law clearly determined that a marriage between an adulteress and her paramour, even after the death of her husband, was unlawful.

The First Canon of the decree of Pope Leo is, that no person should take to wife one whom he has polluted by adultery.

The Canon of the Council of Tribur (A.D. 895) is largely commented upon by Van Espen. A case was stated for the judgment of the Council. One guilty of adultery with the wife of another, had pledged himself that he would marry her if she survived her husband. The marriage was condemned by the Council; and it was decreed that it was not lawful nor consistent with the Christian religion that any one should be married to the party he had polluted by adultery.

But Gratian holds that such a marriage may, under the canon, be allowed after sufficient penance, *peracti penitentia*, unless there

¹ Burns's Ecc. Law, ii. p. 508. ² State Trials, 1834. ³ Comm. vol. i.

had been a plotting against her husband's life, or a promise that, upon his death, the paramour would marry her. This distinction, says Van Espen, was wholly unknown before the time of Gratian, although Popes subsequently approved of it (Works, tome iii. p. 634).

St. Augustine says, the husband being dead, with whom a true marriage existed, a woman cannot become the lawful wife of one with whom adultery was committed.

And Alexander III., in the twelfth century, says: "It is lawfully declared in the Canons, that no one shall take to matrimony whom he hath polluted by adultery, and especially (*maxime*) to whom he has given his pledge while the husband was living, or when he has conspired against the husband's life."¹

But the rule became settled, allowing this marriage when the husband was dead, except in the cases specified by Gratian.²

In the year 1800, a bill was introduced into Parliament, declaring the unlawfulness of a marriage between a person divorced for adultery and the paramour. Its passage was urged by Horsley, Bishop of Rochester, who insisted that such a marriage was condemned by the Divine Law. His argument went to deny the legality of any marriage of the guilty party during the life of the other.

There appeared, subsequently, a pamphlet called "*Nuptiæ Sacræ*," written by Dr. Ireland, Dean of Westminster. I have not been able to find a copy; but, from the statements in the "*Quarterly Review*,"⁴ and by Mr. Shelford,⁵ it appears that he holds that the Saviour allowed one cause only for a divorce; but, for that cause, the marriage was utterly broken, and a new marriage by either party permissible.

The present law of England has settled the question by allowing either party to marry again, the same as if the union had been dissolved by death. There is no exception as to the paramours.

The Scotch law, before the year 1600, allowed either party to marry again; but, in that year, a statute annulled a marriage between an adulterous party and the paramour.

The Canon of the Episcopal Church, of 1868, is in exact concordance with the law of New York in this point.

The late Hugh Davey-Evans, after observing that, if the marri-

¹ De Nuptiis, etc., cap. 10. ² Jus. Univers. tome i. p. 590. ³ *Ibid.*

⁴ "*Quarterly Review*," October, 1822. ⁵ Shelford's "*Law of Divorce*," etc., p. 416.

age of the guilty party were forbidden, there would be an increased temptation to incontinence, adds: "Logically, also, it is not easy to see how a marriage can exist as to one party, and not as to the other. If the adulteress is still the wife of the injured husband after he has put her away, he must be still her husband, and unable to marry another wife. If she be not his wife, it is not easy to see why she should not marry, unless a Divine prohibition could be found, which is not pretended.

"Yet the danger of inducing the commission of adultery as a means of dissolving a hated marriage, and bringing about a union with a new and preferred partner, is very obvious."¹

Paley has a similar line of reasoning as to adulterous connections being fostered by this prospect of marrying.² On the other side, Scott calls the interdiction an encouragement to fornication.

With the highest respect for the opinion of the venerated Mr. Evans, the soundness of part of his views may be questioned. The marriage tie, upon a divorce for adultery, is wholly annulled as to both parties. The guilty one is not inhibited from marrying because of any supposed continuance of the former relation, but as a penalty and punishment for the injury to morals and wrong to the community caused by the crime. The decisive argument, in our judgment, is, that marriage has been Divinely constituted,—is a holy rite, and supposes purity. The mock ceremony cannot remove pollution from the couch, and it insults the chastity of religion to treat that couch as undefiled. And, if the argument has force, that the prospect of such a marriage promotes the success of the seducer, so has the reasoning, that conscience may be aroused the sooner, and felt the keener, when the party bears the plain brand of criminality, than when the unction of a ceremony, however devoid of sanctity, can be applied. The wholesome dread of degradation of station should be left in its full force, nor should the outrage upon society pass without a penalty inflicted.

(c.) In the prohibition of a marriage of the guilty one during the life of the other party, the law of New York differs from the present law of England, and from that of a large number of the States of the Union. We may say that a remarriage of both the innocent and guilty party is now legal through most of our country.

The Act of Parliament of 1858 provided that, in all cases in

¹ May number "Am. Church Monthly." ² "Moral Philosophy," p. 273.

which a full divorce was allowed, the sentence was to have the same effect as if the union had been dissolved by death. But no minister was bound to solemnize a marriage when either of the parties had been divorced.

The Canon of our General Convention forbids a minister to solemnize a marriage of the guilty party, where there has been a divorce for adultery, during the life of the other. So far, there is positive prohibition. But every minister is at liberty to decline officiating, even after the death of the innocent party. His own religious judgment must be his guide.

We have before noticed the Penitential of Theodore, giving liberty to the guilty wife to remarry after the lapse of two years.

The insertion, in the Parliamentary decrees of divorce, of a clause allowing the innocent party to marry again, involved the prohibition of it for the guilty one.

Luther is indignant that the civil law no longer punishes adultery with death, but would permit the criminal to go to some remote place, and marry again. And Calvin was of the same opinion.¹

In Prussia, the divorced parties may both marry again, except that a person divorced for adultery may not marry the paramour.

And by the Code Civile of France, the guilty party in a divorce for adultery could contract a marriage with any one, except the partner in the crime. And the divorced parties could not remarry each other.

The law of Georgia, North Carolina, and Massachusetts, corresponds with that of New York, in inhibiting the marriage of the criminal during the life of the other party.

In Virginia, the prohibition of the guilty party from marrying again may be revoked. In Tennessee, a marriage with the paramour is forbidden during the life of the other.

But the principles we have advocated, the rules we have deduced from the Divine institution of marriage, and the precepts of the Saviour, constrain us to go farther.

While the law of New York deserves all commendation for its inhibition, it is imperfect and censurable for not absolutely prohibiting the marriage after, as well as before, the death of the innocent party. We think the Jewish laws did not permit the marriage of the adulteress who had been spared from death. We find the strongest implication, from what the Saviour declared, that He

¹ *Apud* Woolsey, p. 138.

meant to forbid it. The jealousy with which councils and holy men of old regarded the marriage, even of the innocent party, confirms this view. The reasons which have induced us to regard the marriage of an adulterer with the paramour as abhorrent and unwise, apply, with nearly equal force, to a marriage with any other.

SEPARATIONS OR LIMITED DIVORCES.

The law of New York sanctions separations, or what it terms limited divorces for cruelty, desertion, and some other causes. These are known as the divorces *a mensa et thoro* of the Romish Church and canon law.

In a previous part of the remarks, we have sought to prove that under the Apostles' teaching in the tenth and eleventh verses of the seventh chapter of Corinthians, other causes than that of adultery justified a separation, with the obligation to remain unmarried, in the hope of reconciliation. And further, that the best conclusion upon the fifteenth and sixteenth verses of the same chapter was, that a remarriage was not sanctioned, even in the special case, the subject of such verses.¹

Such separations have been condemned by various writers as of evil tendency. Scott calls them encouragements to lewdness.²

On the other side, besides their allowance in every country where the Romish canon law prevails, they have always been permitted in England; they exist in very many of the Protestant European nations, and in a great number of the States of the Union.

A considerable experience, professional and judicial, convinces me that the evils of such separations are imaginary, or greatly exaggerated. They take place, in the great majority of cases, on the application of the wife for the cruelty or desertion of the husband. She then becomes an object of sympathy and watchfulness. Her interest and happiness enjoin good conduct; and her position, instead of being a temptation to incontinence, is an encouragement to chastity. And as to the husband, he is as likely to break a new marriage vow, as to pursue a course of guilt if unmarried.

The necessity of such intervention of the State in such cases, is indisputable. An absolute divorce, or such a separation, must be allowed. No doubt some evils attend it. These are the inevitable

¹ *Ante* chap. ii. ² See Puffendorf, lib. 6, cap. i. § 22. Judge Swift and others in Bishop on Marriage, etc., § 277.

fruits of crime, and visit the innocent as well as the guilty. But they cannot exceed those which flow from that unbounded license of divorce, which virtually sanctions successive polygamy, and seems to legalize fornication. The peculiar character and habits of the people of New England, especially in the small villages, check the full development of the system; but under the same circumstances it cannot be questioned, that corruption and profligacy would follow much more abundantly from the law of Connecticut, than from that of New York.

VIII.

RESULTS UPON THE QUESTION OF REPULSION.

In direct connection with repulsion from the Holy Communion, we are led to these conclusions:

(1.) Upon a divorce for adultery, not only must the guilty party be repelled on a new marriage, but any one, also, who marries that party. The crime of the adulterer, which time and penitence might expiate, is deepened by a new marriage.

This is as clear where, under the law of the State, either party may marry again, as in any other case.

(2.) If a divorce is had for any other cause than adultery, either party marrying again is adulterous, and should be repelled. And any marrying of either of the parties to such divorce, should be rejected.

We are here treating of cases in which the offence consists in a new marriage. The case of the offending party in other instances is governed by the rubric and canon, now in force.

And upon this point, at least, we clearly hold that no distinction can be allowed between the case of a man and a woman. There was no inequality in the institution of the relation when twain were made one, and there should not be any upon the question of severance.

These are the rules for the guidance of Christian ministers and men, in their rigorous truth. But we may not question that they admit of relaxation and exception. The law of the death penalty was not enforced upon the guilty woman brought to our Lord, but remitted with the injunction to sin no more. And we have seen how ancient councils, while deeply abhorring the crime, allowed restoration upon repentance.

It cannot be denied that questions of profound interest and dif-

ficulty are connected with this point of relaxation. If repudiation of a new union, as well as contrition, is recognized, it is obvious that a total rupture of the new relations may be fraught with greater evils than would flow from its continuance. Cases must arise which will press upon the judgment, and beat upon the heart of a minister, awed at the thought that he may be barring the gates of mercy upon a supplicant. But while this will teach all caution and all tenderness, it must not teach forgetfulness of an offence committed or shared in, which violates the holy command and law of Christian marriage.

One case has fallen within the writer's knowledge where an exception was deemed justifiable. A man who had obtained a divorce in another State for some slight ground, removed into New York, and, by fraudulently concealing his divorce, and representing himself as single, deceived a woman into marriage with him. She had been a communicant. Upon discovery of the facts, she separated from him. There was no child of this marriage. The point seemed clear. It was discussed, What should be the course if there had been a child, and the wife was unwilling to separate? and the opinion was, that she should not be repelled.

Another case has been presented, substantially as follows: Married persons reside within a State, by the law of which an absolute divorce is allowed for desertion for a certain period. The husband, by being seen with women of notorious ill character, frequenting disreputable places, and other conduct, raises a strong presumption of adultery, and confesses it to the wife. He then leaves her for the specified period. She obtains a sentence of divorce for this desertion, and afterward marries. She has been a communicant, or is not otherwise unfit for the rite.

The first thought is, that here the woman has availed herself of an unscriptural ground of divorce to release herself from a hateful union. A limited separation would have relieved her from her bondage, though the marriage would not be annulled. Even in States where no such separation is known, her absolute divorce for desertion, if not followed by marriage, would be justifiable.

We may notice (not as decisive, but not irrelevant) that the facts stated, coupled with desertion, would warrant a divorce for adultery. Desertion may be alleged in such an action as tending to strengthen other proofs, though not sufficient of itself. It is not necessary that direct ocular evidence of the fact of adultery should be produced. That would render it exceedingly difficult to obtain a decree. Circumstances must be shown, which lead the guarded dis-

cretion of a reasonable man to the conclusion that the crime has been committed. Yet it is to be found as a fact.

And as to confessions, the law is extremely averse to rely upon them. The One Hundred and Fifth of the Canons of 1603 forbids the judge to grant a sentence founded solely on the confession of the accused; and the law of New York, though not so imperative, recognizes the principle.

But it may forcibly be urged, that, in the case stated, the woman acts upon the honest and, in her mind, well-founded conviction of the husband's guilt, and knows that this guilt justifies divorce. On this assurance she, in truth, is led to seek a divorce because of adultery, and, it may be presumed, she would not have done so for mere desertion. She may then well be deemed absolved from sin in marrying again. Yet even on this view we do not escape from difficulty. The woman constitutes herself a judge of the husband's criminality. Her conclusions may rest upon evidence amply sufficient, or upon trifles and vague suspicions. To take as a test her belief, would be a very indefinite and unsafe guide. Shall the minister then examine into the testimony, and judge for himself? It is easy to see how unfit and unjust this would be, as virtually trying a party not before him.

Yet it may be that the fact of adultery is so notorious, so flaunted before the world, so accepted in public opinion, as to leave no room for doubt. There may occur a case in which the action of the wife was so palliated and excusable as not to debar her from the altar. It should be strong, for it is to be an exception to a rule based upon a Scriptural precept.

It is true that the laws of the civil government we are under must control us in all civil relations, so that a divorce for causes which that government allows, must for such relations be held valid. But our duties and obligations as Christians are governed by a different law, and that law, in its proper sphere, is supreme.

If, then, what we have deduced be really the teachings of Holy Writ, it is the duty of every minister of religion to recognize, and in the solemn act of repulsion to enforce, those lessons. It is the duty of every layman earnestly to sustain the clergy in such a course. And it is the duty of the great Council of the Church manfully to declare that such is the Christian law. It is fitting that a Church which knows something higher than the voice of the people for its origin and guide, should lead in such an avowal and promulgation of the truth; and we believe that the great body of Christians around us would approve and imitate her course. The institution of mar-

riage came from Heaven, "and to Heaven by nature clings." A rupture and annulment of this union, except as Heaven has permitted, is sinful, and there is but one case in which it is sinless. For every Christian, in every spiritual relation, this is the definite, the absolute, the irreversible law.

We have endeavored to give our views a practical form and expression in the following canon which we submit for examination :

A CANON AS TO REPULSION IN CASES OF DIVORCE.¹

It shall be the duty of the ministers of this Church to repel from the Holy Communion, for the periods specified, persons in the following cases :

1. Any person divorced for his or her adultery, until the end of three years from such divorce, when such person shall remain unmarried. In case such person shall have married again, until the end of three years from the death of the new husband or wife of such person.

2. Any person divorced for his or her offence, other than adultery, until the end of two years from such divorce, when such person shall have remained unmarried. In case of such person's remarriage, until the end of two years from the death of the other party to such new marriage.

3. Any innocent party to a divorce for any other cause than adultery, who shall marry again during the life of the other party, and until the end of two years from the death of such other party.

4. Any person who shall have married another, divorced for the adultery, or for any other offence of such person, until the end of two years from the death of such divorced party.

5. Any person who shall have married another, the innocent party to a divorce for other cause than adultery, until the end of two years from the death of such party.

6. In each of the above cases, upon the lapse of the period specified, the party may be admitted upon satisfactory evidence of true contrition and sorrow for the offence, and may be a worthy partaker of the Holy Table.

§ IV. In special cases where the minister is of opinion that an exception might be justly made to the provisions in the above first five clauses, he may lay the same before the Bishop of Diocese, and with his concurrence admission may be allowed.

¹ Might be § 3 of Canon 12, Title ii. of our Digest.



THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE EUCHARIST.

SECOND ARTICLE.

III.

IN a former notice of this work, we attempted an examination of the first part of it, entitled "The Philosophy of the Holy Communion;" in which the author attempts to reconcile the dogma of transubstantiation with modern forms of philosophical thought. Our object in this review was stated to be an exhibition of the type of religious life and inward experience which dogmatic Roman Catholic teaching generates. This, we think, appears from the second part of the work, entitled "The Theology of the Holy Communion," which we now propose to consider.

In this part, there is one chapter, entitled "The Life of Jesus in the Blessed Sacrament," in which the principles stated are so excessive, not to say audacious, that, to give a just estimate of its teachings (and the work is one that is used as a text-book and work of devotion), and of the natural and necessary effect of them upon those who receive them, we shall be obliged to make somewhat extended extracts. We read as follows:

The wonders of that great Sacrament are not exhausted by the study of transubstantiation itself. When the great act of consecration has been accomplished, when the Sacred Humanity has taken the place of the sub-

stance of bread and wine, we can still try to penetrate into the life and operations of Jesus beneath the veil. A thousand questions rise up as to how the powers of His being are affected by the non-extension of His human frame. What are His thoughts and feelings while a willing captive in the Host? He must be living, since He died once for all, and can never die again. What is the physiology of that most wondrous life? Even His Body must be living; does His Soul use it as His organ? Are His senses awake, or are they buried in the sleep of mystic death? We gaze at the Host, as it lies before us, and all these thoughts throng upon our souls. Above all, at the moment of Holy Communion, we fain would know whether He is simply passive, and, if not, what are the operations of His sacred humanity at that moment (pp. 115, 116).

Let us take the moment of Communion. The Confiteor is said, and the priest holds the little white Host in his hand, and bids the worshippers in the hushed and tranquil church, Look on the Lamb of God, Who takes away the sins of the world. He uses the centurion's touching words, to put the kneeling and repentant communicants at the altar-rail in mind of the greatness of the Lord, Who is to enter into their inmost souls, and their soul's lowly house. He descends the steps of the altar, and places the Lord of Heaven upon the tongue of His sinful creature. Let us, however, forget the communicant, and fix our thought solely on the Blessed Sacrament. We know that the Sacred Host flew from the altar to seek out St. Catherine of Sienna, as she remained at a distance on her knees, crouching down in a corner of the church, weeping because she could not receive her Lord. Jesus, in the Host, was all the while even more eager than the saint, who had been burning with desire to be united to Him, and satisfied His eagerness by working the miracle. We know that He sank through the breast of St. Juliana Falconieri, when she could not receive Him through her lips. He, in the Blessed Sacrament, also, longed for the last time to be united to her upon earth, though the dying saint only dared to gaze upon the Blessed Sacrament once more before she died. But in the communion we are considering, there is no saint in the case. It is only such a one as takes place, at countless altars in Christendom, every day. What is going on in the Soul and Body of Jesus, beneath the sacramental veil, in such a communion as that? Our Lord makes no sign. All is done swiftly and silently. He is quite passive in the hands of the priest; He obeys the ordinary laws of motion, which rule all dead and inanimate things, not those which regulate the rapid flight of angels and of spirits. He is inseparably chained to the species, and betrays no powers of motion of His own. . . . He is, to all appearance, passive, inanimate, dead. . . . What is He doing at the moment of Communion? Does He know me? Can He hear me?

The instinct of every one of us answers this question in the affirmative. In some sense, we all feel that, in the Holy Communion, Jesus knows and loves us; that He is conscious and living (pp. 118, 119, 120).

Let us now, then, go on to consider the state of the Soul of Jesus in the Blessed Sacrament. The same great soul which, when He was on earth, spoke through His lips, looked through His eyes, modulated the sweet tones of His voice, thought with His brain, and lived with His heart, is in each particle of the Host, and is, consequently, received by the communicant. It is there with the self-same relations to the sacred flesh of Jesus which it had on earth. It is

the form¹ of the body then as now; else, the body were a lifeless mass. . . . It is there with all its powers of will and understanding unimpaired. It can live, as when He was on earth before, with all its old tenderness and vehemence. It is there with all its intellect, its human consciousness and its earthly memories, its recollections of the past, as fresh as yesterday, and of all that those thirty-three years brought to Him of sorrow or of joy. Need I say that all its supernatural powers are there as well; its graces in all their infinity and plenitude, and all the riches with which the Father loved to deck the Manhood of the Son (pp. 122, 123).

It is certain that Jesus, in the Sacred Host, can know and love us personally. The instinct of our heart told us true. It is not only by the passive outpouring of grace that Holy Communion helps us; but that outpouring takes place with the will and knowledge of Jesus. Our Lord is not dead, nor even in an ecstatic sleep; it is with the full consciousness of His Sacred Manhood that He is given to us; and Holy Communion is the conscious union of our living Lord with our living souls (p. 124).

There is here a mathematical thoroughness in the application of logic to the elucidation of a mystery, which, upon any other subject, could, perhaps, be regarded with scholastic admiration; but, as applied to this, it is startling, not to say revolting. The attribution of a personal consciousness to the Sacrament is, it may be, to an Aristotelian, a logical result of transubstantiation; but it is one which it has never been our fortune to see so distinctly drawn out and so carnally exemplified; and it has, if we mistake not, no example in any of the writings of the earlier defenders of the doctrine. But there is a still more startling and revolting exhibition of faithfulness to a logical inference in what follows. We quote again:

Amidst all the crowded visions of the past, and the never-ending vista of the future—nay, amidst all that past which He can know of the infinite ideal of what is possible for God to accomplish—Jesus is still cognizant of what is actually before Him; and out of all the several actions in that great drama of the present, He can fix His thoughts upon what is being done by one little soul. His whole undistracted intellect gives its attention to us; and when He is given to us in Holy Communion, our little soul becomes His spouse, as though we had no rivals; as, indeed, practically we have not, in His boundless love (p. 125).

The author thus raises the question as to the way in which Jesus, in the Sacrament, is conscious of our presence to Him; whether it is by some process of knowledge proper to spiritual existences, or by means of His senses; and there is a good deal of

¹ Form, we suppose, is here used in the Aristotelian sense of the vivifying principle; only thus is the language intelligible.

confident assertion as to the extent of His knowledge when in the womb of the Virgin, and also as to His knowledge of us, personally, in His humanity when on earth, which, in our judgment (to say the least), savors far more of presumption than of discretion. But the author is obliged to concede that there is a difference of opinion among theologians on this point. He himself characteristically favors the affirmative of the question, Whether our Lord knows us in the Sacrament by means of His senses, or in some other mode? He says:

If the Blessed Sacrament is the means by which Jesus makes up to us for His forced absence in heaven,¹ He would strive to make His presence on the altar as like as possible to that which existed when He was upon earth. It is a joyful thing to think, when Jesus is exposed in the Blessed Sacrament, and we are kneeling at His feet, that His sweet eyes are bent upon us, and that He hears our sighs. It adds to the joy of Holy Communion to think that He hears our protestations of unworthiness in the "*Domine non sum dignus.*" At that moment, it seems to enhance the excess of His love, to think that He is sensibly conscious of our presence. Surely, Jesus would neglect no possible means of bringing Himself nearer to us; and is He not nearer if the thin veil of the species is only an obstacle to our sight, not to His; and if, instead of being removed from us into a state of bodily unconsciousness, from which He only escapes by the operation of His infused science, He can hold human intercourse with us, as we do with one another?

So far, then, there is a *prima facie* probability in favor of the view that our Lord, in the Blessed Sacrament, is conscious of our presence through His organs of sense, and it is perfectly allowable to hold such a view (p. 181).

The author goes on to discuss the question, with a reference to several theologians,—Bonaventura, Suarez, Lessius, Viva, Cardinal Cienfuegos. In this we will not follow him, nor in the process of reasoning by which he attempts to defend his position. We must, however, extend our quotations a little, to show that there is no misapprehension in what we have cited hitherto:

Let us remember that we must not, for a moment, suppose that our Lord's organs are imperfect in the Blessed Sacrament. We should have not only an

¹ To talk about the *forced* absence of One from any part of His domain, to whom *all* power is given, in heaven and on earth, is such strange and unnatural language as a Transubstantiationist only could employ. And to speak of His presence in *one* Sacrament, as if there only we could find Him personally, is just as inappropriate, when He has promised to be *personally* present in the smallest congregations of His devout worshippers. "There am I, in the midst of them." Does this "I" mean anything less than Christ in *person*, and in His *whole* person? If so, let the scholastics of Rome instruct us *how much* to subtract.

inadequate, but a false view of the doctrine of the Holy Eucharist, if we thought that any particle of the Body of Jesus is absent from the Host. It would, therefore, be wrong to suppose that there is anything resembling loss of sight in our Lord, from the imperfection of His organs. Again, His organs of sense are perfectly distinct from each other. There is no confusion in them in the Holy Eucharist. It is true of the spiritual body, as of the body in its natural state, that it is not one member, but many. Eye, hand, and ear are still as distinct as ever. In the Blessed Sacrament, the beautiful organism is not destroyed. If the limbs cannot be said to be in different places in the body, it is only because the notion of locality is inapplicable altogether, since it is taken out of the ordinary laws of space. They cannot, properly speaking, be said to be anywhere, because such expressions have reference to a state of things which has (*sic*) now passed away, since our Lord's body is now in each portion of the Host, as the soul is in each particle of the body (pp. 185, 186).

It would seem impossible to construct a series of propositions more confused and contradictory. Here are body and soul mingled in one and the same category. We do say, indeed, "the soul is all in every part" of the man; but, in saying this, we do not conceive of the soul as having organs and separate faculties, but as being one and indivisible.

As we have shown in the former article, in speaking of the Presence of Christ in the Sacrament, we may intend, by His body and blood, the vital force and efficacy of His body and blood; and, in this sense, the Presence is analagous to the Soul, all with every part of the respective elements. But when, as our author does here, we speak of the body in its senses and sensible faculties, it is clearly incongruous and contradictory to compare its presence with the presence of the soul in the living body. There is the same fallacy that we have before pointed out, of confounding body and *a* body. He talks of unextended body, *i. e.*, matter in general; but unextended body is not organized, and there is no meaning in the language, when senses and organic faculties are attributed to unextended body. There is, in all this, a confusion which may be converted into a sort of mystery in the minds of inconsiderate readers, who would fail to detect the logical contradiction which runs through the entire argument.

We have given copious extracts, that the doctrine set forth and inculcated in the Roman Obedience may be exhibited in the *ipsisima verba* of the author. If we had read an abstract of such teaching, made by a reviewer, we should not have believed it to be a fair representation; and we have the feeling that any abstract we could have made, would have been received by our readers with sponta-

neous incredulity. We should have been charged with distorting the meaning of the author for controversial purposes. If we had seen it elsewhere than in a well-authenticated work, we should have felt absolutely forced to verify the representation. To our mind, this exhibition of the doctrine of the Real Presence in a Romish caricature is simply enormous—nay, monstrous! It is just such an one as we conceive a scoffer or a hypocrite might invent, to bring a sacred mystery into downright contempt. It is difficult to conceive how any person of ordinary mental culture can admit it. It contains the quintessence of superstition; for it is transubstantiation transubstantiated. We have too good an opinion of such Roman Catholic friends as we know, to believe that it has any approach to substantiality in their minds, if, indeed, it has ever been presented to them, or conceived of in their dreams. Our author does, indeed, permit us to believe that this is only *one* theological view of the matter; and we would hope, in all charity, that there are very few who follow him in embracing it. But even without going to the full extent of *his* speculations, the doctrine which we infer to be commonly received, of a consciousness of Christ in the Sacrament, is only a degree less offensive to a spiritual perception than what we have exhibited. There is a material eating, and a corporeal consumption of the living, personal Christ. Under the conception of transubstantiation, the living body of Christ, taken in the Sacrament, is consumed, and absorbed into the natural constitution of the body. It is a physical assimilation which it undergoes; for, upon the supposition, the digestible properties of the wafer, as bread, are removed. The nourishment, therefore, passes into the flesh,—the material substance of the communicant. The answer that would be made to the question, “How can this Man give us His flesh to eat?” would be, “By changing the wafer into His body; by making it become a Christ.” But the answer which the Lord made to the question was, “The flesh profiteth nothing; the words that I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life.” The realities which my words place before you, are spirit, not flesh; and, as such, they are life-giving. What if ye shall see the Son of Man ascend up where He was before? My flesh and blood are derived from My spiritual body; the body glorified after the Resurrection, and exalted to the right hand of God. Such we conceive to be the significance of these mysterious words of our Lord, which is wholly lost when His presence in the Sacrament is represented according to an earthly imagination, and its assimilation is supposed to be effected by means of material, of fleshly organs.

We cannot be persuaded that such an exhibition of this subject does not have the effect of producing a wholly false and unreal state of the minds of those who receive it. It is not a mere mystery, which the mystical faculty of the mind can grasp without analyzing, but it is an artificial conception, which, as presented to the imagination, is a mere chimera,—a conception without any corresponding reality. The mind has to be tutored into believing it, and then into believing what purports to be a miracle,—a change wrought in a material substance, not to be verified by the senses. How can the mind become familiar with such unrealities without sad deterioration? without finally believing that the soul and the body are alike material, and thus ending in one of the grosser forms of scepticism?

And farther, how is it possible that the doctrine of transubstantiation, with its consequences, as exhibited in this work, can fail to introduce an element of *fleshliness*, and a gross one too, into the religious life? By fleshliness, we do not mean sensuality; nor yet do we mean to condemn a sensuous element in religion. Christianity is essentially sensuous; that is, it has, properly, a sensuous element, and all sacraments and offices of worship imply this; but sensuousness and sensuality are quite distinct, as are sensuousness and fleshliness. Fleshliness is in the mind before it is in the senses. The senses are necessary for the exercise of the spirit as well as of the flesh; and there is no religion more entirely antagonistic to what is spiritual, than that which rejects altogether the use of the senses. By the flesh, as opposed to the spirit, is intended the intellect and the emotions in their natural form, in distinction from the same powers used in the light, and under the suasion of the Holy Ghost.

St. Paul speaks of "knowing Christ after the flesh," as being a condition from which we should seek to be delivered. "Wherefore, henceforth, know we no man after the flesh; yea, though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now henceforth know we him [after the flesh] no more."¹ By this we understand him to mean that for the purpose of initiation into the Christian life, for the first steps of faith, the knowledge of Christ as He was in mortal flesh, as He appeared to the senses of men, as He addressed Himself to their natural emotions, was necessary. This was "to know Him after the flesh;" but as we rise into the higher regions of spiritual life, and our perceptions become exercised thereto, we come to know Him in the spiritual realities, of which the events of

¹I. Cor. v. 16.

His earthly life are the expression. His humiliation, His sufferings, His death, exhibit to us the great and eternal realities which are fulfilled in his person. The love which was manifested both in the Incarnation and on the cross, is something too deep for sentiment, or even for tears. In knowing Christ after the Spirit, we do not need to have the painful image of a suffering Lord, hanging on the cross, to awaken in us a natural, *i. e.*, a fleshly sentiment of sorrow. We have no place for a dramatic representation, whether of the trial or the crucifixion of our Redeemer. We do not need to go about to reproduce the events of His life, whether by the childish exhibition of a crib with its surroundings at Christmas, or by an artificial Calvary,¹ nor by tolling of a bell at three o'clock on Good Friday, or by a scenic representation of the tomb during Holy Saturday. All these things minister only to the knowledge of Christ after the flesh, and, in an equal degree, restrain the spirits of the worshippers from rising up to the knowledge of Christ in the Spirit. These are things that are suitable only for the most immature Christian minds. Of the effect, even of these, to secure an earnestness and intensity of devotion, no one, especially one who has been much in European churches, can entertain a doubt; but whether it is the highest and most desirable form of Christian life may be more than questioned. The moral condition of Spain and Italy may help us to decide. The world has been much amused with the descriptions of the Ober Ammergau Passion-play; but whatever may be said of the beautiful and devout simplicity of the Tyrolese peasants who produced it, we think there has been a very wide-spread feeling, the reasonableness of which few could well explain to themselves, that it was by no means a desirable exhibition. It is a fleshly attempt to exhibit scenes, the significance of which belongs to a higher region; so that the most reverent reproduction of them is nothing less than a sorry and humiliating profanation.

This attempt to reproduce the closing scenes of our Lord's life, whether by the use of the crucifix or by a quasi-dramatic worship, is fleshly in its tendency, because it appeals to and uses the mere fleshly imagination, and calls up emotions which belong to our psychical rather than to our spiritual nature. True, spiritual emotions proceed from within outward; but this proceeds from without, and may be very intense; while it never so much as reaches the spirit. Emotion excited by the picture of our Lord's suffering humanity does not necessarily partake of the character of faith. It

¹ Such as is seen in the Church of St. Augustine, we believe, in Antwerp.

may be mere sentiment, and as vapory and transient as such sentiment.

This conception of the presence of Christ in the Sacrament, which allows the worshipper, as he kneels before the altar, to exercise his imagination in supposing that the consecrated bread is possessed of consciousness, that it perceives Him there present, that it sees, feels, hears every surrounding circumstance that may act upon the senses, can, it seems to us, have no other effect than to bring down the mind from the sphere of spiritual devotion to a merely fleshly and mundane level. The tendency of the spiritual mind is upward; it aspires to rise above any of its own conceptions, in thinking of the exalted Redeemer and Lord. The only adequate conception of our risen Lord is that given by John amid the vision of the Apocalypse,—the revelation of Jesus in His glory: "His head and His hairs were white like wool, as white as snow; and His eyes were as a flame of fire, and His feet like unto fine brass, as if they burned in a furnace; and His voice as the sound of many waters. And He had in His right hand seven stars, and out of His mouth went a sharp two-edged sword, and His countenance was as the sun shineth in his strength." Is it possible to harmonize such a conception with that which is proposed, when one is instructed to conceive of a conscious presence of Christ in the Sacrament, to think of the Sacrament called the Host or the Victim, as then and there seeing, feeling, hearing what is going on about it?

To our apprehension, such methods of representing the greatest mystery of the Gospel can have no other effect than to confine the religious beliefs and sentiments to the sphere of the fleshly; to restrain the thoughts from rising up into the sphere of the spiritual, to make Christians "of the earth, earthy." The entire system of devotional exercises, which are known under the name of "Devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus," partakes, we conceive, of the same character, and tends to produce the same effect; leading to a contemplation of the sufferings of Christ in their material and personal aspects, rather than as representing the great spiritual realities of the death of the old man in Him, in order to its entering upon the new creation in resurrection life.

The great characteristic of Roman Catholic theology and practical instruction, it appears to us, is its failure to present before the mind the risen and glorified Christ, and to enforce the truth that it is by His resurrection life, by His body in glory and not His body on earth, that we may live anew. Not that the supernatural life derived from the Incarnate Word is not made distinctly prominent,

for it is so; but the teaching seems to respect the life of our Lord's humanity in His humiliation, rather than in His exaltation. The Sacraments are spoken of as "the extension of the Incarnation;" which, taken by itself, means no more than manhood in its lowly and suffering condition. But it is the risen and ascended Christ in whom we live; and it would express the full truth more exactly to say that the Sacraments are an extension of the *Resurrection* and *Ascension*. The whole symbolism used in Divine services, and at other times, is all arranged to enforce this idea. Instead of the simple naked cross, from which the victim has been taken down, which He has left for His seat at the right hand of the Father (an emblem at the same time of suffering and of victory), there is the crucifix, with the image on it of the languishing victim; as though He were always about to die, always undergoing the agonies of the cross. This, as is well understood, does, indeed, agree with the Roman doctrine of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, that it is the perpetual renewal of the sacrifice of the cross, and that the priest in the Mass offers a propitiation for the living and the dead. It is Christ as He was on earth, not as He is in heaven, that is represented in the action of the priest of Romanism. It is the renewal of His sacrifice, in the real Holy of Holies above; it is the presentation of Himself with the memorials of that sacrifice, before His Father who is in heaven, which constitutes the completion of the Atonement. This is a distinction which is quite obvious for *us* to make. But we have the best authority for the statement that the rationale of the entire Service of the Mass rests upon a different ground,—the representation of the life of Christ upon the earth. This is shown out, quite clearly, in a little manual used by Roman Catholics, entitled "The Ceremonies of the High Mass," by Olier, Master of the Sorbonne in 1642: This is not an antiquated book, for it is still reprinted and sold; although, we believe, not translated from the French. According to this writer, the whole transaction is dramatic. The procession of priests and acolytes represents the life of Christ on earth. "The cross is carried in front, to show that our Lord Jesus Christ had always His sacrifice before His eyes when He lived on the earth,—He had always in mind the sacrifice of the cross (*Dolor meus in conspectu meo semper*, Pa. xxxviii. 18), and still more, He had always the holy sacrifice of the altar in mind, which is represented by two wax candles, which are carried at the side of the cross. These candles are two in number, although there is only one cross, for the reason that there is only one sacrifice of the cross; and for that of the

altar it is multiplied, although there is only one and the same victim." Each separate act in the service of the Mass is the carrying out of the same idea.

The great significance of the death of Christ lies in its being the death of the old man. "In that He died, He died unto sin once." It was the nature of the fallen race which He had assumed, which was by His death surrendered to the endurance of all the penalty of sin, and rendered capable of coming forth in the power of resurrection life. This is the root idea of at-onement; or our reconciliation unto God. Our old man is crucified with Him, that the body of sin might be destroyed. God the Father "made Him to be sin for us, who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in Him." Had this been kept in view, the poor theory of equivalents in the Atonement could never have arisen. Christ is not represented by St. Paul as bearing an amount of punishment sufficient to balance the punishment deserved by sinful men. It is as the representative of the sinful race that He dies; and while His death serves the purpose of an expiation, a propitiation, a ransom, and is so presented to us, relatively to us who partake in it; and while it is really a sacrifice of the highest conceivable kind, we are authorized from the language of Scripture to say that the great necessity for the death of Christ, in His assumed office of Redeemer, lay in the impossibility that humanity in its fallen condition should enter into the presence of God, except through death. This, as we have said, is the root idea of atonement; and the discovery of this is to know Christ after the spirit. This is a truth which the mere natural man approaching to the sacred mysteries cannot know, and he therefore must come to them with such a knowledge of Christ as can be had "according to the flesh;" not at the first passing beyond His life in the flesh, including the belief of His resurrection and ascension. Such a degree of faith (we are supposing the case of an unbaptized, untaught adult) is the initiative of the Christian life, which in Baptism is confirmed by the grace of regeneration, and "according to this beginning" (as the Prayer Book calls it) may, through the light and teaching of the Holy Ghost, expand into a larger and higher power of apprehension. From "this beginning" the soul which cultivates its gifts rises up to the discernment of the great spiritual realities which the life and death of Christ embody; and in His sufferings and agony upon the cross, sees the process of the dying of the old man, which from henceforth is to go on continually in every one who is baptized, and uses baptism aright, until it becomes complete in the

full participation of resurrection life.¹ It is the spiritual rather than the material cross that the spiritual man sees,—the agony of the conflict with the powers of darkness, which, as the representative of the fallen race, He had undertaken. And from this results also the discernment of the spiritual resurrection, which is so prominent in the Epistles of St. Paul. This knowledge, as the effect of the inworking of the life of the risen and ascended Christ, received in Baptism and cherished afterward, is altogether supernatural. Faith thus made alive, and kept alive, is a new faculty, a power of spiritual discernment of which the natural man, exercising merely unsanctified gifts, is quite incapable.

Herein lies the objection to the form of teaching, of which we have an example in that portion of the work under review, which we are now contemplating. The exhibition of Christ as present in the Holy Eucharist in His organs of sense, of feeling, of motion, certainly addresses the mere natural powers of imagination. It recalls Him to the thought not as the conqueror of sin and of death, but as a suffering victim, who appeals to human sensibilities and to fleshly sympathies. The eye affects the heart; but it may be only the natural sensibility that is affected, to an extent which shall obscure the discernment of the spiritual reality. The Resurrection and Ascension too are not brought into view; so that the great truth that our higher life is through Christ as *He now is*, rather than as *He was*, is not even suggested.

The unavoidable effect must be to limit the knowledge of Christ

¹ We say "uses baptism aright;" for we have no idea of sanctioning the notion that sacraments are efficacious *ex opere operato*. Sacraments are given under a Covenant; and of course their gifts and graces are conditional. In fact, all Divine action, with reference to human discipline, is conditional. Promises are conditional; predictions are conditional; predestinations are conditional. "Yet forty days, and Nineveh *shall* be overthrown," was as absolute, in form, as it could be. But it was conditional and unfulfilled. So we may construe promises and predestinations too (which in one sense are promises and predictions), and be relieved forthwith from the metaphysical troubles which these subjects have so often occasioned. The unfulfilled promises of the prophecies have puzzled many readers. The moment we remember they were promises under a Covenant, and therefore conditional, all perplexity is at an end. We have never known this simple and obvious explanation fail with any inquirer, whether a person of culture or otherwise. We have known it give instantaneous relief about a promise, a prediction, or a predestination. Even law is a contract—so said one of the greatest of jurists—and therefore law becomes virtually a promise, a prediction, or a predestination. This applies to the Ten Commandments.

to that which is "after the flesh," and to give birth to a system of pastoral discipline and personal behavior in accordance with this fundamental idea.

We would not leave the impression that the knowledge of Christ after the spirit implies any neglect or undervaluation of Divine ordinances. We speak thus, because of the very wide-spread fancy that spirit is the antagonist of form, and that the more spiritual any one becomes, the more independent he is of outward ordinances. In common speech, "spiritual worship" is supposed to be worship separated from all liturgical forms. But the antithesis of spirit is not *form*, but *flesh*; and, paradoxical as it may sound, we hesitate not to affirm that the less of form or ordinance there is in a religious system, the more there is of the flesh, because it, of necessity, depends so much the more upon the words and actions of individual men, acting in the power of the flesh. Spiritual worship is worship offered in the power of the Holy Ghost, present in the Church as the second Paraclete. The Holy Ghost is the Spirit of Christ, is His substitute and vicar, and His work is to take of the things of Christ, and show them to believers. He is subordinate to Christ, and all His actings are through Christ's truth and ordinances, established by His authority; and it is not the spirituality of the Holy Ghost which is seen, when men, breaking away from God's truth, enshrined in His Church and ordinances, supplant and displace it for constructions and imaginations of their own. There may be enthusiasm, excitement, vitality of some sort—what some will mistake for spirituality—but it is the excitement of men's own spirits, and not that of the Spirit of the Living God. Sacraments and ordinances are not mere scaffolding, which may be kicked away when a certain height is reached. They are the forms amid which we are to expatiate, in the heavenly places in Him who is now in "the form of God." And growth in spiritual life, instead of causing weariness of them, only increases the sense of their necessity and the eagerness for their use. To the spiritual man, the infrequent dole of the Bread of Life is not sufficient to satisfy him, nor the church unopened except for harangues or sermons. He longs for the daily bread of heavenly grace, and the regular recurrence of the hour of prayer and meditation; and as he grows in the spiritual life, the desire becomes even more ardent, and the satisfaction more entire. But it is all the more needful that the ordinances by which his life is fed be pure,—free from all fleshly admixture, secure from the intrusion of the old leaven of degenerate humanity.

It has not been for a merely controversial purpose that this

matter has been brought into discussion. It is quite evident that the doctrine held in any portion of the Church, in relation to a Real Presence, has a widely-reaching influence upon the character and form of the religious development and religious life; and we have laid hold of this work under review, for the purpose of showing what are the legitimate results of the doctrine of transubstantiation, logically and consistently carried out. It is from this that the type of religious life which is promoted and cultivated in the Roman Catholic communion is derived. The question, whether Christ is present in the Sacrament of the Eucharist, after the manner of a physical or corporeal presence, or present "after a spiritual and heavenly manner," determines the whole course of practical instruction and discipline. In the Roman teaching, it is carried out logically; but the conception of a physical or corporeal presence may be held, without going to the full extent of affirming the withdrawal of the substance of the bread and wine, and the tendency will be relatively the same. It cannot be denied that the tendencies of some of the leading teachers of the party in England and in this country, who are designated as Ritualists, are, at least, equivocal, and in this direction of a corporeal presence; nor that some of the rites and ceremonies which they have introduced, in the celebration of the Holy Communion, seem to favor its carnality.

It is an important question whether the type of religious life which may be distinguished as the Anglican type, as the same has been seen in some of her most saintly members (transfigured, as it may be, and, we trust, is becoming so, by a deeper faith in the supernatural and a freer effusion of the Holy Ghost), shall be retained, or replaced by what we must distinguish as the Roman type. That a decided effort is being made in England, at least, to bring about this change, cannot be doubted. Whoever has visited the headquarters of Ritualism in London—St. Alban's, Holborn—sees at once that all the labors of the clergy are directed to forming religious habits and styles of thought in accordance with Romish discipline. All the externals of the Church, as far as the rubrics and arrangements of the English Service Book will allow, and something beyond, are in the same direction, and have the same manifest tendency. Whether Mr. Machonochie and his associates want to carry the English Church bodily to the Papacy, or not, it seems quite evident that they desire to fashion the hearts of the people, to whom they minister, into harmony with the ways of thinking and feeling which are proper to members of the Roman Obedience. The success of their efforts, we fancy, would excite a

smile upon the lips of an intelligent Romanist, who would perceive many elements wanting, both in the process and the result. This, doubtless, is regarded as a desirable consummation, and a step toward the reunion of the Churches. There are not, probably, many who would regard union on such conditions as desirable.

How far this same disposition exists in our own land and Church, we are unable to say. Here and there, we notice attempts to imitate the prototype in Holborn; and, now and then, we meet with some doctrinal utterances which look in the same direction. There is enough of this element to cause much disturbance and uneasiness. If we may venture to suggest, we should say that there might be no more accessible means to quiet agitation than a joint expression by so many of the bishops as could agree about the limit of teaching allowable in this matter. It is impossible to ignore it, or to satisfy the minds of thoughtful Christians by vague generalities, capable of diverse and conflicting interpretations. Something positive and stable should be had, if we can call it forth. There are, of course, two distinct and quite opposite lines of teaching recognized on this question, and, unfortunately, a perfect consense of all the bishops cannot be obtained; but as there are schools and parties recognized, it might tend to quietness and edification if the doctrines of the respective schools and parties were somewhat more clearly and accurately defined.

It is on the same basis, too, that any distinctive principle of ritual can rest. No one is much concerned, nowadays, by any ritual accessories which have no other aim than to render the accepted and regular services of our Church in a manner more worthy of their purpose; but when they are extended to changes in the celebration of the Holy Communion, they become more serious. Considering the high and supreme place which this service holds in Church worship, any additions to it, made by individual priests, without the sanction of the whole Church, seem presumptuous, and almost profane. No man has a right to intrude his mere private judgment into a solemnity so ruling and so sacred. And this is especially the case when the added ceremonies are designed to be symbolical. If they symbolize no more than what was held and taught by our Church heretofore, their introduction is unwarranted; if they symbolize a different doctrine, their tendency is schismatical, and their use impertinent, presuming, and perilous. No bishop, we should suppose, need have any mawkish hesitation as to their suppression; but it would be well that it be done on distinct and intelligible grounds. We do not know, however, where the conservative

authority of the episcopal office can be legitimately exerted, if it be not in the direction of ritual matters which have not been regulated by any accepted precedents or definite law.

We have little space for any remarks upon the third part of the book under review ; which, however, requires no special notice. It is entitled "The Practice of Holy Communion,"—a title which, to us, sounds rather strange. It consists, first, of a historical sketch of the usages of the Church in former times, in respect to frequency of Communion. Upon this we have only to remark that the author gives no countenance to the well-known practice of non-communicating attendance as at all consistent with a true idea of the rite, or sanctioned by primitive usage. This practice sprung out, is his idea, of the defection and failure of the spirit of religion in the hearts of men.¹ The other chapters consist of counsels addressed to various classes of Christians, as more or less perfect or imperfect, and contain many passages of great beauty, and of real practical value.

We are willing to infer, from what is said, that frequency in communicating is much increased, of late years, in Roman churches. In this we would fain see an indication that the wave of spiritual life, which has shown its fruits in the great revival of the past forty years in the Church of England and elsewhere, has been a broad tidal wave, which has swept over the face of Christendom, and spread its influence throughout the divided and scattered portions of the Body of Christ. God grant that its power may be increased a hundred-fold, until the Bride of the Lamb shall be fully arrayed in the righteousness of saints, and made ready for her marriage to immortal purity, dignity, and bliss.

¹ This is one view. Another is that the Eucharist was commonized by too frequent repetition, and men felt less interest in it. The Church of Rome has a *daily* Eucharist, but has been obliged to content herself with *one* communication in a year! Doubtless, there is a medium, if we can be so happy as to hit it.



RAWLINSON'S PARTHIA.

THE SIXTH GREAT ORIENTAL MONARCHY; or, the Geography, History, and Antiquities of Parthia. Collected and Illustrated from Ancient and Modern sources. By George Rawlinson, M.A., Camden Professor of Ancient History in the University of Oxford, and Canon of Canterbury. One vol., 8vo, pp. 458. London: Longman, Green & Co. New York: Scribner, Wellford & Armstrong. 1878.

IT seems curious that one of the great ancient monarchies should have been comparatively neglected, until Canon Rawlinson made it a special subject. And the curiosity becomes greater when we find that even such a mind as Gibbon's, whose comprehensiveness was a matter of stately pride, should have fallen into the beaten track of misapprehension, and left Parthia as if an inconsiderable or half-forgotten topic. We remember it as one of Gibbon's pet boasts, that he had rather be wrong alone, than right with the vulgar multitude. And the propensity on which it was founded, made him a sad sceptic about religion. The wonder, therefore, is all the greater, that, in his peculiar department of history, he should not have carried out his favorite pretension. Yet Mr. Rawlinson is careful to tell us that he has not, and that the author of the celebrated "Decline and Fall" has proved himself, in reference to a kingdom once the antagonist, and the stout antagonist, of Rome, as dull of perception as a phalanx of acknowledged inferiors.

Gibbon "enlarges on the idea,—an idea quite inconsistent with

the fact that, for the man who provoked the hostility of the ruler of Rome, there was no refuge upon the whole face of the earth, but some wild and barbarous region, where refinement was unknown, and life would not have been worth the having. To the present writer, the truth seems to be that Rome never was in the position supposed; that, from first to last, from the time of Pompey's eastern conquests to the fall of the empire, there was always in the world a second power, civilized or semi-civilized, which, in a true sense, balanced Rome, acted as a counterpoise and a check, had to be consulted or considered, held a place in all men's thoughts, and finally furnished a not intolerable refuge to such as had provoked Rome's master beyond forgiveness" (Pref. p. vi.).

An examination of the map would incline one to think Gibbon in the right, and Rawlinson in the wrong; for Parthia once occupied, geographically, but a small space in territory, and was completely out of the way, and far away from the appropriate "course of empire," on the eastern side of the Caspian Sea. It was, too, only some three hundred miles long, by an average width of one hundred or one hundred and twenty miles, and contained but thirty-three thousand square miles,—about as large as the El Dorado of some of our American speculators, the island of St. Domingo. Still, it was a precious spot, in comparison with its surroundings. It had partial deserts upon the north, and partial deserts upon the south, which shut it up, if one may say so, to longitudinal extension. But it was seamed by ridges of mountains, with soft valleys and bright rivers, which rendered it a succession of Vales of Tempe, or a sort of terrestrial paradise. As Strabo said of it poetically, it was "highly favored of Heaven." Its inhabitants found ample sustenance for the support of a vigorous and elastic race, and for those animals so necessary and so celebrated in their favorite mode of warfare. The Parthians educated a cavalry almost, or quite, as expert as that of some of our native Indian tribes; and this cavalry rendered itself so famous, that its arrows, even in retreat, became a terror to the best soldiers of the times.

But where, exclaims modern curiosity, did this marvellous people come from, who were able, in even Rome's palmiest days, to stay her puissant arm? Were they the relics of some conquered nation, driven away from home, as the Israelites were deported from Canaan and planted in distant captivity? or were they a sort of natural wanderers? Canon Rawlinson, of course, discusses these interesting questions, and presents the conflicting opinions indulged respecting them. His own seems fairly to be (and analogy in the

West amply sustains it) that Parthia was peopled, as middle Europe was, by roaming races, who came, like the locusts, to fasten on what others had made ready for their consumption. He regards them "as in race closely allied to the vast hordes which, from a remote antiquity, have roamed over the steppe region of Upper Asia, from time to time bursting upon the South, and harassing or subjugating the comparatively unwarlike inhabitants of the warmer countries" (p. 25).

Well, such was Parthia's dawn. And had she an easy ascent to opulence, fame, and power? Or did the young national giant undergo labors like those of Hercules? Doubtless, she had a rough and thorny road to travel, in order to reach the heights of princely dignity and sway—had, in Oriental phraseology, to wrestle with principalities and powers—but her determination was invincible, and her final success enviable; so enviable, in fact, that she provoked a jealous and grasping neighbor, to whom we must now introduce our readers.

This was Seleucus Nicator, one of the officers of Alexander the Great, and who, at first, had no eminence to boast of, and no share in the dismemberment of the kingdom when Alexander died, B. C. 323. But he proved himself a remarkable personage, and actually established the dynasty of the Seleucidæ at Babylon, B. C. 311. Seleucus grew so great, that he overshadowed the East with a dominion which embraced nearly a million and a quarter of square miles. One government after another was swallowed up in his immense domain, and Parthia among the multitude. But, true to her genius and her destiny, Parthia chafed and fretted under her vassalage, till, in a lucky hour, when her liege-lord's attention was drawn to another quarter of his huge possessions, she revolted, and declared for independence.

"The three Seleucid sovereigns who reigned prior to the Parthian revolt, were, one and all, engaged in frequent, if not continual wars, with the monarchs of Egypt and Asia Minor" (p. 37). These eastern wars were, indirectly, Parthia's gain, not to say salvation. She slipped away from a loosened yoke, and struck for sovereignty. Her effort was, indeed, a most taxing one, and her struggles as costly as they were bitter. But they purchased enduring triumphs. "It adds another to the many instances where a small but brave people, bent on resisting foreign domination, have, when standing on their defence on their own territory, proved more than a match for the utmost force that a foe of overwhelming strength could bring against them. It reminds one of Marathon, of Bannockburn, of Morgarten" (p. 50).

This was in 237 B. C.; and in something more than half a century onward, such was Parthia's accelerated progress, we meet with the reign of a monarch who raised her to the dignity of an actual empire. This was Mithridates II., who reigned from 174 to 136 B. C.; and concerning whom, says the historian of whose labors we are endeavoring to give an abstract, "It is not too much to say that, but for him, Parthia might have remained a mere petty state on the outskirts of the Syrian kingdom; and, instead of becoming a rival to Rome, might have sunk shortly into obscurity and insignificance" (p. 69). Under him, Parthia became the centre of twelve large provinces, and grew to about five times its original length, and nearly as many times its original breadth.

And here, then, was a power to be respected by the mightiest. Here was a power to compete with the old monarchs of Syria, and, finally, to confront imperial Rome; who, having laid all the West under her ban, was now looking eastward, to make her rule commensurate with the world's remotest boundaries. Rome, some contend, had an eye, in this scheme, to the extension, not of her rule only, but of her civilization. This is the theory of Mr. Freeman—becoming quite a celebrity for his historical criticisms—respecting one whom Pope dubbed "Macedonia's madman," and of whom thousands have accepted the poet's sarcasm as an established verity. And if Alexander could entertain such a view, well might Rome do it, when following him in the track of conquest. Rome has always been famous for plans of unifying; and it may be quite as true that she wanted to spread political identity under the emperors, as it was afterward true that she wanted to spread ecclesiastical identity under the popes. The first economy may have suggested, probably did suggest the second. Rome needs all the charity which can in anywise be expended on her; and we are disposed to meet, with the least incredulity possible, the plea offered in her behalf, that she quarrelled with men, not so much because they were opposed to her *régime*, as because they were, in her creed, barbarians, whom it was her policy and her duty, as the foremost of earthly agencies, to train for progress. This, of course, is not the idea of many respecting her, any more than it has been the idea of many respecting the notorious Macedonian. But if a pen like Mr. Freeman's can brighten the page of *his* story, Rome may, in time, have the same plausible excuse allowed for spreading universal political sway, which the popes have offered for her when endeavoring to render her sway not universal for politics alone, but for ethics and dogmatics. The theory of a universal and of a consolidated

empire was perfectly familiar at Rome long before a pope had set his foot there, or had strength enough for a voice soft as an Italian zephyr. The popes merely found an egg in an old nest, which they fain would have hatched for their personal aggrandizement.

But we are wandering away from a centre of power, dominion, and unification which was now culminating in the East. "The great increase of power which Mithridates had obtained by his conquests, could not be a matter of indifference to the Syrian monarchs" (p. 81). Yet these monarchs had been so pestered and enfeebled by intestine difficulties, that they could not properly attend to the acquirements of former days; and Mithridates successfully established his sway from the Hindoo Koosh to the Euphrates.

The time came, however, when Syria had rest, and awoke, "like a giant refreshed with wine." Then her eye fastened upon Parthia with a dooming frown. She summoned her forces with vindictive confidence, and, alas! that confidence was overweening. She miscalculated the strength of her opponent, and was defeated. Mithridates proved too good a soldier for her; and, what is more and better, when he had paralyzed her army, he proved himself no mean political economist and statesman. He deserves all the encomium bestowed upon him by Canon Rawlinson. "He appears to have been one of those rare individuals to whom it has been given to unite the powers which form the conqueror, with those which constitute the successful organizer of a state. Brave and enterprising in war, prompt to seize an occasion and to turn it to the best advantage, not even averse to severities where they seemed to be required, he yet felt no acrimony toward those who had resisted his arms, but was ready to befriend them as soon as their resistance ceased. Mild, clement, and philanthropic, he conciliated those whom he subdued, almost more easily than he subdued them; and, by the efforts of a few years, succeeded in welding together a dominion which lasted, without suffering serious mutilation, for nearly four centuries" (pp. 94, 95).

And now, if Syria had been content to let Parthia quietly alone, her power might have cemented into a strength quite irresistible, especially under the civic economy of which Mithridates endeavored to lay a broad and sure foundation. But Syria could not forget or endure her ascendancy, and endeavored once more, under Antiochus, to repair her own ignominious discomfiture. Her effort was like a gambler's stakes, when his fortunes are growing desperate. She was more unsuccessful than previously,—sacrificed, it is said, three hundred thousand lives, with untold treasure and appliances; lost

her monarch's life, and left his family in captivity; in fine, came almost to a national end, as if crushed by an avalanche of misfortune.

This was the grand calamity which virtually established the independence of the Jews. The Syrians had oppressed them, and they sided with the Parthians; though, singularly enough, it is said Parthia is not once alluded to in their sacred writings.

Now, here was an opportunity which Parthia might have improved to unspeakable advantage. She might have descended upon her stricken prey, like a huge vulture from the mountains, and batted on it till it was utterly consumed. But Parthia, like too many other schemers, was wise in the day of apprehension, and giddy with success in the day of triumph. She had subsidized the Scythians when Syria was marching against her with her formidable legions. When, by stratagem and prowess, she laid Antiochus low, before the Scythians were called for, she most unwisely and unjustly refused payment of the promised subsidy. So the Scythians took indemnity into their own hands, and knew well enough—as they assailed Parthia in the rear—how to make her pay, in full tale, for her unworthy defalcation. And treacherous Parthia had to turn on her own steps, to rescue her very firesides from predatory retribution.

Politically speaking, Parthia lost a priceless opportunity. True, she succeeded in driving off the Scythians. "They found a vent for their superabundant population in Seistan, Affghanistan, and India; and ceased to have any hopes of making an impression on the Ar-sacid kingdom" (p. 124). Yet, meanwhile, upon her northwestern frontier, and amid the ruins of Syria, a power was growing up, which the Romans styled Armenia Magna; and "which extended from the Euphrates on the west, to the mouth of the Araxes on the east, and from the valley of the Kur northward, to Mount Niphates and the head streams of the Tigris toward the south." This rising Armenian power became a source of anxiety and apprehension to Parthia, and a conflict was the inevitable issue. It was unfavorable to the Armenians; and Parthia was now fast becoming a wide dominion, whose shadows were darkening *westward*, and throwing their influence over the possessions of a sister dominion in the East. This dominion was the Roman; and it was probably the rapid extension of Parthian influence which awakened the attention of the Roman Senate to the importance of a foothold on Asiatic soil. Rome, it is true, might have attained this in 190 B. C., when she aided the downfall of Antiochus the Great, whom Hannibal assisted, and who advised him earnestly to pursue his old Carthaginian policy of fighting Rome in Italy. But Antiochus disappeared, and the time seemed

not *then* to have arrived when Rome could make an impression upon Asia, which would be as deep as it was abiding. So she stood aloof till the resounding steps of Parthia roused her to attention, observation, and action.

Rome and Parthia first came into contact (as this summary easily prepares us to believe) in what is now styled Asia Minor. A kingdom had grown up *there*, which occupied an intermediate position between two approximating empires, and this was the Kingdom of Pontus. Pontus soon became notorious in Roman annals. Its last famous monarch, Mithridates V., proved himself no inapt or insufficient breakwater against the ocean which was now beginning to thunder along Asiatic shores. Rome contrived to become his antagonist by intermeddling among subordinate portions of Asia Minor, and soon entered into a conflict with him, which it required the ability of such a general as Pompey to bring to a successful termination. Pompey was, indeed, astute enough to persuade the King of Parthia to aid him in his struggles with Mithridates,—struggles which Mr. Rawlinson does not exaggerate when he calls them “tremendous.” And then he was politician enough to argue with the Parthian monarch, that his interest lay in securing his compensation *elsewhere* than from the Roman treasury.

That monarch was sagacious enough to penetrate what we might call Pompey’s Jesuitical logic. He muttered anathemas and menaces; and Pompey, had he listened to ambition and military ardor, might easily have converted them into a *casus belli*. But he was verily a scientific soldier. He sat down and counted the cost of converting a useful ally into an implacable foe; and the result was a sedate conclusion that Parthia was then too mighty for his approaches in the ringing array of arms. So he tried softer, but frequently more effective weapons. He temporized, and kept Parthia at bay. With his Roman self-sufficiency, he could not well help insulting the Parthian sovereign, by denying him his favorite title, “king of kings,”—a title, by the way, which tells its own tale about the width of Parthian subjugations. He thus threw upon him the burden of a declaration of war, if war might indeed become the dread appeal for vindication. For, as Mr. Rawlinson well says, keenly appreciating the character and policy of the great Roman general, “The war had not been formally committed to him; and if he did not prosper in it, he dreaded the accusations of his enemies at Rome” (p. 146).

And here the grim relations between Rome and Parthia stood, some time, in ominous abeyance. But when Crassus obtained the

consulship, in 55 B. C., and also the command of the armies for the East, he determined to do what Pompey had left undone, and bring the resources of the overpowering West to bear upon Parthia with redoubled force.

But, unfortunately, Crassus was as communicative as Pompey had been reticent. He publicly announced "his intention to march the Roman legions across the Euphrates, and engage in hostilities with the great Parthian kingdom." He even threatened to penetrate to India and the great eastern ocean. This silly bravado, uttered a whole year before he was able to take the field, afforded the King of Parthia ample time for preparation. And when Crassus finally made his appearance, he was so well girded for a encounter, that he actually taunted his antagonist. Crassus was a sexagenarian; and he offered him mock pity for the tardiness and imbecility of infirm old age.

This personal hit—and such an one always sinks deepest, and is rarely forgiven—told most effectually, and made Crassus too angry to be cautious. Necessity, bald necessity, imposed on him one fruitless and mean campaign. But the next, by his intentions, was to redeem it fully and disastrously. Alas, the disasters of it were all his own! He neither understood the topography of the country he invaded, nor the mode of warfare familiar to its inhabitants. The Parthians, as we have said, made cavalry one of their specialties, since no sort of soldiery could be more available on plains which stretched away interminably like our almost boundless prairies. Crassus should have deployed his army among rough surfaces, where his heavy infantry might easily have outmatched the liveliest Oriental horsemen. But he was foolhardy enough to fight the Parthians in their own way; and, to illustrate his desperate imprudence, we shall quote Mr. Rawlinson's graphic description of the training and tactics of this far-renowned arm of Parthian warfare:

The Parthian horse, like the Persian, was of two kinds, standing in strong contrast the one to the other. The bulk of their cavalry was of the lightest and most agile description. Fleet and active coursers, with scarcely any caparison, but a headstall and a single rein, were mounted by riders clad only in a tunic and trowsers, and armed with nothing but a strong bow and a quiver full of arrows. A training begun in early boyhood, made the rider almost one with his steed; and he could use his weapons with equal ease and effect, whether his horse was stationary or at full gallop, and whether he was advancing toward, or hurriedly retreating from, his enemy.¹ His supply of

¹ Hence the allusions of Virgil, Horace, and Tacitus to the terrible Parthian arrow.

missiles was almost inexhaustible; for when he found his quiver empty, he had only to retire a short distance, and replenish his stock from magazines borne on the back of camels in the rear. It was his ordinary plan to be constantly in motion, when in the presence of an enemy, to gallop backward and forward, or round and round his square or column, never charging it, but, at a moderate interval, plying it with his keen and barbed shafts, which were driven, by a practised hand, from a bow of unusual strength. Clouds of this light cavalry enveloped the advancing or the retreating foe, and inflicted great damage without, for the most part, suffering anything in return.

But this was not the whole. In addition to these light troops, a Parthian army always comprised a body of heavy cavalry, armed on an entirely different system. The strong horses selected for this service were clad almost wholly in mail. Their head, neck, chest, even their sides and flanks, were protected by scale-armor of brass or iron, sewn, probably, upon leather. Their riders had cuirasses and cuisses of the same materials, and helmets of burnished iron. For an offensive weapon, they carried a long and strong spear or pike. They formed a serried line in battle, bearing down with great weight on the enemy whom they charged, and standing firm as an iron wall against the charges that were made upon them. A cavalry, corresponding to this in some respects, had been employed by the later Persian monarchs, and was in use also among the Armenians at this period; but the Parthian pike was apparently more formidable than the corresponding weapons of those nations, and the light spear, carried at this time by a Roman army, was no match for it (Pp. 160, 161).

The Romans tried to fight such enemies, as the British did the French at Waterloo, by forming a hollow square, having light-armed troops inside, with horse scattered along the whole line, and adown the flanks. But the hail-storm of Parthian arrows was so incessant and so penetrating, that the Roman ranks melted and waned away; while if they charged, the Parthians flew off like birds upon the wing, and could no more be grasped than floating steam-clouds. The son of Crassus followed them, supposing them discomfited. He was drawn into an ambuscade, and slain; and the final result was an utter failure for a soldiery hitherto deemed invincible, and whose valor the wide world had stood in awe of.

And this was the first dread clash between empires then commanding the known world's destinies. It might have been terrific to Rome, as well as mortifying; but the King of Parthia was jealous of the general who presided in it—suffered him to sink into disgrace, and even to die—anticipating the fate of Belisarius, the too great general of Justinian. The general had his reparation in the virtual losses of an unworthy master; for Parthia, if on the alert, might now have claimed complete equality with Rome, if not absolute superiority; but the auspicious moment for her attainment of a peerless culmination glided by, and Rome received no deeper wound.

She even mustered her forces for a fiercer war, to make Parthia do bloody penance for temporary glory.

This war, however, was a reality in the fancy alone of, perhaps, the grandest chieftain Rome ever produced, the acknowledged head of all the Cæsars. When the Great Dictator had brought his African wars and his Spanish wars to an end, he allowed his intention of leading an expedition against Parthia to be openly talked about. "But Parthia was saved from the imminent peril, without any effort of her own. The daggers of 'the Liberators' struck down, on the 15th of March, B. C. 44, the only man whom she had seriously to fear; and, with the removal of Julius, passed away even from Roman thought, for many a year, the design which he had entertained, and which he alone could have accomplished" (p. 185).

The civil war which followed Cæsar's assassination naturally resulted in intestine commotions, and required all the attention of the West for its own security. And this gave Parthia not only breathing time for future emergencies, but opportunity to enlarge her own appliances variously and mightily. For awhile, certainly, the prospect was ominous for the power which thought Europe too narrow for its prodigious enterprises, and sought to make Asia but a vassal. "It seemed," says our historian, "as if Rome had found not so much an equal as a superior. It looked as if the power, heretofore predominant, would be compelled to contract her frontier, and as if Parthia would advance hers to the Egean or the Mediterranean" (p. 193). Parthia, doubtless, had a day-dream of the immense possibilities before her, and did make some serious adventures to attain them. "But it turned out that the effort made was premature. While the Parthian warfare was admirably adapted for the national defence, on the broad plains of inner Asia, it was ill-suited for conquest, and, comparatively speaking, ineffective in more contracted and difficult regions." How singularly the issues of history sometimes disappoint human prognostications! A cavalry which Rome could not cope with, may indirectly have saved her!

So, in the high scheme of Providence, "it turned out" that, at least for the time current, the West was reserved for a peculiar people, fitted for its own climate, soil, and civilization; and the East was shut up to a corresponding destination. The time for universal commerce had not come, for the time for a universal or catholic religion, in the shape of Christianity, had not come. Christianity, so far as this world is concerned, was new-born, and had at first but the strength of a bantling. It was to struggle with untold agonies, for anything like stability among the nations. It was to go through a

baptism of blood and fire, to reach the period when it might become a catholic religion—a religion for the world and for mankind—not for Roman or Greek alone, but for “barbarian, Scythian, bond and free.” It was necessary, doubtless, that Christianity should suffer—suffer deeply and suffer long—to demonstrate her essential capabilities,—those especially which illustrated her powers of endurance and expansion.

And while Christianity was to pass through this period of scorching and attesting trial, perhaps it was the secret destiny of Parthia to counterpoise the cruel weight of the Colossal Empire of the West, lest it become overwhelming, and absorb into its paganized self the fate of a whole “round world.” Parthia was, assuredly, and for many a weary year, a curb, a menace, or a check, to the strivings and outreachings of Roman progress and domination. Crassus marched defiantly into Parthian territory, and was annihilated. Cæsar contemplated a retrieval of his overthrow, and assassination brought him to an unexpected end. Anthony finally resolved to carry out the plan which Cæsar had projected; and behold, Anthony succeeds scarcely better than the pioneer in Parthian campaigns. He marched, as Napoleon did in modern times, into a clime he did not understand, and was utterly unprepared for. His supplies gave out. An autumnal equinox was upon him, with a cold that benumbed and paralyzed his legions. He was forced to turn and flee. And then came a Parthian triumph parallel to a Russian one, when Napoleon was driven out, in snows and storms, from the flames of Moscow. The Parthians hovered round him, as wolves around beleaguered travellers. They threw “themselves across his path, and thenceforward, for nineteen consecutive days, they disputed with Anthony every inch of his retreat, and inflicted on him the most serious damage.” They “reduced the retreating army by one third of its numbers” (p. 204).

The fate of Anthony was a solemn, and, what is more, an effectual lesson to the too grasping empire for many a long day; nay, for more than an actual century. It made an impression upon his contemporary, Augustus, which was like the Laws of the Twelve Tables engraved on brass. Only let our readers think of the astounding conclusion, which Tacitus tells us he put on record, as to the purpose for which a western empire had been reared and nurtured. It was that Rome had arrived at ripe maturity, and that she might now cease from her Titanic labors, and simply hold her own! And the conclusion is the more wonderful, because of its adoption by his successors. They, too, apprehended that a huge empire might first

become unwieldy, and then unmanageable, till it fell, like a structure crushed into destruction by a weight beyond its strength. For one hundred and thirty years, and until the days of Trajan, Parthia had comparative peace, and was treated as a neighbor by no means to be scorned or interfered with. And, doubtless, all this was the better for the fortunes of a religion like the Christian, which had no outward champion to lean upon, and asked for no higher boon than forbearance and toleration.

For it is a singular and very impressive fact, that Parthia could afford to grant such a boon, while Rome parsimoniously withheld it. "Christianity," says our learned Canon, "penetrated the Parthian provinces to a considerable extent; and, in one Parthian country, at any rate, seems to have become the State religion. The kings of Osroëné are thought to have been Christians from the time of the Antonines, if not from that of our Lord; and a flourishing Church was certainly established at Edessa before the end of the second century" (p. 401).¹

This was all that could be desired for Christianity itself; and yet, as Mr. Rawlinson has (in another place, p. 300) distinctly perceived and stated, the political effects of Christianity, and of dispersed and persecuted Judaism also, were not favorable to old, fixed governments, anxious for, and ever aiming at, concentration and solidity. These two faiths dissolved many an ancient tie, while one (Christianity) had not yet erected itself into a coherent and wide-spread association. All which Christianity could do, while it was an object of incessant and unsparing aggression, was to plant itself and disseminate itself. It could not upbuild itself, cluster round strong centres, and become, what it by and by did, a confederation of republics, with acknowledged heads, and with legislatures also, in the shape of so-called provincial or universal councils. As our Saviour intimated, it would begin by disintegrating families; thus preadapting it for a broader range, and the creation of new bonds of communion for kindred, clans, and nations, until, if not impeded and thwarted, its "Communion of Saints" might give the

¹ The thirtieth parallel of latitude, which passes near Antioch, crosses Osroëné, which lay along the eastern bank of the Euphrates. Constantine is supposed to be the first distinguished civilian who patronized Christianity. The kings of Osroëné, it may now be seen, dispute with him that honor. Moreover, the Syriac version of the Scriptures (the Peshito) was probably made, at their instance, for the Church of Edessa; and a council about Easter was held there (says Dr. Burton), A. D. 198. This shows that the Edessan Church was regularly constituted.

world—not one centre, indeed, as a Romanist would have it, but, rather, one circumference. Christianity was, indeed, designed to be, what Mr. Rawlinson says Rome esteemed herself, “a unifying power.” But, as her kingdom is not of this world, she aimed not at the constitution of a politico-ecclesiastical monarchy. Unfortunately, this is what Jesuits presume she ought to be, and what men like Tacitus, an historian, and Trajan, a statesman, called a destructive superstition, because aimed at the government of hearts alone. She seemed to them an enemy to political constitutions and instrumentalities, because she declared no preferences for any special one of them.

Trajan thought her one of the disorganizing elements of Asia; thought, too, he saw other agencies at work to reduce the Oriental world to “crumbling atoms,” as Mr. Rawlinson is pleased to style them, and the ambition of his predecessors revived and kindled. The spirit of the old “unifying power” took full possession of him. “In the East, he might hope to add to the Roman State half a dozen countries of world-wide repute, the seats of ancient empires, the old homes of Asiatic civilization; countries associated with the immortal names of Sennacherib and Sardanapalus, Cyrus, Darius, and Alexander” (p. 301). He had closed the Dacian war in triumph, in A. D. 107. He took ample time to settle and assure his conquests. But, in A. D. 114, he deemed it opportune to seize such chances as the unsettled state of Asia and the degeneration of its old chief reliances afforded him, to try again the fortunes of Roman valor upon her battle-furrowed territory. And Parthia, conscious, perhaps, that she was not what she once was, met him, not at the sword’s point, but with propositions of dignity, yet of peace.

However, it was no part of Trajan’s scheme to be propitiated. He had devoted Parthia to subjugation, as the first of the Cæsars had done; and the time, with its omens, seemed to beckon him eastward. Eastward he accordingly hastened, with all the pomp and circumstance of formidable war. Antioch was his first resting-place; and there, having obtained complete possession of Armenia, he spent the winter of 114–15, amid everything to excite, to flatter, and to encourage. One circumstance, it is true, ought to have appalled and stopped him. Antioch, and an immense area on every side of it, was visited by an earthquake resembling that of Lisbon, whose undulations extended over fifty millions of square miles. The Emperor was surrounded with death and devastation, and narrowly escaped in his own person by leaping through a window. “It seemed as if Providence had determined that the new glories

which Rome was gaining by the triumphs of her arms, should be obscured by calamities of a kind that no human power could avert or control; and that, despite the efforts of Trajan to make his reign a time of success and splendor, it should go down to posterity as one of gloom, suffering, and disaster" (p. 309).

Nevertheless, Trajan was not intimidated by the losses and anguish of those around him, so long as his military projects were not effectually interfered with. He recovered from the shock of a temporary calamity, and listened to no remonstrance against his studied plans. He opened his campaign in the spring; and victory seemed to perch on his banners, with the promise of success redeeming all previous shortcomings. His efforts were imperial, his appointments were imperial, and his progress, for a long time, imperial too. The Parthian monarch abandoned his capital in despair, and fled to the recesses of dark forests and ragged mountains. Trajan sailed down the Euphrates in galleys actually carried inland, reached the Indian Sea, and sighed that his age did not permit him to perfect the scheme of Alexander, by adding India to his vast possessions, and marching square up to Nature's most distant limits.

But here, in the very acme of exultation, misfortune, like a sorceress, opened for him her box of pestilential trouble. Revolt broke out behind him, like the plague, and he had to hasten back, in the chills of trepidation, to secure his apparent conquests. The tide had turned, and was driving him upon the breakers. As he swept along to his former lines, he stopped to subdue the small town of Hatra, and was repulsed with ignominy. "His troops suffered from the heat, from the want of provisions and fodder, from the swarms of flies which disputed with them every morsel of their food and every drop of their drink, and, finally, from violent hail and thunderstorms. Trajan was forced to withdraw, after a time, without effecting anything, and to own himself baffled and defeated by the garrison of a petty fortress" (p. 315). And thus A. D. 116 ended amid gloom, remorse, and failure. Failure, indeed, for Trajan for evermore. His spirits began to flag and his health to lessen; and the waning summer of the following year brought his earthly career to a cheerless close. He died in August, A. D. 117.

His successor, Hadrian, seemed to have been impressed by his ill-fortune, much as Augustus was with that of Anthony. He made no attempt whatever to continue the struggle with the Orientals. He even offered them peace, and a restoration of some of the important but ill-gotten acquisitions of the intemperate Trajan. Of

course, such offers were willingly acceded to, and Parthia once more folded her arms, and had a balmy and prolonged tranquility. She was content to rest awhile, and muster her resources for conflicts not unlikely to be again and again fought over. And she needed all she had accumulated for the days of Cassius, in A. D. 163, and of Severus, about the close of the second century and the beginning of the third. The King of Parthia, Volagases III., who reigned from 148 to 190, determined, in 160, to avenge Parthian losses, and reëstablish Parthian domination. He should much rather have been contented with his actual, if shorn, condition. Cassius, though but a general and not an emperor, succeeded better than the wearers of purple majesty. "The expedition of Cassius was the first invasion of Parthia in which Rome had been altogether triumphant." And Severus, though he met with provocations and reverses, on the whole maintained the balance of power against Rome's old and unwearied antagonist. Caracalla, in A. D. 215, made such proposals to the King of Parthia for a seeming union with Rome, and a partition of the world between them, that his offers were suspected and repudiated. Perhaps the Parthian duly appreciated his personal worth and moral reliability; for Gibbon, not apt to traduce anybody but females and Christians, pronounced him "the common enemy of mankind." Caracalla's anger was worthy of such a character. With the meanest spite, he violated the sanctuaries of the royal Parthian dead, and scattered their remains like chaff upon the threshing-floor. He could not have insulted Orientals more keenly or more excitingly. Parthia never forgave the malignant sacrilege, and fought with him the most inexorable battle in which she ever joined with the fiercest foe.

This battle was that of Nisibis, in Northern Mesopotamia, to which point the King of Parthia had advanced to encounter the Roman forces. According to the historian Herodian, it lasted three whole days, when the heaps of dead men were "piled to such a height, that the manœuvres of the troops were impeded by them, and at last the two contending hosts could scarcely see one another!" Yet there was no victory on the Roman side; for peace was purchased by a heavy payment in booty, in captives, and in money. And the money was equivalent to what we should call seven million and a half of dollars,—a sum, for those days, which the award of the Geneva arbitration would by no means equal now. "Rome thus concluded her transactions with Parthia, after nearly three centuries of struggle, by ignominiously purchasing a peace." Such is Canon Rawlinson's verdict over the issue, and it is unquestionably just.

This, however, was almost the last great feat of Parthia, as the claimant of anything like imperial eminence. Her struggle with Persia soon succeeded, when Persia and herself virtually changed positions. The subordinate became the principal. Persia rose to ascendancy, while Parthia was reduced to the rank of tributary. Thus did a monarchy of five centuries of distinction fade away from the foreground of historic fame, and become known only as a thing gone by and committed to cold records,—as a picture in a gallery of battle-pieces.

We have carried on this condensed and rapid sketch to something like a close, since Mr. Rawlinson properly says that anything like a summary of Parthian annals is a matter quite unknown to ordinary readers, and may induce them to try his book for ampler knowledge and higher satisfaction. His book is not intended for the romantic and the sensational; but is studded with facts, upon which the *real* student of history may expend much care and frequent contemplation. And for another reason is this summary offered to our readers. A diagram or skeleton of a subject gives general views, which enable a reader to locate and estimate particulars to far greater advantage. We feel sure that a perusal of this summary will enable one to take up the learned Canon's volume with more interest, and keep its thread and bearing in distinct recollection. We have seen the day when such a summary would have been a help, for which we should have been sincerely grateful.

And now, we suppose, as we are about to lay our pen down, the reader will naturally expect from us some decision about the moral which Parthian annals teach us, and the main design which Providence may have had in shaping them. Perhaps it is but right that we should hazard an opinion upon such interesting topics; though an opinion only it may be. Indeed, we have hinted at such a thing already, when it was intimated that the immense empire of Rome was becoming too potential, too downbearing; and, like the builders of Babel, infected with the idea of universal unity and universal assimilation. Rome needed a counterpoise continually; and sometimes an abrupt and thorough check. She needed such supervision as was invoked by the Jewish Psalmist:

“Let not the ungodly have his desire, O Lord.
Let not his mischievous imagination prosper;
Lest they be too proud.”—*Psalter*, cxi. 8.


She appeared not to have this drawback in Europe; for Europe,

even to Scandinavia, furnished no competent opponent to her dictatorial will. While her love of "unifying power" might have produced that civil consolidation which Popery aims at, and to which she would add—as if Heaven's catholic vicegerent—ecclesiastical consolidation also! Papal Rome caught this idea of "unifying power" from its pagan forerunner, and has endeavored to appropriate and develop it, as well as other pagan models. But Providence defeated universal unification at Babel; and seems never to have found humanity good enough and trustworthy enough for a reversal of its decisions. It has reduced *potential* unities to smaller compass, as it has human life,—lest the perversity of men employ them as scourges rather than benedictions. And it has allowed these unities to be competitors, that they may be checks to too much assumption, and to intolerance.

Had the policy of *ancient* Rome, which was the pattern of a policy for *modern* Rome—had it been as successful as it was eager, Rome might have been the world's incubus and taskmaster. She needed sturdy and dogged opposition, and she found it in Asia. In this Asiatic resistance and defiance, Parthia stood foremost. And she acted her part with a sagacity and a success which, considering her origin, no political prophet would ever have assigned to her. There was a tutelary genius (as philosophers might have called it), which presided over her destiny. There was One—as we believe—whose are the kingdom, the power, and the glory forever, who made her the unconscious instrument of His will. She favored Christianity, as Rome was not disposed to do. Christianity first found governmental security—let us never forget it—on Parthian soil! Christianity found a home in the East, when in the West direful war had been made, not upon its disciples only, but upon its records of inspiration! This war was so exterminating, that when the great edict of Milan, in A. D. 311, gave Christianity tolerance, its sacred books had vanished into the darkest recesses, or from the sight of men. Their scarcity was so great, that one of the early duties of Constantine, as a Christian emperor and patron, was to provide copies of the Scriptures to be distributed, and employed by scribes for the necessities of the faithful. Humanly speaking, if the policy and the cruelty of ancient Rome had accomplished the hateful triumphs which it sought for, the world might have become a moral desolation. Christianity might have been crushed, and everything else that was anti-Roman, if Parthia had not been "a rock of offence," against which ruthless and lawless warriors dashed as harshly, but as vainly, as wild waves against granite-built shores.

Questionless, she fulfilled her necessary and not unsalutary mission; for, as our Canon testifies, she "obtained recognition from the Græco-Roman writers—albeit a grudging and covert recognition—as the second Power in the world, the admitted rival of Rome, the only real counterpoise upon the earth to the Power which ruled from the Euphrates to the Atlantic Ocean" (p. 174).

And now, for a last word, we have only to say, in the language of a thoughtful modern observer, "Read history in a reverent and believing temper. It is—it is a solemn thing, this track of a world's destiny in the sands of time."



LITERARY SCEPTICISM.

LITERATURE AND DOGMA. An Essay toward a better apprehension of the Bible. By Matthew Arnold, D.C.L., formerly Professor of Poetry in the University of Oxford, and Fellow of Oriel College. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1873.

COPIOUS as the discussion of modern religious scepticism has become, there seems to have been no careful attempt to ascertain what in it is actually cause and what is effect. Are the doubts that prevail due to certain specific discoveries that have been made in different departments of knowledge, putting discredit upon the records and institutions of the Christian faith, or are they the result of an occult yet diffused spirit of unbelief, having a remoter and more subtle origin, mysterious in its growth, complex in its operation, moral as well as intellectual in its nature, predisposing the mind to reject the authority of Revelation because all authority is irksome, and so setting men out in efforts to find points and create instruments of attack? According as this question should be settled in the one way or the other, there would arise a corresponding difference in the estimate put upon the sceptical manifestation. In the one case, the men of faith would be required to lay out all their strength on the special assailants as they arrive in succession, meeting fact with fact, argument with argument, learning with learning. The tactics and the fight would be purely intellectual. Apologetics would be a

trial of logical, scientific, scholarly strength or fence. The battleground would be comparatively clear. Beaten in a fair encounter, each particular enemy would be finally disposed of, and the defender of the faith would be at liberty to turn his attention to the next comer. If, however, it should prove that these multiplied objections are only so many related offshoots from a common parent stock, a growth involving elements of the will, the affections, the tastes, in a whole generation or period, one of the shapes of that time-spirit (*zeit geist*) of which Mr. Matthew Arnold, after Goethe, has so much to say, affecting civil society no less than the Church, bearing upon political government, education, and manners as well as religious beliefs and worship, and infusing a temper of insubordination into them all,—then, manifestly, the difficulty encountered would assume another aspect. The work of defence, if not less simple and less easy, would have less of the distinct, sharp outlines of a dialectical engagement. Changes must be wrought in the very springs of men's private life. Influences must be brought to act on dispositions and inclinations, on the hidden choices and tendencies of the soul, on the fine essence of character. The young must be reached, more than the mature. Reverence, humility, self-subjection and devotion, seldom suddenly produced, will have to take the place of conceit, ambition, self-assertion, unrestrained curiosity. A check must be put upon the propensity to level dignities for the sake of diminishing duties, and to abolish deference and grace in a clamor for personal rights, before any serene and fruitful age of faith will come again. Either way, however, much of the same sort of patient and not very inviting labor must needs be done. When the authority of Revelation and the Divine constitution of the Church are disputed, and when they are disputed, as they often are, by men not indifferent to moral truth or regardless of human welfare, the eternal verities must be reaffirmed, the new and plausible sophistry must be exposed, the true and the false must be separated, and that weakness of error, which forever lurks underneath the most brilliant and imposing show of strength, must be uncovered.

It has been repeatedly illustrated, and notably by Mr. Farrar and Dr. Burton in their Bampton Lectures, how forms of both heresy and infidelity—neither word being used here in a sense that charity could condemn—which wear a look of originality, really carry an ancient pedigree under a modern dress. From Porphyry and Celsus the progress of unbelieving literature has been rather in the way of expanding its dimensions and reclothing

its primitive forms, than in any process of invention. So, in the work that is now to come under examination, the last utterance of educated doubt, it is not difficult to detect a commixture of the serious yet airy Epicureanism of Lucretius—

“Lucretius, nobler than his mood,
Who dropped his plummet down the broad
Deep Universe and said, ‘No God!’”

—with the stoic morality of Aurelius. Its author, a disciple of the Renaissance, is, like Schelling, more indebted, after all, to Neo-Platonism than to the Revival of Letters; for it may be said of him, as accurately as of Plotinus, that his deity “which seems personal, is actually only the personification of an abstraction, a mere instance of mental realism.” His treatment of some portions of the Old Testament, as the prophet Daniel, for example, is almost identical with that of Porphyry, from whom it very likely descended to Dr. Arnold of Rugby, and from him, with some better heirlooms, to the less manly son.

This identity of type, however, is very far from implying a stationary condition, or a monotonous activity. The germ being the same, the *flora* is wonderfully diversified. Indubitable here is the principle of “development.” The old apologists, good for what they undertook, are wellnigh good for nothing for the days of Baur and Strauss, Comte and Renan, Huxley and Gregg, Herbert Spencer, Mill, Emerson, and Matthew Arnold. Not only do the antique fabrics of disbelief come out, in the hands of these recent men of genius and study, “as good as new,” but through their several lines, whether of investigation or decoration, the denying interest becomes more formidable in resources and more seductive in its fascination. All that a brave and honest contestant even for the royal treasure of man’s immortal hopes can expect, is that the war be fair and the terms honorable; and though his antagonist offer only the pagan prayer of Ajax for light, he will pray to the Lord of all good gifts for love as well. To all Christians who contend in this spirit, whatever their solicitude may be for individual doubters, the coming of a fresh phase of scepticism in the hands of an able advocate will be attended with this comforting reflection: Provided this new onset, led by an acknowledged master, fails, then one more danger threatening the cause is disarmed, and then the impartial spirit of history must score one victory more for the Faith once for all delivered.

In his recent work, “Literature and Dogma,” Mr. Arnold leads

such an onset; leads it by right, as we judge, and certainly with a dash of confidence, free from any apparent misgiving that his leadership will be disputed. Dissatisfied with the "received theology," to the extent of open animosity if not of execration, though without defining in any one instance what he understands the "received theology" to be, he takes pains to inform his readers precisely in what interest, and in obedience to what behest, that theology is rejected. It is not philosophy, not philology, not archæology, not any branch of scientific research; it is literary culture. Just as we were all settling into the notion that the great remaining battle-ground for the Creed and the Scriptures was the domain of physical science, or rather along the margin where the boundaries between the domains of science and revelation are to be adjusted, this gentleman moves into the company, and assures us positively that any issue of that sort is but lateral and nugatory. Whether Christianity, now moribund, is to come to life and thrive; whether the Bible is to remain of any account at all to "the masses of the people;" whether "the artisan class" are to abandon the very idea and name of religion in disgust, become rabid destructionists, and bound over beyond Maurice and Stanley, beyond Darwin and Huxley, beyond Lewes and Baden Powell, making a final stand alongside of Mr. Bradlaugh, depends simply on "culture," on "extensive reading," on the "literary spirit," on a general knowledge of the manner in which men express their thoughts. Hence the portentous alternative now impending,—a heathen eclipse, or "the new religion."

We ought to mark carefully the distinction between this vein and that worked by such students of language as Semler, Eichhorn, Paulus, or any of the critical German rationalists or their followers in England and America. Exegetical criticism is one thing; it is a great science, proceeding on certain established and defined canons pertaining to the origin, grammatic structure, laws and modifications of written and spoken language as a medium of human thought, so applied as to ascertain or determine the real sense of writing and speech. "Literary culture" or "extensive reading" is another thing, and not this.

The motive of the author is not to be misunderstood. Why should a "new religion" be gone after at all? Because, he declares to us, the old one is done with, or presently will be. Clergymen and pious laymen are deploring the prevalence of unbelief. This is not so bad, perhaps, because they are a timid and sensitive order of men, alarmists by profession. The real peril is in the "masses of the people." An "inevitable revolution" has begun.

"Many of the most successful, energetic, and vigorous of the artisan class" are shaking their heads over mistranslations that they have heard about in both Testaments. The "received theology"—that is, we suppose, the representation of Christian doctrines made either in the Church or in some popular sects, but we do not know which—is "losing its hold" on these shrewd and deep-sighted laborers and their families. "Practical hold it never had on them, perhaps, very much." There are too many "precise schemes of God and a future state," impossible to be believed. What these are, so far as the standard of teaching in the English Church is concerned, we have some curiosity to know; but no intimation is given, unless the doctrines of the Personality of God and the Trinity are two of them. Worse yet, to make it certain that "the received theology is a hindrance to the Bible rather than a help," Mr. Huxley, it appears, has remarked to the London School Board that, "if these islands had no religion at all, it would not enter into his mind to introduce the religious idea by the agency of the Bible;" which will make Christian people only the more glad that Professor Huxley has not the function of introducing the religious idea into the British Islands on hand; and, since those nations of the earth which have made its civilization, through their most profound, accomplished, and comprehensive minds, for fourteen centuries before Christ and eighteen centuries since, have been well agreed that the Bible is incomparably the best agency for introducing civilization anywhere, it would scarcely be reckoned a matter of credit to anybody's mind, if such an idea did not somehow "enter" it with respect to the British Islands. There is, we are told, a certain "gloss put upon the Bible," not by "one Church or sect," but by "all Christian Churches," and "largely shared with them even by natural religion;" and this gloss is an "axiomatic basis" which "must go, and it supposes all the rest." And, sure enough, when we come to learn what the gloss is, we see that it is pretty evenly and widely spread, for the fatal "assumption with which all the Churches and sects set out is, that there is 'a great Personal First Cause, the moral and intelligent Governor of the universe,' and that from Him the Bible derives its authority."

We have it on his own declaration, that Mr. Arnold deploras the decadence of belief in the Bible as much as anybody can. He would save Holy Writ if he could; indeed, this is the object of his making his book,—though it must be Holy Writ with the "*quasi* Personal First Cause left out;" a modification that would form a singular contribution to "literature." He and his school are considered com-

petent to the task, because, he says, "We take an uncommonly large view of human perfection." They propose, having this large view, to account for creation, conduct the universe, and make a Bible without a personal God. In disturbing the existing superstition, and replacing the misunderstood Bible that now is, with a Bible cleared of the illusion of a "Personal First Cause," the author wishes to proceed under a sense of "the utmost duty of considerateness and caution." The tender-hearted reformer, favored with a broader vision than ordinary, yet seeing how happy the deluded are in their delusion, will be slow to speak out all that he knows. Pity smiles and shuts her lips. Does not Goethe say, "I keep silence in many things; I am well content if others can find satisfaction in what gives me offence?" Mr. Arnold expresses this rule of religious reserve, held by him in common with an order of well-known Roman theologians, in his own undogmatic way: "There is no surer proof of a narrow and ill-instructed mind, than to think and uphold that what a man takes to be the truth on religious matters is always to be proclaimed." This was Montaigne's idea, and is of the very essence of scepticism. Nevertheless, in the present case, necessity conquers mercy. Sentimental scruples must give way to heroic treatment. Loyola or Liguori himself could not hold his peace. "The present time is a time to speak." We are bound, therefore, in courtesy, to allow to Mr. Arnold the credit of a sincere desire to benefit his fellow men.

Not more obvious are the occasion and the motive for this rectification of the "received theology," and this conscientious opening of a Bible disburdened of deity, than is the method. The remedy for the bad religion and the irreligion alike, for the superstition and the scepticism, is "culture," including "right tact and delicacy of judgment." Especially, we must "read" more. "Through" extensive "reading we get the power to estimate proportion and relation in what we read," though, thus far, "such a system is hardly ever thought of." We come short in the matter of reading, and hence in the matter of faith and righteousness,—the whole English-speaking race, from old Buddaens, who counted every day lost, even the day in which he was married, when he did not get six hours for books, down to Coleridge and Macaulay. The university libraries, Bodleian and all the rest, are so far a failure that they have not taught the British mind how to understand the general drift of the Scriptures. "There is not enough experience," our author thinks, "of the way in which men have thought and spoken to feel what the Bible-writers are about." We need to read not only what is written, but what is

not. We must "read between the lines," and with "flexibility of spirit." This will "give to the Bible a real experimental basis." The book itself is singularly wanting in solidity; "the language of the Bible is fluid, passing, and literary, not rigid, fixed, and scientific," and to admit this is "the first step toward a right understanding" of it. What "passing" language is, especially if it stays where it was, we are not able to understand; "fluid," as applied to language, is a vicious metaphor, and as to being "literary," that appears to be a quality of all language that is written, and, since the "literary" method is the author's cure for the religious disorders of Christendom, it would seem rather to be a merit. We are not quibbling. A scholar of Mr. Arnold's standing in the literary world, writing on the very gravest of all subjects, putting forth unbounded pretensions, and arraigning everybody for superficial mental habits, must answer for every term he sends through the press. And when he asserts that the language of the whole Christian Manual, its law and promise, narrative and precept and beatitude, is "fluid and not fixed," his own language becomes disreputably indiscriminate.

Very far must any thoughtful believer be from making light of the scepticism of the age. Very heavy must be the accountability of any Christian who withholds the tenderest sympathy, the most patient effort at comprehension, the most generous and considerate charity from the brother-man, whoever he may be, who finds it hard to believe, is bewildered by contradictory voices, stumbles at the incredible accretions that have grown up around the simple essentials of the Gospel, mistakes mortal error for the truth of heaven,—in short, longs for a settled faith, and aches with an untold agony because he cannot find it. Daily is the Church of God dishonored, terribly is her power to bless contracted and crippled, by the contempt or condemnation dealt out to these hungry hearts from the flippant mouths not only of her members but her ministers. Yet nothing is gained to a manly faith by exaggerating the evil on the one hand, or by flattering and coddling its victims on the other. By far the greater number of English and American minds, in every class, and of all degrees of culture, accept, without mental protest or misgiving, the superhuman claims of Revelation, the substance of the Apostles' Creed,—possibly the "popular theology," though not in a theological way. Nor is it an unreasoning or unintelligent assent. Men and women who read and think on other subjects, read and think about religion. The educated classes, in a vast majority, while they apprehend the gravity of many new questions that have arisen from recent studies, have no idea of relinquishing Christianity, or ac-

knowledging any other spiritual leader for the life that now is, and the life to come, than Jesus Christ, Son of God and Son of Man. When the intellectual life is allowed to predominate over the spiritual, the likelihood of doubt and denial is increased. But no respectable teacher in the Church asks men to stop thinking or studying, or to shut his eyes on a single fact or phase of the universe, unless it is the details of personal sin. As the ambition of the understanding works its way among what we call the lower orders, there is a considerable inflation of intellectual vanity. Half-instructed people catch at the doubts as well as the knowledge of minds superior to their own. They count it clever to see through and discredit what those about them take on authority. Hence there is an increasing number of those "energetic artisans," "shrewd working men," of whom Mr. Arnold stands in awe, imitating the unbelievers whose cleverness they admire. But for every one of them there are probably, in the homes of these working men, twenty who take the authority of the Scriptures without question, and many who reverently clasp them to their hearts, and gather from them, day by day, strength, peace, consolation unutterable. Two chief causes prevent the Christian faith from exerting its legitimate practical influence over the people, —on the one side, the enormous pressure of material things, money, business, dress, luxury, sensual attractions; on the other, mental indifference or uncertainty, aggravated in some cases into actual disbelief. Much the greater part of the latter is attributable to just such works as this of Mr. Arnold, captivating, bright, daring. The least that can be asked of these authors is, that they will weigh their words, and finish their dreary business without literary fraud. To sow the seeds of scepticism, and then cite the harvest as a proof of the need of a "new religion," is not respectable logic. A nobler service would be rendered to the workingman by encouraging him to turn the faith he has to practical use than by dazing his brain with such phantasms as duty without doctrine, religion without worship, and a Bible without a God.

What, then, are the evidences that our author does actually banish the Divine personality from his reconstructed religion? They are partly direct and partly inferential. As we have seen, he makes the doctrine of a "Great First Cause, the moral and intelligent Governor of the universe," to be the prime root of all the religious unreason of the Church and incredulity of the times,—the *πρωτον φευδος* of the "received theology." At the Archbishop of York, and the Bishops of Winchester and Gloucester, he hurls sarcasm and vituperation with indignant fury, from the beginning of his book to

the end, for no more grievous offence than that they endeavor, in an uncontroversial temper, to do something in the line of philosophy and argument to make the belief in that doctrine, coupled with that of the Divinity of our Lord, appear reasonable. There is, he says, "a power that makes for righteousness," a "stream of tendency," by which it is well with the righteous and ill with the wicked; but "whether we call this tendency God or not, is a matter of choice." In a few instances he does so call it, but evidently by way of convenience, rather as an accepted name than as a correct one; as when he says, with angry carelessness, "We disserve God when we sing nine tenths of our hymns,"—the darkest imputation that the whole host of critics have cast upon hymnal-makers yet. "The word God," he maintains, "is used by most persons as a term of poetry and eloquence; a term thrown out, so to speak, at a not fully-grasped object of the speaker's consciousness,—a literary term." He contrasts it with the term "morality," observing that the latter conveys an ascertained and definite idea,— "the idea of human conduct regulated in a certain manner." The contrast is unfortunate. The sense of the term morality is relative to the mind that uses it. To each man it stands for what is right or best in human conduct, in his eyes; but the definition of that will vary with times and places. So does the term God convey the idea of what is best in living beings,—the Good One. The conception, doubtless, varies in either case. But the term God just as surely means a person, as the term morality means a kind of conduct. To the Christian, the name means the Holy One inhabiting eternity, whose character the Scriptures reveal. Mr. Arnold nowhere pronounces himself a pantheist or an atheist, and therefore we pronounce him neither. But he says, "Trust in God is trust in the law of conduct." Nowhere does he say, as even his admired German mentor is able to say, "Faith is a profound sense of security for the present and future, and the assurance springs from confidence in an immense, all-powerful, and inscrutable Being."

The Scriptures aside, there is no great difficulty in conceiving a process by which a pantheistic or an atheistic philosophy might work out its conclusions. The phenomenon, indeed, is an actual one. The thing has more than once been done, and the accounts of it are accessible. The originality of the present enterprise of literary scepticism consists in attempting to reconcile its theory with the Scriptures, or even, if it might be believed, of deducing it in some sort from them. The *conatus* is twofold. The authority, the credibility, of some of the more intractable passages, is disposed of at once by a flat denial. For the rest, we must "read between the lines."

It will not be very strange to students of experience if, the interlinear spaces being a good deal widened, what is read proves to be put there by the reader. The Old Testament is taken in hand first, and we are instructed how it come to be what it is, in a chapter called "Religion Given,"—a title signally inappropriate in both the terms, inasmuch as the thing said to be given is not "religion," and whatever it may be, it is proved to be not "given," but humanly developed. Mankind early discovered in themselves, and in the going on of events, a "tendency" by which it is well with the righteous and ill with the wicked. Righteousness is the right rule of human conduct. By a close arithmetic calculation, it is concluded that "conduct" covers not less than three fourths of human life, and what forms so large a fraction *must* be "religion," and must be what a Bible will concern itself about. Watching the operation of the "tendency," primitive man was deeply impressed by it, and undertook to find a name for it. Our Old Testament calls It by three names,—"God," "Lord," "Jehovah." The Hebrew appellatives, being more or less mythological, are dismissed by our author, and, throughout his work, he mends the English version by writing "the Eternal" instead of "the Lord." The definite article, with the adjective, has done the school of literary sceptics distinguished service. Those of us that are fifty-years old, remember just when that idiom crossed the Channel—along with a freight of German double substantives—and by whose importation, and how the exotic fashion degraded into mannerism the noble and pure English of Mr. Carlyle's earlier style, as in his life of Schiller, and how it could *not* twist the vigorous vernacular of Mr. Coleridge. This substitution of "the Eternal" affords Mr. Arnold much comfort. It is more abstract and less personal. "O ye that love the Eternal!" Improving a little further in the same direction, he suggests exchanging God for "the not ourselves!" "Righteousness," he declares, "is the master-word of the Old Testament," and "righteousness belongs to the not ourselves." But in the name of that Old Testament, with its pages everywhere unmistakably admonishing us, open them where we will, we reply, "The master-word of the Old Testament is God Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth, Father and Judge of men," and "righteousness belongs" to Him. The name and thought of righteousness, nobody will deny, are there, in glorious and mighty power, as marking out the practical fruit of religious faith, and of the law of God for man, His subject and child. But God is there before any being or thing besides, even in the first sentence of the book,—*"In the beginning, God."* This is not a generalization

resulting from a long series of moral struggles, or a flash of anthropomorphic poetry. The style is that of history and biography, simple and intelligible, not in the least that of "vague expressions thrown out at an immense something unrealized,"—a very extraordinary definition of language of any sort, and likely to seem the more extraordinary the more we think of it. The men of Chaldea and Canaan, Mesopotamia and Jerusalem, were not monotheists, or even theists at all, because their morality drove them to it. Neither the patriarchs nor the citizens of the Mosaic commonwealth give any evidence of having perfected for themselves an ideal or a practical morality. On the contrary, the grandeur of the moral and spiritual life of the Jews, both national and private, was that they verily believed in and worshipped an objective Deity, revealed to them from on high; and, moreover, He was very much the Deity which it horrifies Mr. Arnold to hear of, from bishops and theologians, a "great Personal First Cause, an intelligent Creator and Ruler of the universe." They got their morality from their divinity, not their deity from their conscience. That awful spell which lay on their souls, shaped their ritual, delivered their law, reared the tabernacle and the temple, more august than the shadows of their mountains, was the *presence of Jehovah*, not the mystery of an unsuccessful struggle after an ideal excellence. Literary scepticism exactly inverts the real order. God condescends to show Himself to man; man does not lift himself, by taking energetically hold of his feet, and then scaling the heavens, nor does he anthropomorphize an abstraction, naming it Elohim or Jehovah. No mutilation of the Hebrew writings could possibly befall them like stripping out of them the one living and intense conception which pervades and illumines them from end to end,—the conception of one conscious Being, with all personal attributes, personal, so to speak, to the last degree, personal, if you please, to anthropomorphism, but, by all means, literally a Person, the Maker, the Father, the Friend, the Avenger, the Guide,—He who rules the world as king, He who comforts His crying child like a mother. Literary scepticism does not see this! Sure that it has packed into its head the "best that has been thought and said in the world," it returns from its cosmopolitan researches with the message that we have no Father in heaven; we are a race of orphans; sorrowing and dying, sinning and repenting, we have no loving breast on which to lay our sick heads and faint hearts, nothing but a "stream of tendency,"—a "Power that makes for righteousness." How much does it matter that it tells us here and there some true and admirable things about the beauty and power of

the righteous conduct and righteous teaching which *are* in the Old Testament? Even Theodore Parker did better by us than this, when he exclaimed, "I am not going to undervalue the charm of wisdom, nor the majestic joy which comes from loving principles of right; but if I could have only one of them, give me the joy of the affections, my delight in others, and theirs in me." Mr. Arnold placidly exhorts, "Let us use words as mankind generally use them!" Were mankind generally to deal as he deals with words that other men have used, we should know nothing of Cyrus or Socrates from Xenophon, nothing of Tiberius from Tacitus, nothing of the Popes from Ranke, nothing of the Kings of England from Hume. The past would be a phantasmagoria, and its characters would be the phantasms. History would be a myth. Language would be an illusion.

Language is not an illusion, nor can its abstract terms be taken as the names of substantial entities, without fearful confusions in philosophy, and serious injuries to truth. Mr. Arnold's literary theory of religion comes to its next disastrous catastrophe when it is tried by its metaphysics. The "Power that makes for righteousness," being, by abundant repetition, fairly seated in the throne of the universe, in place of "the Lord" of the Bible, turns out, on closer inspection, to be—what? What is a "power?" Let the mind, however acute, disciplined, or comprehensive it may be, attempt to shape or to grasp any conception whatever of "a power," as apart from all persons or things of which it might be regarded as a quality or attribute. What is it? Where is it? Whence is it? When we say that in human affairs there is "a power that makes for righteousness," we must mean, at the least, either that men and things are so constituted that righteousness is naturally produced, or that being produced, it yields favorable results, like happiness. But the phrase, "human affairs," points to a very composite system of facts, in which very many persons and things are involved. Is it meant that all these so exist or act that, as by some secret harmony, righteousness is a result spontaneously generated? This is not asserted. Is it meant, then, that apart from all the substance of these men and things, there is some exterior agent operating upon them and through them to produce the result? If so, can that agent be anything short of an intelligent mind, or "Governor of the universe?" To make of a mere abstraction a substantial entity is almost as bad in philosophy as to take it for the supreme intelligence, the Deity, is bad in religion; the literary system of salvation does both, and makes no defence of either. It is now generally allowed that what are called "forces" of nature, like "heat," "space," "electricity," "life," are only modes

of being or action in the material substances where they appear, and are no substances, no things, in themselves. This term "power," therefore, used as our author uses it, is a verbal illusion.¹

From general letters and philosophy the author next makes an excursion into the domain of Biblical criticism. Convenient beyond most conveniences of the speculative system-maker is Mr. Arnold's device for disposing of everything in the Bible that does not comport with his theory. Bethinking him of a felicitous phrase of his *other* Bible-writer, Goethe—*der aberglaube ist die poesie des lebens*—it opens before him a ready receptacle, large and comely,

¹No better statement of this fallacy has been made than in some recent papers of Professor W. D. Wilson, D.D., addressed to scientific men. We quote a passage from one of these papers, as meeting squarely the fashionable scepticism as to a "Personal Creator." After exposing its misuse of the term order, as if it were something else than a mode of nature's operation, he proceeds:

"But when and how 'in nature's order' on the theory of development or evolution, does mind make its appearance? I can conceive of but three hypotheses,—

"1. There is none. This is pure materialism; and if it be true, the word mind should be struck out of our vocabulary, and dropped out of use altogether. But few, if any, men, however, take this ground openly and explicitly, although they may use language and hold theories that imply it. It is true that Cabanis (I think) has said that 'the brain secretes thought, as the liver secretes the bile.' But even this is not correct; the word 'bile' is concrete, and 'thought' is abstract. He should have said 'the brain secretes thought, as the liver secretes inflammation, or as the stomach secretes digestion.' In this view, then, there is no mind; the brain thinks, reasons, remembers, loves, hates, hopes, fears, etc. If scientific men believe so, certainly it is not too much to ask them to be consistent, and use language in accordance with their theory.

"2. The next hypothesis is that the mind itself is a material product. It cannot be a simple element; for then the matter that was previously in existence must be regarded as having *created it out of nothing*. This hypothesis does not need discussion. It is not held, so far as I know, by anybody. It is useless; for if matter, in any of its known forms, can produce the phenomena by which we prove the existence of mind, we can by this prove no more than the existence of brain. If there be not something immaterial besides brain, there is no need of anything besides brains.

"3. The only other hypothesis is that the mind is an immaterial substance, which, although it may not act in this world and in this life without the brain as its organ, is nevertheless substantially distinct from the brain, and may, for aught we know, live without a body or any bodily organs.

"But of course no mere evolution or development of matter could produce mind any more than it could create a new material substance.

"We need not complicate this matter by any theories or speculations as to the existence of mind in the animal world. Nor can we inquire whether there

into which, with a wave of the literary arm, he can sweep all those books, chapters, and verses that refuse to conform. Daniel must walk at once into this den of the literary Darius, taking with him much of the later prophets, not a little of the earlier, the Messianic portions of the Psalms, the Apocalypse, and so many texts of the Epistles that the ordinary Bible reader is much puzzled to settle it where the line between *glaube* and *aberglaube* shall be run. "Extra belief, that which we hope, augur, imagine, is the poetry of life, and has the rights of poetry." The question becomes, however, What rights has prose? The Messianic ideas, "which were the poetry of life to Israel, in the ages when Christ came," substituted themselves for science, "and it is the more important to mark that they did it because similar ideas have so signally done the same thing in popular Christianity." So that when plodding students of the Scriptures come upon anything there which appears to be out of harmony with the literary sceptic's new religion, the road out of the difficulty is short and straight, leaving all questions of exegesis, grammatic construction, history, compara-

is mind in plants, or those animals where as yet there have been no nerve cells discovered. Mind does not exist in mere inorganic matter, and evolution takes us back in the course of 'nature's order' to the time when there was nothing but mere inorganic matter.

"Hence, we have the alternative, either there is no mind—mind is material—or there is an Agent or Creator,—a Being who is not material nor a part of the material universe, however intimate may be His relations to it. And between these three I think that there will be no hesitation, even among men of science themselves, when the cloud of mere unmeaning verbiage shall have been cleared away, and the three suppositions, with their necessary implications, have been clearly stated.

"Shall we then admit the existence of a Supreme Being, a Personal Agent, a Creator as proved by the facts and phenomena of nature? Either we must do this, or we must erect the 'forces' of affinity, cohesion, and gravity into substantial things; nay, more than that, into personal agents. For, on this theory, at the time when the matter of the universe was in the 'state of equilibrium or rest,' they must have been at rest and inactive also, and, consequently, they must have been spontaneous personal agents, to have started into activity *of themselves*. Matter was at 'rest,' and could not move or excite them; hence, if there was no God to use them as His instruments and agents, they were self-active, and so, spontaneous and personal. And then we not only depart from 'the scientific idea' by ascribing to them the 'slave labor' of demiurges; we elevate them to the dignity of more than human labor and skill; we raise them to the attributes of divinity and creation.

"I trust it will not take long for the new theory of 'forces' to satisfy every thinking man, be he scientist or poet, that there must be in this world of ours and *above* it, besides matter, mind also."

tive interpretation, integrity of documents in the background; *that* is only what somebody hoped, augured, imagined. It is *aberglaube*. And if one should ask, Where does *aberglaube* end? no writer of our acquaintance is so likely to answer dogmatically, and without reasons assigned, as the advocate of literature *versus* dogma. It is true, such relief as may be had from being told that all this propensity of people to "tell themselves fairy-tales," whether in the Bible or out of it, is a harmless exercise, is afforded us. "The object of belief is conduct; conduct is three fourths of life; and if a man helps himself in his conduct by taking an object of hope or presentiment, as if it were an object of certainty, he may even be said to gain thereby an advantage." It is in this part of his treatise that Mr. Arnold introduces an interesting dissertation on the moral characteristics of the Person and kingdom of Christ, whom he admits as a wonderful teacher, and the author of a "regiven religion." The sketch of the great ethical features of that teaching, its "disinterestedness," its "self-forgetfulness," its "sweet reasonableness," its inward method, its glorious power over the senses and the temper, is drawn with touching verisimilitude and beauty. In cathedral, Bible-class, or rural mission, some of the passages could not be out of keeping; and very defective, we insist, must that preaching of the Gospel be where such teaching were not heard. In direct connection with calls to duty so lofty and so pure, one would rather not have met an intimation of indifference to the deep distinction between truth and error, like that just quoted. In a high morality, nothing should be made more clear than that no good comes of delusions. Error in the mind never yields blessedness in life: But another question occurs:

For what cause should a writer, who has provided so extensive and accommodating a recourse for the deportation of refractory Scriptures as *aberglaube*, still deem it worth his while to waste his patience on any nice perplexities of critical exposition? He will condescend even to a sacrifice like that, for the more complete unmasking of the hollow pretences of the "received theology." Thither, too, we must therefore follow him. Complimenting the Duke of Somerset on affording a shining exception to the unliterary habits of the modern English aristocracy, because the duke "finds very much to be dissatisfied with in the Bible and its teaching," but buffeting him straightway for holding on upon "faith in God" as the "unassailable fortress of the soul," he proceeds to examine the accounts of the Old and New Testament miracles, and the prophecies. His treatment of the former is much below that

of a score of rationalistic writers within the reach of all classes of the American people. It is, to an incredible extent, a stale reproduction of their cheaper commentaries. Such are the references to the alleged miracles of Romanists and Pagans; the ignoring of the contributions of Christian scholars to the subject in all its bearings; the absurd imputation of incompetency or inaccuracy to the witnesses, on account of variations in subordinate details arising from their differing points of observation, like the statements about the blind man healed at Jericho. He does not even know what parts of the text Christian scholarship concedes to be spurious, and has therefore rejected. We shall not consume either our readers' time or our own in refutations of it which are commonplace, and which ought to have come under the eye of a censor who sneers at all Christendom for its lack of reading.

The author's purpose, however, is not so much to ascertain the meaning of certain Scriptures, with deference to the authority of such meaning when it is found, as to convince the misguided "masses of the people," who are supposed to be already in a state of lively suspicion, that the English Bible they have in their hands is a gross misrepresentation of the original writing. According to the scope of his reasoning, so far as the settlement of any point of doctrine is concerned, it is of no manner of moment whether the writers meant one thing or another; because, as he maintains elsewhere, what with "*zeit geist*" and "*aberglaube*," and various mental hallucinations and limitations, these writers are liable to correction at any time, by the less fallible insight of literary culture; the real question being, not what they wrote, but what they ought to have written. Still, the bondage of reverence for the Bible must be broken through at as many points as possible, a surreptitious translation being one of them. The mysterious monitions which herald the disclosure of these crafty attempts to hoodwink the understanding of unlettered readers are enough to make one shudder. If Bible makers *will* indulge themselves in fairy-tales, and drink "*aberglaube*" to intoxication, they must "pay for it;" "palpable error and mistranslation are what will have weight with the mass of mankind;" "Will not people be startled when they find?" etc. With these ominous warnings, we are taken first to "the proof from prophecy." Four passages only, out of the entire earlier and later prophetic literature of the Old Testament, are noticed at all. With these four exceptions, the whole stream of pre-science and prediction, running through the Jewish national utterances, is unexplained and unheeded. Nothing is said of the twofold

sense, of typical significations, of numerous events foretold which we know from secular history to have taken place in marvellous conformity to the foretelling, of most of the Messianic Psalms, of Isaiah's descriptions of the sufferings of the Son of Man. The passages chosen for comment might all be surrendered to the objector without any essential weakening of the actual "proof;" enough would be left; and yet these are evidently selected as the strongest to be found for the objector's purpose. By chapter and verse (details which our literary censor slights), they are, Gen. xlix. 10; Ps. ii. 12; Ps. cx. 1, and Jer. xxiii. 6. It will be well worth while to hold an honest candle over these four texts.

In the first, Jacob predicts that "the sceptre shall not depart from Judah" . . . "till Shiloh come, and unto Him shall the gathering of the people be." So the "received theology" and the English version have rendered it; the Catholic belief being that the term Shiloh, signifying the Peacemaker, is a title of our Lord,—His coming, out of the tribe of Judah, being the remote and final consummation of the pre-eminent glory of that tribe in its judicial and legislative character. What says Mr. Arnold? "It more and more becomes known" (*known!*) "that the passage is rightly to be rendered, 'so long as the people resort to Shiloh.'" Why "rightly?" No reason is assigned. The Hebrew verb "come" (readers acquainted with the Hebrew will not need the characters, and they would be of no use to those who are not), is in the *kal* form, future tense, third person *singular*, masculine. There is, of course, no preposition. Gesenius (*Lex. Bagster's edition*) makes Shiloh, without question, the *subject and nominative of the verb*, not the object, and only as a secondary and distinct signification refers to the village of Shiloh, in Ephraim. Places and persons are called by the same proper names all over the world. Grammatically, therefore, the received reading appears to have all the support it needs. For "kiss the Son," in Ps. ii. 12, Mr. Arnold expects "the people" to find out that they ought to read "be instructed," or "be warned," and to be disgusted with their English Bible because it has deceived them. But there is no occasion for alarm. The rendering is exceedingly literal. The Hebrew verb signifies a reverential salutation, or ceremony of homage, and is distinct from two other verbs which signify "to instruct" and "to warn." Gesenius, not certainly a victim of evangelical prejudice, says of the passage: "Kiss the Son; sc. of Jehovah, *i. e.*, the king. Compare Ps. ii. 7." "Thou art My Son,"—which in the Epistle to the Hebrews is applied to Christ. Of Ps. cx. i., "The Lord said unto

my Lord, sit Thou on My right hand, etc." Mr. Arnold says, "Will not people be startled when they find that it ought to run instead, 'The Eternal said unto my lord, the king;' the king referred to being supposed to have been a human prince. The simple fact is that in the original, the first noun is "Jehovah," and the second, a different one (Adonay), a word having for its primary meaning "owner," "master," "possessor," and hence appropriately applied to Christ. Jewish writers of an early date and Hebrew lexicographers do so apply it. Our Lord (Matt. xxii. 44) *applies it to Himself*. Mr. Arnold thinks it is a mistake, and that a sufficient number of "people" will agree with him to produce a general sensation. His fourth case of critical learning is Jer. xxiii. 6,—where, instead of "In his days, Judah shall be saved and Israel shall dwell safely: and this is his name whereby he shall be called, *The Lord our Righteousness*," he proposes that we shall read, "This is the name whereby they shall call themselves, The Eternal is our Righteousness;" and then he asks, nervous and apprehensive as before, "What will the people say as they come to know?" What they will say we cannot tell; neither experience nor prophecy enable anybody to tell what the people will say; but the inquiry here is not practical, because the people never will "come to know" what Mr. Arnold abuses himself and them by imagining they will. The Hebrew word "call" has the singular number; the noun has the singular suffix; there is no verb in the last clause, and both the accents and formations demand the translation as it stands. So ends our author's "literary" venture in the field of prophetic interpretation. On the strength of it, he would frighten the intelligent working-classes from trusting their theological teachers! If a specimen of exposition of a like kind should happen to occur in the sermon of a village preacher of the "received theology," what hands of horror the high morality of literary scepticism would hold up! Whether it is, in this treatise, solemn ignorance or solemn imposition, we are not called upon to decide; we are called upon to say that it is the one or the other. And this is what a leading literary journal of the United States, delighted at what looks like a bold dash at the Old Faith, with a clear innocence of information, pronounces "critical acumen," a "model of critical writing of the most careful and dispassionate order." It goes farther; it is foolish enough to assure the scholars of America that "with some of the famous proof-texts concerning Christ, and with the orthodox methods of Biblical criticism generally, Mr. Arnold makes short, though never sharp or irreverent, work in his tenth chapter, entitled the

Proof from Prophecy," actually *quoting* some of the blunders which with Mr. Arnold were evidently second-hand. As to the "reverence," the same journal is obliged elsewhere to confess that the "illustration of the doctrine of the Trinity by the fairy-tale of the three Lord Shaftesburys will be thought by many (we certainly should think so), little short of blasphemy." It also outrages the piety and the learning of such venerating scholars as Buckminster and Thacher, Channing and Greenwood, Norton and Ware, by the absurd statement that "Mr. Arnold's work allies itself with the work of our own earlier and more devout Unitarians," with which it has not one solitary feature in common except the rejection of the Trinity; and further hazards the following vaticination of its own: "We are inclined to think that the volume embodies more fully than anything which has yet appeared the purest faith of the time immediately to come." We are not ourselves sanguine of surviving to witness so much as the sunrise of that strange day; but the "shrewd and intelligent artisans" who will be up early to greet it, must not forget to join to their morning hymn—when they shout, "Great is the Religion of Culture"—"and the 'Atlantic Monthly' was its prophet."

The New Testament text is scarcely treated with more fairness than the Old. In instance after instance the author either arbitrarily attributes to the text a sense which is not there, or disposes of it by an arbitrary adverse personal opinion of his own, with no pretence of a reason assigned. Three examples occur in two pages,—that of St. Paul's reference to the promise to Abraham, and those of the quotations from the Psalms, in the accounts of the crucifixion, where we are first given to understand that the Scriptural writers supposed certain Old Testament passages to mean thus and thus, and to be intended as literal predictions, and are then informed that such suppositions were "erroneous," "childish," "unintelligent trifling," and that "in one or another of the cases, the mistake will be visible to everybody;" which is flatly false, because, to hundreds of Mr. Arnold's betters in power and sharpness and wealth of intellect, no mistake at all is visible. More trying than his contradiction of the Apostles is his patronage of them. After charging St. Paul with using "arguments fanciful and false," he really seems to imagine that he shall comfort some distressed Christian, as much as he comforts his own conceit, by letting it be known that "as to the root of the matter, we are all at one with St. Paul,"—only, "he could, *like the rest of us*, bring a quite false argument in support of a quite true thesis." St. John did pretty well for his

opportunities, but is sadly overrated. To weaken the testimony of Evangelists and Apostles, we are told "it is not Jesus himself who relates His own miracles to us;" as if, after performing them, He did not again and again refer to them, cite them in proof of His Divine origin, make them *one* of the grounds of faith, and so weave His allusions to them as facts into His most spiritual discourses, that He really sets a firmer stamp upon them than if He had recorded them. "It is not Jesus himself who tells us of His own apparitions after His death;" but what is far more wonderful, He foretells His appearing, and then actually appears; He insists on the reality of His resurrection. "It is not Jesus who alleges His crucifixion and sufferings as a fulfilment of the prophecy, 'The Eternal keepeth all the bones of the righteous,'" but He does repeatedly allege these events as a fulfilment of *other* prophecies more explicit, as on the walk to Emman's, "from Moses and all the prophets." The special pleading is apparent; and this sophist presumes to arraign the New Testament writers for "mistake," "trifling," and writing to make out a case! He is violently exercised about the Apostolic representations of the second coming, loading his pages with such adjectives as "futile," "fantastic," "turbid," apparently unaware that Christian critics have long been in the habit of discriminating, in their view of inspiration, between the light furnished to these writers on subjects essential to the matter of the revelation they recorded, and their opinions, prospective or otherwise, on points incidental to it. What he says of Christ's having a higher and clearer apprehension both of the earlier Scriptures and of the true foundation of His kingdom, is well said, and is in excellent conformity with Christian teaching generally. His disparagement of the minute and exact labors of critical students in testing readings and manuscripts, and fixing dates and authors, is easily enough explained, and agrees with his irritation at the Marquis of Salisbury for his vigorous defence of the value of definiteness of doctrine in these loose times; but it is unworthy of Mr. Arnold's reputation as a scholar. Equally so is his evident ignorance of the present general rejection of the text of the Three Heavenly Witnesses for critical reasons. For his own emendations of the text, he rarely has anything better to offer than his own "probably," or "it seems impossible." His notions of interpretation and the genuineness of documents are generally second-hand; that, however, would not be discreditable if they were not third-rate, and superciliously announced. We have the key to all his treatment of the historical facts, and a measure of its worth, in one of his

sentences: "The one safe guide to the extrication and right reception of what comes from Jesus is the internal evidence." Now, there is in Christendom a great body of Biblical students. The finding out of what these Scriptures, in all their parts, actually are and actually mean—their origin, history, changes—has been the business of their lives, lives in many instances long and honored. They have such wide and deep learning as the best universities and best libraries in the world, together with indefatigable intellectual labor, supply. To prosecute their work thoroughly, they have mastered many languages, sciences, travels, topography, customs, comparative philology, and archæology. It has been costly work; many of them have borne poverty and neglect in the enthusiasm of their pursuit. The grand motive of these studies and sacrifices has been to know and serve the truth. The passion of these men is a pure text. Nothing not belonging there is wanted; they are ready to let go anything that can be proved to be foreign to the original letter and sense. Every fact in "literature" bearing on this earnest quest is welcome, as every verified discovery of science is welcome to every theologian, whatever its effect on his opinions or his past beliefs. In all directions, at all hazards, it is truth, and truth alone, that is to be revered. From the style and tone of Mr. Arnold's book a natural inference would be that these men are a feeble clique of half-educated fanatics and narrow-minded pharisees, the moles and bats of an enlightened age, who have sworn themselves into a conspiracy to keep the working-classes, and especially the "intelligent artisans," in a perpetual bondage of superstition. Would that some angel of God, of singular tenderness and strength, might send far into the chambers of his soul a saying that he has the hardihood to quote from à Kempis, "*Este humilis et pacificus, et erit tecum Jesus!*"

So long as we are told that thousands of men, young and old, read the books of literary sceptics because they are bright, it is laid upon us to show distinctly of just what stuff, both good and bad, these books are made. If they are contemptuous of the "athletes of logic," if they are reckless of self-consistency, if they scorn definiteness of doctrine, it will avail them nothing. There remains a respect for these things among all classes and conditions of men, working men included. When Mr. Arnold makes so free with the truth as to tell his readers that "Bishop Wilson, when he says, 'Look up to God,' means only just this, 'trust your conscience,'" we charge him with taking a moral liberty in the world of thought and speech of a like kind to that which makes a trickster and an embezzler in

the world of trade and finance; and the court to which we prefer our charge is the common-sense of mankind. We appeal to the same tribunal when he offers the astounding suggestion that our mechanics and tradespeople will be greatly cleared up in their ideas by reading, instead of that dear and sweet old assurance which makes man to be "as one whom his mother comforteth"—"God is love"—the new "literary" version, "The not ourselves is love;" when he undertakes at the same moment to excuse the Apostle Paul and explode his Epistles by the remark that he "uses the terms grace, new birth, justification by faith, in a fluid and passing way;" when, applying the "literary treatment to religious history," he defines "the Catholic Church" as "the prophetic soul of the wide world dreaming on things to come;" when he attempts to get some sanction for his wild picking and choosing between the covers of the Bible by the sophism that certain books in our Canon were left out by Athanasius, or the Latin Church, and others by the Greek Church, leaving it to be supposed they were left out *on the same grounds* on which Mr. Arnold would reject them; when he lampoons the Deity whom Christians worship by likening Him to an English earl; and, finally, when, after blaming St. Paul, and by insinuation the Son of God himself, for the bitterness of their invective, he hunts the Bishops of Winchester and Gloucester up and down through his three hundred pages, pelting them with satire and ridicule and wrath for no other offence than that in their own place and office, as believers in what they affirm, they avow, their intention to maintain the doctrines of our Lord's divinity and of the personality of God as the self-existent Creator. At the same bar, or another, the author must respond to the accusation of intensifying a prejudice against the Scriptures while pretending to deplore it. More than once he complains that Christians use the Bible as "a talisman;" *i. e.*, as if its material were imbued with some sort of sanative magical efficacy apart from the signification of its words. This complaint is in itself quite incompatible with the other, which assails the religious world for the excess of "exact, definite, dogmatic," instruction, or "scientific theology." Nor has it any better basis than that. Protestant Christianity may be answerable for some mistakes and some defects; but whatever erroneous opinions any branch of the Reformed Church may have propagated, no branch of it has ever treated the Bible as a "talismanic Bible." Let this author, or any other man, cast about him to find three people in the whole range of his observation who have done it. The most poorly-furnished exhorter of the most ignorant sect

bids his hearers prize and read the Bible for what its language conveys to them. Mr. Coleridge, a great master of "the best that has been thought and said in the world," knew that, when he wrote that beautiful passage which gives us the picture of the English peasant's cottage-window with "the Bible gleaming through the lower pane." Not here, however, does the audacity of the literary method reach its climax; not till it confronts the great commission of our Lord. With his "delicate perception and tact," our author beholds in the world the indisputable fact of the Christian Church. Where did it come from? How and why was that monument of *something* built up? No seeing eye can fail to trace it to the final order of the ascending Son of God constituting it to live forever with its creed, its ministry, its initiatory sacrament: "Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost: teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and, lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." What shall be done with this? This and the "new religion of culture" will not live together. But how to get rid of it? Is there any flaw in the text? None. Is there any suspicion on the document? It will be hopeless to suggest it. Is there a possibility of any second meaning? Not the least. But there is one device left, and before *that*, text and Church shall disappear together. We quote from p. 236: "It is *extremely improbable* that Jesus would ever have so charged His Apostles!" Mr. Arnold kindly informs us what Jesus probably did say; but *this* is out of the question. "It is by far too systematic, and what people are fond of calling an anachronism. It is not the least like what Jesus was in the habit of saying." This we are expected to take as the end of the matter. History is corrected, and the Church is gone. "So that our three creeds, and with them the whole of our so-called orthodox theology, are founded upon words which Jesus *in all probability* never uttered!"

The truth is, the actual theory at the base of this system, and the theory which the advocate puts forward, fancying he believes it, are in radical and hopeless contradiction with one another. The actual theory is rationalism; the fanciful theory is culture. In the rhetoric of the treatise, the test proposed for an abiding and "verifiable" religion for man is a knowledge of the best that has been thought and said in the world,—about as awkward and discouraging a one as could be offered to the common people. But in the mind of the advocate, the test really resorted to is individual reason. This secret quarrel runs through the scheme from top to bottom, enfeebling

it fatally. No two processes can well be more alien to each other than that of finding a religion to live by in the jargon of literatures of departed ages, and that of finding it in one's own interiors. Which is the more impracticable enterprise, it is difficult to say; but, at any rate, they are mutually incompatible. That there is one "literature" where a religion may be looked for, is plain enough; so plain, that even a sceptic must see it. Unable to get rid of the Bible, these gentlemen open it; and there forthwith begins the collision between the two theories. The moment the Bible says anything which the rational intuition pronounces "impossible" or "unlikely," a literary forcing operation is brought in to eject it, or to metamorphose it. Hence comes *aberglanube*. The book before us is, in large part, a strained product of this unnatural wrestling in the womb between the literary and the speculative spirit. The Scriptures are treated with a mixture of deference and insult, coquetry and violence, such as never befel any book in the world before, and the natural sense of it is outraged. The author gravely assures us he is no rationalist; he has no favor for Socinians; the Unitarians may think to take some comfort, but they must not be "unduly elated," neither must the Broad Churchmen. Mr. Maurice was "always beating the bush with deep emotion, and never started the hare." No; the new religion must not be confounded with neology; and yet it is nothing else in the world but German rationalism talking in the dialect of an English university, with a slight French accent, and the intolerant emphasis of a Scotch schoolmaster. It must choose between two masters. If it takes syntax and prosody, the inner light must not expect to flame very high. If the criterion of truth is subjective, after all it seems scarcely worth while to fall down and worship ancient and modern Letters, looking to the Renaissance for a ritual, and to the printing-press for a priest.

What challenges the chief attention in Mr. Arnold's treatise, however, is his main proposition. He proposes to substitute for a shifting, indefinite, and uncertain "basis" of religion in the minds of men, a basis that is permanent, definite, ascertainable, the same always and everywhere. "We must find for the Bible some other basis than that which the Churches assign to it,—a verifiable basis, and not an assumption; and this, again, will govern everything which comes after. This new religion of the Bible the people may receive; the version now current of the religion of the Bible they never will receive." "The assumption with which all the Churches and sects set out that there is a *great Personal First Cause, the*

moral and intelligent Governor of the universe, and that from Him the Bible derives its authority, can never be verified." "Here, then, is the problem: to find for the Bible a basis in something which can be verified, instead of in something which has to be assumed." "The thing is to recast religion" (Pref. ix. and x.).

For the unverifiable and variable "basis," then, or the express revelation of a Personal God in the Divine Man, recorded in Sacred Scriptures, which are kept, witnessed to, and preached by, an organized Church,—what is it that this literary school will set up as the unalterable and abiding authority, the one fixed and definable thing, the "everlasting foundation" on which poor distracted humanity, sick of illusions and heavy-laden with doubts, is finally to lean itself and be at rest? It is "righteousness." If this term should seem to carry with it any implication of relations with a Deity, any reference to the character and will of an absolute and perfect Being, whose law is the measure and touchstone of right, that notion must be at once dismissed. You must blow away this traditional flavor of the supernatural which hangs about the grand old word righteousness, into the nebulous region of *aber-glaube*. There is no room for it in the "verifiable basis." Exact thinking does not admit the assumption of a supreme, self-existent mind. The "righteousness," it is to be clearly understood, is *rightness of conduct*; and since there can surely be no conduct beyond the sphere of personal relations, the conduct must be conduct between man and man, or man and his inferiors, and the "righteousness" must be that which, in all its elements, origin, conditions, and operation, is limited to a terrestrial society.

It would appear, then—the new religion, with its canons and logic apart—that we are here brought fairly out upon the ground of morals, as distinguished from the ground of religion altogether. It has always been thought convenient, for the purposes of both expression and thought, that a discrimination should be kept up between those verities or ideas or imaginations, whichever they may be, pertaining to an alleged sphere of supernatural life, lying above the human plane, and those pertaining to the sphere that we call nature, occupied by man and explored by his finite faculties. Hence a distinction came to be recognized, a good while ago, between religion on the one side, and ethics on the other; between duties to God and duties to man; between the science of theology and the science of morality. Scholars have, generally, considered it expedient, and a part of their business as scholars, to take note of this distinction. It might, therefore, be expected, when a new

school appears, claiming to be by eminence the representative and guardian of letters, the very pink and pattern of literary chivalry; in fact, venturing to base an original and revolutionary republic of free thought on "culture," which is described as "knowing the best that has been thought and said in the world," that it would pay some respect to the familiar classification just referred to. But, on the contrary, we are peremptorily told that there may be a religion, and, indeed, the very first thing we ought to be doing is to get a religion, which has no concern with anything but human "conduct." Literary scepticism strikes right and left, abolishing theology with one hand, and upsetting the rules of philology with the other. Showing no compunction at emptying the universe of an intelligent Creator and Providence, one would suppose that its affluence of resources would enable it to dispense also with the superannuated phraseology of the superstition,—letting names go with things. To that there are evidently objections. So we are to have a "recast religion," which is moral conduct. Manliness is a synonyme for godliness. Social integrity and the filial obedience of faith are confounded together. We may keep in Christendom the word "piety" if we choose, but must restore its Virgilian sense. Both clauses of the twofold evangelic commandment are fused into one. Seeing that something like this is the fashion of unbelieving culture; seeing that rationalists continue to preach sermons in pulpits from Bible-texts, and that men insist on being called Christians who have become critics and censors of Christ, and that Mr. Arnold himself professes a desire to restore the lost honors of the Scriptures, by relieving them of the doctrine of a Personal First Cause, and that there are ecclesiastics who consent to take and hold lucrative places by promises and subscriptions made in one sense but taken by the other party in another, we ought, doubtless, not to wonder overmuch if we find an atheistic righteousness recommended under the old name, "religion." We pronounce it, however, a literary inaccuracy, and an affront to the English dictionary. Nor shall we pretend that we are able to see that the "righteousness" of men who deal in this way with words and things, whatever superiority they may claim for it on the score of its having been delivered from the bondage of the creed of the Church, has any special advantages over the old-fashioned, straightforward way of calling things by their real names, and distinguishing things that differ. Why not, with a bolder disciple of modern culture, and a more brilliant master of paradox, go straight to the mark, and say, "God builds His temple on the ruins of religions?" Only, one can hardly help asking,

"Who, Mr. Emerson, is your God?" Says a contemporary essayist of rare clearness of head, untrammelled by any tradition, enslaved to no dogma, but as firm in his moral judgments as he is faultless in his English style, our author's peer in letters, Mr. Philip Gilbert Hamerton: "Although nothing can be more distasteful to persons of culture than the bigotry which refuses the name of religion to other people's opinions, merely because they are other people's opinions, I suspect that the popular instinct is right in denying the name of religion to the inferences of the intellect. Taking frankly the received meaning of the word, as it is used by mankind everywhere, we must admit that, although high intellect would lead us to high and pure morality, and to beautiful conduct in everything, toward men, toward women, toward even the lower and lowest animals, still it does not lead us to that belief in the otherwise unbelievable, or to that detailed *cultus* which is meant by *religion* in the universally accepted sense. It is disingenuous to take a word popularly respected, and attribute to it another sense. Such a course is *not strictly honest*, and, therefore, not purely intellectual; for the foundation of the intellectual life is honesty."

The question, however, remains as to the soundness of Mr. Arnold's main proposition. Suppose we agree, with him, to pronounce a belief in the existence of God, because it is not capable of a conclusive logical demonstration, an "assumption," and an objectionable assumption. Suppose we reject revelation as half mythical, discard the "accepted theology," disown the Church, turn our backs on the whole system of creed, worship, and sacraments, as being too "unverifiable" and unfixed to satisfy either "the masses of the people" or "thinkers," and move off upon this "basis" of the New Religion, holding only to "the power that makes for righteousness," with its enveloping halo of *aberglaube*. Shall we have got then to the solid ground? Will that prove to be the abiding, definitely-bounded, verifiable, unchanging "foundation," on which men of all classes, conditions, ages, no matter what science and time may do, can repose themselves, sure that they shall not be moved?

What is this "righteousness?" Is it absolute or relative? If absolute, as it should be to meet this writer's claims for it, then it must be the same in all periods and in all places. How is it known? Where can its unvarying, authoritative law be ascertained? Only in one of three sources: in the individual reason; in some external human standard, as the legislation of some society or king, or recognized custom of men; or in a mind superior to man. The last is by literary scepticism ruled out. That there is any universal and

uniform statute-book of morality for all nations—a world's code of right conduct—is not pretended; if there were, the literary sceptic, “knowing the best that has been thought and said in the world,” ought to be able to point it out. It comes to this, that it is left to each individual to make out, as best he can, what rightness of conduct is. Is he endowed with an infallible intuition to that end? The moral history of the world proves incontestably that man's intuition of the morally right approaches not a whit nearer to uniformity than his intuition of a Personal and Conscious Divine Will superior to his own. There are, perhaps, men to be found without a conscience,—moral monsters. There are, perhaps, men without the idea or feeling of God,—religious idiots. Both are abnormal specimens. The weakness of either intuition is a weakness of character. But the true type of character never was and never can be produced by either of the two intuitions alone. The intuitive sense of right will no more create a definite and uniform style of conduct, without the fixed standard of a Divine revelation, than, to borrow Whately's figure, the countless clocks and watches of a community will keep uniform time without correction by a sundial or some celestial observation. How often have we all come just to the verge of persuading ourselves, by some sophistry or other, that a doubtful action would be allowable, when the yielding foot or hand or eye was stayed by the simple recollection, This is clearly forbidden in the Bible. And the subsequent action of conscience has confirmed the decision.

Literary scepticism will not demur at an appeal to literary history.

Where, outside of the Book of the dogmatic faith, with its superhuman sanctions, shall we look for the “fixed and verifiable basis” of the religion of righteousness? We are invited to abandon allegiance to the authority of a written revelation, to Church, creed, theology, for the solid foothold of confidence in a “power that makes for righteousness.” Whose righteousness, and what righteousness? As it must be a righteousness not fashioned or determined by the unverifiable doctrines or teachings of the Christian Scriptures, it will be natural to look for it in the lives of those men and women who have cut loose from the “accepted beliefs,” or at least have emancipated themselves from ecclesiastical rule. Are they agreed then? We say, “men and women.” The phrase reminds us that into “righteousness,” or moral “conduct,” the relations of the sexes enter as a considerable element. Shelley, as is well known to those who really knew him, was both sensitive and

scrupulous as to his conduct, "hating what he considered to be immorality," and living a life "as nearly as possible in accordance with the moral ideal in his own conscience;" but during the lifetime of his wife Harriet, he made no secret of living with Mary Godwin. The manner of living of Mr. Lewes and "George Eliot"—who thinks that "souls have their color," and practically holds that the matching of the colors is independent of any law or covenant of wedlock pronounced by Church or magistrate—is known to everybody. Several murders have lately taken place in intelligent and cultivated circles because more than one man has laid claim to the same woman. Is this the kind of righteousness that "the power makes for?" These people have not been in the least influenced by reverence for the "dogmatic" teaching of the Gospel on the subject of marriage. Their practice is not, like the sensual sins of some nominal Christians, a lapse from a confessed law, or a plunge of passion; it is the practical working out of an acknowledged theory, the legitimate fruit of a system which makes human nature a law to itself. Is the righteousness of Madame Dudevant the righteousness of Hannah More? Here are a thousand people struggling to make a decent way through the world, and supposed to be disgusted with the Bible. They inquire for a guide. Mr. Arnold, as priest and prophet of a new religion, bids them follow a "power that makes for righteousness." If they ask where "the power" is, and how they shall know it, they are circularly answered that they shall know it by its making for righteousness. But what if they further inquire whether it is the righteousness of Stuart Mill or John Keble, the righteousness illustrated in the biography of Goethe, who was so thoroughly versed in "the best that has been thought and said in the world" that he might take up undisputed the audacious boast of Lord Bacon, and say, "I have taken all knowledge to be my province"—an Agamemnon on all intellectual fields—or the righteousness of the handsome but ascetic St. Bernard of Clairvaux, half freezing himself in an icy stream to cool his appetite? There is one righteousness of the Essenes and another of the Mormons.

Dr. Livingstone found by one of the lakes in Central Africa a tribe of natives where the women were scandalized to hear that in England the law allowed each man only one wife, and the Kandjans are said to compare Monogamists to monkeys. Polyandry has been held to be a moral obligation. Among the Wahabee Arabs a falsehood told in behalf of a prevailing usage is regarded as more righteous than unfashionable veracity. Consider-

ing the tremendous drift toward that sort of virtue wherever man is, is it nothing that men should venerate a law of God which, expressly and peremptorily condemns the liar and demands truth, with such penalties and sanctions as only God can impose? Would the morals of Plato answer for America to-day? Would Spartan or Lacedemonian conduct do as a pattern for the young men of commercial and "cultured" England?

A writer of our time, already once cited—and we cite him again especially because he is entitled to much weight in this question, being himself in the front rank, both by ability and enthusiasm, of the eloquent advocates of culture, Mr. Hamerton—distinguishing between the pure tendencies of intellectualism in itself and the wretched failures of literary men in the mixed condition of society, makes this candid confession: "You need not expect me to defend very vigorously the morality of the intellectual life. Many intellectual people have led immoral lives; others have led lives which, although in strict conformity to *their own theories of morality*, were in opposition to the morality of their country and their age." The simple truth is, the more widely the man of letters extends his researches into the literatures of the world, the more inevitably will he be pushed to an induction exactly opposite to that which forms the principal position in Mr. Arnold's illogical book. He will find that book only one more of many examples where a gifted and well-meaning author starts with a theory which first overmasters his own mind, then runs away with his judgment, and finally breaks down under the facts it sweeps up. He may go as far as he will with his "true culture" and his "reading;" the more books he reads—even including the Old Testament itself, if he reads it without the key furnished by its superhuman plan as a foredisclosure of the incarnation of the life of God in the person of the Lord Jesus Christ—the more he will find "the best that has been said and thought in the world" to be no "fixed and verifiable basis" for either morality or religion; no unerring guide to the conscience and life of man on the earth. The more reluctant he will be, too, if his head is clear and his heart right, to exchange Christian doctrine—"dogma," if you please—for "literature," faith for knowledge, worship for culture, the Church for the university, the creed of the ages for a syllabus of eclectic lectures on Jewish and Gentile ethics. The very best he could do on that scheme would be to come to some sort of eclectic individual conclusion of his own, which, so far from binding other men or suggesting a uni-

versal principle of conduct, would scarcely secure his own steadfastness, or bear him up in the fiercer onsets of temptation.

Such a treatise as has now been under review marks one further stage in the advance of positions by the party of unbelief. The issue, some definite issue, cannot be very far away. Fifty years since, the quiet reception of a volume so inherently irreconcilable with the first claims of Revelation and the axioms of the Christian Church among the Christian communities of England and America would have been beyond the range of possibility. It was only as far back as 1774 that Lessing published the *Wolfenbüttel Fragments*. Nearly all the rationalistic literature that is now popularized has come into existence within the lifetime of the present generation. As Strauss has pointed out, the characteristic of most of the critical attacks of the eighteenth century was, that they charged the Scripture writers with imposture; of course they gained but a limited and feeble acceptance with minds really devout or really capable of a judicial view of the subject. The assaults of the nineteenth century generally admit that the writers were honest, but attempt to empty them of credibility by considerations drawn from literary, psychological, and historical phenomena. Less offensive to veneration, and less absurd in the first aspect, these broader speculations have found access to a higher order of minds.

In this country, the progress of denial has been both more recent and more rapid. Many of us can remember the departure of Unitarianism from the "orthodox" standards of New England. During all the earlier period of that controversy the appeal was made on both sides to the letter of Scripture, as to "the law and the testimony." The right of certain texts to their place and their meaning was disputed; in some cases, different degrees of authority were attached to different books of the canon; but Worcester and Whittman no more thought of maintaining a thesis expressly against Holy Writ than Stuart or Woods. The "*Christian Examiner*" began by asking, "What saith the Scripture?" almost as earnestly as the "*Panoplist*." Till the debate between George Ripley and Andrews Norton, simultaneously with the anti-supernatural preaching of Theodore Parker, the miracles of the New Testament and the superhuman nature of our Lord were commonly embraced in the Unitarian belief. At present, what proportion of the Unitarian preachers or people believe them? Nowhere is such a belief made essential to good standing in the denomination. Yet it will hardly be questioned—in some quarters it is even boastfully proclaimed—that the "free

religion," the extremes of liberal speculation, the literary scepticism of this day in America, are the lineal and legitimate successors of the Unitarianism of half a century ago. What is the plain inference? Decay of doctrine is the source of religious disease. Take away the definite teaching of a dogmatic faith, and against the wild radicalism and bitter atheism that will sooner or later pour in there is no standard whatever that can be lifted up. So says the Word; so says history; so says reason itself. It is by a sure instinct that all this school of sceptical speculation hate Christian dogma. They hate it as bandits hate castles, as revolutionists hate rule, as the life that loves itself always hates the light in which it cannot live. Has the Church nothing to learn from this unconcealed repugnance of her enemies to her creeds, this patting of her shoulder just in proportion as her voice is uncertain, and her message indistinct? She is a Church Catholic as she is a Church apostolical and true; and therefore her gate must be open enough and her walls wide enough to hold all forms of thought and life and feeling that are compatible with the truth of Christ and the order of His kingdom. It is just as important that the bounds should not be set too near as too far; that dogma should not be either narrowed or stiffened from the original largeness and spiritual liberty of the Son of Man, as that it should not be dissolved. A danger lies on either side, and there are opposite extremes. But the doctrine held and taught must be such as can be held firmly and taught without a shadow of ambiguity. Primitive Catholicity, reconciled with primitive orthodoxy, is the need. How sorely is it needed! What signifies the trumpet if we know not for whom, or by whose command, it calls? What signify eloquence, learning, ecclesiastical apparatus, if the thing taught does not stand out with the clear outline and unmistakable face of truth, forever frank, and forever the same? When the Church of England was agitated by reports of the rationalistic destructionism of German thought, forty years ago, Dr. Pusey, then a Fellow of Oriel, Mr. Arnold's college, having travelled in Germany, wrote his "*Historical Inquiry*," and accounted for it by the divorce of religious sentiment from theological doctrine in the preceding age. That luminous argument was never answered either by his immediate opponent, Mr. Rose, or by any hand. Truth revealed from God, truth declared by man to men, truth so held that the line between itself and error cannot possibly be confused or blurred, is the "everlasting foundation." Could the Church only be cajoled or frightened off from that, the beating of her into powder would be easy work, and the new religion would arise and shine.

All the positive truth and all the positive power proposed by this new system for the salvation of the race are included in the Catholic religion. Not a single idea, not a single instrumentality, not a single force, mentioned in this treatise as helpful or satisfying to the soul of man, is not patent in the teaching of the Church; we say it deliberately, and we challenge contradiction. The negations are the untruths. Righteous conduct, the moral intuition, the clear reliance on the issues of integrity, the "mild reasonableness,"—they are all made conspicuous and indispensable in the practical demands of Christian theology, as it is inculcated in the pulpits and schools of every orthodox branch of the visible kingdom of Christ. Not always are they as eloquently preached as in some of the better pages of Mr. Matthew Arnold. To their signal enforcement he might have consistently brought all the abilities of his mind and all the riches of his culture, without disturbing one "dogma" of the shorter or longer creed, without denying a sentence of the canonical Scriptures, without departing a step from the door of the Fold, certainly without an irreverent flout or an acrimonious fling at belief or at the believer; and then how beneficent would have been his ministration to the crude distrust, how healing his medicine to the restless life, of the working classes of the people! What, instead, is the remedy he submits to the judgment of the thinking world? Rejecting the very idea of any message of light or love, of pity or pardon or sympathy, from God as a Father to man as His child, suppressing every confiding aspiration that struggles upward to hold personal communion with a living Friend above, thrusting back into Pagan shadows every definite hope of an immortal fellowship of souls hereafter made forever alive by a life kindled and sustained in them by the life of Jesus Christ, his scheme would send each isolated individual mind to seek out and gather up and bind together the materials of a religion among the elements of human nature. We have only to take one look into our weak and erring selves to see how forlorn an errand that would be. And what, now belonging to the freehold of our Christian home-heritage, should we then be expected to let go? The Fatherhood of God, leaving us orphans "crying in the night" to "a something not ourselves;" worship, for such a crying would not be worship, and not one word do we find written in all the volume before us of that ineffable blessedness of the praying heart which has been the highest thing, the touch of Heaven, the gleam of glory, in every nation that has lived under the sun, and the comfort of all that have been comforted; relief for the sense of sin, that haunting sorrow which has clung to our race

from the beginning, chased and stung it in all its migrations and advancements, and been everywhere the burden and tragedy of its travailing soul; the incarnation, or the coming into this poor, sad, broken life of humanity on the earth of the life of God in the Son, Son of God and Son of Man, to recreate, to restore, to quicken, to give health, beauty, and gladness, reconciling all that is imperfect and unclean here with all that is eternally complete and pure in Him. These we must let go. We need not count up the losses further. We can see the meagre outline left, the gaunt shape, the ghastly face, the dreary eyes, the hollow and pulseless breast, of the new religion of culture. Cunning hands have set the image up,—the hands of one of the most finished and best furnished of all the sons of literary breeding in the nation where culture has done its best. Assailing the Christianity of the Church at a chosen point, taking its own time, boasting of its resources, literary scepticism, if not a new adversary an old one in a new and brilliant attire, has made its onset, no man hindering. On grounds of which our readers are amply apprised, we conclude that, in its declarations and its arguments, its learning and its philosophy, its reading of the past and of the heart of man, its interpretations of Scripture and its accounts of interpretations better than its own, its erring aim and its inconsistency with itself, the assault fails. And therefore do we venture to expect that, just at this point, the impartial spirit of history, when the due time shall come, will score one victory more for the Faith once for all delivered.



PRINCE BISHOP OF Breslau.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF COUNT SEDLNITZKY VON CHOLTITZ, PRINCE BISHOP OF Breslau. Berlin: 1872.

LITTLE more than two years ago, a life of singular interest was brought to its close, in the city of Berlin. Leopold Sedlnitzky von Choltitz, once Roman Catholic Prince Bishop of the most extensive diocese in all Europe, but in his later years a member of a Protestant Church, passed hence to his everlasting rest.

Careful analysis of the causes of historic events has had the effect of making history less and less biographic. The glory with which individual heroes were wont to be encircled has lost not a little of its sheen, and individual actors are now regarded rather as types and representatives of contemporaneous thought and action, than as originators of the same. And yet, within fair limits, it is not unphilosophic to recognize them as causes of the events with which their names stand connected. They have, perhaps, openly suggested, or openly acted out, the thought that had else been suppressed. To conviction which has been general, they have added a boldness not general, prompting them to avow, and live for or die for, their convictions. In a word, if they have not actually kindled, they have certainly fanned the flame of change and progress.

Among such justly ranks the Prince Bishop of Breslau aforesaid. With the ecclesiastical revolution at present moving so grandly

toward its culmination in Germany, he must ever be identified. Feeling this, some of his friends, fortunately for the world, induced the good bishop to write a connected account of the main events of his life. Since his death, this autobiography has been published.

Its romantic and dramatic interest is among its minor characteristics. Its higher value lies in this, that it is the life of a Roman Catholic bishop, who was forced to resign his See, because he insisted on holding himself bound by his oath of civil allegiance. It thus serves eminently to illustrate the character of the modern Church of Rome, as defined by recent papal bulls and the decrees of a so-called Ecumenical Council, demonstrating the way in which that Church regards, and must regard, all questions of civil right and civil duty. It is again equally instructive, as being the life of the first Roman Catholic bishop who, since the Reformation, has become a Protestant; for it enables us to appreciate the detrimental bearing of the recent dogmas of Rome upon the religious life of a conscientious and brightly-intelligent man.

In the following pages we shall do little more than let the author tell the story, in his own words of strong simplicity.

The early impressions of Sedlnitzky were not such as to lead him to distrust or criticise the Church of Rome. It was the Church of his parents, and doubtless the recollection of the practical holiness of character which they exhibited must have softened the feelings of the grown man toward the errors he observed, and prevented anything like impatience and rashness in the determination which at length carried him out of the Roman communion. "My parents," he says, "sprang from families in which the fear of God and piety were, so to speak, domesticated. Both were brought up in the Roman Catholic faith, and to it they were zealously devoted, regarding it as the only means of salvation, without, however, feeling on that account at all less charitable toward those who thought otherwise. The region in which we lived was thoroughly [Roman] Catholic. The number of clergy in the cities and villages near us was very considerable; and, besides this, there were monasteries in the neighborhood." Young Sedlnitzky was brought in contact with a large number of these ecclesiastics. "During the life of my mother and grandmother," he says, "one or even two of the monastic clergy were continually in the house, for the purpose of reading a daily Mass to them. In addition to this, my father had a private chapel, well appointed in every respect; while he was very fond of social company, and possessed a great taste for music." All this had the effect of rendering the house of Sedlnitzky a constant

resort for the clergy of his neighborhood. Contact with them served to impress him with feelings of affection and regard for at least the majority.

Ample room was given to these representatives of the Church to exert the most powerful influence over the young Count, his early instructors having all been clergy in orders. And if they did not largely augment his reverence for the Roman Catholic Church, they do not appear to have interfered with his affection for it. In general, they seem to have been men of cultivation and sincerity. The third of four whose tuition he enjoyed must have been an enthusiastic admirer of the optional system of study. His pupil, though only twelve years old, had, according to the practice then prevalent, been provided, by the foresight of his father, with a prebend's place in the cathedral chapter at Breslau; but the worthy padre does not seem to have thought it requisite to direct his attention, in any special manner, to theological studies. "He gave me free opportunity to devote myself to my favorite subjects, viz., natural history, physics, mathematical geography, and, later, astronomy." The juvenile canon had evidently some suspicion that his predilections would not receive the unqualified approbation of parental wisdom, for he tells us that "in seclusion, through eager private study, much information in these departments of science was acquired, without my parents having a suspicion of what I was doing." Evidently the injudicious course of confining the pupil's attention too closely to ecclesiastical studies was not adopted.

And again, the Church of Rome was made positively attractive to Sednitzky. He was so identified with it when a mere child, as to leave an impression most agreeable on his mind. At the age of twelve, as already stated, he was presented with a canonry in the chapter of the cathedral of Breslau. "Highly delighted at this," he says, "I conceived a great idea of my importance, when the suffragan bishop, a friend of the family, conferred upon me, with great solemnity, ordination and the tonsure in the neighboring parish church; and I, furnished with the cross and canon's robes, could regard myself as a member of the upper clerical order." "His grandmother," says the editor of the autobiography, "had his robes made for the young canon, and, when now an old man, he remembered with what joy she and his mother received him, when, for the first time, he presented himself to them in his new dignity, and adorned with the insignia of his office." When he had reached his fifteenth year, the then Prince Bishop of Breslau bestowed upon him a prebendary (canonry) in the collegiate Church of St. James

and St. Nicholas. The income from both the canonries was, at first, too insignificant to mention, and out of all proportion to the outlays. Still, they served in a manner peculiarly effective to commend the Church of Rome to the affections of Sedlnitzky.

And if his attention was called, as it seems very early to have been, to the points of difference between his own and the Protestant Church, his eye fell on much that tended to confirm the influence of his parents and teachers. On the one hand, "the most beautiful buildings, decorated by the hand of Christian love, a worship addressing itself to the imagination, as being full of deep, mystical meaning, congregations praying upon bended knees in the ardor of devotion, all had something very attractive to a spirit seeking for edification; while, on the other hand, the Protestant churches, built, in general, in the most bald and tasteless style, opened usually but once a week, the drawling, and to me, at that time, almost unintelligible and tuneless singing, the preaching almost purely abstract, all gave me the impression of extreme insipidity. In like manner the activity of the Romish priests in the school, in the family, by the bedsides of the sick and dying; in fact, in all circumstances exhibiting such extraordinary self-sacrifice, impressed me as being far more zealous than what I could at that time discover in the Protestant Church. A notable advantage enjoyed by the Roman Catholic Church appeared to me to be, that it had instrumentalities for applying the work of redemption to the individual, at every stage in his passage through life. Specially valuable among the seven sacraments seemed to me that of penance, since it not only rendered imperative self-examination and the exercise of humility, but also afforded the opportunity to impart counsel, instruction, and help to the earnest spirit, when in the most favorable frame.

In like manner the marriage relation seemed to me to be established on a far higher and holier basis, when I compared its indissoluble character in the Roman Catholic Church with the frequency and ease of divorce in the Protestant communities.

Most of all, however, I was shocked at the lack of unity and peace. The numerous parties existing in the Protestant Church gave it, in my view, the appearance of unconnected and unorganized societies, that rested upon the intellectual conceptions of imperfect individuals; while, on the contrary, the Roman Catholic Church rested upon truths established and witnessed by the power of the Holy Ghost.

While the above conclusions were being formed, Sedlnitzky was, unawares, imbibing principles destined to overthrow them,—the principles, viz., of sound unprejudiced reasoning.

When approaching the close of the gymnasium course, he was placed in charge of a fourth instructor. "Like his predecessors, he was a Roman Catholic priest, but more versed in the natural sciences than they. I could now," he writes, "with greater success than ever, follow my own inclinations; and, consequently, I neglected the study of history, the dead languages, and cognate branches. The transactions of history, embracing the perpetual changes occurring in the life of individuals or of nations, and the play of human passions, finite in respect to both time and space, appeared to me altogether subordinate, when compared with the measureless grandeur, the absolute regularity, the unchangeableness and beauty of the works of God. My soul was filled with the deepest reverence for a Creator who has called myriads of worlds out of nothing, and marvellously guides them; who embraces in the compass of His love the immensity of His works, and unerringly directs the course of each. In consequence of my fondness for astronomical studies, I regarded with special admiration the men who had entered this sanctuary of knowledge, and proved themselves capable of explaining its deep mysteries. They seemed to me immeasurably exalted above historians and philologists. I recollect that, at the very time I was admiring Kepler's discovery of the laws regulating the movements of the planetary system, the first asteroid was discovered. It soon appeared upon the celestial charts as a fragment of the large missing planet, the existence of which Kepler had announced upon the principle of the laws discovered by him. My admiration for him was so great, that he seemed to me not simply an extraordinary genius, but a veritable prophet."

Logic and psychology formed a part of the then course of study for the upper classes of the gymnasia. And it was well for the intellectual development of Sedlnitzky that it was so. While under his third and fourth instructors he evidently paid little or no attention to anything but scientific subjects. "At this time, however," he writes, "Stolberg's translation of Plato's Dialogues fell into my hands. It was as though scales had fallen from my eyes, and a new light had entered them." The young student discovered that there was a world of mind as well as a world of matter,—an invisible creation not unworthy of being compared with that which had so powerfully and justly impressed his outward eye. "Through my Platonic studies," he says, "I was led to recognize the one-sidedness and defective character of my knowledge, and I conceived a profound impression of the value of linguistic and historical science; and this, added to the necessity of passing a stringent examination

before being admitted to the university, induced me to use all diligence to remedy the existing defects in my knowledge."

So zealous had been the young student's employment of his time, that, on entering the University of Breslau, he was allowed to omit the first year's curriculum, and was placed in the second year class.

At the university, as, during his course of preparation, his mind was specially attracted by the study of the physical sciences, he formed an intimate acquaintance with the Professor of Astronomy, who, as he says, seemed to him like an oracle. Having, however, as before noticed, detected in his previous education an unfortunate "one-sidedness," he did not devote himself exclusively to scientific studies. Quite a rival in his affections to the Professor of Astronomy, was the Professor of Greek, Roman, and German Literature. His instructions were particularly valuable, because, in place of directing the student's attention mainly to matters of verbal and grammatical criticism, he sought to make the reading of classic literature a communion with the spirits of its authors.

The character of Sedlnitzky's mind was such as to render him dissatisfied with everything merely authoritative. If it were superficial, it was rejected. A striking evidence of this is contained in what he says of the Professor of Astronomy: "He sought to explain the phenomena of nature by material means and mechanical power; but the belief in a God who, like some incompetent watch-maker, stands beside his work, and occupies himself in keeping in order the complicated powers that move it, or aiding them in case of failure, could not satisfy me." We should imagine that his teachers, if observant, must have recognized, in such indications of independent thought, a tendency not well to develop in one whom it was their office to render a docile and obedient child of the Church of Rome, and an unquestioning dispenser of her dogmas. The habit of weighing matters in the balances of sober logic, is one which ill comports with the functions of a Roman Catholic priest. That is emphatically not his vocation. It is all done for him by an infallible head, whereof his noblest ambition is to be an instrumental servitor. The child is father to the man; and the inquisitive student who rejects the superficial explanation of a professor, not unnaturally develops into the too logical and independent Prince Bishop of Breslau.

In 1806, the Count entered upon the theological course at the university. "Here, as elsewhere, the precaution was taken by the wary Church to which he belonged, to subject the aspirants to her

ministry to no extraneous influence. The instructors," says Sedlnitzky, "were partly ex-Jesuits, partly pupils of such." Admirably has the Church of Rome pursued the advice of Solomon, "Train up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old he will not depart from it." Nothing, perhaps, has so thoroughly stamped the court of Berlin as the court of Antichrist, as has the passage of the recent law, requiring ecclesiastics to study at the State gymnasia and universities under instructors appointed by the State. It destroys the system which alone can render men of intelligence sufficiently narrow-minded to be valuable priests of the Church of Rome; that system, viz., which confined the training of the priesthood to priests, and by preference to Jesuits and ex-Jesuits.

How powerful, and, therefore, how dangerous such influence must be, is shown in what Sedlnitzky says respecting the all-important subject of the exegesis of the New Testament. Its Chair was filled by a man who, for the most part, confined himself to grammatical explanations, avoiding all inquiry as to the meaning of that of which he treated. And on his own part, Sedlnitzky says: "I was ill qualified to appreciate the value of exegetical studies. I well understood that the Lord had founded His kingdom, not upon the written word, but upon oral instruction,—upon His personal tuition and His holy life. This led me to recognize in that oral word, and in the oral tradition which later became written, a fixed, that is, in the teachings of the Church, the main basis of Christian truth. Accordingly, it was quite natural that, with all reverence for the Holy Scriptures, I should nevertheless turn my attention by preference to speculative theology." A noble result, indeed, upon the mind of a young divinity student, that he should consider the study which is designed to give him a better understanding of the New Testament comparatively unworthy of his time and energy! But pass we on; a change impends. While preparing to give religious instruction to others, Sedlnitzky is led to contemplate the subject of Christianity in its bearing upon himself. In doing so, he found he was utterly unacquainted with its real character. He attends some lectures in Breslau on the philosophy of religion. They are given by a learned and pious man, once a Roman Catholic, but now a Protestant. He urges strongly the value of the reading and study of the Scriptures, insisting that they are the grand source of light and life. Sedlnitzky follows the advice of this heretic, and, as a result, undergoes a complete change in his conceptions of Christianity. He, for the first time, understands the fundamental truth of truths, that the grace of God

is the power whereby the new life of love to God is begun and fostered.

In 1811, we find Sedlnitzky entering upon the duties of the ministry, strong in the conviction of his childhood, that the Church to which, as we have seen, he was so meagrely indebted for any exact knowledge of Christian truth, was the sole means appointed by God whereby the sanctification of the human soul could possibly be accomplished.

He is invited by Prince Hohenlohe, Bishop of Breslau, to become an assistant and secretary on the staff of the vicariate of the diocese. This board was entrusted with the management of the ecclesiastical affairs of the diocese. In his capacity as member of such a board, it was his office to endeavor to set forward every measure that might contribute to the fostering and strengthening of living Christianity. Let us hear what it was that commended itself to him, as deserving his most earnest attention. "In the first years of my office on the Board of Ecclesiastical Direction, an event occurred which greatly interested me. During a visit to my father I read, in the papers of the day, that a society had been formed for the purpose of disseminating the Holy Scriptures among persons of all confessions. I was so delighted with the idea, that, without delay, I wrote to the Prince Bishop, then at Johannisberg, and informed him of my intention to join the society, and to disseminate New Testaments in editions which should have received his episcopal approbation. I received, without delay, a favorable response from him. When, on my arrival in Breslau, I presented myself to my superiors, I was greeted, particularly by one of them, with the utmost coldness. When I was referred to the ecclesiastical regulations prohibiting the reading of the Bible by the laity, I found no difficulty in citing a large number of instances from all centuries, which stood decidedly opposed to the regulations in question. Irenæus, Clemens, Origen, Cyprian, Lactantius, Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, and many others of old time, had urged the reading of the Scriptures as a conscientious duty, not alone upon theologians, but upon all Christians, even upon uneducated women. Yet more, in quite recent times, pious men in the Roman Catholic Church had recognized the reading and learning of the Holy Scriptures as a duty incumbent on every Christian. Even Pope Pius VI. recommends it, and says, 'For they are the most important sources [of truth], and they should stand open to all.' But by those who were opposed to me, the very greatest stress was laid upon the unity of the Church, which, they asserted, would be imperilled by the

reading of the Bible. Although, not less than they, I regarded the unity of the Church as essential, nevertheless it was impossible to reconcile our respective views. I felt almost disposed to withdraw from my position on the Ecclesiastical Board. But, after the experience I had myself had, I was firmly convinced of the necessity of making the Holy Scriptures accessible to all. I recognized them as the supreme means ordained by God to awaken and strengthen living faith in the hearts of congregations, and thereby (contrary to the ideas of my colleagues) to further genuine unity with Christ. I could not, therefore, possibly abandon my purpose. And yet, owing to the differences with my colleagues, my efforts were almost completely without result; and I was obliged to endure the pain of seeing the copies of the Holy Scriptures which had been sent to the vicariate laid under embargo, although they had received the approbation of the bishop. I was therefore unable to distribute any but those that came directly to myself or to my friends. To my great consolation I noticed that this distribution found favor, not alone in the cities, but even in the rural districts; and that, in particular, many ecclesiastics, even of those who were known to be strictly orthodox, gave me their cordial support."

Here we may notice how strong is the antipathy of the Ultramontane section of the Church of Rome to the dissemination of Scripture, and how, wherever and whenever it can dare to manifest that antipathy, then and there it will do so. Count Sedlnitzky had found the Scriptures the wellspring of life. When entrusted with a share in the ecclesiastical direction of the diocese, he desires to impart to others that from which he had derived strength and comfort. His bishop approves the project. But his colleagues in the Direction utterly oppose him, and succeed in defeating him. Not only is the Ultramontane party negligent in fostering spiritual life; it is diametrically opposed to that which is the Divinely-appointed means of beginning and nourishing that life.

After some time we find Sedlnitzky transferred to another region, in which he had an opportunity of seeing how the civil and ecclesiastical policy of the Church of Rome is intrinsically opposed to all ideas of civil or ecclesiastical liberty.

"After awhile," he writes, "I received a request to accept a position in the Royal Government at Breslau, with which were connected duties relating to the Church, and to the higher school system of the country."

The regulation prevailed at that time, that all ecclesiastical and educational institutions, including gymnasia and seminaries, should

without restriction of creed, be managed by councillors of both confessions, under the supervision of a president. Before a separate board was created for the management of the affairs of the Protestant Church, the concerns of that Church were discussed in the same session, in the presence of the Roman Catholic members of the consistory.

This union of civil and ecclesiastical duty required some very definite principles of action. "I well understood," Sedlnitzky says, "how each department would naturally regard its own sphere of operations as the more important. This difficulty was augmented by the fact that the members of the two bureaus differed essentially in their views." Sedlnitzky marked out for himself a course, which could not fail to render him an object of suspicion to his Ultramontane associates. After careful examination of the subject, "I expressed clearly and definitely," he says, "the principles by which I felt it my duty to be guided." That principle was, "that a favorable result is most certainly attained by the peaceful coöperation of both civil and ecclesiastical bureaus." Collisions he ever sought to avoid, as unmitigated evils to both Church and State. Such being his ideas as to the relations of Church and State, let us see what views he held as to the relations of the Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches. They were precisely analogous to the former. The civil authority with which he was invested, gave him some voice in the direction of the affairs of the Protestant Church. It was therefore necessary that he should have clearly-defined views as to the relations of that Church to his own.

Theologically, he considered that the advantages of the Roman Catholic Church were overwhelming. Nay, his farther more intimate acquaintance with the two, and his minute comparison of their respective claims and merits, served only to confirm him in the view that the Roman Catholic was the only true Church. Not even his friendship and profound regard for some of the most pious of men belonging to the Protestant Church could shake his conviction on this point.

True, he saw that the Protestant Church held views, on two important topics, with which he cordially sympathized: one, the necessity for the general reading of Scripture; the other, the importance of faith as the source of spiritual life. And yet, in regard to both these advantages, there were modifying considerations. In the case of the former, he saw that a correct appreciation of the Word of God, as the most efficient means of sanctification, was not confined to the Protestant theologians. And, in reference to the

second point, its importance was very greatly lessened, inasmuch as he saw how frequently in the Protestant teaching that faith, which is in Scripture the cordial acceptance of God's revelation, is confounded with the acceptance of individual opinions. What seemed to Sedlnitzky utterly condemnatory of the Protestant Church, was its lack of unity. And finding this, as he supposed, in the Roman Catholic Church, although he was himself a living witness of the entire absence of any real unity in that Church, he deemed it immeasurably superior to the Protestant Church, so far as concerned its theological and ecclesiastical character.

But the conclusion which he reached, the course which he pursued, in reference to the *civil* relations of the two Churches, brought the good man into growing disfavor, and finally into irreconcilable conflict with the authorities at Rome.

In order to obtain a clear view of this matter, and to appreciate the historical basis of Sedlnitzky's views and conduct, it is necessary to premise somewhat as to the condition of things. Up to the accession of Leo XII., in 1823, there had been, for about eighty years, a succession of popes, who, from one motive or another, had so managed the affairs of the Church, as in general to harmonize, externally at least, with the new order of things in Europe. A noteworthy evidence of this was, that the Order of the Jesuits was abolished, and its re-establishment forbidden for all time to come.

In 1823, however, the spirit of conciliation, which had so long characterized the conduct of the Holy See, was exchanged for one diametrically the reverse. The Order of Jesuits was restored, and invested with enormous privileges; in 1824, the Bible societies were condemned; in 1825, a day of solemn prayer for the eradication of all heresies was appointed,—in a word, it became the darling idea at Rome to reassert the supremacy of the Roman See over even the civil power, and to effect the concentration of all ecclesiastical authority in an absolute Popedom.

Up to this time, the life of Count Sedlnitzky had fallen within a period in which the views of the authorities at Rome had been of a moderate type; in which, indeed, it had been regarded as an impossibility, or rather as an absurdity, to attempt to re-establish the antiquated mediæval claims of the Italian Church.

Habituated, therefore, to views of this kind, he naturally found himself among the opponents of Ultramontaniam. He well knew that Ultramontaniam had precipitated Germany into the thirty years' war; he saw how indispensable for Germany, considering its political and social circumstances, was that recognition of the civil

parity of the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches, which had, after the bloodiest sacrifices, been extorted and legally established through the Peace of Westphalia. Whatever his theological predilections for the Roman Catholic Church, he saw that civilly the two communities must be entitled to equal respect from the courts of law.

The precise point where the two opposing forces of Ultramontanism and Conservatism in the German Church have met, has been the matter of mixed marriages.

Sedlnitzky's convictions and conduct were based not merely on theoretical principles of justice,—they had the overwhelming sanction of long-standing historic precedent. Whether he turned to the conduct of the popes themselves, or of their subordinates, or to the expressed opinions of the infallible heads of his Church, he found himself abundantly justified and approved. As soon as the Protestant Church had acquired a governmental and legal existence, the question of mixed marriages presented itself for solution. At first the Papacy was disposed to prohibit all such marriages, without a dispensation; which dispensation it was accustomed to make dependent on the abjuration of heresy, and the pledge to bring up all children as Roman Catholics. When this could not be insisted on, the bishops were expressly directed to proceed according to local circumstances; a pious dissimulation was employed, and that was winked at which could not be controlled.

This more temperate disposition found expression in more than one official document. In different sections of Germany, different degrees of judicious laxity were advised by the Papal authorities, in accordance with circumstances. The case of Silesia presents a type of the concessive policy of the Papal government, which is quite instructive. Several cases in which the necessary dispensation had been refused, induced Frederick the Great to demand that the Vicariate of Breslau be invested with power to grant dispensations, even in the case of mixed marriages. The King insisted that he could not allow the Papal authorities to exercise any control over his Protestant subjects. He informed the Pope, that if he raised any difficulties, he would simply issue orders that such marriages should be celebrated by Protestant clergymen, and would make "such regulations as will cause his Holiness to regret having forced him to this course." Such language as this was not incomprehensible to the infallible occupant of the Vatican. A note was dispatched by the Secretary of State in Rome, on the 11th September, 1777, to the effect that while the Pope is unable to concede to all the demands of the Sovereign of Silesia, he nevertheless has done

everything in his power to comply with his wishes. "The following instructions are therefore issued to the Bishop of Breslau :

"(1.) While the Catholic Church has always held in abhorrence marriages with heretics, she nevertheless endures them with a certain species of dissimulation, in those places where heresies prevail with impunity (*dissimulatione quadam ubi impune grassantur hæreses*).

"(2.) The right of granting dispensation in the case of marriages within forbidden degrees of relationship, the Papal Chair reserves exclusively to itself. As heretofore, however, it will on special grounds impart the general right ; and, therefore,

"(3.) The Apostolic Vicar is authorized to grant dispensations, on pressing necessity, in such cases as clearly come within his legitimate cognizance."

The general result of all this appears to have been, that mixed marriages were celebrated, even by Romish priests, without any conditions imposed on the parties. At a later day, the theologians of Rome made the surprising discovery that the celebration of such marriages could not be allowed, unless, beforehand, the authority over every creature vested by God in the Church were recognized, and assurances were given that all children should be brought up as Roman Catholics.

In this altered policy of the Church of Rome, on the subject of mixed marriages, has been, for years, the source of differences between that Church and the civil powers of Germany. Naturally, the conflict has been particularly severe in those provinces in which the State has assumed control over the educational system of the country. This was the case in Prussia. Up to 1803, the established law of the land was, that the religion of male children should be that of their father ; that of girls, of their mother. A cabinet order of November 21, 1803, however, directed that for all children the religion of the father should be decisive, and no departures from this regulation were admissible, even should the parents agree to them. In 1825, these rules, hitherto applicable only to the Eastern provinces, were by cabinet order extended to the Western ; and all obligations entered into by the betrothed, conflicting with them, were declared null and void. Roman Catholic priests were forbidden even to *request* that the children should be brought up as Roman Catholics, if the father were Protestant ; and the Protestant ministers, on the other hand, were forbidden to request that the children of a Roman Catholic father should be educated as Protestants.

From all this it appears that at no time had it been regarded by the Roman Catholic Church as a matter of necessary doctrine, or of conscience, to prohibit the celebration of mixed marriages, or to demand for all children a Roman Catholic education. It is also to be observed that in the Kingdom of Prussia there were laws of the land distinctly forbidding that any such thing should be even *requested*.

Now, while a majority of the German bishops, one after another, gave in their adherence to the new principle put forth at Rome, palpably hostile to the State as it was, Count Sedlnitzky maintained and defended to the last the old German and Prussian position. He had sworn to obey the laws of Prussia; and he would not allow even Rome to make him break his oath.

With the sadness of a truly heavenly-minded Christian, he viewed the employment in the Church of measures not merely secular but unsanctified. "There appeared," he writes, "a mighty opposition to the good Spirit,—a principle which involved the belief that the kingdom of God can be established by the use of unhallowed means." Some advocated this policy, because too simple to appreciate its real character; others had views of a purely secular nature.

The re-establishment of the Jesuits was one of the measures alluded to. It was, on all sides, among Protestants and Roman Catholics alike, unfavorably regarded; among the former, for obvious reasons; among the latter, mainly because it would practically annul a Bull, in which the re-establishment of the Order had been forever forbidden, on clear grounds of morality and religion.

"This event," says Sedlnitzky, "seemed to me of less consequence, because I felt sure that after the experiences of the past, both sovereigns and bishops would take good care that the Order should have no power outside of the Church. Besides this, the Order was by law excluded from the majority of the states." But while free from alarm, the good Count could not be free from grief.

It seemed to me as a sad sign of the times, that no better instruments should be chosen for carrying on the work of the Church, than the members of an Order detested for their religious and moral principles, and their intrigues in the State.

I felt far deeper concern at the reintroduction of errors and abuses, which in former times had had such pernicious results. I have said above what value I attached to the Sacraments of Confession and Penance, as producing consciousness of sin, and thus fostering humility, as well as affording an opportunity to the conscientious pastor to impart advice and consolation. With deep sorrow, however, I was compelled to observe how this blessing

was impaired, and in many cases wholly destroyed, inasmuch as by the granting of indulgences at special places and special times, there was produced the appearance of a greater efficacy of grace at such times and places; and Catholics were induced to assemble in great crowds, with the view of securing absolution in the easiest possible manner, with the unholy idea that the efficacy even of the Communion is augmented through the power of Papal absolution; and that this same absolution has the extraordinary virtue of reaching beyond this, to the life of another world, and is capable of being transferred to others. When called upon to deal with such a multitude as throng the specially privileged places alluded to, the confessor can have none but the most superficial idea of the spiritual condition of each; while the transaction will become for the faithful themselves a dead *opus operatum*, which can only serve to beget and confirm a feeling of security in sin.

Equal cause for regret Sedlnitzky found in the increased attention paid to pilgrimages and saint-worship. In this latter he says there was "a close approach to an ascription of Divine attributes." He bewailed, too, the employment of all those details which serve in the Church of Rome to render devotion almost, and often altogether, a mere mechanical operation; "the wonder-working images and statues, amulets, medallions, rosaries, and other dead objects."

Lamenting most seriously the prevalence of all these abuses, Sedlnitzky yet was of opinion that their disastrous influence might be nullified, if the teachings of our Lord in their purity were given to the people. "And, therefore, the repeated prohibitions of the reading of the Bible appeared to me the most fatal errors of the times." With brave hope he encouraged himself in the idea that "the diffusion of the Divine Word, and its immediate influence upon the heart, could not be checked by man; and that thus an antidote would be supplied to what may be termed the despiritualizing agencies alluded to. And yet he could not but see that all these things were the embodiments of a principle, antichristian in its character, but exceedingly strong,—the spirit of the Ultramontane Church. Against the advancing power and claims of that spirit, he contended in the strength of genuine Christian heroism.

And yet, withal, we find him uniting the qualities of the statesman with those of the soldier. He is a philosophic observer of human nature. Singularly free from the spirit of combative reform, he allowed no intemperate zeal to interfere with the success of the great end he ever kept in view,—the fostering of genuine spiritual life in the Church of Germany.

He had no plans for suddenly demolishing prevailing abuses, or correcting long-standing prejudices. He looked, he says, to a general popular acquaintance with Scripture, and a more thorough un-

derstanding and better exposition of it, on the part of ecclesiastics, as the radical cure for all errors and abuses in the Church. "If congregations and families could only be intimately acquainted with the Word of God, then I thought all errors and abuses must of necessity be abolished, without the disadvantages and dangers which in an external contest against old habits and deep-rooted prejudices are unavoidable."

Sedlnitzky well appreciated the necessity of preparing the masses for any changes, however intrinsically expedient, or even apparently necessary. A number of the clergy in the Diocese of Breslau united in a proposition to the Prince Bishop, to abolish the use of the Latin tongue in the services of the Church, and to have the law enjoining the celibacy of the clergy abolished. He agreed in their views as to the propriety of these changes, in themselves considered, but was forced to differ from them, inasmuch as he thought the people not ready for the change. "I saw that the abuse arising from the use of prayers in an unknown tongue will be perpetuated, even though the mother tongue be employed, so long as the prayers are regarded by the people as an *opus operatum*, or means of expiation. Moreover, I saw how the people are captivated by the grand and harmonious sound of a language which they do not understand, because it seems to have in it something sublime,—elevated above the ordinary every day life, and commending itself, therefore, to them as a more suitable vehicle of devotion. Hence, I was convinced that a change, for which no preparation had been made, would be simply disturbing and disquieting in its effects."

Similarly, he thought it would be in the highest degree expedient that the clergy should not be formed into a separate class,—as widely removed as possible from the laity in all their social habits and feelings. He saw that the effect of the Romish doctrine of clerical celibacy was to interfere with the Christian conception of marriage. In Holy Scripture, he found a judgment as to the nature of marriage utterly at variance with the antimarital dogmas of the Vatican. Here it appeared as a means of mutual edification and sanctification; and thus as an essential part of the system of salvation. In the Church of Rome he found it virtually stripped of every element of holiness, inasmuch as they who are to be patterns of holiness are compelled by an inexorable vow to abstain from it. At least, there is here an imputation of imperfection; and this is confirmed by the accepted scholastic difference between "Law," or a mere requisition of, and "Perfection," which implies

a voluntary addition to, God's requirements. The married, they say, can fulfil the "law, and be accepted before God; but perfection can be attained only by the unmarried."

Now, were the principles of Scriptural Christianity rightly understood by a congregation; if they were thoroughly grounded in the Scriptural views of the true nobility of marriage, they would of course, argued Sedlnitzky, entertain as high a respect for a married clergyman as for one unmarried. But a change in this matter, if sudden, would, as in the other case, be productive of harm and not of good. But, notwithstanding these moderate views, Sedlnitzky was in no sense a timeserver. When the true interests of the Church were jeopardized; when he found that Ultramontaniam was laboring to destroy its proper character, and to render it a mere engine of civil power, he assumed a very decided attitude. He saw very soon that a reform, brought about through correct Christian teaching and plain exposition of Scripture, was imminent; in other words, that internal reform without external struggles would precipitate, in due time, the external reformatory changes which appeared to him so desirable. His hope for proper changes was based upon his observation of what was going on within the limits of his own diocese. When he directed a glance beyond that diocese to the regions of Southern Germany and Italy, a widely different conclusion was forced upon him. He then understood how prodigious an influence the Jesuits were exerting, and how everything looked toward the concentration of power in the Papacy, and the virtual destruction of the episcopate. As never before, he now saw the necessity for an external struggle. His patriotism and his Christianity alike required him to stand firm in his opposition to the encroachments of the Ultramontane party.

The position he assumed and maintained was by no means a novel one. It was one occupied for more than a century by the German Roman Catholic Church. At the close of the Thirty Years' War, the relations of the two confessions had been definitely set forth in the stipulations of the Peace of Westphalia. In the articles of that peace the principle was admitted on the one side, and asserted on the other, that both parties should henceforth be entitled to precisely equal civil rights. By this instrument all, without any distinction, even the numerous ecclesiastical princes, the electors, prelates, and abbots, bound themselves, and solemnly vowed to compel their subordinates and subjects to comply with its requirements. And although the terms of the treaty had never received full recognition from the popes, they had nevertheless had

from them a connivance (*quaedam dissimulatio*), which bordered closely upon express and acknowledged sanction. The efforts of the Ultramontane party were directed to the nullification of these terms of the Treaty of Westphalia. Those members of the German Church who adhered to them, and to the cognate principles which had found advocates in such men as Gerson, Bossuet, Fénelon, and Noailles, all who maintained the doctrine of a Catholic Apostolicity, and the paramount authority of councils as opposed to the notion of Papal concentration and Papal supremacy, had nothing to expect but censure, disgrace, and penalties. "I saw," says Sedlnitzky, "that there was a possibility that, again, the Divinely-appointed Apostolic system of government might be abrogated."

Twenty years' study of Church history convinced him that the concentrating of all episcopal authority in the See of Rome—the grand principle of Ultramontanism—was wholly unsupported by historic precedent. He found that Gregory I., in the sixth century, had protested against the title of "Universal Bishop," asserting "that the use of this term was bold blasphemy and actual denial of the faith;" even saying of it, that it is "*vocabulum pestiferum profanum*;" an "*imitatio antichristi, usurpatio diabolica*." It was evident from history, that the principles of the diffusion of episcopal power, and the paramount authority of councils, the principles embodied in the Gallican articles, were those which had been recognized by the Church Catholic in the days of its purity and grandeur.

Whether, therefore, he regarded Ultramontanism in its probable influence upon Germany, or as in a more general way a system of Church government, he saw that the only position for a Christian and a patriot, was one of irreconcilable antagonism to its anticatholic pretensions. In the spirit of this conviction, he continued to discharge the duties devolving upon him as a member of the Silesian government.

In the year 1835, Schimonsky, Prince Bishop of Breslau, died; and Sedlnitzky was immediately chosen by the cathedral chapter as temporary successor. Very soon it was ascertained that he was a "dangerous innovator," an "intimate friend of Protestants;" a person "utterly regardless of the Unity and Catholicity of the Church." Pamphlets and published letters teemed with such accusations. "On the subject of the unity of the Church, I had often expressed my views, by word and deed. And what I had said and done was capable only of this interpretation, that mere external uniformity was not my idea of unity; but that I regarded spiritual

unity in Christ as above all things essential. So, too, in reference to the Catholicity of the Church, I insisted upon it as an essential mark of the Church; urging, however, that that alone was true Catholicity which added to uniformity of confession, the effort to attain unity in spirit and in truth."

But all this was of no avail. It was evident that the man who had in the provincial government shown himself an admirer of the Treaty of Westphalia, was not a man who could be employed as an instrument for the furthering of Ultramontane assumptions. Hence everything said or done by him "was purposely misunderstood and misinterpreted." Expressions which he had never employed were attributed to him, and actions ascribed to him "which lacked even the appearance of probability." From various sections he received letters in German, French, and Latin, criticising his conduct and giving him directions as to his future course, and threatening every species of injury in case of his non-compliance. These letters, he says, he should have thought of little moment, but that their style showed their authors to be persons of cultivation.

While he is seriously disturbed by these evidences of malignant hostility, he receives a communication which could not fail to have been powerfully reassuring. The Minister of Religion wishes to inquire if he will accept the position of Bishop of Breslau, in case the choice should fall on him. He informs him that it is the express desire of the King that he should do so. Of course there could be but one answer to such a note. The day of election is appointed and arrives, and Sedlnitzky is chosen unanimously, and indeed by acclamation; a thing which had never occurred at any previous election, and could be construed only as an expression of the most unbounded confidence. After his acceptance of the bishopric he received from all quarters assurances of support. What, he says, touched him most, were the congratulations of those clergymen whom he knew to be men of earnest piety. But, on the other hand, the party that had been so active in misrepresenting him, during the time that he temporarily discharged the duties of the episcopate, gave him serious occasion to apprehend difficulty in the future. They were careful again, as before his election, to neglect no opportunity for villifying him. Every measure which he adopted was interpreted in the most unfavorable manner. "To cite only one," he writes, "it was alleged as an innovation, that I did not write in my title, 'By the grace of God, and the Apostolic Chair.' I was obliged to give an explanation of this to the Minister of Public Worship. Fortunately, I was able to show that by far the greater number of my predeces-

sors, and most of the bishops, had for a century omitted the 'papal grace;' obviously because of the unsuitable coördination of the Pope with God, and partly, too, because they did not yet recognize the Romish as the only Apostolic See. Expressions employed by me in the closest confidence were spread abroad by pen and mouth, and I had experiences which, among honorable people, I had hitherto regarded as absolutely impossible. Several of my writings, before they ever appeared, were publicly discussed and construed in the most distorted manner. Several I found myself compelled to withhold altogether from publication, in hope of better times. This was particularly the case with my pastoral letter. Although it contained nothing which could give offence, yet I well knew how the most innocent expressions would be misinterpreted, and even what had not been said at all, would be employed as a ground of complaint, and as the means of exciting hostility toward me." So strong did Sedlnitzky perceive his treacherous opponents to be, that though he had the cordial support of his parochial clergy, all through the diocese, he was, nevertheless, seriously impeded in his plans for the upbuilding of the diocese, by the knowledge that whatever he should do would be so handled as that evil rather than good would be the issue.

But aside from the attacks upon him personally, there were efforts in progress which gave him far greater concern. These were efforts of the adherents of the Roman Curia to undo the work of the Peace of Westphalia, and subvert the principle of the civil equality of both Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches, on which the entire social and political structure of Germany might be said to rest.

In order that these efforts might be attended with success, it was indispensably necessary to get rid of such an obstacle as the Prince Bishop of Breslau. Five years had not elapsed since his elevation before he received, in a singularly circuitous and altogether unusual mode, a communication signed Gregory XVI. At that time, in Prussia as in Austria, and most states, correspondence with the Papal Chair was carried on through the intervention of the Bureau of Ecclesiastical Affairs. The communication in question, however, came to Sedlnitzky through the hands of a certain duchess, who had herself received it from a certain countess. This created in his mind the suspicion that it was not genuine; and it was some time before he became satisfied as to its authenticity. The Papal letter bore date January 18, 1839. Sedlnitzky, still in doubt whether it was what it purported to be, received a note from the Papal Nuncio,

Altieri, at the court of Vienna, who, in terms of polite severity, reprimanded him for so long delaying a response to the communication of his Holiness. This note of Altieri bore date Vienna, June 27, 1839. It served to convince Sedlnitzky that the note, so singularly transmitted so him, had actually emanated from the Vatican.

Selections from Gregory's dispatch, the original Latin of which is to be found in the Appendix to Sedlnitzky's autobiography, will show at a glance the esteem in which the good bishop was held; and will thus make clear, also, the attitude of the Ultramontane Papacy toward the ideas of political justice, fair-minded liberality, and toleration, of which he may be regarded as the representative. Principles in the least degree allied to those which were established by the time-honored Peace of Westphalia; principles that, for more than a hundred years, had given domestic and political tranquillity to Germany, were, and, it may be added, are, and always will be, held in abhorrence by the Ultramontanists.

Gregory begins by informing Sedlnitzky that he has learned with grief, and that not for the first time, that the course which he is pursuing "gives cause of complaint to all good men." Declining to enter into every detail of which he has been informed, he barely alludes to his neglect to issue any pastoral letter during a period of two whole years, and passes on to those matters which, he says, "tend to the obvious injury of souls, and the detriment of the Catholic Church." "Of this character is the unlawful course to which you adhere, in the very weighty matter of mixed marriages; for neither the authority of our apostolic voice, nor the illustrious examples of your fellow bishops, nor, finally, the dutiful letters of many of your own clergy, have hitherto been sufficient to induce you to abandon a principle of action which is *clearly repugnant to the principles and laws of the Church*. We most earnestly urge that you reflect with seriousness upon your past management of your charge, and, adopting a course of conduct worthy of a minister of Christ and a dispenser of the mysteries of God, zealously endeavor to repair the injuries to which you have subjected a faithful people. Think, venerable Brother, what will befall you when the Chief Shepherd shall require the blood of the sheep at your hands. Awaiting a response which shall afford us consolation in our present bitterness of grief, we impart to you, Brother, *most lovingly* (!), our apostolic benediction.

"Given at Rome, at St. Peter's, January 18, 1839, in the eighth year of our Pontificate."

In the response, which Sedlnitzky did not hesitate to send as soon as he had received Altieri's note from Vienna, he proves to the Pontiff the falsity of the charges brought against him; and, in reference to the subject of mixed marriages, assures him, "In no way have I departed from the established practice which my predecessors, guided by the laws of the Emperor Charles VI., Maria Theresa, and succeeding Prussian sovereigns, have observed for more than one hundred and twenty years. I felt myself particularly constrained to adopt this course, inasmuch as I had sworn to introduce no innovations; and, moreover, because I was aware that my predecessors in the episcopal office had frequently consulted the Apostolic Chair on this matter. I well knew, too, that, on the one hand, the bishops had been actually parties to the drawing up of the laws before their passage, and had, therefore, given *their* assent to them; and that, on the other hand, the popes, when consulted, never made objection to the course prescribed by the laws, and adopted by the bishop."

In proof of what he writes, Sedlnitzky says that, "although the Papal Court had protested against the Peace of Westphalia, and never officially recognized the principles of toleration and of the civil parity of Protestants with Roman Catholics, it had, nevertheless, been distinctly known, at Rome, that in Germany and the neighboring states, regulations based on those principles had been made by secular and ecclesiastical princes, and that the universal practice was in accordance with those laws. In many cases, the connivance of the popes had been expressly declared. Benedict XIV. writes to the Archbishop of Poland, that, 'where he could not prevent mixed marriages, he might, with a species of pastoral wisdom, silently ignore them.' Similar instructions were issued to the Bishops of Holland and Austria. An order of Charles VI., of the year 1716, expressly enacted, 'that in Silesia, the established practice of the Holy Roman Empire must be followed, viz., that sons shall be brought up in the religion of their father, daughters in that of their mother.' This law was published by the government."

When Silesia was ceded to Prussia, a consultation was held by the Prince Bishop and the Cathedral Chapter, on the ground of certain difficulties which had arisen, and, as the result of their deliberations, an edict, dated August 8, 1750, was put forth, prescribing that "the practice of the past should continue, viz., the daughters following the religion of their mother, the sons that of their father; and that no conflicting agreements entered into before marriage should be allowed." Although these circumstances were fully known to the Papal Court, nevertheless the then temporary occupant of the episcopate was led to send information of them directly to the Pope. On this he

received from Benedict XIV. the response, that "he cannot positively approve of the regulation, but that nevertheless he can give a feigned approval" (*non posse positive approbare, sed posse tamen hoc dissimulare*). To this he adds: "The fact that I have knowledge of this [which evidently had given some conscientious pangs to the scrupulous son of the Church] ought to be sufficient to satisfy your conscience, since, in the matter under discussion, there is no conflict with national or Divine law, but only with ecclesiastical" (*Scientia hæc nostra sufficere debet, ad tuam assecurandam conscientiam, quando quidem in materia de qua agitur, non occurret oppositio cum jure divino, aut naturali, sed tantummodo cum jure ecclesiastico*).

Feeling himself thus entirely justified by historic precedents, and by the express authority of the Papacy itself, in adhering to the course alluded to, he yet felt anxious to convince himself that his position was that which would best further the interests of his diocese, and the German Church in general. He therefore examined the system which it was proposed to substitute for the old-established practice.

The leading features of this system were the "Assistentia Passiva" and the "Reversals." By the former is meant that the Roman Catholic priesthood, who hitherto had celebrated mixed marriages, should cease to do so—should, at the most, be merely inactive spectators—and thus should altogether withhold from them the sanction of the Church. Sedlnitzky saw clearly that this would have the very disastrous result of casting a species of slur upon such marriages, suggesting the idea that they were not inviolably sacred, and affording a pretext for divorce.

By the "Reversals" were meant certificates, or signed assurances, given by the betrothed, that all the children should be educated as Roman Catholics.

The effect of demanding these, Sedlnitzky considered, would be equally unfortunate for the interests of the diocese and the Church. It would, in the first place, destroy all possibility of kindly feeling between the two Churches. It would, by reason of its compulsory character, beget, even in the mind of those Protestants who might otherwise have been favorably disposed toward the Roman Catholic Church, a spirit of obstinate determination to have their children brought up as Protestants. And, as far as children were concerned, it would cause a larger proportion of them than heretofore to abandon the Roman Catholic Church, when they arrived at years of discretion.

Furthermore, beyond these unfortunate results in the family, it would be on a larger scale injurious. Could the regulation regarding "Reversals" be rigidly carried out, the Protestant population

would, year by year, diminish in geometrical ratio, and in many districts would soon altogether die out. It could not, however, be supposed that Protestants would look on with indifference while events of this kind were occurring; and it was easy to foresee that counter measures would be adopted by them,—measures prompted by detestation of the Roman Catholic Church.

Nor was the judgment of Sedlnitzky simply theoretical. It was corroborated by events actually transpiring before his eyes. Already, on the Rhine, the projects of the Ultramontanist party had been attempted, and the results of the efforts thus made were just what, on general grounds, might have been expected. There was an end of peace, and struggles occurred, in which feelings of the bitterest animosity found expression. Nor was that animosity confined to the region where it had been kindled. As an evidence of this, Sedlnitzky says that some time before the change took place in the Rhine region, instructions had been sent to the Papal Nuncio at Vienna, in which the policy then pursued toward heretics and heretical princes was severely criticised. The Bull had not been unknown, but it had been in fact ignored, and in part had received the mildest possible interpretation, as one of those acts of diplomacy to which little real importance is attached. As soon, however, as the new rules were enforced on the Rhine, these instructions were at once brought to light, commented upon in the most hostile spirit, and the dangers pointed out which would threaten Church and State in case they should be enforced.

What had occurred elsewhere, Sedlnitzky felt assured would take place in the Diocese of Breslau. Not only would the measures of the Ultramontanists fail to attain the end proposed, but there would ensue precisely such a state of things as, in days not altogether passed out of the national recollection, had for thirty years desolated Germany with one of the most terrible of civil wars, and filled every household with anxiety or dread or mourning.

And yet he felt persuaded that there was not the least possibility of his being allowed to maintain what he judged to be the only position of justice,—sound statesmanship and practical Christianity. "From all that had occurred," he says, "I was assured that, even if the truth of the statements made in my response to the Pope could not be impugned, nevertheless they would have no weight. My earlier position and conduct in the provincial government" (in which, it will be remembered, he had uniformly followed the course now become so obnoxious to the Papacy) "had rendered me an object of suspicion, and indeed given me the character of being altogether untrustworthy."

In view of all this, Sedlnitzky resolved to resign the Bishopric of Breslau. "I saw now," he writes, "no way of averting the danger which threatened the diocese, except that I should resign the episcopate, and make room for a man who might enjoy a better prospect of having his statements treated with respect. I knew that if I took this course many intrigues and animosities would lose their point; while such a successor might be in a position to set forth, with advantageous result, the detrimental consequences which would follow the proposed changes."

In this hope, Sedlnitzky added to the above response to Gregory's letter, a passage tendering his resignation. Before dispatching his note in this form, however, he forwarded a copy to the Prussian Bureau of Ecclesiastical Affairs. He received, in return, a note "informing him that it was the wish of his Majesty that he would omit the passages that had reference to his resignation; inasmuch as the King felt convinced that the grounds upon which he urged the retention of the old practice would not be disregarded."

Sedlnitzky felt obliged, in compliance with the wish of his Majesty, to withhold his resignation for the present, although everything led him to expect from Rome a reply which would confirm him in his previous resolution. This answer he received, after the lapse of nearly a year. Extracts from this second epistle will serve to show that the feeling of detestation toward Sedlnitzky, and the views which he entertained, had undergone no abatement.

Venerable Brother, health and the apostolic benediction! Your response to our letter of January, 1839, far from diminishing in the least degree our long-continued anxiety as to the wretched condition of the affairs of the Catholic Church in your very extensive diocese, has, on the contrary, augmented that anxiety to the utmost. Had you actually removed the grave accusations brought against you, or, acknowledging your fault, had, with genuine penitence, shown a disposition to remedy, so far as in you lay, the evils occasioned by your conduct, we should have found cause for consolation. But, with the keenest disappointment, we find in your reply neither justification nor repentance. For, to begin with the subject of mixed marriages, we complained that, in this very important matter, you have adhered to and insisted upon a course of conduct utterly repugnant to the principles and laws of the Church.

We spoke, viz., about your unlawful use of the sacred rite, or your giving some other kind of sanction in the case of such marriages, without beforehand taking care to insist upon the conditions prescribed by the Church herself. It is, moreover, quite certain that it is impossible for you to have been ignorant that such a procedure as yours had never been approved by the Apostolic See; and, therefore, everything falls to the ground which you have adduced in justification of yourself. Moreover, even if this Holy See may not have

made express objection to a widely prevalent abuse, this is to be ascribed to the want of accurate knowledge of the facts, and by no means to any real tacit assent; especially since, as often as occasion arose, the Holy See urged, in regard to this very matter, observance of the sacred canons. But setting aside these considerations, you should have had regard to what was brought to your mind by letters from some of your own clergy, viz., that we ourselves, in an allocution delivered December 10, 1837, and subsequently made part of the general law of the Church, openly and solemnly denounced any and every practice, in the matter of mixed marriages, contrary to the proper sense of the declaration of our predecessor, which had been erroneously adopted in the Kingdom of Prussia. And, in this allocution, it was said distinctly, that if the admonitions of Catholic pastors in reference to the accustomed preliminary stipulations were disregarded, they should abstain, not alone from sanctioning such marriages by the use of the sacred rite, but from every act by which they might seem to be approved. It is, therefore, a grave and unpardonable offence, that, utterly ignoring all these enactments, you have betaken yourself to a promised obedience to civil laws; as though it were possible that matters should be referred to civil law, which are opposed to the doctrine and discipline of the most holy Church; or as though you have not bound yourself to the Church, and to this Holy See, by an oath universally paramount. It is intolerable that you have even gone so far as to represent it to be of advantage to the Catholic Church that the aforesaid civil laws should be observed, while you argue, from the opposite course, calamity and ruin, as though the true safety and weal of the Church did not depend upon maintaining her principles in their integrity, and as though the canons, based upon those principles, ought to be adapted to the judgment and approval of the world. . . .

Gregory proceeds to say that it is necessary for Sedlnitzky to resign his office, and concludes by urging a speedy reply, and "imparting to him most lovingly (!) his apostolic benediction." The letter is dated "St. Peter's, May 10, 1840."

In commenting upon it, Sedlnitzky makes one observation which is requisite to the correct judgment of what Gregory says. The Pope affirms that his allocution of December, 1837, had the force of law. Sedlnitzky observes "that in no way, in accordance with the principles of the canons, can that be true; since allocutions at no time have had the force of law."

From this second Papal communication it was clear that, as the good bishop says, newspapers and pamphlets were more relied upon at Rome than the word of a bishop, and that, too, without any search for the truth. It was evident, also, that well-known and indisputable historic facts could be denied at Rome by the highest ecclesiastical authority, when their admission stood in the way of Ultramontane schemes.

Sedlnitzky speedily wrote a letter of resignation. Grateful as

this step might be expected to be at Rome, it was otherwise regarded at Berlin, at Breslau, and in the diocese which he had so ably managed.

His note had scarcely been written, when Frederick William IV. became Sovereign of Prussia. He immediately sent for Sedlnitzky, directing him to bring with him the communication of the Pope. He read it, and, deeply moved, gave expression to the most reproachful indignation. "He at once directed a courier to be sent to recall the ambassador who was on his way to Rome with a friendly note. In fine, he expressed the wish that I would not resign, urging that the matter concerned me personally, far less than the Prussian throne and the Prussian people." It was clear to him what the import of this note was. The accusation brought against Sedlnitzky was, that he had complied with the usages sanctioned by the civil laws of his country for two hundred years; that he had felt himself bound by an oath of allegiance to the Sovereign of Prussia, to obey the laws. It was clear that the Papacy intended to adopt the mediæval practice of intermeddling with civil affairs, subordinating the civil power to itself, and nullifying the obligations of citizenship. Frederick could, as Sedlnitzky had done, recall in imagination the scenes of the Thirty Years' War, and picture Protestant and Roman Catholic Germany once more in arms against one another. The picture was appalling, and the King felt anxious to retain, in the threatened emergency, the services of one so thoroughly Christian and wisely patriotic as Sedlnitzky. But the bishop still felt convinced that his withdrawal would have better results for the Church and the country, than his retention of the office, and labored to bring the King to the same opinion. Frederick listened to his arguments, and closed the interview by saying that he would think over the entire matter. Some days afterward, he sent for Sedlnitzky, and told him that he had decided to accept his resignation. "He led me," writes the bishop, "into an adjoining room, where the Cabinet were assembled. He explained to them the grounds of my resignation, and his acceptance of it. At the same time, he informed them that he had appointed me his active privy counsellor, with the duty of making my residence near him."

Sedlnitzky hastened, after this, to transmit to Rome the above-mentioned reply to the Papal Chair, tendering his resignation of his office; the reception of which proved, no doubt, a source of abounding consolation to the sorrowful soul of the Rome-wise pious Gregory. The arms of error rejoiced in their augmented strength.

Sedlnitzky, subsequently to this, resided at Berlin until his death, availing himself of the opportunities afforded by his official position to accomplish a large amount of good in furthering the interests of religion and education.

An event of importance belonging to this period deserves to be noticed. This was his renunciation of the Church of Rome, and his entrance into a Protestant communion.

It occurred in 1863, more than twenty years after his resignation of the Bishopric of Breslau. It was done after careful and earnest thought and inquiry. The bishop closed his autobiography with the account of his withdrawal from office. Yet, from other sources, it can be gathered what the precise causes were which led to this momentous step.

Year by year, almost day by day, he was shocked by the new and bolder usurpations of the Roman Curia. The apostolic form of government, to which he attached great importance, was rapidly sinking into practical desuetude. The concentration of ecclesiastical power in the See of Rome was even approaching consummation; subordination of every bishop, including him of Rome, to the supreme authority of councils, which history showed to be in accordance with the primitive constitution of the Church Catholic, was fast becoming an unknown thing; in a word, the Romish Church was ever ceasing to have external unity with the Apostolic Church; for the avowed principles of its organization were simply unknown, undreamed of, in apostolic times.

And as regards inner-spiritual unity, depending on oneness of faith, every symptom of agreement between the two was rapidly disappearing. Fearfully shocking to Sedlnitzky was the Papal "instruction" that the "Bulls of the Popes must be regarded as the Rule of Faith and Practice." Added to this, was the publication of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception—"A dogma," he says, "actually undermining the fundamental doctrine of Christianity, viz., reconciliation through Christ alone." For, he argues, "if the Virgin Mary, really free from sin, yet suffered, it must needs have been for the sins of others that she suffered; and if so, then she anticipated the work which Scripture asserts to have been done by Christ alone." Thus, not only was the Ultramontane Church unable to demonstrate its external unity with the Apostolic, it failed wretchedly in all pretence to spiritual unity with that Church in matters of faith and doctrine. And, as if to perpetuate this diversity, and render approach to apostolicity an impossible affair, the Curia put forth repeated prohibitions against the reading of the Bible!

Yearning for that unity which he had ever deemed essential—spiritual unity with the Church of apostolic days—and finding no trace of it in the Church of Rome, Sedlnitzky felt himself compelled to go where (as he believed) he could find it; and he, consequently, received the Communion in a Protestant church, in 1863.

And yet no symptom was ever displayed by him of bitter or unkindly feeling toward the Church of Rome. It was ever a longing with him—a felt and uttered longing—that she might be emancipated and cleansed; ever was he prompt to see what was good in her; ever regretful to see how widely she was sundering herself from the bonds which should have made her one with, and like unto, the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church of earliest Christian times.

In 1871, after a brief illness, he was called away to his everlasting rest.

Two conclusions are plainly deducible from this biography. First, that the Ultramontane Church is now, as it ever has been, irreconcilably hostile to everything that savors of civil freedom or religious toleration. If it does not offer open opposition to them,—if here, in America, it does not publicly denounce them,—if it does not stigmatize our institutions (which, like the Peace of Westphalia, demand toleration) as infernal, and subversive of true Christianity, why is it? These denunciations are only in abeyance. Circumstances are not deemed favorable. The Church of Rome claims to be unchanged, and, more, to be unchangeable also. Let us recognize her claims, and appreciate the fact that, when she dares to do it in this country, she will make her bishops carry out, in their fulness, all her antiheretical decrees. Intrinsically, the modern Church of Rome is identical with the Church that deluged Germany, for thirty years, with Protestant blood; with that whose tribunal of the Inquisition (which Mr. Southey called “Hell plucked up by the roots”) half depopulated Spain, and attempted to carry out its diabolical aims in the Netherlands. In our own day, a bishop in her communion, controlling the largest diocese in all Europe, and supported by the unwavering approval and cordial respect of one of the mightiest sovereigns on the Continent, is forced to resign his See because he will not perjure himself in the interests of the Ultramontane party of Central Italy. He is censured in communications from the Pope himself, because he insists on respecting the oath of allegiance which he has taken to his sovereign. Perjury is holiness when it is committed at the bidding of an infallible dictator. Verily, we are not far removed from

those days which we designate "the dark ages," when pious bishops and holy priests of God, and so-called vicegerents of the Prince of Peace, sold, for fixed prices, the right to commit sins; and when an emperor of Germany was compelled to beg Papal pardon for maintaining his civil rights! A good Vatican Catholic, in the strict sense of the word, cannot, by any possibility, be a good citizen. His Church so binds and straitens him, that, in certain emergencies, he cannot be true to his country without becoming false to his religion!

And, again, the life of Sedlnitzky shows that, if not utterly antagonistic to genuine spiritual life, the Church of Vaticanity (if we may make a word) is, at the least, a very inadequate means for fostering that life. The good bishop furnishes a type of the intelligence of Europe, asking spiritual nutriment and receiving the indigestible petrifications of Ultramontane and unscriptural dogmas, absolutely subversive of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity. It may not unfairly be said that an intelligent man, honest to the core, cannot possibly be a serviceable member of the Church of Rome. His reason and his conscience must (as they did the Bishop of Breslau) repel him from a communion whose "rule of faith and practice" is not Holy Scripture, but a collection of the dogmas and moralities of fallible, if not ungodly, men.



TRADITION.

NOTICES OF THE JEWS AND THEIR COUNTRY, by the Classic Writers of Antiquity; being a collection of statements and opinions from the works of Greek and Latin authors, previous to A. D. 500. By John Gill. Second edition, revised and enlarged. London: Longmans & Co. 1872.

WE do not select this book for special consideration, though it would be well worthy of it; but for a needless slant, let off in a notice of it by the "British Quarterly." That journal takes occasion to show how little could be known of Judaism, if we were dependent upon its scattered monuments of tradition; and then goes purposely out of its way to have a fling at those Churchmen whom it supposes to use the Fathers and other relics of antiquity, as if ultimate and independent authorities. It sneers at them in the following terms: "A lesson of great worth might be taught thus to those who criticise the New Testament as well as the Old, by the few fragments of Christian antiquity furnished during the commencement of the second century."

Now, in our simplicity, we had begun to think that the measured and moderate, if specific, use which we make of Christian antiquity had become an understood and appreciated affair. But we are sadly mistaken; and we see that a proper estimate and a just employment of the relics of this antiquity, are, every now and then, to be vindi-

cated afresh, even for reputably literate, for at least pretentionally cultivated minds.

Thus, even the "Westminster Review," in its harsh criticisms of Mr. Gladstone, snarls at his references to the Nicene Creed, as if he esteemed that Creed a mere self-willed dictum, or personal enactment of the Nicene Fathers. And Mr. (perhaps Dr.) Haven, a man of high standing among the Congregationalists, treats that Creed as he would a Creed of the pettiest society of his own ecclesiastical circle, as if a thing which a few individuals concocted out of their own brains, and would impose upon others, because agreeable to their own predilections,—“hammered on their anvil.”

And here comes the Philadelphia "Episcopalian," with the rudest sort of dash at the good old rule for interpretations of Vincent of Lirins, about the united suffrage of *universality, antiquity, and consent*; a rule which even such a famous evangelical as George Stanley Faber stoutly contended for.¹ It finds this rule among the muniments of the Alt-Catholics; and anti-popish as is the company it is found in, brushes it away with the contemptuous repudiation that the sponsors for such a rule "accept next to nothing."

It does seem strange, passing strange to us, that people wise enough, apparently, according to Solomon, to have their eyes in their heads (Eccl. ii. 14) instead of less promising portions of their bodies,—that such people cannot, or will not, admit that a Churchman clings to the Scriptures, as a supreme and ultimate authority, with as much steadiness and firmness as the greatest glorifier of the word "Protestant" throughout the land; that he holds the Scriptures, and the Scriptures only, to be the organic law, and the statute law, and the entire law, under God's great Covenant, for the redemption and salvation of sinful men.

Still, while doing so, he not unnaturally, or inconsiderately, or vainly, asks—as a man would do who acknowledged the Constitution and the statutes of the United States as the whole of our law, for citizens of the United States (as such)—Who is to pronounce upon the meaning of such law, when its construction becomes a questionable matter?

¹ The rule of Vincent is supposed to be one which he learned in the School, or College, of Lirins. It may fairly be believed that the rule was suggested by the Book of Deuteronomy. The identity, perpetuity, and spread of the Jewish people are referred to, for verification, in the way of *antiquity* and *universality* (chap. iv. 32). In the way of general *consent*, "the sight of the nations," in verse 6, same chapter. So those who call the rule *monkish* had better look a little further into their Bibles. A rule which would verify Judaism is a good rule whereby to verify Christianity.

Some have read our national Constitution and our national statutes so differently—with such extreme antipathies—that we have actually had to plunge into a dreadful and desolating war, to determine which construction shall be uppermost and overruling. Diverse readings of our ultimate law have, then, brought on civil war! Aye, and diverse readings of the Bible keep up a civil war in Christendom, to this very hour. Christendom has nothing but Christians in it,—if you will be content to let them all say they receive the naked Bible, and say no more. But begin to interpret that Book, and at once these (so-called Christians) become belligerent Latins, or Greeks, or Armenians, or Protestants, as changeful in hue as the chameleon.¹

Wherefore, as the Bible alone does not produce unity, and, still less, uniformity, we Churchmen have got into the habit of trying to make history bear upon its interpretation, to see if *that* will not have some effect in bringing the civil war of Christendom to a truce, if not to a settled peace. We all know that when an article of a constitution, a statute-law, a treaty, a contract, a last will and testament, are disputed upon their very face (as they continually are,—only remember what a contest there was between *two nations*, over the Treaty of Washington), that courts of law and equity go into the history of such documents, to glean, if possible, their proper construction, from the usages and practices to which they have been subjected; in other words, to see if the history under which they came into existence, and with which they have travelled, will not throw the needful light upon their doubtful phraseology.

All which amounts to the following (to a juridical mind) simple postulate: courts and jurists settle disputed constructions by *traditive interpretation*.²

Now, this is just what we expect and aim to do, by calling in the Fathers, the councils, the creeds, the canons, the liturgies, and the customs of ancient and formative Christian times. There is no

¹ Supposing men to treat the Constitution of the United States with the same irresponsible freedom with which they treat the Bible, the result would be as follows, according to one of our former Presidents: "The Constitution is not worth one straw, if every man is to be his own interpreter, disregarding the exposition of the Supreme Court." We can see how such treatment nullifies human law. One would suppose that it would also nullify Divine law. Practically, it does so.

² Or, as Mr. Selden expressed it: "Say what you will against tradition, we know the signification of words by nothing but tradition ("Tab. Talk," Art. Tradition). Hence the legal maxim, *Contemporanea expositio optima est, et fortissima, in lege*.

creed-maker but the Sovereign Thinker of the universe,—the all-wise and the never-erring God.¹ A council has no more right to manufacture a creed—as the “Westminster Review” supposes the Council of Nice to have done, out of its own self-willed brains—than it has to originate a Church, or to inaugurate an empire.

But while councils, as the acting legislatures and representative assemblies of the Church, and sometimes of the Church Catholic, have no *creative* faculties, they certainly have *ministerial* faculties, like authorized trustees or vicars. They become—if their action is accepted and adopted by the Church as an ecclesiastical body politic—they become the Church’s virtual voice, and Christendom itself can speak by and through them. Their preservation of the faith, as handed down to them, and their attestations of its verity, when thus accepted, become an expression, not of an individual’s opinions, but of the public Christian mind,—its proclamations, its ruling precedents, its assent and consent to go upon an abiding record, for the appeals and references of all future times.

And they certainly are this, and all this, when, having first represented the whole Christian world, the whole Christian world has subsequently sustained and ratified their action. Then their action becomes a high precedent, which is tantamount to organic law.²

¹ Man thinks for himself, and for the little sphere in which he moves; and accordingly it is hit or miss with him continually. God thinks for the universe, and under all its circumstances; and so He, and He alone, has the right to say, authoritatively, how others ought to think. This is no new position; the Psalmist understood the two cases perfectly, and contrasts them in the twelfth Psalm. “We,” says man, “are they that ought to speak.” No, is the answer; the words of the Lord are the only pure ones, *i. e.*, pure truth, without any mixture of dross or alloy. The illustration by silver purified seven times, brings out his idea as graphically and beautifully as possible. The quotations are from the Prayer Book Psalter. In the Bible translation it is, “our lips are our own;” that is, no one has a right to control them,—a sentiment very fashionable in times as late as ours.

² We once asked an exceedingly well read lawyer (an author) if his profession did not make much of precedents. “Oh, yes, they are sometimes equivalent to law.” “Suppose they run ever so far back, and meet with little or no contradiction?” “Then, sir, they are law, absolute law.” “Thank you,” said we to our friend, who belonged to the Dutch Church; “that is the way in which our folks figure out Episcopacy!” Lawyers are used to such gibes, and know how to take them better than divines. Our friend laughed heartily, and said he was fairly caught. Jeremy Taylor, in his “*Ductor Dubitantium*,” expressed a similar idea about precedents in interpreting: “Nothing is more reasonable in questions concerning the interpretation of a law, than to inquire how the practice of people was in times by-gone; because what they did when

And six of such councils we can find, without much difficulty; for they are familiarly referred to in one of our old Homilies. Four of them have been found and honored by the Puritans themselves, who styled their action the Lord's doing, and not man's (Preface to the Cambridge Platform).¹

Now, is it not a little wiser and a little safer to take the action of such bodies, and the documents and institutions which go along with them (canons, definitions, creeds, liturgies, and forms of worship), as guides to Scripture interpretation, than it would be to accept the dictum of the "British Quarterly," or of the "Westminster Review," or of Doctor Haven, or any other popular theologian, or of an assumptive newspaper like the Philadelphia "Episcopalian?"

Such a query brings out, with emphasis, the true and exact state of the case; for historical interpretations there must inevitably be, to the end of time. Historical interpretations there must ever be, for constitutions, for statutes, for treaties, for contracts, for last wills and testaments, and for *all* documents and volumes whose naked text is subject to divergent or diversified constructions.

We acknowledge this, readily and contentedly, when we enter courts of law and equity,—tribunals which are appointed to interpret and adjudicate for litigated differences. Those who go into such courts for aid, know instinctively that the quarrels of lawyers are not settled by the opinions or asseverations of the quarrellers, but by what Churchmen would call the introduction of tradition. Judges ask for the history of disputed words and phrases, for the acceptation of them in times gone by, for the usages under them

the reason and sense of the law was best perceived, and what the lawgiver allowed them to do in the obedience of it, may best be supposed to be that which he intended" (Book iii. chap. 6, sec. 6).

¹ Perhaps we ought to say that the Puritans, who were acute enough, as we readily admit, approved of the action of these councils, in reference to matters of *doctrine*. In reference to matters of *discipline* and *worship*, the action of councils as the attorneys (so to speak) of the Church, might be freer. They could never change the faith; they could only attest the Church's understanding of it, as received from apostolic times. Nor could they change a main feature of discipline, like the constitution of the ministry. But they could control the prerogatives of the ministry. For example, the First Council of Nice said that *one* bishop must not consecrate another bishop,—*three* must do so. And the same council came pretty near sanctioning clerical celibacy. It also made a distinction between heretical and schismatical baptisms, allowing the latter to be accepted. But the council would never have presumed to say whether or not baptism was a sacrament. Such an act would not have been thought of.

and from them and along with them. In this way, they work back to, and up to, the meaning, the intent, the design, the aim of those who started the words or phrases which are matters of dispute.

Now the precise meaning of a sentence is the meaning of *his* mind who first employed the sentence. No matter what its grammar, no matter what its rhetoric, no matter what its spelling, any more than it is material what is its chirography, supposing it to have been committed to writing. The meaning of a sentence is to take its hue from the purpose and forethought of him who uttered it as its author. Under this canon of hermeneutics, "the mind of Christ," and not the mind of any one else besides, is the genuine meaning of the Scriptures.

But who now is to declare, determine, and decree what that mind is, when expressed in words whose signification is the very point to be discovered? Disputed words cannot settle the meaning of the words disputed. "Ben Jonson," says a profound observer, "satirically expressed the vain disputes of divines by Inigo Lanthorne disputing with his puppet in a Bartholomew Fair. It is so; it is not so; it is so; it is not so; crying thus to one another a quarter of an hour together." Well, then, if flat contradiction will not answer, may we not go outside of the disputed words, to see if some reference may be had for determinative constructions? Yet if we do, what shall that reference be? Shall the disdainful "British Quarterly" be here our guide? or the imperious "Westminster Review?" or some high-trumping doctor? or the fiat of an editor, who duplicates his personality by speaking, as a crowned head does, in the plural number? Or, shall the Pope of Rome step in, or the ten thousand popes of Puritan New England, to end the strife? There must be a reference to some outside direction which the inward mind will pay respect to; or all are right, and all are wrong together!

So Churchmen distrust mere private judgments, and incline to follow the example of our best interpretative judicatories. They go into the history of words and phrases, and practices and institutions, as opened to them by *public* creeds and liturgies, canons and definitions, and the *private* writings of contemporaries, to ascertain from such sources how history has accepted and construed and handed down the inspired documents of our religion. Is there a safer or surer way to reach "the mind of Christ" in his own Holy Word; since the wildest enthusiast may plead spiritual illumination? Is there any other way for reasonable and considerate men to travel, who know that they have no right to inflict their "private interpre-

tation" upon others, and who also know that others have no better right to inflict a different "private interpretation" upon themselves? "The text," says old Selden, one of the most learned and impartial of men, a member of the Westminster Assembly, and esteemed a pattern of anti-prelatical piety,¹ "The text serves only to guess by; we must satisfy ourselves fully out of the authors that lived about those times." He was talking about the Bible when he uttered such language; and, again talking about the Bible, he held forth in the following strain: "The Puritan would be judged by the Word of God. If he would speak clearly, he means himself; but he is ashamed to say so. And he would have me believe him before a whole Church, that has read the Word of God as well as he" ("Table Talk," Arts. Bible and Religion, Nos. 8 and 10).

Now, a Churchman wants not any man's individual opinion, except for what it is worth as an opinion.² Yet the reading of "a whole Church" is, with him (as with the profound jurist, Selden),

¹ One of the hardest things which some people have to do, is to acknowledge the piety of a prelatist. Thus, Milton called bishops "downtrodden vassals of perdition." And there is an element of this hatred of bishops in the pretendedly liberal "Westminster Review." In the last number is an article, the drift of which is to drive bishops out of Parliament. One reason is, they are not *pious* enough! For example, a hundred years ago, they did not vote against the slave trade! No doubt; and the advocates of *progress* ought to put up with it. The spirit of the age was in favor of the traffic. Why, the celebrated Evangelical, John Newton, followed the trade after his conversion. Cromwell sold white men, *his* prisoners, and New England Puritans sold Indians, *their* prisoners, into slavery. The "Westminster Review" is just a trifle one-sided. It sees what it wants to see, and then grows blind. It reminds us of the fashionable insanity which overtakes a man when he gets into a killing mood.

² The Fathers never expected to be believed for their mere opinions' sake. Thus, when St. Augustine alluded to his private opinions as a theologian, he did not hesitate to speak of even his great work on the Trinity in the following way: "Let him who says, when he reads my book, Certainly I understand what is said, but it is not true, assert, if he pleases, his own opinion and refute mine, if he is able" (De Trin. bk. i. ch. iv. 5). But when he spoke according to "the canonical rule, as it is both disseminated through the Scriptures, and has been demonstrated by learned and catholic handlers of the Scriptures," he expected to be treated in a different way (De Trin. bk. ii. ch. i. 2). And so when he testified as to Church practices, those, that is, of the Church at large, of Christendom, in his day; as, for instance, when he alluded to the laying on of hands upon the baptized: "The Church preserves this custom, even now, in the case of her rulers" (De Trin. bk. xv. ch. xxvi. 46). He means by the Church here, not his diocese, not the Church in Africa, but the Church Catholic, the Church the world over.

an altogether different matter. He is willing to take that, and especially under the *limitations* of one who had well studied the differences of other times and of his own, Vincent, of the celebrated School of Lirins, in the old Tyrrhene Sea. He is quite willing to do so, though our newspaper friend and counsellor pronounces upon the rule of Vincent as reducing us to ecclesiastical destitution, as shutting us up unto "next to nothing."¹ But let us look around, and see if such a predicament is as shearing and bereaving as he supposes. Has not the continuous existence and success of Christianity itself been affirmed and settled by such a standard as Vincent's antiquity, universality, and general consent? If Christianity could not plead that it had always and everywhere, and by all, been what it claims to be, could we defend it before sharp impugnors? Was it not considered a potential argument in its favor, by one of its inspired apologists, that it was "not done in a corner" (Acts, xxvi. 26), but, as Moses might have expressed it, in "the sight of the nations?" (Deut. iv. 6.) And does not the identity and perpetuity of Christianity's canon of Scripture stand impregnable on a similar basis? and the continuity of its Church, of its ministry, and of its sacraments? Have not all the great doctrines of Christianity about the persons of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost—about the Incarnation and the Atonement, original sin and justification from sin; about the Resurrection, the Ascension, and the Judgment—the same proofs to plead and cling to for their satisfactory verification? Not that these things have never been questioned or disputed. Such a position is not now put forward, nor presented as a matter to be arbitrated. But has not Christendom, and the vast majority of Christendom, always and everywhere, and through all its ranks, accepted and owned and held fast to such things? And are the clear and distinct and broad acceptance of Christianity as a Divine religion, with its canon of inspiration, its Church, its minis-

¹ We do not wish to be invidious, and, therefore, we quote a description of a much stronger case of assumption—that of Matthew Arnold—as thus neatly and tellingly given by the "Nation" for the 21st of August: "In the cool, not to say complacent, exercise of the genuine Protestant 'right of private judgment,' which has given to this disquisition great freshness, Mr. Arnold offers us, in place of all this Churchly error, in place of the nineteen-century old beliefs, *his own* conclusions in regard to the Bible and its principal Personage." Admirable indeed! Mr. Arnold mounts his hobbies on horseback, and rides down the traditions of centuries and of millions as if powder and dust.

Quadrupedante putrem sonitu quatit ungula campum.

try, and its sacraments, with *all* its leading and prominent doctrines—are they really that “next to nothing” which our newspaper dictator would fain have us believe or fancy them? With such things for pilotage and governance, ought it not rather to be a fact that the differences of Christendom about matters subordinate, are the “next to nothings” which his prying eyes should have fastened on, amid the relics and memories of days gone by? Ought not these differences (a respectable pile, at least, of them), instead of receiving a sort of ritualistic adoration, as if embodiments of vital verities, be the rather treated as were the curious and, no doubt, glittering books of the sorcerers of Ephesus, and committed to a bonfire? (Acts, xix. 19.) Does not all Christendom acknowledge about enough to constitute a single self-tolerating association? about enough to enable it to put the awful word heretic, if not the bitter word schismatic, into such abeyance that the old “Communion of Saints” may stand some chance of restoration, and the Apostles’ Creed of relief from the ignominy of self-reproach? Are there not general matters, catholic matters, which nearly all Christendom could easily acknowledge and defer to; for example, the platform, so to speak, of the first Nicene Council, where the Trinity was the great hinge of doctrine, and episcopacy the great hinge of discipline,—is there not, in such matters, enough for all Christendom to acknowledge, and honor, and defer to, as (at the very least) a basis, a *πov στω*, a starting-point and working-point, from which Christendom might find its way, first to union and then to unanimity, until the words of our Saviour’s intercession became a blessed history and not an anxious hope, “That they all may be one, as Thou Father art in Me, and I in Thee, that they also may be one in us?” (John, xvii. 21.)

We want to lean upon such a possibility and upon its expectations, and to embrace their comforts. And it is our humble trust, amid the shadows of declining years, that all the better portions of Christendom may one day entertain the same proclivity. And, in such an attitude, we lay our pen down, and, looking heavenward, pray God to hasten such a day’s benignant dawning.



BOOK NOTICES.

THE PERSONAL LIFE OF GEORGE GROTE. By Mrs. Grote. London: Murray. 1873.

We have neither the time nor the space for anything like a review of the life of the banker, politician, and historian, and so must content ourselves with looking at it from the stand-point of religious observation,—one, certainly, becoming the journal we represent. We know very well that Mr. Grote was accounted a radical in both religion and politics, was affiliated with the managers and supporters of the “Westminster Review,” and was looked upon (for awhile, surely) as a *Magnus Apollo*, if not a *Jupiter Tonans*, among literary sceptics. So we felt anxious to get hold of some clue which would enable us to understand the *denouement* of his history in relation to matters of religion, and to appreciate, with some definiteness, his religious latitude and longitude. Mrs. Grote’s memoirs have supplied the data which we wanted; and we proceed to give our readers an insight of the conclusions we have reached.

Mr. Grote’s life began, it seems, under the stern tuition of a mother of the old, thrice-illustrious, as some would say, and thrice-gloomy, as we would say, school of Calvinistic fanaticism. She shut the boy up in what a Romanist would call a sort of monastery, and subjected him to down-bearing Calvinistic discipline,—in its

way, just as austere, restraining, chafing, and fretting, as any system of penance invented for Romish solitaries. The boy rebounded from his slavery with as wide a recoil as possible, and went as far in an opposite direction as we have known the sons of dark-browed, steel-eyed Calvinistic parsons do in our collegiate days. When the shackles were off, these victims of ecclesiastical feudalism became liberals of the extreme sort. And so it was with young Grote. He wanted to get as far as might be from the monastic routine of Calvinism, and went with a plunge into the slough of infidelity.

But he could never throw off the trammels of early education ; and, in some respects, its influences for good were never lost upon him. And these associate facts, his dread of too stern a faith and his horror of no faith whatever—when he saw the Acherontic gulf where he was like to drown—have enabled us to explain many of his peculiarities, and to thread his life through, in relation to religious subjects, without material difficulty.

Thus, his determination for the fullest freedom led him to study Hume ; but his awakened conscience—a thing Hume knew nothing of, and would have called a bugbear—would not allow him to go Hume's gait, to a position of stark nullity or utter falsity, making hope itself bat-blind and heartsick. He even pronounced in favor of Aristotle's ethics, rather than those of the subtle and reckless Scotchman. Aristotle's ethics have some sort of *basis*, Hume's had none. His mere utilitarian expediency is no basis at all ; for it is letting out the bottom of a system, and reducing it, as a system of principles, to utter inanity. This did not suit Mr. Grote's conscience, as tutored by religion, though in an unamiable form ; and he preferred pagan ethics with some sort of foundation, to infidel ethics with none at all !

And we can—not to say that it is an instruction and a pleasure to do so—trace the unknown and, perhaps, unperceived, certainly the unacknowledged, influence of early impressions all through his long career. He could not endure the great Positivist, Comte, because he struck morals out of the list of positive sciences. Morals as a system, and a system with regular causation and regular ends, suited Mr. Grote's inward convictions and habits of thought. He could not comprehend why mind and spirit were not *realities*, as well as matter,—quite as positive, and quite as susceptible of analysis and synthesis, as wood and earths and metals.

Now, a man cannot be a sceptical out-and-outer who goes as far as this. And, accordingly, we are not surprised to find Mr. Grote capable of reaching the conviction that pretendedly thorough scept-

ticism is a veritable delusion; that it leaves the mind beset and hampered with doubts, just as much as a definite and decided faith—just as much as giving up *γνῶσις* and betaking one's self to *πίστις*—as ceasing to be a conceited Gnostic and becoming a humble believer.

For example, he did not find in Comte what, of course, after his supercilious pretensions and promises, he confidently presumed to find in him,—“the solution of those perplexities respecting the fundamental principles of geometry, which he had never yet been able to untie to his own satisfaction.”

That is, Mr. Grote had wit enough to perceive that any science, whether physical, moral, or metaphysical, must begin with postulates; and that to try and get behind those postulates is a simple and a downright impossibility. We Christians, for instance, begin with the postulate that there is a cause of all causes, which we call God. The infidel responds that, *scientifically*, we cannot prove the existence of such a cause. Perhaps not, to *his* satisfaction; and the offsetting answer is, Neither can you prove *scientifically* the postulate you start with,—its non-existence. Its *impossible* existence all the infidels in creation, with Satan to back them up (and their crew has no sharper auxiliary), could not demonstrate.

Wherefore, the upshot of the matter is that the bouncing infidel begins with a postulate as well as his low-rated Christian neighbor. And Grote at last saw this. He tried to untie the fundamental principles of a mundane science that he measured his farm by, and he was confounded,—still confounded, after years of the sorriest hankering and the most painful delving. He ended with the postulates of geometry, where he began. Comte, the infidel Solomon, gave him no satisfaction,—less, perhaps, than others, because he had promised with so much flattery. Of course, he came to the sound, common-sense conclusion that physics, beginning with postulates, just like morals and metaphysics, were really no more *positive* than they; and that the boasted certitude of Positivism, when sifted to the bottom, terminated in a supposition, and became a mere chimera; ended, we should say, in a trick, if its authors, in trying to delude others, had not cheated their own selves!

Would that the disciples of modern infidelity could get *as far as this*. The next step would be toward faith—to taking something upon trust—and this (to speak in the lingo of a scientist) is all a man wants to begin gravitating in the direction of Christianity. The first thing which Christianity says to a man is what our Saviour himself said to an applicant, “All things are possible to

him that believeth." And an anxious experimenter will find it so. Faith is usually rated as a continuously hard thing. This is all a mistake; it is the first step in it only which is hard; that is, hard to any serious degree. Once a man *begins* to act from what he believes, instead of what he knows, or thinks he knows, and his future progress will be as easy as that of light when it has cut through a rim of forbidding darkness. When light had pierced and divided the inky canopy of chaos, the grand difficulty was over. Then such changes and diversities as evening and morning ever bring, came not unnaturally, to say nothing of their sweetness and beauty. And so the unbeliever will ever find it, in the chaos of a mind whose aims and aspirations look only to the deepest of all glooms,—that of a hopeless grave. Such a mind has only "the blackness of darkness" to brood over till outside light—light from beyond and from above—gets in. Then ulterior vicissitudes will only render progress more perceptible and more agreeable. And, for all we know, there may be nights and mornings—the waning of light *here*, and the brightening of light *there*—to all eternity. But as such changes *within*, as well as *without*, are not objected to here—are looked upon as helping progress, and not debarring it—so it may be hereafter and forever.

To us it is intensely interesting to study the history of Mr. Grote's mind, and to ascertain how far he went in scepticism, and where he stopped. We trace his outset in scepticism to what was bad in his education; and his arrested advances in it, to the lingering influence of what was good in that education. And we do not abandon him without some glimmerings of hope that a faith which he did not entirely relinquish, may have cheered and solaced his declining days. Not that he confessed as much. Oh, no; he would have been too proud and sensitive,—too apprehensive of the sneers or the pity of old associates, for an avowed surrender. But there was a peace and a quietude hovering around his latest days, which we attribute to a felt, but an unacknowledged, faith. Even the mysteries of geometry troubled him and gravelled him; and he may, as a relief, have gone back to his early days, and betaken himself to a faith in higher things, which can be mysterious with better grace. We shall certainly incline to such a belief, until constrained to give it up.

Mr. Grote had mingled much with aristocratic circles, nominal radical though he might be. He even scolded Mr. Mill, as if he were a vulgar member of a strike-club, because he said he had "a fanatical hatred against the rich, simply because they are rich."

And this enables us to explain another seeming anomaly in his character,—his sympathy with the South, rather than with the North, in our late rending civil war. He had imbibed the impression which was too widely circulated in England, that we at the North were what some have vulgarly called “mudsills;” and, political democrat if he were, he was a social aristocrat; and such representatives of social life he could not possibly tolerate. Had he travelled in this country, and become personally acquainted with its northern portions, we feel assured that he would have been as consistent in his politics as he was in his morals and metaphysics; for how *can* a genuine democrat, who believes in the political equality of mankind, side with the abettors of such an institution as slavery? But we can easily forgive Mr. Grote for believing us at the North not as high-bred gentlemen as we ought to be. Our Southern brethren should not have judged us by the roaming pedlers, with whom, alas! they were quite too familiar.

INDEX TO SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. By Charles Hodge, D.D. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1878. Pp. 81.

Dr. Hodge has executed an Index to his “System of Theology;” and, what is more (we understand), has done it himself. Now this is as it should be, and adds to the good Doctor’s reputation. For an author knows what ought to be indexed a hundred-fold better than the mere index-manufacturer, who will put down little things and great things, *pari passu*, simply because they belong to certain pages. But a skilful author knows often, that when a leading idea has been marked, the subordinate ones can easily be found; and, accordingly, *he* would leave out what an untaught mind would note as if principal things. So there is philosophy even in the construction of indexes. We say indexes purposely; for when index has been turned into English, it should have an English plural, and not a Latin plural. We are willing the mathematicians should say *indices*; for they often appropriate Latin terms. But if index is converted into home-made English, then its plural is *indexes*.

As to the *use* of an index, we are not surprised to find a writer in “Notes and Queries” quoting Lord Campbell as saying he could hang an author who did not make a *fitting* index to his book. We are not surprised at the hot indignation of an old lawyer, at a non-indexing or a bad-indexing author. It grew, possibly, out of such an incident as this: at a most critical moment, when he wanted an authority in a capital case, his volume failed him, and a man’s life

was put in jeopardy by an author's indifference or carelessness. We have known a life lost by, apparently, a most inconsiderable failure. At a most anxious period in an operation, a surgeon looked in his box for an instrument to take up an artery. To his consternation, it was gone! His careless assistant had left it miles away! The patient became exhausted, sank, and died! We should have justified his principal if, in the anguish of his failure, he told that assistant he ought to swing upon a gallows. Perhaps the anger of Lord Campbell was quite justifiable. Authors who write books to be relied on, ought to make a conscience of elaborating what Lord Campbell calls a *fitting* index; and we honor Dr. Hodge for his hard, pains-taking labor.

LIBERAL CHRISTIANITY: Its progress in Western Massachusetts. An Essay before the Local Unitarian Conference at Chicopee, June 11th. By A. D. Mayo.

Mr. Mayo is a Unitarian minister, and is, of course, qualified to portray the destinies of his denomination, as passing under his own eye. It had a tremendous foe to cope with in Western Massachusetts, which is thus described: "Perhaps no community was ever more thoroughly under the influence of the old Congregational Calvinism of the Puritans than Western Massachusetts, at the outbreak of the revolutionary war. Only a few protests had been heard against its stern dogmas and discipline, by clergy or laity, and they were suppressed in summary style."

Yet, by and by, Unitarianism of "the Channing type," as Mr. Mayo graphically and appropriately styles it, presumed to assail this ancient giant; and, at first, with no inconsiderable success. But this success was owing to the fire and heat of controversy. When Unitarianism was thrown back upon its own resources, and compelled to live by its own vitality, it became a failure. Mr. Mayo's lamentation is, "We can remember the time when Unitarianism of the original 'Channing type' was the most powerful influence in a large part of Franklin county; and, thirty years ago, the Unitarian body out of Greenfield and Springfield was relatively more influential than to-day."

So, old-fashioned Unitarianism, turning States-evidence, acknowledges its best form to have grown moribund, if not quite defunct. And the radical form of it has made little progress, in the face of two schools of theology, which Mr. Mayo accounts liberal enough for most easy-going Christians, and of a denomination which, while

it satisfies the feelings, lays little stress on doctrine; *i. e.*, is, in temper and accommodation, about as ready to be got along with as Unitarianism's own dear self! The two schools of theology alluded to are that of New Haven and the Winchesterian Universalists; the first of which forgives everybody, and the next saves everybody, by the wholesale! The form of Christianity instanced is Methodism, which resolves religion into emotion and excitement—temporary, too, at that—and thus suits the more electric portion of the community. It enables them, as Dean Hook says, to turn justification by faith into justification by the feelings, and thus renders religion as little laborious as possible, and always at hand as a sort of impromptu effort. No wonder that, in such genial neighborhood, Unitarianism has ceased to be a want, and is quietly dying out!

The lesson which a Churchman should derive from this, is one about the necessity for dogma and principle upon which to found emotions and ethics of the genuine and permanent kind. The current in Western Massachusetts—a type of many other neighborhoods—is, no doubt, against precision in doctrine. This precision is quite necessary in medicine and in law, in science and philosophy, in politics and finance; but in religion we can get along without it! Let experimenters try, and see. Our own opinion, with the sorry Massachusetts lesson before us, is, that when doctrine has departed, religion will not stay long behind; and that a dreary indifference will succeed, harder to contend with than old-fashioned, belligerent infidelity.

A HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. Middle Age. By Charles Hardwick, Archdeacon of Ely. Third edition. London: Macmillan & Co. 1872.

A HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH DURING THE REFORMATION. By Charles Hardwick, Archdeacon of Ely. Third edition. London: Macmillan & Co. 1873.

To make a good summarizing text-book of history, one wants two main qualifications: first, a most comprehensive memory for facts; and next, a philosophical discernment in the selection of them. It is not every fact, nor every important fact, which should be put down in such a summary. It is the telling, the influencing, the germinating facts which one wants there; those, for example, which Mr. Herbert Spencer (with all his scepticism) cannot help saying have "causal relations." And how, by the way, Mr. Spencer can believe in *one* causal relation, and not in a million, and in the

germination of this million from one final cause, is, to us, a greater puzzle than any he has yet found out in dogmatic theology.

Now, for such facts as *properly* belong to a summary, we look at Archdeacon Hardwick's volumes, not with wonder only, but with admiration. He seems to have got together not only an amazing amount of matter for the Church history of the Middle Ages and the Reformation, but also of the right sort of matter; that which a philosophical student most wants, and that which is linked together by the best sort of dovetailing. We commend his volumes to both teachers and students, with cheerful confidence.

HARPER'S WEEKLY.

We have looked upon "Harper's Weekly" as one of the most reliable of our journals; as being, *e. g.*, more cautious than usual about its statements of fact. So we addressed ourselves with some eagerness to its article on "Religious Intelligence," for the 21st of June last. And we accepted with gladness its opinion about the religious condition of our country. "We may safely boast that our country is the most sincerely religious of all modern nations; that the Bible is read by nearly all its people; that the schoolhouse and the church are always found close together, and that, except in the wildest of the distant settlements, or the loneliest of our inland districts, there is *no portion* [our italics] of our country where the disciple of the Divine Master is not found reading the Sermon on the Mount, and teaching charity and purity to the rudest listener."

As we read this eulogy, we felt rebuked for some lower opinions and sorrowful misgivings which we have occasionally entertained about our common country, and determined to reform our estimations. But we read only *fourteen* short lines further, when our eyes rested, in blank amazement, on such language as this: "Nowhere is the wild chase for wealth more active, or more desperate, than with us. Nowhere are such vast fortunes won in a single lifetime, or such endless wrecks of fame, character, and hope exhibited in the fierce desire to be rich. The prisons teem with our ruined gamblers. The miseries of thousands are not seldom required to make up the opulence of one. Our palaces are often palaces of fraud; and the stain of irretrievable ignominy sometimes accompanies our most successful enterprises."

Now, suppose a sceptic to say, If this is the fruit which "the most sincerely religious of all nations" brings forth, what, then, is the religion *professed* but a cheat, or a farce? And how would the

"Weekly" answer such a query? Should not our public journals be a little more careful, both in their commendations and their censures? Sweeping, wholesale assertions about history, must be taken with abatement. When Sir Robert Walpole was sick, and some one wanted to read history for his amusement—"Well," said he, "bring along my liar!" The statesman had encountered so many contradictory assertions, with the solemn visage of history looking like a sponsor for *every one*, that he had lost confidence in *all*, and received history as if but a theatrical representation—a tragedy or a comedy—and nothing more. So the captive Pope treated Napoleon I. at Fontainebleau. When he tried to wheedle the ecclesiastic, the answer was, It is comedy! When this made him angry, and produced a storm, Now, the answer was, it is tragedy! The great Emperor was self-convicted, foiled, and went away.

LOCAL LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS AND CONNECTICUT, Historically considered.

By Wm. Chauncey Fowler, LL.D. Prepared from the New England Historical and Genealogical Register, with Additions. Albany: Joel Munsell. 1872.

A very thin octavo of one hundred and four pages, filled with very pregnant matter. We have never seen the centrifugal and disintegrating force of Puritanism so clearly exhibited in so small a compass. The facts, taken from records, are beyond dispute; the author has had little need to draw inferences. The unwillingness of the colonists, when desired to submit to anybody else's authority, their intolerance of anybody who would not submit to their own authority, and their intense jealousy of one another, are shown in the strongest possible light. Certain other unamiable features of craftiness and cunning are also incidentally brought out. But the book is by a learned and scholarly descendant of the Puritans, and is written for the purpose of exhibiting their love of freedom and of local law.

In the opening of the book (p. viii.) is given a curious document,—“Articles from the Church of Leyden. 1617.” We quote the fourth and fifth :

“4. Wee judg itt lawfull for his Majesty to apoynt bishops, civill overseers, or officers in awthority onder hime, in y^e severall provinces, dioses, congregations or parrishes to oversee y^e Churches and governe them civilly according to y^e Lawes of y^e Land, untto whom y^e ar in all thinges to give an account & by them to bee ordered according to Godlynes.

"5. The authority of y^e present bishops in y^e Land wee do acknowledge so far forth as y^e same is indeed derived from his Majesty unto them and as y^e proceed in his name, whom wee will also therein honor in all things and him in them."

It seems, then, that they had no objection to bishops considered as civil officers of the Church; but they denied all spiritual authority in the Church, as they wished to escape from all civil authority but their own in the State.

THE FOREIGNER IN FAR CATHAY. By W. H. Medhurst, H. B. M. Consul, Shanghai. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1878.

We have here, in this unpretentious book, some information about the position of foreign merchants and missionaries in China, and also some observations on the character and habits of this peculiar people, and their relation to the Western powers in the past, together with a few sensible opinions upon the policy which these powers must pursue in the time to come. In a sketchy way the author touches upon the customs of the Chinese, their social institutions, modes of travel and sepulture, correspondence, press, etc. Although not exempt from many defects of character common to heathen people, they are said to be honest, honorable, and courageous; industrious, thrifty, and sober. In fact, the cases of actual drunkenness are extremely rare, and "a public-house is an institution unknown," for tea ready-made is everywhere,—at home, at the open tea-houses, as well as at the corners of the streets; and the "ragged" husband need not betake himself to a tavern, since the law affords a method of escape by allowing "persistent loquacity on the part of the lady" to be a sufficient ground for divorce.

Whoever reads this book may have some misapprehensions corrected, and will find that John Chinaman is not the cruel, crafty, cat-consuming, daughter-drowning, opium-smoking creature that he is popularly supposed to be.

The observations of the author upon the operations of the missionaries seem very fair and just. He testifies to their efficiency in this wise: "I think I am only doing the Protestant missionaries simple justice when I state that their efforts have been attended with exceptional success, and this, although it is but a short while ago since they ceased to count their converts by mere hundreds." His criticisms on the conduct of missions in China, based on an experience of thirty years' residence in the country, are not unworthy of consideration. The progress of these missions has been impeded,

not only by denominational differences and controversies, but also by the mistakes of the missionaries themselves. While allowing the great good that has been effected by many devoted couples, Mr. Medhurst thinks it a mistake to send out married men, since a single man has more leisure for undivided attention to the work, more opportunity to disassociate himself from foreign surroundings, and a fairer chance of earning the respect of the Chinese, among whom celibacy is an important element of self-sacrifice.

The second mistake is in erecting pretentious churches with tall towers or steeples; since the Chinese idea is, that any erection pointing upward is sure to bring down an evil influence.

The third error lies in preaching in the colloquial language, and in printing books in a local *patois*, since no respectable or educated man will demean himself to listen to a foreigner speaking in a vulgar tongue, and publications of this sort merely excite contempt.

There is much food for reflection in a late utterance of a Chinese statesman: "Native institutions and creeds have but little to fear from the disturbing influences of *missionary publications*."

Still, it is gratifying to know that our Church is working in this direction. The Bible is already translated into the *Wangli* tongue for the educated classes, and Dr. Schereschewsky is now engaged in rendering the Old Testament into the *Kuan Hwa*, the mother tongue of two hundred millions of people.

We think the reader of this little book can hardly fail to derive from it both amusement and information. The type is good for weak eyes, the map of China is a very fair one, and the outward appearance of the volume is quite attractive.

THE BIBLE DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL. An answer to the question: Is the popular conception of the soul that of Holy Scripture? By Charles L. Ives, M.D., Professor of the Theory and Practice of Medicine in Yale College, New Haven, Conn. Published for the author by Judd & White. Pp. 121. 1873.

Theological controversies travel in cycles, and not infrequently repeat themselves. History generally, as Frederick Schlegel says, indicates "a circuitous march of humanity." During the last century, a controversy arose about the supposed sleep of the soul, between death and the resurrection, and quite a volume was expended upon its mere history. If the volume were at hand, we would give our readers the exact size of it, to let them know how much ground it covers. All we can say is, that it is a good-sized

octavo. Within the recollection of many, the Rev. Reuben Sherwood, late rector at Hyde Park, N. Y., had a controversy with a Dutch doctor of divinity, about the intermediate state; and pamphlets were published on both sides. And now a doctor of medicine from Yale College is calling the attention of Congregationalists to this subject, and has sent us his publication for criticism.

We say Congregationalists, for Churchmen make a familiar distinction, which he seems to be unaware of, between Paradise and the Heaven which is God's more especial residence, and also the Heaven in which the righteous will ultimately dwell,—and which St. John, in his Apocalypse, represents as something *new*, and something *yet to be*. To Churchmen it would be catechetically simple to say, "David is not ascended into the heavens." And yet this is a text which, Dr. Ives is careful to inform us, once utterly confounded a Congregational professor of theology, so that, in sheer dismay, he confessed it was altogether beyond his comprehension!

Then, as to the *inherent* immortality of the soul, which, he says, Congregationalists devoutly and persistently believe in,—this is no part of *our* creed. God only is *inherently* immortal; and other beings (even angels) are so dependently, and by permission (I. Tim. vi. 16).

A great deal of Dr. Ives's pamphlet hits wide of our mark; but when he contends for the inherent mortality of the soul, and its incorporation with the body, *as one subject*, we are obliged to dissent from him *in toto*. The creation of the soul and the body were two entirely distinct acts of the Almighty. The body was created *before* the soul, and in an entirely different way, and from an entirely different source. The body was formed, and formed completely, out of the ground. The soul had a celestial origin; it was the inspiration of God's own lips,—a procession from Himself (see Gen. ii. 7).

But, exclaims the doctor, brutes have souls, as well as human beings. Suppose we admit his allegation: we may do so, *salva fide, et salva ecclesia*. "All flesh is not the same flesh," as St. Paul says; and as he might say, if a mere metaphysician. So all souls are not the same kind of souls, nor of the same rank or dignity. This shears away a host of the doctor's proof-texts.

The Doctor is a great, not to say clamorous, literalist. Let us take him in his favorite vein. "God is not the God of the dead." If, then, the soul is dead in the grave, it has no God; and if it have no God, who is to raise it up again? He says, indeed, the Sadducees *might* have replied to our Lord, when He preached from the

burning bush that *all* live unto God. No doubt they might. But they held their peace, and we think the Doctor should hold his, especially when he has contended so eagerly *for* literal, and *against* inferential commentary.

That the soul may exist independently of a body—that a spirit may exist *per se*—must be possible, or how can angels exist; nay, how can God himself exist? If this cannot be admitted, then the Doctor must be as consistent as the Sadducees, and go on to deny the existence of good angels as well as bad ones. And, by that time, we can fancy him taking another Sadducean leap, and to have got beyond a literal resurrection. We see not why he may not turn that into a fable, as he has done the parable of Lazarus and Dives; or, with Hymeneas and Philetus, pronounce it “past already” (II. Tim. ii. 17, 18).

He is confident, however, that if people would only believe *as he does*, the whole Church Catholic would be at one again! This, to a Churchman, is what the French call a *bouleversement* of his most settled precedents. He distinguishes religion into the three fundamental departments of doctrine, discipline, and worship, holding, as the foundation of orthodox doctrine, the apostolic doctrine of the Trinity; as the foundation of orthodox discipline, an apostolic succession in the ministry; as the foundation of orthodox worship, not the utterances of private spirits, but the attested examples of apostolic times in creeds and liturgies. To take an idea which has long been relegated to the sphere, not of dogma but of opinion,—turning, *e. g.*, upon such an opinion as the Doctor propounds as ruling, about the language of our Lord to the penitent upon a cross; to take *such* an idea and exalt it into the key of all theology,—well, we will not say what some would say in, perhaps, contempt or bitterness. We will only venture to remark that such a conclusion does not surprise us, coming from one who has not studied theology as history and the Church have transmitted it, “through the ages all along;” at least, have so transmitted it in its fundamental elements. We should rather expect it from one who esteems it his individual right to be his own creed-maker, and his own law-giver; in other words, ever and always his own interpreter. The idea of such a rule of construction for religious documents as that of Vincent of Lirins, *semper, ubique, et ab omnibus*¹ (in other words, the rule of predominant

¹ That is, if we may interpret for the general reader, the rule of *antiquity, universality, and consent*; three guides in doubted-of constructions in a statute-law, a treaty, or a constitution, which would be respected, and most defer-

ing precedents), might do for courts of law; but it will not answer for the devotee of private judgment in matters of religion. So the Doctor's book (after the fashion of the day) rides upon the wheels of private judgment, from starting-post to goal. Congregationalists are certainly challenged by it to a controversy, which may require no poor historian, and we welcome them to a full campaign. The doctor is evidently contemplating a denominational civil war! And it is manifest (to use vernacular phraseology) that he has got fight in him!

RECENT EXEMPLIFICATIONS OF FALSE PHILOLOGY. By Fitzedward Hall, M.A., Hon. D.C.L., Oxon., formerly Professor of the Sanskrit Language and Literature, and of Indian Jurisprudence, in King's College, London. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1 cr. 8vo. pp. 124.

A small book, but from a man of merited eminence; who, for his tribe, is quite a wonder. Old Dr. Watts said that there was but one individual prouder than a philosopher; and that was a grammarian! He said so, because so many philologists publish books to show their own smartness. Dr. Hall seems to work with genuine modesty and zeal, for the sake of our old mother tongue. We know him, personally, for an accomplished scholar, a most courteous gentleman, and a Churchman of the old-fashioned, anti-extremist type. We hope he will not arraign us for literary forgery; but really, anti-extremist is a word, which, if hardly of tower-stamp, expresses our opinion just now, of certain localities, better than any we can think of. A man must have a hobby nowadays, and go off in a tangent, in some direction *of his own*, to be at all in fashion.

But we shall become tangents ourselves to Dr. Hall's good book, if we are not more careful. Most sorry are we, that it is a book which it is almost impossible to review, upon any principle but the old one,—*ex pede Herculem*.

We can give his aim, as presented by himself, and then a single case, and ask our readers to buy the book—keep it at hand—and consult it often. It has a double index, one of authors, and another of words and phrases; so that its contents can easily be reached in the way in which it will most be wanted,—the way of frequent reference.

entially, by any bench of judges in the land. But doubted-of constructions in the Bible are for a professor of infallibility at Rome, and his copyists, who abound in these United States.

The practices aimed at in this volume are thus characterized (p. 1):

"In these latter days, the propagation of our vernacular philology is, for the most part, after this wise. The criticaster, having looked for a given expression, or sense of an expression, in his dictionary, but without finding it there, or even without this preliminary toil, conceives it to be novel, unauthorized, contrary to analogy, vulgar, superfluous, or what not. Flushed with his precious discovery, he explodes it before the public. Universal shallowness wonders and applauds; and Aristarchus the Little, fired to dare fresh achievements, is certain of new weeds to wreath with his deciduous bays."

This shows us what Dr. Hall's plan, purpose, and temper are, in the work he has undertaken. We now give an instance of his criticism, in reference to a word, which will attract some of our most attentive and exploring readers—our clerical ones. The word selected is the word *parson*; more likely, doubtless, to catch their eye, than some more attractive to the general scholar. The Rev. Mr. Blackley, in his "Word-Gossip," is the author whom Dr. Hall summons to a reckoning.

"To connect *parson*, etymologically, with *person*, he boldly affirms to be a 'ridiculous error.' Blackstone, who so connected it, 'though a good lawyer, was but an indifferent philologist, or he would have observed the necessary connection between *parson* and *parish*, specially illustrated by the existence of the word *parish-ioner*;' and he is gratuitously taxed with 'implying that the *parson* of a parish was, in theory, what he certainly is not, necessarily, in fact, *the person*, the individual of most importance in a parish.'"

Mr. Blackley, we take it, is an Englishman, who is not all familiar with the workings of the voluntary system; where the longest pockets usually occupy the highest seats in our American synagogues, and convert *poor* parsons into a sort of lackeys. But we let such dictatorial pockets go, for Dr. Hall's complete corrective of Mr. Blackley's assumptions.

"On the true origin of *parson*, which has no connection whatever with *parish*, or with any similar word, there is but little to add to what Dr. John Cowell wrote more than two centuries ago:

"*Parson* (*persona*) commeth of the French (*personne*). It peculiarly signifieth, with us, the Rector of a church. The reason whereof seemeth to bee, because hee for his time representeth the church, and susteineth the person [personality] thereof, as well in siewing [suing], as being siewed [sued] in any act touching the same.'"

Our readers can judge from this specimen, of the ease and piquancy with which Dr. Hall handles such cases as come under his review. He renders his cases interesting, where others would comment with the spirit of a Dryasdust. We hope many, very many, will purchase his volume. If they love pure, uncorrupted English, they will not go unrewarded. And we beg to indulge the hope that Dr. Hall will not stop here, but will give the public a further taste of his genuine erudition, in volumes yet to come. He has laid up too much to be lost. Let him take down more treasures from the shelf.

THE SCIENTIFIC BASES OF FAITH. By Joseph John Murphy, Author of "Habit and Intelligence." London and New York : Macmillan & Co. 1878.

This is a work which cannot be adequately described or explained within the comparatively short space generally devoted to a single "book notice." It is such a mixture of truth and mistakes, of sound reasoning and illogical inductions, that only the careful reader of the whole thing can get a clear idea of its merits and defects. The title of the book indicates the author's intention, which is to show that faith and science, instead of being irreconcilable and antagonistic, have a logical connection, both in thought and as parts of the same Divinely-constituted order of things. The term science is used as including metaphysics, as well as the knowledge of material laws; and in this sense harmonizes, it is claimed, with religion. He professes to reject the doctrines of Materialism, and that Positivism which denies the possibility of a revelation from God outside of that made known by the ordinary methods of demonstrative or inductive science; and also to that Mysticism which "regards the indefinite revelation of God in man's conscience and spiritual nature as sufficient, and admits no more definite revelation in Him in history." Among the topics discussed are,—The Meaning of the Moral Sense, The Freedom of the Will, Justification by Faith, The Divine Purpose of Creation, Original Sin, Immortality, and the doctrine of a final general restoration of all things. The book lacks system. It takes up a mass of questions with very little regard to their bearing on the main purpose which the author had in view, and the reader is sometimes tempted to think that Mr. Murphy's real desire was to give his individual opinion on religious and philosophical subjects in general, rather than present a reasonable system for the help of others. We can see the work-

ings of a thoughtful mind, and also the blunders of a mind that has not yet gained a capacity for teaching. Occasionally he puts forth an idea that opens, as through the sudden rift of a cloud, a new realm. But oftener the cloud remains unbroken, and he seems to be himself groping for light. And yet his work is well worth reading, for the sake of both the truths and the errors that mingle in its many pages. The world may learn wisdom from his failure, as well as from his success, and discover that, in order to find a true scientific basis for faith, it is not necessary to get quite so far away from sound theology as he seems inclined to go. Thus, for example, why should a man who accepts the New Testament as genuine and authentic history, place the record of the Book of Genesis, as far as to the call of Abraham, among the myths?

YEAR BOOK OF NATURE AND POPULAR SCIENCE FOR 1873. Edited by John C. Draper, M.D., Professor of Natural History and Physiology in the College of the City of New York, and of Chemistry in the University Medical College. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1873. Pp. 338.

The rapid progress of physical and of social science demands more than one of these annual publications. The present series is not to be confounded with the "Annual of Scientific Discovery," issued in Boston. It is a New York publication, having a similar object. The volume is arranged in sections, on the plan of large scientific associations, and, by means of its full table of contents and excellent index, it is easy to turn at once to whatever it contains. Its scope will appear from the enumeration of its sections: A. Mathematical and Physical Sciences; B. Chemistry; C. Geology; D. Social Science; E. General Biology; F. Mechanical Science. The editor well says, in his preface: "The presentation of a complete record of the investigations in nature and science for a year, would require a library of many volumes. The editor has, therefore, selected only such subjects as appeared to be of general interest, the object in view being to reach the largest number of readers, and diffuse among these a knowledge of the more important results obtained and opinions advanced during the year." It were to be wished that the selection had been more strictly confined to what has appeared "during the year." Many pages, notably under the section of General Biology, taken from works which have been before the public for several years, might then have given place to more recent and less familiar matter.

A statement of the general results attained, and of the tendencies

of investigation and speculation, under the several heads given above, illustrated by extracts from the most recent publications of their prominent investigators, could not fail to possess great interest and value as a measure of the progress of science. This, however, is not precisely the design of the present annual. We miss altogether these general statements, and, perhaps, such a "review" as is suggested would involve a larger labor than can reasonably be expected of an otherwise busy editor. What we have, in fact, is a somewhat miscellaneous scientific scrap-book, in which extracts from a considerable variety of writers are carefully classified and indexed. The value of an annual scrap-book depends chiefly upon two elements,—the fairness with which the excerpts are apportioned among the different schools it undertakes to represent, and the distinctness with which they are confined to the period since the last publication. Dr. Draper's volume accomplishes the former object as fairly, perhaps, as can be expected, under the bias to which every human mind is more or less subject; but the latter would have been more perfectly attained by the rigid exclusion of what is apparently "copy left over" from previous publications.

Nevertheless, no reader of the book can fail to be struck with the marvellous activity of science in every department, with the nicety and accuracy of its methods, and with the rigid scrutiny to which the results of each individual observer are subjected by the multitude of his colleagues. We rejoice that so much is being learned of the Divine works and laws in nature; and believe that this knowledge will aid in drawing those who hold it in faith ever nearer to Him "who is over all."

NOTE TO ARTICLE II. ON THE EUCHARIST.

(Received too late for insertion with article.)

In the former article, an oversight occurred which the writer wishes to correct. On page 404, it is said: "His Body was what it was by virtue of the presence with it of His Soul and Divinity. It was not the mere natural flesh, but the living organism, with all its affections and activities, that He gave to inaugurate in His disciples the same species of life that was manifest in Himself." This statement would imply just the very doctrine that has been condemned in this present paper. The statement would express the writer's view more accurately if amended thus, by adding after the word "activities," the following: "And it was the essential life of His Body, so constituted, that He gave," etc.

38. 5-10



